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Abstract 
Drawing upon the rich theoretical insights on the central status of technological change 
and innovation in national development, this dissertation investigates policy development 
processes at the national level and private firm and extra-firm institutional interactions at 
national, international, and regional levels to gain insights on the national innovation 
system construction processes in a developing country context, Turkey. Cognizant of the 
strong emphasis in contemporary literature on crucial role of regional agglomeration 
processes in stimulating innovation and competitive advantage and the unique context 
and challenges to accelerating innovation in developing countries, the study utilizes 
regional and national innovation system frameworks as supplements to each other to 
investigate the local and non-local networking patterns of firms and institutions within 
major economic regions. The dissertation research shows that NIS construction process is 
changing and evolving as shortfalls, failures and unmet needs are identified. The major 
issues with respect to the applicability of the NIS framework are fostering a basic cultural 
awareness of the importance of innovation, building a systems perspective among 
program implementers and establishing meaningful information sharing and collaboration 
mechanisms across bureaucratic boundaries. At the firm level, the linkages and 
collaborations are at an early stage of development and exhibit certain problems and 
frictions. Firms‟ innovation processes are not contingent upon systemic regional 
relationships or collaborations and mostly reflect higher national and international 
influences overriding the advantages rising from proximity to major local actors and 
institutions. Firms try to access to knowledge irrespective of their collaborators 
proximity. Therefore, leveraging synergies between innovative actors and knowledge 
providers, irrespective of space, might serve better for the fuller development of the firms 
and also the developing national innovation system. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
An Integrated Multi-level Approach to Evaluating Technology and Innovation 
Policy Design and Implementation in a Developing Country Context  
1.1  Overview 
The principal research questions explored in this dissertation flow from the classic 
problem of how developing countries can improve their development performance 
through the enhancement of their technological and innovative capacities. The basic aim 
of this dissertation is to draw upon the insights of the national innovation system (NIS) 
framework to better understand and evaluate efforts to improve technology and 
innovation outcomes in middle-income developing countries. The NIS framework, rooted 
in institutional and evolutionary economics, analyzes how technological change and 
innovation are shaped by complex interrelationships among laws, policies and private and 
public institutions within a nation state. Because the (NIS) framework has been employed 
primarily to explain innovation and growth dynamics in advanced market economies, this 
work will attempt to recast and apply NIS concept to a developing country context by 
delineating the NIS construction processes in Turkey.  
In contemporary economic development literature there is a growing consensus 
that national technology and innovation performance cannot be understood solely in the 
context of macro-level forces. Advances in national development are seen to be in part 
shaped and driven by the ability of dynamic and innovative regional economies to 
produce globally competitive products and services. Therefore, the construction of a 
national innovation system through policies and the evolution of private firms and public 
institutions must consider and encompass local agglomerations that enhance 
technological improvement and innovation. In this context this dissertation focuses on the 
three dominant regional economies to explain the dynamic nature of innovation processes 
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in the Turkish case. In the three case study regions, Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, I 
investigate the significance of linkages and networks among manufacturing firms and 
―extra-firm‖ institutions universities, public research institutions, government agencies, 
financial institutions, industrial associations, etc. involved in the emergence and diffusion 
of new technologies and knowledge. In sum, this dissertation aims to capture the nature 
of interactions among system stakeholders both at the inter-regional and intra-regional 
level and identify the main successes and remaining barriers to the fuller development of 
the national innovation system in Turkey. Before further elaborating on the objective and 
scope of the dissertation I should state that this dissertation adopts a definition of 
innovation as ―the processes by which firms master and get into practice product design 
and manufacturing processes that are new to them whether or not they are new to the 
universe or even to the nation‖ (Nelson 1992:349). 
 
1.2 Theoretical Context 
The status of technological development and innovation have moved the center of 
international development theory as a result of theoretical advances in economic growth 
theory and compelling empirical and case study evidence from countries such as Japan, 
Korea and Ireland that advanced rapidly from low to high income status. Earlier 
economic growth theories in the neoclassical tradition posited a general tendency toward 
per capita income convergence as more countries were integrated into the global market 
economy. While there has been some general trends toward per-capita income 
convergence, especially with the recent rise of China and India, uneven and highly 
unequal economic growth trajectories have persisted even as globalization has become a 
more extensive and powerful force.  
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The older neoclassical theory did not view technological advance as a central 
factor in the economic growth process. They viewed technological change as exogenous 
to the growth process (Solow 1957). The knowledge related to inventions and 
innovations was viewed as a free public good accessible to all. Knowledge was seen as a 
byproduct of basic scientific research occurring mostly in public institutions which firms 
could access free of charge. As such, the conventional theory could not conceive of any 
durable national or regional advantage from the possession of technological knowledge 
or innovative capacity. In terms of uneven international development, if technologies and 
knowledge really did fall like manna from heaven, less developed countries could simply 
learn to exploit them and converge toward the more advanced economies.  
However, post WW-II history suggested that catch up and convergence was not a 
clear trend and that major frictions could be found in highly uneven endowments of 
human capital and technical and innovative capacities that appeared to be reproduced 
over time. This led to the development of a set of new growth theories that viewed 
technological change as endogenous to the growth process. In Romer‘s new growth 
theory, for example, to create new innovations standard labor inputs are not sufficient, 
human capital must be devoted to the task, and human capital is more productive with a 
larger stock of knowledge (Romer 1986, 1990). The more knowledge there is, the more 
productive R&D efforts are—higher human capital produces more knowledge; the 
greater the stock of human knowledge, the more productive the human capital. In the new 
growth theories, a process of cumulative causation can take hold whereby new 
knowledge and human capital lead to still more innovation and human capital 
accumulation. Therefore, countries not at the innovative frontier might not catch up and 
leading countries can maintain a durable comparative advantage in technology and know-
how. In this context, evidence contradicting the convergence hypothesis in the form of 
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durable leading and lagging nations might be explained by uneven capacities to generate 
new knowledge and human capital to support innovation and technological progress.  
Further theoretical and empirical analyses of uneven technological change and 
innovation explored the specific processes and institutions that drove technological 
advance. Schumpeter‘s disequilibrium theory of profits and economic growth puts 
innovation and monopoly profits (or technological rents) at the heart of the accumulation 
process. Hence the structure and relationship of institutions that support innovation 
becomes a central object of analysis in any account of economic growth. Careful analysis 
of the innovation process and the institutional support for technological advance, 
including the role of public sector institutions, has become a crucial component of growth 
and development studies over the last 40 years. This research has provided strong 
evidence that nations or regions can maintain or improve their growth prospects by 
stimulating human capital and R&D complementarities, creating supportive legal 
frameworks, investing in innovation, and creating institutional supports and incentives to 
foster innovation in private firms.  
In addition, recent work in economic geography and innovation studies argue that 
knowledge spillovers, from R&D and human capital investment are spatially bounded for 
a period of time. As Krugman says knowledge travels across hallways easier and more 
efficiently than across continents (Krugman 1991). This is supported by the idea that 
technology transfer or innovation spillovers involve the transmission of tacit as well as 
codified knowledge. Proximity, networks and face-to-face contact increase the efficiency 
of tacit knowledge transfer. This aspect of classic agglomeration economies put into 
relief the metropolitan region as a potentially significant unit of analysis in the study of 
uneven patterns of technological change and regions become important in evaluating 
national technology policies. 
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The most recent and systemic attempt to explain uneven national performance in 
technology development and innovation is the National Innovation Systems (NIS) 
framework. This framework studies how technological change and innovation is shaped 
by a complex ensemble of law, policies and institutions that are built up over time and 
evolve within a nation state. An innovation system, in its broadest terms, can be defined 
as a system that consist of firms, institutions and organizations, operating together 
through continuous interactions to produce new and economically valuable knowledge 
(Lundvall 1992, Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen 2002). Key system components include 
legal standards affecting property rights, technical standards, education and training 
institutions, firm and industrial research and development activities, direct public 
investments in R&D, institutions supporting technology diffusion, government research 
priorities and institutions and so on. The NIS framework carefully delineates the complex 
institutional set up in a particular nation, but is especially concerned about how the 
components interact and evolve over time to foster the accumulation of technological and 
innovative capacities. The effective running of the system, the art of co-existence of 
many units and agencies working toward similar objectives, and learning to achieve 
them, depends in important ways on the ability of governments to design policies that 
nurture the quality of interactions among institutions. Different national histories, patterns 
of intergovernmental relations and institutional set ups shape patterns of interaction and 
cooperation. These differences in turn influence the characteristics of specialization and 
innovative performance between nations.  
The applicability of the NIS framework to lower and middle income countries 
requires a specific understanding of the status of technological change and innovation 
given the level of industrial, technical and educational development in a country and a 
consideration of how state institutions and actors attempt to structure technology and 
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industrial policies to increase the pace and impact of innovative activities. A main 
advantage of the NIS approach is that it assumes that context matters greatly and national 
efforts to change technological performance cannot be drawn from a recipe list or 
―reverse engineered‖ from experiences in advanced economies.  It can be said that the 
national innovation systems framework is an ex-ante not an ex-post concept in 
developing countries (Arocena and Sutz, 2000). Layered public and private institutions 
that make up systems in advanced market systems generally do not exist or exist in very 
weak or fragmented forms that exhibit limited interaction among public and private 
sector institutions (Intrakummerd et.al. 2002, Alcorto and Pere 1998, Radosevic 1998, 
Viotti 2002, Shulin 1999). Meaningful attempts to construct NIS elements and foster 
knowledge building interactions between the elements necessitate a durable and energetic 
commitment by governments which are typically reluctant or inexperienced in 
developing integrated policies. Momentum and coherence in NIS construction is also 
difficult to sustain because outcomes are uncertain, hard to evaluate, and likely to occur 
over time horizons much longer than typical political cycles.  
However, the unexpected rise of some middle income countries in the 1990s 
including Taiwan, Israel and Ireland, which were previously not recognized for their 
capabilities in high-technology industries, highlighted the important role of government 
technology and industrial policies and support institutions in shaping technological 
advance and the international competitive positions of these countries. These cases, all of 
which adopted unique means and approaches in developing their competencies, provided 
evidence that developing countries have multiple options to follow in establishing more 
advanced high-technology sectors. These options are shaped by critical decisions on: 
acquisition of research and development (R&D) skills and competencies and their 
repercussions on institutions playing leading roles in innovation; R&D financing 
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mechanisms determining the level of resources and scope of R&D activity; state support 
for leading technology companies and their long-term impact on the established market 
system; and foreign investors and how they contribute to development of local innovative 
capabilities (Breznitz, 2005). These success stories of the 1990s, combined with earlier 
cases rapid development of technological and innovative capacities such as Japan and 
South Korea, indicated national innovation systems could be constructed and made to 
―work‖ through targeted innovation policies linked to national industrial policies. The 
study of NIS construction in developing countries is relatively limited. In particular, there 
is very little understanding of specific planning and decision making processes associated 
with NIS construction and no systematic accounts of the process from perspective of the 
key actors and institutions directly engaged in technology development and innovation. 
Moreover, there is very little understanding of the nature, scope and quality of 
stakeholder interactions that usually define unique characteristics of individual national 
innovation systems. 
 
1.3 Key Questions and Methods 
The basic aim of this dissertation is to draw upon the insights of the NIS 
framework to better understand and evaluate efforts to improve technology and 
innovation outcomes in middle income developing countries. This dissertation will 
investigate specifically how national technology and innovation policies in Turkey have 
evolved and evaluate recent attempts to structure these policies around the NIS 
framework. This work will also examine how national technology and industrial policies 
in Turkey incorporate existing centers of regional industrial and technological 
development into the construction of the national innovation system. The study utilizes 
the regional scale to analyze innovation networks among the manufacturing firms and 
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between these firms and regional and national ―extra firm‖ institutions. In particular, I 
will highlight evidence of emerging interactions, dynamic relationships between firms 
and other institutions and their geographies during the national innovation system 
construction process.   
It is hoped that this research will make a unique contribution by focusing on 
specific challenges faced in NIS construction in the specific context of Turkey. In 
addition, the gaps and successes and failures in developing system components and 
encouraging interactions between key public and private sector institutions will be 
evaluated through extensive interviews of those most directly and actively involved: firm 
managers and R&D personnel, government planning agencies, universities and research 
institutes, and managers of technology assistance initiatives.  
This work will specifically seek to address seven main questions: 
1. What is the historic role of the central government in supporting technological 
development and innovation in Turkey? 
2. What level of national and technical and industrial development was achieved by the 
end of the 1990s under numerous post WWII government technology and innovation 
planning initiatives? 
3. What were the distinct planning, policy and institutional initiatives that characterized 
the new emphasis on building a NIS system beginning in the late 1990s? 
4. What are the major difficulties and problems confronting policy makers in their efforts 
to build a more effective national innovation system? 
5. How strong are intra and inter-regional (including international) networks and 
relationships among innovative manufacturing firms in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul?  
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6. How present and deeply embedded are components of regional innovation systems 
among innovative manufacturing firms in the main Turkish regions- Ankara, Izmir and 
Istanbul? 
7. How can national innovation policy take better advantage of existing strengths and 
capacities at the regional level? 
 
This study adopts an integrated multi-level methodological approach to explore 
the ex-post national innovation system construction processes in a developing country 
setting. The study critically evaluates regional and national innovation system 
frameworks advanced in the literature and through international institutions (such as the 
World Bank and OECD) to investigate their applicability to the national innovation 
system building process in Turkey. Of central importance here is to understand whether 
technical and innovation collaborations show a regional or inter-regional character and 
the implications of these findings for national policy construction.  
At the national scale, the role of technology and innovation policy is fundamental 
(Mytelka and Smith 2002, Sotarauta and Srinivas 2005) since it influences the direction 
of industrial development.  National policy must focus on the business sector since it is 
the backbone of a national innovation system and any kind of change or transformation 
requires change and reorientation of private firms (Teubal 2002).  In the case of Turkey, 
national policy determines the strengths of the supporting structure which includes 
universities, public research institutes, technology centers, business associations and 
government steering institutions, whose actions directly or indirectly influence the 
functioning or and strategies of private firms. The specific ways that national policies are 
being utilized (or not utilized) by firms and how participation with government programs 
and institutions is influencing the innovative performance of firms, is an important object 
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of empirical investigation in this work. At the regional scale, I will examine empirically 
the interactive character of innovation networks during the emergence of product and 
process innovations and determine the importance of links and relationships within the 
regions compared to those outside the region. The novelty of this research rests in part on 
explaining a multidimensional issue at different spatial scales in an integrated way. 
Regions, in this respect might have great explanatory value as agglomeration economies 
may foster innovations in local firms or industry clusters and hence shape the dynamics 
taking place at the national level (Isaksen et.al 2001, Muller 2001, Simmie 1998, 2001).  
In order to answer the research questions, the study adopts a mixed 
methodological approach and utilizes case study, in-depth interview and survey methods. 
To examine the relative importance of national versus regional relationships, two levels 
of case studies were used to understand spatial considerations of the national innovation 
system building process in Turkey.  Case study research methods are especially valuable 
in understanding and explaining complex social phenomena through in- depth studies of 
real-world actors and institutions (Yin 1994).  
At the national scale, Turkey emerges as an illuminating case for assessing 
emerging innovation system features because she is a middle-income developing country 
with certain innovation system characteristics, which are neither fully developed nor 
especially weak or fragile. The long science and technology policy and plan making 
history of the country opens up a number of opportunities to understand the interplay 
between structural impediments to more advanced development and institutional learning 
formed out of prior successes and failures.  In addition, Turkey is a centralized nation 
state where all regions are subject to the same regulatory, institutional and 
macroeconomic rules and processes. The country, therefore, offers an informative context 
to assess the significance of more spontaneous regional characteristics that may emerge 
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from the interplay between market forces and unique local business cultures or 
institutional arrangements.  
At the regional scale, Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara metro areas appeared as the 
most significant cases to explore the main research questions as they are the three biggest 
cities in the country and host the vast majority of prominent public and private 
institutions central to the national innovation system. It should be noted that this study 
intends to use the regional innovation system concept as an instrument to evaluate the 
status of NIS construction in Turkey. In this respect, the cases at the regional level are not 
selected because they represent some distinct types of relatively autonomous regional 
innovation systems as exemplified in the literature. These regions are selected because 
they are inherently part of a centralized administrative structure yet informative enough 
(in terms of industrial variety, intensity of knowledge and technology, 
institutionalization, etc) to explain national dynamics from the bottom. 
The qualitative approach in the study was needed to examine system building 
processes through in-depth questioning of policy makers, research scientists, industry and 
trade organization officials, technology development incubator officials, etc. who were 
active while new policies were forming on NIS construction in Turkey. Further, a 
qualitative approach was required to understand the unique and detailed characteristics of 
regions that stimulate interactions and innovations. Firms as the major players of 
investigation were the subject of extensive in-person interviews to extract the kind of 
specific and nuanced knowledge essential to understand their innovation efforts and their 
relationships with other institutions and actors. This approach provided much more 
context rich and specific understanding through repeat and follow-up questioning than 
would be yielded by structured postal surveys or other large sample survey techniques. 
On the other hand the relatively large number of face-to face interviews/surveys (83) that 
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were conducted allowed a deeper understanding of the characteristics and patterns of 
innovative activities of large number of firms and the importance of interactions with 
other actors in the system.  
The adopted mixed methodology based research design strategy offered unique 
insights into key research questions and followed the four subsequent steps. First of all, in 
order to evaluate recent attempts to structure technology and innovation policies around 
the NIS framework, the research examines historic and contemporary government 
planning documents on innovation and technology policies. The policy documents and 
plans were collected and reviewed based on their focus upon technology and innovation 
based capacity and capability development. This step also included interviews with key 
participants in recent innovation planning and policy including policy makers and 
analysts in the State Planning Organization (DPT), The Scientific and Technical Research 
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), the Technology Development Foundation of Turkey 
(TTGV), the Small and Medium Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB), the 
Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade (DTM), the Ministry of Industry and Trade (STB), 
and KOSGEB-TEKMER (KOSGEB Technology Development Centers).  
The second step involved the study of current documentation on industry 
structure, industry strengths, employment, exports and any data relevant to 
competitiveness and innovativeness of industries and the study regions. Location 
Quotient and Shift-Share Analysis were conducted to understand the basic industrial 
compositions and dynamics of the regions. This stage also included identification of the 
firms engaged in technology development that would be included in empirical study in 
three major industrial regions of Turkey. 
The third step was identification and study of public and private development, 
research and technology organizations through in-depth interviews with leaders in 
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universities, research institutes, technology transfer agencies and business associations 
that contribute to technology development and innovation in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul. 
And the final step was in-depth examination of a randomly selected sample of innovative 
firms in the manufacturing industry in three major industrial regions in Turkey that 
received government R&D support.   
The integrated multilevel research enabled the study of NIS construction 
processes through the eyes of policy makers, bureaucrats, analysts, and researchers; and 
the R&D personnel and firm mangers in Turkish companies. The broad scope of the NIS 
research in a developing country context is managed through the introduction of regional 
scale which provided important insights with respect to the importance of regional 
processes to the direction and performance of the NIS construction process. Following 
these respective elements, the dissertation is organized as follows. 
This introductory chapter is followed by a theory oriented literature review 
chapter. This review delineates theories concerning the significance of technology and 
innovation in national growth and development from several theoretical traditions in 
political economy and economics that the dissertation draws upon, including evolutionary 
economics, state developmental theories, and national and regional innovation system 
frameworks. This chapter gives special attention to the role of state and public policies in 
the economic growth processes of emerging and/or developing nations and to the role of 
regional agglomerations and networks in national developmental efforts. It discusses the 
gaps in the NIS literature in developing countries and presents RIS as a practical means 
to bring the significant role of regional agglomerations into the NIS discussion in 
developing country contexts. 
The third chapter introduces the integrated multi-level methodological approach 
to analyze innovation system building processes in Turkey by highlighting the objective 
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of the research and the fieldwork chronology and experience. The research methods and 
instruments section covers a brief profile of the case study regions, data sources including 
identification of supporting institutions that form the NIS framework in Turkey and the 
interviewees, and identification of firms to study: the process of sample selection and 
survey implementation. 
The fourth chapter provides a historical overview of the industry, technology and 
innovation policies in Turkey, and lays out developmental histories of industry, science, 
technology, and innovation policies in Turkey to frame and interpret current innovation 
policies in a historical context. The history of modern manufacturing development starts 
with the Ottoman period and continues with the early republican period. This was 
followed in the Post WW-II period by a period broadly emphasizing import substitution 
based development (1960-1980), followed by export oriented industrialization (1980 to 
the present) policies. I then review more contemporary science, technology and 
innovation policies and touch upon the problems associated with the adoption and 
implementation of plans and policies given long term political and institutional 
influences.  
Chapter 5, evaluating the NIS construction process, draws upon the previous 
chapter and evaluates the roles, duties and interactions of public institutions and policy 
makers with other actors during the recent national innovation system building process in 
Turkey. The chapter examines the applicability of NIS in Turkey and discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of Turkish NIS.   
 The sixth chapter focuses upon the specific technology development and 
networking characteristics of Turkish manufacturing firms and evaluates innovation 
behaviors of manufacturing firms in all three regions in aggregated terms. This chapter 
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adopts an integrated approach and highlights innovation practices, characteristics, 
significance of external links and barriers to innovation in all three regions. 
Chapter 7, the role of regional agglomerations and networks in technology 
development investigates industrial specialization and change, local elements of NIS and 
embeddedness of the firms in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul. This chapter evaluates the 
importance of regional agglomerations and presence or absence of local linkages and also 
significance of existing linkages with respect to new product and technology 
development.  
The concluding chapter brings together main findings from the chapters 5, 6, and 
7 and addresses the successes as well major difficulties and problems confronting policy 
makers in their efforts to accomplish to build a more effective national innovation 
system.  
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical Framework 
The literature and evidence on the status of innovation and technological change 
in developing countries is limited in a number of ways. First, there are a relatively small 
number of studies that characterize and analyze the role of innovation in specific cases of 
national development in middle or low-income countries. Second, much of the analysis of 
technological change in developing countries attempts to directly apply frameworks 
derived from studies of innovation processes in advanced market economies. In this 
dissertation I attempt to reach beyond prior studies to isolate insights from the broader 
literature that apply more usefully to the developing country context and test these 
insights in an in-depth case study of firms and public and private support institutions 
related to the innovation process in a middle-income country. 
In this chapter I reference several theoretical traditions in political economy and 
economics including neo-classical growth theories, evolutionary growth frameworks, 
technology gap theory, state developmental theories, and national and regional innovation 
system frameworks. These theories provide context for the main themes of this work 
including the impacts of state policies on technology absorption, development and 
diffusion across countries. The specific case of Turkey as an example of technological 
and institutional development in a newer industrializing country can also be better 
understood and evaluated in reference to these major theoretical strands. The first key 
challenge in this work is to understand how national innovation system (NIS) framework 
that has been developed to explain innovation and growth dynamics in advanced market 
economies can be recast and applied to the NIS construction process in a developing 
country context. The second aim is to understand how regional agglomeration economies, 
especially knowledge spillovers might come into play in the industrial and technological 
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development of emerging nations. In order to better comprehend these issues, it is 
necessary to borrow insights from several different theories. Late development and 
developmental state theories deserve special attention as they are more directly relevant 
to role of the state and public policies in economic growth processes of emerging and/or 
later industrializing countries.  
 
2.1 Traditional and Contemporary Neoclassical Growth Theories 
In the conventional neoclassical economic growth theory developed in the 1950s, 
firms are viewed as atomistic entities operating to achieve profit maximization objectives. 
In this static view, new knowledge and technology are created ―outside‖ of the economic 
sphere as  public goods and are viewed as basically exogenous to the process of 
economic growth per se. Firms have full and perfect information on available 
technologies and they select the optimizing technologies given factor prices and demands 
for their goods and services. In other words, all firms are on equal footing in gaining 
access to technology to compete on the basis of prices of undifferentiated products. The 
basic proposition that technology is a universal public good in a macro system that tends 
toward equilibrium sets up the conditions of a tendency toward international convergence 
in national per-capita income. 
In the earlier neo-classical models a long-run equilibrium growth is determined by 
the growth in the labor force (or population), the growth rate of the capital stock and an 
exogenous rate of technological improvement. In long term full employment equilibrium, 
with the GDP and the capital stock growing at the rate of labor force growth, growth in 
GDP per capita becomes contingent on the exogenous rate of technological improvement 
(Fagerberg 1995). As an explanatory factor of long-run economic growth, Solow 1(1956) 
                                                 
1 Solow‘s (1956) model: Y= A KαL1-α (where Y is output, A is technology, K is capital and L is labor) 
 18 
incorporated technology into the neo-classical growth model where technology is treated 
as an autonomous growth factor that is exogenous and available to all firms and 
countries.  
Solow (1957) conducted a seminal empirical study to account for growth in the 
US economy where he found that only a small portion of the growth in US output per 
worker over the 1909-1949 period could be attributed to increased capital intensity. The 
remaining productivity growth that could not be attributed to increases in capital intensity 
was identified by Solow as a ―residual‖ component reflecting general technical change 
(Scherer 1999:24). Solow‘s famous ―residual‖ could include many things, but it was 
believed that technical change constituted the major part. Later, following Solow‘s work, 
many growth accounting studies were conducted to measure this ―residual‖ factor and 
what share of economic growth could be attributed to advances in technology. (Madison 
1987). In these earlier models technology was identified as a crucial dimension of 
economic growth in the neoclassical production function, yet technological change was 
exogenous and typically ―embodied‖ in the capital or labor factors in conventional 
growth accounting.  
The implications of this traditional theory for uneven international growth were 
important in that a general pattern of per capita income convergence was consistent with 
the general equilibrium premises of the model. Output per capita increases in the long run 
because of exogenous technological progress and convergence happens along the 
transition course as lower income countries with abundant labor get higher returns from 
capital investment. Countries below their steady state positions will, hence, grow faster 
than higher income countries closer to their steady state positions due to diminishing 
returns to capital investments or inputs. In other words, for countries with the same 
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steady positions including same savings rate, population growth rate, government policy 
and etc., poorer economies grow faster in GDP per capita than the richer ones (Barro and 
Sala-i Martin 1997:1, Sala-i Martin 1996). 
The older neoclassical growth theory does not entail any explicit theory of 
innovation per se because it does not provide any explanation on how or why technical 
change occurs in an economy. Significant income and growth differences across 
countries were not easy to explain based primarily on different rates of capital 
investment. These gaps led to increased efforts to endogenize technological progress in 
more meaningful ways in subsequent growth theories. Most notable was the emergence 
of the new neoclassical growth theory, pioneered in the work of Romer (1986, 1990) and 
Lucas (1988). These contributions criticized the exogenous technological change 
assumptions of the older growth theory by abandoning the blanket assumptions of perfect 
competition and ―cost free‖ access to technology by all firms regardless of location. 
Instead, they argued that knowledge is endogenous and that economic growth results 
from increasing returns associated with knowledge, which is, unlike other economic 
goods, is non-rival yet partially exclusive. The more knowledge is accumulated, the more 
productive human capital investment becomes. Hence, the enhancement of human capital 
and accumulation of knowledge serve as the primary engine of long-run economic 
growth in these newer theories.  
The new growth models also try to endogenize technological change by 
accentuating the public-private nature of the innovation process (Romer 1990, Grossman 
and Helpmen 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992). Technology and knowledge can be 
retained within firms (excluding third parties) and returns from successful innovation can 
be used to compensate for the expenditures made during the process of technology 
generation. Rival firms can be excluded from new knowledge and technology for some 
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period of time through patents or secrecy. This leads to a situation of imperfect 
competition and possibly above normal returns that compensate for private R&D or other 
knowledge investments. However, there is also non-excludable part that cannot be 
appropriated due to knowledge spillovers. Some technology and specific skills spill over 
from the innovative firm and generates positive external effects on the product, service 
and process technologies of other firms. These positive externalities contribute to 
increasing returns in the overall output of goods and services (Ruttan 2001). At the same 
time, these technological rents and spillovers dissipate over time as other firms catch up 
with original innovators. 
The new growth theory undercuts the strong convergence hypothesis of the older 
standard theory by questioning the assumptions of decreasing returns to capital inputs, 
perfect competition and exogenous technological change. It replaces the diminishing 
returns to capital assumption with increasing social returns to human capital assumption. 
In the new growth theory, knowledge spillovers can amplify initial differences among 
countries through cumulative causation processes. Cumulative causation suggests, that ―if 
a region gains some initial advantage, new growth and multiplier effects will tend to 
concentrate in the already expanding region, rather than in other regions‖ (Malecki 
1997:48). If cumulative causation emerges, growth becomes self-reinforcing as 
endogenous forces tend to increase productivity by attracting still more new knowledge 
and higher returns to human capital. Human capital also affects this process by flowing to 
regions where there is already larger stocks of knowledge and skilled labor. Advanced 
countries, in this respect, can sustain durable advantages relative to developing countries. 
Given that there are lower levels of human capital accumulation and less efficient access 
to local or global pools of knowledge in developing countries, these countries might not 
catch-up in the long run. Thus, in the new growth theory, per capita income differences 
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across countries can persist in the long run and are not inherently subject to general 
equilibrium tendencies. 
 
2.2 Institutional and Evolutionary Growth Theories 
In both the older and more contemporary neoclassical growth models the more 
tangible and specific contours of knowledge generation and innovation processes both 
within and external to the firm are poorly specified. The neoclassical tradition offers only 
abstract answers to the ―why‖ and the ―how‖ questions of technological change and 
economic growth.  In contrast, Schumpeter provides a more specific and historically 
grounded account of the growth-innovation relationship based upon the central role of 
innovation in private market competition. Schumpeter viewed innovation as a primary 
determinant of growth and economic growth as fundamentally rooted in a disequilibrium 
process. Models that posit convergence to a steady state growth path cannot explain 
growth in capitalist market economies since it is an inherently dynamic process with 
sharp periods of disequilibrium. For Schumpeter, growth processes can never be smooth 
or tend toward some steady state equilibrium because capitalism‘s dynamic force comes 
from innovations2 that enterprises create in their ongoing attempts to maximize 
profitability (Schumpeter 1942:83).  
Innovations generate ‗entrepreneurial profits‘ through decreased production costs, 
new product introductions, and new market openings. Instead of fighting to minimize 
costs given stable factor costs and price taking on competitive markets, firms compete for 
profits that come from new or distinct products and services. New products or ways of 
producing and marketing existing products provide innovating firms with ―monopoly 
                                                 
2 Innovations in Schumpeter are not necessarily path breaking, radical or ‗new to the world‘ technological 
changes. They may be new or improved products or processes of production, new sources of inputs supply, 
new markets for old products and new forms of industrial organization. 
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profits or rents‖ over a specific period of time since competitors cannot replicate the 
innovation in the short-term. The intense competition for ‗entrepreneurial profits‘ is a 
‗process of industrial mutation‘ that comes within the economic structure and thereby 
changes the structure permanently. Firms‘ incessant search for innovations threatens the 
existence of other firms that are unable to innovate and in a process famously labeled as 
‗creative destruction‘ (Schumpeter 1942:83). Schumpeter‘s disequilibrium theory of 
profits and growth puts innovation and monopoly profits (or technological rents) at the 
heart of the economic growth process. Hence, the structure and relationships of both 
private firms and public institutions that support innovation is a central object of analysis 
in any deeper account of economic growth. 
Following Schumpeter in placing innovation at the center of the growth process, 
evolutionary economists perceive innovations as outcomes of qualitative changes in 
history, persistently driven by the diverse capabilities of firms, governments and 
institutions (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi and Soete 1988). This strand of thought 
stresses two important issues regarding the nature of innovation. First, the innovative 
capabilities of firms depend on active searching and learning processes. Searching and 
learning activities generate real costs for private firms and innovative capabilities are 
difficult to obtain and are unevenly scattered across firms and countries. Second, 
innovations are complex, non-linear social processes resulting from formal and informal 
networks and relationships among firms and other public and private institutions.  
Evolutionary economics explains different national performance and patterns in 
international trade by emphasizing uneven capacities to generate and adopt new 
knowledge and technologies. Uneven capacities can be associated with a wide range of 
skill differences and differences in institutional support required for adoption, utilization, 
imitation and creation of technology (Rosenberg 1982, Dosi and Soete 1988:418, Juma 
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and Clark 2002). In contrast to the assumptions of the conventional growth theory, firms 
in developing countries operate with a high degree of imperfect knowledge regarding 
technological opportunities.  Finding technologies and their efficient use is a difficult and 
costly process since it involves developing new skills to master codified and especially 
tacit elements in new technologies (Lall 1999). Adoption and modification of foreign 
technologies to local needs also requires a certain level of know-how and technological 
skills because technologies are typically first developed to serve users and customers in 
high income countries. Therefore, the earlier less innovative firms understand and 
prioritize active searching and learning processes with respect to developing their 
capabilities, the better it will be for their long term economic competitiveness. At the 
macro level, support systems, incentives and regulatory frameworks that stimulate more 
active searching and learning by indigenous firms may affect the pace of technological 
advance and enhance national growth prospects over time. 
Hence, a comprehensive explanation of economic growth entails a deeper 
understanding of both economic and non-economic factors shaping innovation processes. 
In evolutionary economics, technological change results from conscious and active policy 
efforts addressing skill building and organizational restructuring at the intra and inter-
firm levels. As more firms and institutions become involved in complex learning 
processes, knowledge flows become more intense and firms can gain more from 
networking to learn and to innovate. Innovation and growth thus become outcomes of 
certain socio-cultural contexts shaped by complex interactions among different actors in 
the system (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi and Soete 1988, Malecki 1997). 
Evolutionary economics leaves open the possibility for developing countries to 
catch up with more advanced economies, but catch-up is conditional on specific 
characteristics and factors. This theoretical tradition does not accept a general process of 
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convergence or divergence since it is not based on steady state, general equilibrium 
assumptions of neo-classical growth theory and sees growth as a dynamic process 
stimulated by innovations and institutions. Therefore, in a constantly changing 
environment, convergence may takes place at different rates in different countries with 
different institutional settings (Verspagen 1993).  
Evolutionary economics also rejects neo-classical growth theory‘s assumptions 
about technology as a pure public good. In the evolutionary perspective, less developed 
countries suffer from existing technology gaps and low capacities to absorb new 
technology and knowledge. However, poorer countries may advance through diffusion 
and adoption of foreign technologies if factors favoring these processes develop and 
accumulate overtime in specific cases (Fagerberg 1994). In this way, evolutionary 
economics departs from technology gap (Posner 1961) and product cycle theories 
(Vernon 1966) by emphasizing the possibility of the durable accumulation of resources 
and development of institutions and practices that foster innovations. 
In technology gap and product cycle theories, advanced countries benefit from 
advantages of continuous product and process innovations leading to divergence in 
technology levels across countries. Developing countries, on the other hand, work 
towards diminishing existing technology gaps through successful imitation. Drawing 
upon Schumpeter‘s concept of the innovating firm but apply it to national level processes, 
technology gap theory argues that new innovative products and processes bestow a 
temporary monopoly advantage to innovating countries. However, through time, 
advanced countries lose their advantageous positions due to international technology 
transfers. In order to maintain advantages of the ―technology gap‖ and their relative 
positions in the international economic order, innovating countries continue to invest in 
R&D and other support activities to sustain their advantages. 
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The product cycle theory offers a similar insight only with more emphasis on the 
specific nature of the technological evolution of industrial products. The model posits a 
typical pattern of a product‘s development from the beginning to the end of its lifecycle. 
Among the four main phases identified in the product life-cycle model, the first phase is 
the ―innovation phase‖ in which technologies emerge and change rapidly. Here, new 
disruptive ideas and technologies are introduced and they are typically concentrated in 
the hands of firms in a few advanced market economies. Firms in this phase are very 
much dependent on highly skilled research scientists, engineers and producer service 
providers for idea generation and development and improvement of new technologies. 
The second phase is the ―growth phase‖ in which larger scale production for a mass 
market emerges but product and process technologies are still changing and evolving 
rapidly. The third phase is the ―mature phase‖ where technologies are mostly stable and 
there is limited room for process or further product innovation. And, the fourth phase is 
the ―decline phase‖ where technologies are becoming standardized and being replaced 
with new innovations (Malecki 1997:63). In the product cycle theory, as product and 
services mature, standardization prevails and this allows the shift of basic production 
activities from advanced to developing countries. As developing countries master large 
scale production and/or imitation, they hold a comparative advantage over advanced 
countries due to their lower wage rates and investment in later vintage production 
facilities. Advanced countries capture more value-added and higher profit rates in the 
innovation and growth phases; exporting their products in these phases and then 
importing them back in the decline phases when production is standardized and the 
technology is ageing (Freeman and Soete 1997).  
Evolutionary economics appreciates the insights of the technology gap and 
product cycle models, but criticizes their inadequate and limited treatment of more 
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complex innovation processes. In evolutionary perspectives, innovation necessitates 
accumulation of technologies and supporting structures over time. International 
technology transfers thus do not take place as easily or in the consistent patterns indicated 
in the product cycle and technology gap models. In the evolutionary framework, 
convergence among developing and advanced countries is a possibility, but it is a long 
and uneven process requiring conscious and constant institution and capacity building 
efforts on the part of developing countries. 
 
2.3 The Role of the State and Government Polices in Growth and Development 
Despite the considerable advances in understanding the role of innovation in 
uneven growth provided by newer intuitionalist and evolutionary approaches, the specific 
role of the state and public sector institutions is not systematically explored. The crucial 
role of government as a potentially leading actor in the growth and development process 
was first emphasized in the late development paradigm based on the works of Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962, 1968, and 1970).  
Gerschenkron argues that although backward countries on their path to 
industrialization do imitate more advanced countries in certain respects, they differ 
fundamentally from advanced countries ―by the very virtue of their backwardness‖ 
(1962:6-7). Conditions that limit industrial development, such as the scarcity of capital, 
competent and disciplined workers and entrepreneurial talent, shape in different ways the 
speed of development and the productive and organizational structures of emerging 
industries. So, even though industrial processes that are similar to the ones in advanced 
countries are launched at in backward countries, their effects are considerably different 
since backward countries have their own peculiar institutional characteristics that lead to 
unique patterns and outcomes.   
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Gerschenkron points to the existence of two major differences among various 
countries: (1) their degree of backwardness and (2) the vision and ideology of backward 
states that stresses the importance of competition with the forerunners with respect to 
technology development and industrialization. Within this framework, Gerschenkron 
contends that the more backward an economy in the beginning of its industrialization in 
comparison to other advanced countries, the greater will be the ―discontinuity‖ from its 
previous economic experiences and hence the greater will be the potential pace of overall 
industrial growth. As long as states have a strong vision for industrialization, they will 
emphasize the development of industries making large scale, capital intensive goods 
whose production techniques can be imported from more advanced countries.  
In Gerschenkron‘s theory of late-comer advantages, backward countries gain from 
entering already established product markets where they don‘t need to face the 
uncertainties and risks of opening new markets. The needs of the global markets for 
manufactures goods have been delineated by pioneer firms. They also have access to the 
latest manufacturing technologies, which have been developed through expensive 
research and development investments by pioneering countries, at much lower costs. 
Late-comers hence start with large scale ―state of the art‖ manufacturing facilities that 
benefit from scale economies while pioneer competitors struggle through earlier phases 
of smaller pilot plant production and poorer process technology. It should also be noted 
that Gerschenkron ties these late-comer advantages with the advancements in state 
planning and financial capabilities of backward countries. The existence and guidance of 
a capable bureaucracy is essential in his view in order to convince financiers to invest in 
large scale plants and newer technologies. New technologies are out there and easily 
accessible, as long as these two institutional capabilities are developed, improved and 
coordinated.  
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Gerschenkron‘s theory of late development identifies the crucial role of the state 
in the development of new institutions but does not recognize the importance of more 
complex processes of building technological capacities and skills on growth prospects in 
less developed countries. In Gerschenkron‘s thesis, the central role of the state is to either 
directly stimulate production in sectors where investment needs are high or act as a 
financial creditor in the development of these sectors. Gerschenkron‘s theory was 
important because it laid the basis for developmental state theories which tried to shed 
light on the tremendous growth of Japan after the Second World War (Johnson 1982, 
Freeman 1987, Anchordoguy 1989) and newly industrializing Asian economies such as 
South Korea and Taiwan over the past thirty years (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Haggard 
1990, Pack 1993, Park 2000, Amsden 2001).  
Starting with the analysis of Japan, developmental state theories emphasized the 
role of government in targeting, supporting, and mobilizing finance and investment for 
new industries. To overcome technological barriers that developing countries face on 
their path to industrialization, states in a national effort, strategically design and 
implement long-term development plans by establishing specific development agencies 
such as MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in Japan, EPB (Economic 
Planning Board) in South Korea or CEPD (Council on Economic Planning and 
Development) and ITRI (Industrial Technology Research Institute) in Taiwan.  
MITI‘s role in Japan‘s remarkable growth did not only come from a capable 
bureaucracy designing policies that favor export oriented catching-up strategies, but also 
from its assigned status which held it responsible for the selection of strategic sectors and 
technologies. MITI, assumed the role of the ―pilot agency‖ of a state-led development 
effort that actively intervened and supported the growth of conglomerates that could 
compete in selected strategic industries (Johnson 1982). The underlying driver of 
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industrial development was a strong, unitary state supporting and mobilizing finance for 
large investments in the latest manufacturing technologies that were initially designed 
elsewhere. The Japanese model of technology adoption and product development focused 
on adoption of the latest process technology to produce products introduced by more 
advanced counties, followed by continual improvements in both product and process 
technologies over time. 
Taking Japan as a model, Korea also established a ―super agency‖, EPB that had 
the power to shape economic policy and the industrial transformation of the country. By 
meritocratically recruiting the most educated and talented specialists, EPB established a 
bureaucratic structure that could confront the incongruity of a capital scarce environment 
with ambitious industrial transformation goals. It supported the emergence and growth of 
large conglomerates (chaebols) and aggressively ―orchestrated their activities‖ up until 
they secured significant international market positions among selected industries (Wade 
1990: 320, Evans 1995). 
Similarly, though with somewhat lighter state direction, Taiwan used a 
government led approach in its development efforts. The CEPD was not a pilot executive 
agency as in other cases, but it held powers resembling to MITI‘s in most respects. 
Taiwan established another agency to fulfill objectives in technological arena. She set up 
the ITRI to build up new capabilities in new technologies with an objective to close the 
existing technological gaps with advanced countries. In this respect, the state used ITRI 
as a medium to acquire new technologies from abroad to co-develop these technologies 
with private firms, to recruit talented workers living overseas, and to directly fund 
projects to transfer new technologies to other firms (Matthews and Cho 2000, Matthews 
2002).     
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As these developmental efforts transformed these nations from economically 
backward to higher income countries over relatively short periods of time, scholars 
turned their attention to the ―east Asian model‖ to better understand how did they it and 
what lessons could be transferred to other developing countries (Evans 1995, Kim and 
Nelson 2000, Chibber 2002). The developmental states shared some common attributes 
in their state-led development efforts. First of all, they all broadly followed the 
Gerschenkronian model of development by creating targeted, export-oriented industrial 
systems based on technology transfer from leading nations. Second, they established 
specific state institutions empowered with certain authority and regulatory powers to 
formulate long-term industrial plans. And third, based on these plans, they supported 
growth of large conglomerates and mobilized finance for investment that allows select 
firms to compete with each other and with international firms to succeed in targeted 
sectors (Bretnitz 2005). However, as technology and R&D intensive industries became 
more important in sustaining competitiveness of countries, the traditional 
Gerschenkronian model of development became less compelling. These East Asian 
countries faced new challenges as they attempted to move into areas where products and 
especially services were less well defined and stable, markets were changing more 
rapidly, and where advanced countries were less willing to transfer the latest available 
technologies.  
As the pace of innovation increases and the life span of new products decreases, 
leading companies became more protective of new knowledge embedded in their 
products. Reverse engineering and incremental innovation lost their potency and it 
became harder to develop competitive products with lower income countries such as 
China and India aggressively moving into more mature market. In addition, tracking the 
latest technological developments and rapidly employing them in new industrial 
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strategies went beyond the managerial capabilities of state development agencies. Central 
state agencies, pressured by the rapid change of technologies and competition from other 
later developing countries, started to gradually delegate their roles and responsibilities to 
developmental agencies and to give private market developments more influence instead 
of retaining lead positions in development of new industries (Bretznitz 2005, Evans 1995, 
O‘Rian 2000, O‘Rian 2004). Instead of being organized around a centralized state 
structure, national governments have established numerous developmental agencies in 
different policy domains (technology development and transfer, capital access, labor 
training, etc.) that are flexible enough to deal with the requirements of complex 
technological systems in different sectors. These agencies are equipped with skills that 
understand specific needs of industries and constantly redesign policies based on new 
developments (ORian 2000, 2004).  Yet even with this new approach, labeled as the 
―flexible developmental state‖ or ―developmental networked state‖, many developing 
countries in the 90s were unsuccessful at assessing the changing global circumstances 
and reorganizing themselves quickly enough to cope with the changing needs of their 
targeted industries and powerful new competitors.  
Both late development and developmental state theories emphasize an essential 
role for national governments in the growth and development of new industries and hence 
technologies. Although changing global markets and production networks have altered 
the institutional structures needed to successfully develop or support new industries, 
developmental states either as initiators or as supporting actors continue to influence the 
overall growth trajectories of their countries. Unfortunately, different developmental state 
models are not comprehensive enough to delineate various institutional factors and 
specific linkages and relationships facilitating development of new industries. Systems of 
innovation theories, in this respect, fill in gaps and provide a more useful framework to 
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study different institutional models that influence progress of existing and growing 
industries in both developing and advanced countries. 
2.4 The National Innovation System Framework: Policies, Institutions, 
Interactions and Innovations 
The innovation systems approach has been widely used to explain the interactions 
among multiple institutions and actors that generate and utilize technologies. The concept 
of national innovation systems (NIS) was introduced in the late 1980s based upon key 
premises of evolutionary economics (Freeman 1987, Dosi et. al 1988) and further 
elaborated in the 1990s (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997). Freeman defines 
national innovation systems as: ―…the network of institutions in the public and private 
sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies‖ (Freeman 1987:1). Among the first to use the concept, he emphasizes the 
importance of government support in terms of setting a vision for long-term economic 
development and commercialization of advanced technologies.  
Governments play an essential role in any NIS because of the intrinsic nature of 
innovation and R&D processes. With respect to private sector R&D, market failure 
occurs because of externalities that are not appropriately valued in private markets. Firms 
which invest in new technologies cannot internalize all of the returns from their 
investment because some knowledge and productivity gains benefit other firms or end 
users. Spillover effects can take numerous forms including the ability of competitors to 
reverse engineer or copy designs, the mobility of skilled workers who transfer knowledge 
and skills to new working environments, or communication of new knowledge through 
more informal channels. As the firms bearing costs of innovation do not capture all the 
benefits, they under invest in research and development. Because social returns from 
investment in innovation significantly exceed private returns, sub-optimal private R&D 
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investments justify government investment and coordination in new technology 
development activities.  
Lundvall further (1992) elaborated the concept and proposed both a broad and a 
narrow definition of NIS. Broad and narrow definitions of NIS mostly differ based on the 
scope of actors and domains considered in the analysis of innovation activities. While the 
narrow definition takes into account only the search for new inventions and innovations 
or ―organizations and institutions involved in searching and exploring such as R&D 
departments, technological institutes and universities‖, the broad definition includes ―all 
parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set up affecting learning, 
…searching and exploring [such as] the production system, the marketing system and the 
system of finance…in which learning takes place‖. For Lundvall, learning is embedded in 
everyday experiences of the actors in the system and takes place in every part of the 
economy (Lundvall 1992:2). Actors in the system including governments, firms, public 
and private research institutions, universities, customers and suppliers have specific and 
important relationships among themselves. These multiple domains and actors influence 
the creation and diffusion of new technologies in industrial systems.  
Dynamic relationships among the actors, first of all, influence the production and 
technology absorption capabilities of firms. By immersing themselves in these multiple 
relationships, firms learn over time the complex capacities to develop new products and 
services or invest in new process technologies to expand their product range (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1989, Carlsson et. al. 2002). Second, private firms as the most dynamic agents 
in end markets for products and services, get crucial feedback from their customers to 
improve their outputs and enhance the profitability of their activities. And third, financing 
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institutions both public and private influence firms‘ behavior to innovate through their 
decisions to allocate capital to specific R&D activities3.  
Lundvall‘s broad definition of a NIS attempts to cover all the factors involved in 
the enterprise of innovation, but it is criticized for its vagueness and lack of specificity 
(Edquist 1997, Miettinen 2002). Some scholars try to synthesize the broad and narrow 
definitions to establish conceptual clarity in this newly emerging area of study. For 
instance, Niosi et. al. (1994) define NIS as a ―...system of interacting private and public 
firms (both large and small), universities and government agencies aiming at the 
production of science and technology within national borders‖. According to them, 
―interaction among these units may involve technical, commercial, legal, social and 
financial in as much as the goal of the interaction is the development, protection, 
financing or regulation of new science and technology‖. Likewise, Radosevic (1998:85) 
defines systems of innovations as ―a coherent configuration of firms, related institutions 
and organizations that are involved in the generation and utilization of new technologies 
                                                 
3 Depending on the location of activities, whether they are conducted in private firms or public research 
institutions or universities, different national financing modes affect the scale and scope of R&D activities. 
The more financial resources are allocated to higher risk innovative product development activities, the 
more experience and competence grows among both investors and the private enterprises that acquire 
capital (Bonte 2004). Private financing is different than public financing, as it looks for high private returns 
to compensate for high-risk investment. The investors, venture capitalists or other high-risk financiers, are 
heavily involved in innovative projects and directly influence the capabilities of firms, their business 
models and their interactions with other producers either in local or global production networks. Public 
financing and support to private R&D, on the other hand, serves greater objectives such as the advancement 
of basic science and greater generation of knowledge or innovation related to national missions (defense, 
public health, national transport, etc). Either targeted (e.g. specific R&D projects mostly in selected sectors) 
or untargeted (e.g. tax abatements, R&D credits, R&D personnel subsidies) public support intends to 
increase private firms‘ general interest to R&D activities. It may have a direct impact on the productivity of 
supported firms or an indirect impact via generating new knowledge or new technologies with more general 
applications. Governments may prefer funding projects that have higher social than private rates of return, 
but measuring the gap is not an easy process (Mansfield et.al. 1977, Jaffe 1989). In any case, both private 
and public financing generates conditions promoting dynamic learning processes that are broadly 
simulative for technological development and economic growth. 
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based on common technological regimes and shaped through mechanisms of market and 
pre-market selection‖.  
Different definitions of the concept emphasize the ―system‖ dimension stressing 
the interactions among institutions and actors rather than linear model of innovation 
beginning with publicly supported basic research and ending with a specific firm 
introducing and new product or process. The actors involved in different systems may 
vary, but the quality and value of interactions and within networks of institutions are seen 
as central in enhancing innovation performance. Nation states, in this respect, tend to 
generate distinct frameworks as the dynamic relationships among the actors involved in 
different cultures and systems may change according to specific histories and national 
industrial and technology policies that influence not only the inter-institutional learning 
processes but also the scale and scope of R&D activities.  
Early studies of NIS mostly examined the characteristics of national technology 
and innovation policies and institutional differences between advanced countries 
(Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993). These studies analyze economic performances of specific 
countries through their technological and institutional capabilities, such as R&D systems, 
as in the case of Nelson (1993). However, comparative analysis of various national 
innovation systems presents serious challenges due to unique histories and institutional 
roles and traditions, even though each country case presents very valuable in-depth 
information about the formation of policies and development of institutions that foster 
innovation. A number of more recent studies have focused on measuring the strengths 
and systemic comparisons of different national innovation systems to better identify 
elements and characteristics that might explain differences in innovation outcomes.  
Furman et.al (2002), for instance, measured the national innovative capacities of 
17 highly industrialized countries by analyzing the linkages between the strength of a 
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nation‘s common innovation infrastructures and the environment for innovation in 
specific industrial clusters4. Nasierowski and Arcelus (1999) developed a NIS model 
through the identification of specific elements and their interrelationships in each 
individual national system. Chang and Shih (2003) use national R&D expenditures, R&D 
performance, technology policy, human capital development, technology transfer and the 
climate for entrepreneurial behavior as variables to specify the importance of structural 
differences between innovation systems of China and Taiwan. Although these studies on 
national innovation systems diverge in terms of questions addressed, methods and their 
level of analysis, aggregate indicators that are used to measure robustness of systems 
such as GDP per capita, patents, R&D expenditure, number of scientists and engineers, 
and quantity and quality of scientific publications tend to be common in many studies. 
These variables are useful for comparative purposes but they are limited in terms of 
illuminating the interactive dimensions of learning and collaboration between elements 
and institutions that comprise the NIS. Also, these variables are more meaningful and 
consistent for studies of advanced countries because of the high quality of existing data 
and their representation of higher levels of innovative performance. However, using 
similar measures in studies on developing countries is problematic as most of these 
measures are not well constructed in these countries. In addition these common aggregate 
indicators often miss the dynamics of more incremental innovation and ―learning‖ 
processes because new patents and path breaking product innovations are not common 
outside higher income OECD countries. 
The early studies on national innovation systems have shifted the attention of 
policy makers both in international organizations and in individual nation states from a 
                                                 
4 ―The number of patents granted to investors from a particular country other than the United States by the 
USPTO in a given year‖ is used as the dependent variable (Furman et.al 2002:909). 
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traditional science and technology policy focus towards the importance of a broader 
range of national policy strategies promoting innovation and international 
competitiveness (Lundvall and Borras 2005, Lundvall 2006). Policies influencing only 
the technological development parameters such as R&D performance or expenditure are 
considered insufficient as innovations are now recognized as outcomes of complex 
processes that require involvement and interaction of various actors fostering new 
knowledge, competencies and practices. For advanced countries systems are usually well 
functioning, but often in need of change or reform depending on changing global 
technologies and economic circumstances. For developing countries, on the other hand, 
the quality of institutions and their interrelationships may be much less developed and 
articulated. Policy makers in less developed countries are challenged by the task of 
developing policies oriented to building up national innovation system elements and 
interactions in situations where public and private institutions are weak and suffer from a 
lack of historic experience and capacity.  
 
2.5 The National Innovation System Framework in Developing Countries 
The success of the NIS approach in measuring system characteristics and 
performance in industrialized countries and in developing better technology and 
innovation policies has made it tempting to apply the framework to developing countries. 
The NIS framework of assessment and analysis is open to history, context and unique 
national structures. In this sense it is an advance over other theories and best practice 
policy studies. What most of the studies, however, have missed is that while national 
innovation systems is an ex-post concept in industrialized countries; it is an ex-ante 
concept in developing countries (Arocena and Sutz 2000). In advanced countries, the 
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concept is ex-post since it analyzes legible features of strong and diversified systems with 
well-established institutional and infrastructural attributes and clear outcome measures 
focused on product innovation. The concept is ex-ante in developing countries since  
innovative activities and institutions at the national level are not well formed, have 
limited histories  and tend not to work together in complementary and systematic ways. 
Innovations, defined in strict sense of new products or process breakthroughs that may be 
patentable are not common in developing countries. Institutions, both public and private, 
have few connections and have limited power to influence national competitiveness 
relative to the more fully developed national innovation system frameworks in advanced 
market economies. Therefore, when national innovation systems are examined within the 
context of developing countries, the system construction or building processes must be 
the key object of analysis to better understand newly emerging dynamics that might lead 
to increased innovation in existing or emerging industries (Arocena and Sutz 2000, 
Lundvall et.al. 2002). The application of the NIS framework in general must focus on the 
potential of new institution building and institutional arrangements fostering interactions 
versus historic performance.  
The NIS literature on developing countries shows that the framework is applied in 
two distinct forms. The first approach attempts to explain the main aspects of national 
innovation systems (Shulin 1999, Arocena and Sutz 2000, OECD 1999). According to 
this group of studies, the strength of national innovation systems in developing countries 
are correlated with their economic and institutional development levels. National 
innovation systems in developing countries are much less mature in terms of institutional 
composition, the sophistication of scientific and technological activities and linkages 
between organizational units (Shulin 1999:43). Because of more limited institutional 
support and capacity learning to innovate is more closely related to capital accumulation 
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and learning by doing than new knowledge and product generation through dedicated 
R&D activities. Also, purposeful strategic management is generally not sophisticated in 
less developed national innovation systems due to lack of long-term planning capabilities 
and experience. But despite discouraging limitations for developing countries, NIS has 
given leaders a valuable framework to understand challenges and to promote policies to 
deal in more effective ways with specific and unique deficiencies in developing countries 
(Arocena and Sutz 2000:59). Whether the system can be purposefully designed or not, 
awareness with respect to the role of innovation in development processes encourages 
policy makers to evaluate their systems and make deliberate policy choices to change 
existing factors that may hinder technological development.  
The unfavorable conditions in less developed countries due to the ex-ante nature 
of innovation systems necessitate an approach that integrates the national innovation 
systems framework with the developmental state theories. As the developmental state 
theories show there is a significant body of literature explaining the importance of 
institutional successes and failures in economic and industrial development (Amsden 
1989, Wade 1990, Bardhan 1996). Many newly industrializing countries, despite 
inadequacies in institutional composition or the scale scientific activities, may also have 
promising institutions such as quality universities or forward looking government 
agencies that might facilitate the innovation system construction processes. Yet 
coordination among the actors, which is the essence of the NIS perspective, is not assured 
by the existence of these isolated institutions. A strategic approach and a lead 
organization is needed to better educate and coordinate various public and private sector 
actors and create an impetus toward common objectives. These orchestrating initiatives 
often involve developing basic policies that regulate user-producer relations and facilitate 
joint R&D activities to leverage strengths of isolated firms and public institutions. 
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Government support must be linked to some notion of national industrial development 
policies. If nascent innovation policies are disconnected from national development 
objectives, they become inefficient in terms of achieving the stated targets. The emphasis 
in the NIS framework on building both elements and interrelationships might be useful in 
advancing more flexible and interactive modes of behavior which is also the essence of 
the more contemporary model of the flexible, supportive developmental state.  
The second approach studying NIS in developing countries analyzes the specific 
country cases by either examining the existence of innovation system components or 
identifying the strengths and/or weaknesses of ―system‖ level performance in specific 
cases (Intarakumnerd et.al. 2002, Alcorto and Pere 1998, Radosevic 1999, Viotti 2002). 
Several studies find the application of the concept to developing countries relevant and 
illuminating in specifying the existence of weak and fragmented systems in Thailand and 
Latin America respectively Intarakumnerd et.al. (2002) and Alcorto and Peres (1998).  
Rodosevic (1999) finds the concept applicable in terms of catching-up and growth 
purposes but he stresses the non-existence of coherent national and regional innovation 
systems even in middle-income countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast, 
Viotti (2002:654) critiques the application of the NIS concept as an analytical tool in 
technologically less developed countries. According to him, national innovation system 
approach is inappropriate to deal with ―the processes of technical change in 
industrializing economies, which are extremely different from those of industrialized 
countries‖. In developing countries, innovation is characterized more by organizational 
change, learning from imported technologies and incremental product improvements 
rather than classic product or process innovation tied to dedicated R&D. Therefore, 
instead of innovation systems, a learning system framework is better to analyze and 
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understand the knowledge embodied in operational strategies of leading firms and their 
suppliers and their broader institutional linkages in developing countries.  
These studies have contributed significantly to possible applications of the NIS 
framework in developing countries. But while thinking in terms of system construction, 
explaining specific characteristics and evolutionary development processes of individual 
actors in the system offers limited conceptual or policy guidance for decision-makers in 
less developed countries. Considering the ex-ante nature of the issue, national innovation 
systems in developing countries need to be investigated at various levels integrating the 
national, the mesoeconomic5  and microeconomic dimensions, (Cimoli and Dosi 1995) 
that highlight the type and importance of institutional interactions as the national 
innovation systems are constructed. 
Clearly then, the applicability of the national innovation system framework to 
developing countries requires a specific understanding of the status of technological 
change and innovation given the level of industrial, technical and educational 
development in a country. It also requires a consideration of how state institutions and 
actors attempt to structure technology and industrial policies to increase the pace and 
impact of innovative activities. All of these investigations necessitate a macro level 
analysis at the level of the nation state. However, if, as the new growth theory suggests, 
knowledge is bounded over some period of time within economic regions, then 
innovative activities are likely to demonstrate distinct regional concentrations. As such, 
                                                 
5 National innovation system approach recognizes regions as important economic bases of coordination at 
the meso (between local and national) level. As Lundvall and Borras state ―the region is increasingly the 
level at which innovation is produced through regional networks of innovators, local clusters and the cross 
fertilizing effects of research institutions‖ (Lundvall and Borras 1997:39). In developing country contexts, 
regional frameworks might be utilized as a bottom-up perspective to better comprehend construction 
process of national innovation systems. 
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sub-national regions as crucial units of analysis can be put forward as an additional 
necessary framework to better understand national performances.  
 
2.6 Regional Agglomerations and Regional Innovation Systems  
As the late development and more recent state developmental theories indicate, 
nation states through their targeted trade, industrial and innovation policies are able to 
influence the sources of national competitiveness and development. The countries that 
base their industrialization strategy on dynamic competitive advantages instead of static 
comparative advantages (Dosi, Pavitt and Soete 1990) are cognizant of the fact that 
conditions that generate and foster technological knowledge have to be created and it 
takes consistent effort, investment, and time. As noted above, earlier state development 
success stories such as Japan and South Korea were based on national industrial, trade 
and technology policies that focused on large firms and industrial sectors. There was very 
little emphasis on smaller firms and very little consideration of economic regions as 
discrete objects of analysis or policy making. The limits of these earlier state led 
development strategies that began to sharply emerge in the early 1990 directed attention 
to more complex and extensive firm architectures encompassing small and large firm 
producers and suppliers and to specific agglomeration economies and innovative 
practices in industrial districts and regions.  
At the micro level, firms are considered as the essential agents in complex 
systems where learning occurs through continuous interactions among different actors. 
The evolutionary approach recognizes individual firms as unique actors with a primary 
role in innovation and technological improvement. They are ―dynamic, evolving and 
quasi-autonomous systems of knowledge production and application‖ (Spender 1996:59) 
with particular knowledge assets whose effective management, maintenance, integration 
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and updating affords competitive advantage (Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos 2004:1-2). The 
uniqueness of firms engaged in innovation derives from the particular behavioral routines 
they follow (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi and Malerba 1996) which differentiate 
themselves within the complex environment they function. Along with their different 
routines, firms develop dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000) concomitant with their strategies, knowledge assets, and available 
financial and technological resources. The ability of the firms to develop these 
capabilities is highly dependent on their internal capacities and the capacities of 
surrounding institutions to absorb and exploit knowledge and technologies (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1989). Supporting and building up these absorption capacities are essential in 
the process of development as firms and support institutions  need to understand and 
learn the basics of new technologies while using them to generate endogenous 
capabilities to innovate to build on existing technologies and knowledge6.  
The strong linkages between the absorptive capacities of firms and their dynamic 
competitive advantages rely heavily on firms‘ available knowledge base and knowledge 
outside the firm which can be accessed. The accumulated knowledge in firms and extra-
firm institutions in a specific geography puts into relief the importance of geographic 
concentration and proximity for innovation and competitiveness at the regional level as 
firm performance can be influenced by external economies of agglomeration including 
acquisition of highly talented workforce, localization of specialized suppliers and 
spillover of knowledge among local actors. Geographic proximity in this respect, 
                                                 
6 The capability approach suggests that absorptive capacities of firms in developing countries are generally 
low since they follow a technological path that is built on low-tech commodity production due to lower 
access to capital, technology and knowledge. Enhancing absorptive capacities of firms in developing 
countries is not enough by itself as firms are immersed in an institutional setting that they co-evolve with. 
The institutional setting comprised by the political, commercial, financial and industrial institutions in a 
country form the ―social capabilities‖ (Abramowitz 1986), the competence of which determines the future 
possibilities of growth and competitiveness as they shape firms‘ dynamic competitive advantages. 
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cultivates not only traditional agglomeration effects which arise primarily from access to 
a collective set of resources such  higher quality productive factors at lower prices 
(Krugman 1995) but also knowledge associated externalities and spillovers7 (Marshall 
1920).  
Since Marshall in the late 19th century, regional agglomerations were thought to 
yield positive externalities that improved the competitive prospects of resident firms. 
Classic economies of urbanization were seen to benefit all firms in larger urban regions 
due to reduced costs of supplier matching and shared infrastructure. In addition, 
economies of co-location benefited groups of firms in the same or similar industries and 
were tied to lower unit labor costs due to labor pooling, reduced cost of inputs and 
technology and localized knowledge spillovers. Firms benefited from being located in a 
historically developed industrial area, as knowledge is created and transferred more 
effectively due to proximity8.  
                                                 
7 Fritch (2000) explains the geographic distribution (centre-periphery scheme) of innovation activities by 
two main reasons: ―First, spatial clustering of innovation activities of a certain type or in a certain 
technological field is usually associated with a well developed supply of the needed inputs such as 
differentiated labor markets with specialized qualifications, a rich supply of innovation related services, and 
the easy availability of information relevant to innovation activities. Secondly, it is argued that knowledge 
spillovers that are generated by innovation activities are concentrated in areas close to their respective 
source. Spatial proximity to many such sources enables an innovator to benefit from a higher level of 
knowledge spillover than that available in a more remote location far from other innovators active in the 
technological field relevant to him‖. 
8 Relatively recent works in economic geography that provide evidence on the causal links between 
spillovers and innovation. These studies note that knowledge spillovers from R&D and human capital 
investments are spatially bounded over a period of time. (Jaffe et.al 1993, Adams and Jaffe 1996, 
Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999). For instance, Jaffe et.al. (1993) study the 
localized corporate and university patent citations and confirm the existence of knowledge spillovers. 
Similarly, Adams and Jaffe (1996) examine the effects of knowledge spillovers on the productivity of firm 
R&D and affirm the importance of spatial proximity in most instances. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) 
search for the spatial concentration in knowledge-intense industries (measured by industry R&D, human 
capital and academic research) and reaffirm the prevalence of knowledge spillovers among these industries. 
And, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999) analyze the international knowledge flows by using citations and 
confirm localization of these knowledge flows.   
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Knowledge spillovers intensify the propensities of co-location as they stimulate 
available innovation and learning which often emerge through firms‘ incremental efforts 
to build on existing stock of knowledge within the region. Knowledge spillovers take 
place mostly through joint projects, consultations, personal contacts and workforce 
mobility among firms. Experience based competence which involves specific, tacit 
knowledge, on the other hand, is mostly carried out through informal gatherings where 
managers and workers have the opportunity to discuss their experiences face-to-face 
regarding specific problems and/or achievements on product development or production 
methods and technologies with actors from outside the firm.  
The power and influence of geography on knowledge activity increase as 
knowledge moves along the continuum from codified to tacit knowledge. Codified 
knowledge, which in most instances is treated synonymously with information that is 
easily transmittable in formal, written formats such as patents, software codes, technical 
drawings or formulas, does not require interpersonal interaction (Howells 2002, Choo 
1998, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, stems from 
direct, informal experience that are often intuitive, not fully articulated, and hard to put 
into artifacts (Rooney 2003). As Howells (2002:872) elucidates ―it represents 
disembodied know-how that is acquired via the informal take-up of learned behavior and 
procedures‖. Tacit knowledge cannot be easily transmitted and assimilated through 
impersonal channels such as the internet or telephone9. Tacit knowledge exchange 
benefits from face-to-face interaction to pass on implicit aspects and a strong motivation 
                                                 
9 Cowan, Foray (1997) and Cowan, David, Foray (2000) consider tacit knowledge as an important strategic 
asset as it allows for better exploitation of the codified knowledge. Firms, depending on the industry they 
belong to, need some type of tacit knowledge to understand and internalize the content of the external 
codified knowledge. The degree of tacitness depends on the cohesiveness of the knowledge receiver as it 
might be perceived as clear as a codified document if articulated in the right context. 
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and capacity on the side of the recipient especially when the inherent complexity is high 
as in the case of technological knowledge.  
The inherent complexity and ―incompleteness‖ of new technical insights is the 
main reason for knowledge to be confined to certain geographies because diffusion of 
tacit knowledge requires more persistent and direct interactions that are easier to achieve 
with closer proximity of actors and institutions (Iammarino and McCann 2006:1025). 
Tacit technological knowledge, which is hard to convey through by conventional 
communication channels does not flow freely in the air and quite the opposite, it actually 
―sticks‖ inside specific firms and institutions (von Hippel 1994). New technical or 
industry specific knowledge is generated by people and teams within departments as 
firms work on developing new products that evolve from their accumulated experience10.  
This sticky technological knowledge leaks or spills over firm boundaries as a result of the 
interdependencies between firms, either through labor mobility, joint project 
development or more informal relations in a place. Although knowledge producers often 
intend to fully appropriate the benefits of new technological knowledge by preventing 
access without explicit compensation, it is usually difficult due to non-excludable nature 
of knowledge (Teece 1986, Fischer, Diez and Snickars 2001). 
Empirical evidence suggests that knowledge spillovers show a local character in 
many cases that leads to technological innovations being concentrated in specific 
                                                 
10 Audretsch (1998) puts into words the connection of sticky knowledge inside firms with knowledge 
worker mobility as follows:  ―If the scientist or engineer can pursue the new idea within the organizational 
structure of the firm developing the knowledge and appropriate roughly the expected value of that 
knowledge, he or she has no reason to leave the firm. On the other hand, if he places a greater value on his 
ideas than does the decision-making bureaucracy of the incumbent firm, he may choose to start a new firm 
to appropriate the value of his knowledge. In the metaphor provided by Albert O. Hirschman (1970), if 
voice proves to be ineffective within incumbent organizations, and loyalty is sufficiently weak, a 
knowledge worker may resort to exiting the firm or university where the knowledge was created in order to 
form a new company. In this spillover channel the knowledge production function is actually reversed. The 
knowledge is exogenous and embodied in a worker.  The firm is created endogenously in the worker‘s 
effort to appropriate the value of his or her knowledge through innovative activity.‖ (Audretsch 1998:21). 
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territories over certain periods of time (Maskell and Malmberg 1999). Many frameworks 
such as regional innovation systems (Asheim and Isaksen 1997, Braczyk et.al. 1998, 
Cooke 1997, Cooke 2001, Fischer et.al. 2001, Diez 2002), clusters (Porter 1998), 
industrial districts (Becattini 1992), learning regions (Morgan 1997), and innovative 
milieu (Maillat et. al 1996) attempt to explain the aforementioned association between 
space and knowledge spillovers with respect to generation of new technologies and 
regional competitiveness. These conceptual frameworks resemble to each other in many 
respects11.  
The regional innovation system framework stands out among the others because 
of the emphasis it puts on the existing institutional infrastructure with respect to 
generation of innovations through actors who are systematically engaged in interactive 
learning. The RIS concept is sometimes described as ―reduced-NIS‖ (Hertog, Bergman, 
et.al. 2001) as it transfers the loci of fundamental associations among the actors from the 
national to the regional scale. However, it can potentially enrich the macro focus of NIS 
because it emphasizes the need to understand how regional institutions and relationships 
relate to and influence national development processes12. The RIS concept owes the rise 
                                                 
11 The common denominator is the importance of local agglomerations in knowledge and technology 
spillovers. Proximity among the actors, who are surrounded by common sets of rules, norms and 
conventions, stimulates the process of knowledge creation and dissemination. Regions are hence a crucial 
unit of analysis for learning economies as they contain specific localized resources such as skilled labor 
force, education and training systems, supplier networks, special financing institutions, trade associations 
and local support agencies. Specialized local institutions and knowledge provide an environment that 
incubates innovations and stimulates innovative capabilities. (Malmberg and Maskell 2002). 
12 Cooke et.al (1997:489) explains the influence of different body of thoughts on the concept of regional 
innovation systems as follows: ―The origin of the concept lies in two main bodies of theory and research. 
The first is systems of innovation research; the second is regional science, with its interest in explaining the 
location distribution and policy impact of regional high tech industry, technology parks, innovation 
networks and innovation programs. The onset of ‗co-makership‘ supply-chain relationships amongst firms 
and their contribution to cluster formation, to some extent concentrated in regions, opened up the way to 
exploring the extent to which innovation processes at regional level could be defined as systemic, and the 
two intellectual levels be united‖. 
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in its popularity both to the wide acceptance of the NIS at different levels of national and 
international policy making and to the inadequacies of traditional regional development 
policies in coping with the requirements of intense international competition in a 
globalized world. 
Similar to national framework‘s emphasis on national capabilities, the RIS 
attempts to explain the innovative capabilities of regions by focusing on existing 
interdependencies among firms and institutions whose interactions develop a special form 
of social capital and learning that reinforces the competitiveness of regions (Asheim and 
Isaksen 1997, Autio 1998, Braczyk et.al. 1998, de la Mothe and Paquet 1998, Howells 
1999, Acs 2000, Cooke 2001, Isaksen 2001, Cooke et al 2000, Doloreux 2003). The RIS 
concept does not have a simple definition, but the main idea is based on the premise that 
―[a set of actors] produce pervasive and systemic effects that encourage firms within the 
region to develop specific forms of capital that is derived from social relations, norms, 
values and interaction within the community in order to reinforce regional innovative 
capability and competitiveness‖ (Gertler, 2003 in Doloreux and Parto 2004:9). The RIS 
framework holds that knowledge is locally bounded and competitive advantages of 
regions depend on the quality of existing localized resources such as a specialized labor 
force, advanced research and training institutions and a unique environment and culture 
supporting innovation. The interaction of these elements shapes the ability generate 
externalities to enrich the collective learning processes in regions13 (Cooke et.al 
1998:1581).  
                                                 
13 The embeddedness idea lay emphasis on systemic interactions and ―systemic qualities‖ when regional 
innovation systems are perceived as cultural constructs. Cooke et.al (1997:488) lists the cultural aspects 
linked to ―systemic quality‖ in an innovation system as follows: culture of cooperation, associative culture, 
learning culture, experience and ability to carry out or incorporate institutional changes, coordination and 
public/private consensus, productive culture (labor relations, cooperation at work, company commitments 
to social well being, productive specialization), existing interface mechanisms (in the scientific, 
technological, productive, financial fields), different types of learning capacity, social valorization of the 
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The regional innovation systems framework encompasses two important 
concepts, clusters and networks. Industry clusters and networks have received significant 
attention among policy makers as a specific form of agglomeration. Both concepts 
emphasize how cooperation and competition among firms in the same or related 
industries allow a mechanism for small to medium-sized firms to compete in domestic 
and international markets (Nanoka 2004, Ingley 1999). The concepts of networks, 
clusters and regional innovation systems are inherently related. Clusters encompass 
networks and regional innovation systems encompass both clusters and networks. As the 
core mechanisms that make up the whole systems, networks are studied in different 
contexts such as a new form of governance in a regional industrial cluster (Turnbull et.al. 
1996). Networks describe new organizational structures that result from various 
relationships. They characterize different forms of inter-organizational interactions 
among a number of economic agents including buyer-supplier relationships, R&D 
collaborations, different forms of ownership agreements such as joint ventures, or sharing 
of testing and training centers and many others that stimulate the flow of resources, 
embedded knowledge and/or scientific know-how (Ozman 2002). Industrial networks are 
dynamic in nature and they develop and prosper as the intensity of interactions increases. 
Firms benefit from being parts of the networks because knowledge externalities and 
learning rise with increased interactions resulting in more rapid and efficient technology 
development (Evangelista et.al. 2002). However, networks as forms of inter-firm linkage 
and governance frameworks do not have an explicit geographic focus. Network 
relationships can emerge and evolve at the regional, national or international levels.  
                                                                                                                                                 
use of science, university linked to the productive system, non-bureaucratized educational and training 
system linked to the productive system. 
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Clusters, on the other hand, add a specifically spatial dimension to the network 
approach and highlight benefits of geographically concentrated firms and institutions in a 
particular field (Porter 1990). Although the idea of competition through cooperation to 
achieve economic advantage among agglomerated firms is not new and goes as early as 
back to the 19th century, the industrial clustering approach reintroduced the value of a 
geographically proximate group of  firms and institutions which are linked together 
through complementary expertise revealed by information and products flows. Physical 
proximity among closely linked industries leads to extensive investments on specialized 
factors of production over time promoting positive externalities that trigger innovation 
and growth. The focus in the cluster approach is based on mutual geographical or 
functional links among firms in individual industries which are vertically and 
horizontally14 connected with other firms and institutions that share similar objectives 
with respect to industry growth (Cooke 2001). While this consciously adopted, intense 
networking based approach can serve as a local economic development strategy, it also 
stimulates capacity building efforts of firms to achieve global competitiveness. 
Commonalities and complementarities such as shared human capital or labor pools, 
common technology, common distribution channels and production of complementary 
goods and sharing of complementary facilities respectively increase the potentials of 
interdependent firms in specific sectors, to compete in international markets. And, such 
interconnections necessitate existence of mutual trust relationships that also benefit from 
proximity (Albu 1997).   
                                                 
14 While vertical links refer to links between firms at different levels of the production chain such as the 
relationship between customers and suppliers; horizontal links refer to relationships between peer firms at 
the same level of production chain. 
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Regional innovation systems overlap with but are different from the industrial 
clusters (Todtling and Trippl 2005:1206).  Incorporating the networking and 
collaboration arguments of industrial clusters, the RIS framework puts more emphasis on 
how horizontal linkages between firms and the extra-firm support structure function 
collectively to stimulate local growth. Industrial clusters frequently embody specialized 
sectors and emphasize importance of firm interactions to increase competitiveness, while 
the regional innovation systems framework additionally accentuates systemic learning 
processes and improvement in absorptive capacities of firms located region-wide, not just 
in select industrial sectors. The regional innovation system concept has received 
considerable attention with its emphasis on broader linkages and especially the quality 
and importance of interactions between public and private institutions and actors, but has 
also been critiqued as a ―fuzzy‖ framework (Markusen 1999) as it does not offer a 
generalized model that would fit in diverse cases. The ambiguity in RIS studies is related 
to vague and inconsistent descriptions of economic regions and associated governance 
and policy-making structures. Nevertheless, the flexibility of the concepts also has 
advantages because framework elements can be applied to analyze and evaluate any 
region that focuses on building social and institutional relationships to support 
technological upgrading and innovation in resident firms.  
Any region can be seen to have some kind of an innovation system as long as the 
region contains a certain degree of agglomerated productive forces embedded in local 
institutional structures with certain localized and/or non-localized learning processes 
influencing its capability to innovate (Kaufmann and Todtling 2001, Dolereux 2003, 
Wigg 1999). The amount and intensity of interactions vary according to the peculiar 
institutional and policy characteristics of regions and thus adherence to a single and 
cohesive framework in reality is hard to observe or operationalize. The empirical studies 
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which contribute to identification and clarification of the regional innovation systems 
framework in different contexts confirm that the concept cannot be defined too rigidly 
because it applies to many possible operational types. As Cooke (2001:14) denotes, it 
must be ―sufficiently generic to enable innovation systems to be distinguished from non-
systems, non-regions and non-innovative settings‖.  
Different types of regional innovation systems bring clarification to the 
functioning of a variety of RISs. For instance, Cooke (1998) puts emphasis on the 
governance infrastructure and business association dimensions which can be grassroots, 
network15, dirigiste; and have a localist, interactive or globalized business relational 
structure respectively. Even though the governance structure in Cooke‘s typology 
connotes political governance, it actually refers to the organization and management of 
technology transfer activities. In this respect, the different modalities of governance are 
analyzed according to the types, levels and degrees of funding, research, technical 
specialization and coordination among actors. While the grassroots model refers to a 
region where technology transfer is locally organized at a city or district level; funding is 
diffuse, mostly comprising a variety of local grants and loans; research competence is 
applied and knowledge is synthetic16; technical specialization is low; and the degree of 
supra-local coordination is weak. The dirigiste innovation model lies at the other end of 
the continuum and appears in a region where technology transfer institutions and 
                                                 
15 In Cooke‘s ‗network model‘ or Asheim‘s ‗regionally networked innovation systems‘, actors are deeply 
embedded in regions as in the cases of ‗grassroots‘ or ‗territorially embedded innovation systems‘,. The 
interactive learning is still the most defining feature of the innovation systems. However, here, institutional 
infrastructures, such as R&D institutions, universities, technology transfer organizations and business 
associations are highly involved in firms‘ innovation processes. The interactions among them are 
consciously supported through policies and institutional support to increase innovation capacities and 
competitiveness of regions. 
16 Based on Laestadius (1998), Asheim and Gertler (2005) differentiate synthetic knowledge base from the 
analytical one. In distinction, while analytical knowledge rests on creation of new scientific knowledge 
base which is conducive to more radical innovations, synthetic knowledge emerges from more practical, 
problem related engineering knowledge generating incremental innovations. 
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activities are mainly initiated from the central government. In this form funding is 
centrally determined; research is basic and in most cases detached from the direct needs 
of the industry, and technical specialization and degree of coordination is relatively high 
as they are shaped by central government policies (Cooke 1998:20-24). 
 Grassroots and dirigiste modalities also resemble other characterizations in the 
RIS literature such as Asheim‘s (1998, 2005) ‗territorially embedded innovation systems‘ 
and ‗regionalized national systems‘ and Howell‘s (1999) ‗bottom-up systems‘ and ‗top-
down systems‘ respectively17. These typologies have increased applicability and value of 
the RIS approach because they are rooted in studies analyzing RISs in different regional 
and national contexts. A number of studies have investigated specific regional cases and 
distinguished the observed, operational regional innovation systems from the abstract 
conceptual frameworks offered in the literature (Asheim 1998, 2005; Cooke et. al 2000). 
These studies examined individual RISs and their corresponding resemblances to a true 
regional innovation system by analyzing the main institutional dynamics that promote 
technological innovation18 (Asheim and Coenen 2005:1186). The need to investigate the 
specific roles that regions play in the context of less developed regions also motivated a 
                                                 
17 Grassroots, territorially embedded innovation systems and bottom-up systems share the common 
characteristics of strong local networking among customers, suppliers and support institutions in enhancing 
the competitive advantages of regional firms and industrial sectors. Localized inter-institutional learning 
processes are highly embedded in the regional business culture and are perceived as the main sources of 
ongoing innovative activities. In these innovation systems, more formal knowledge-generating 
organizations such as universities or public and private R&D institutes have less important roles compared 
to the other forms. Dirigiste, regionalized national systems and top-down systems, on the other hand, 
emphasize strong influences of central decision-making authorities in shaping local institutional structures 
and productive resources, especially in the way firms, science and technology and R&D systems are 
organized to enhance  the competitiveness of regions. Planned science parks and technopoles linked to 
larger scale research institutes and sponsored by national or higher-level governments are typical examples 
of these centrally initiated regional innovation systems. 
18 An important issue that needs attention here is that the empirical studies which constituted the basis of 
the widely accepted RIS typologies are mostly the ones examining regions that are functioning within 
strong national innovation systems. 
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set of comparative studies which examined the determinants of innovation in less 
developed regions. These studies compared regions with their advanced counterparts to 
reveal the presence and importance of specific networks and interactions seen to be 
critical to regional innovation in advanced countries (Doloreux 2002; Cook et.al. 2000). 
Lack of associated interactions and low innovation potential in institutionally less dense 
settings are used as controls to explain the effects of more intense networks in stimulating 
innovations in interactive regions.  
The specific characteristics of sub-national entities set apart regions form 
aggregate national processes even if they are influenced by powerful unifying and 
institution building flowing from national level policies. Asheim and Coenen (2005) note 
the importance of national and regional interdependencies in NIS and RIS perspectives:  
 
―In a globalizing economy characterized by vertical disintegration and distributed 
knowledge bases, the important perspective ought to be the interdependencies 
between regions and nations, where the deciding criteria must be the location of 
core activities (and not the whole value chain as such) and the relative importance 
of their connections to regional knowledge infrastructures‖ (Asheim and Coenen 
2005:1178). 
 At the regional level values, norms and established routines influence the character of 
interactions among firms and their embeddedness within the web of local innovation 
support structures (Willke 2000). Certainly, institutions, together with firms and 
technology supporting or transferring organizations, are one big important component of 
regional innovation systems as they set the rules for firms involved in interactive learning 
processes19 (Amin and Thrift 1995; Maskell 2001). They, however, do not inherently 
                                                 
19 ―The institutional thickness concept, for instance, which takes the thickness of institutions as its starting 
point of analysis, was launched after scholars found out that successful industrial districts in Europe are 
characterized by a ―thick‖ issue of support institutions.  Institutional thickness, which nourishes relations of 
trust, is characterized by inter-institutional interactions and synergy, collective representation by many 
bodies, a common industrial purpose and shared cultural norms and values. (Amin and Thrift 1994:15 in 
Hassink 2002:155) 
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offer an environment conducive to generation of innovations due to potential regional 
―lock-in‖ effects. Institutions may suppress development as they support inertia to carry 
on existing routines and ways of doing business versus fostering dynamism and the 
establishment of new routines favoring innovations (Johnson 1992). The strength and 
performance of regional innovation systems is hence always contingent in their ability to 
address new challenges, learn and adapt, and overcome common frictions and 
incoherence often associated with regional production and innovation processes20 
(Heidenreich 2004). 
Depending on their ability to deal with contingencies and uncertainties with 
respect to their capacities for innovation, new knowledge generation and ongoing 
networking, some regional systems may be highly developed as in the cases of Silicon 
Valley, Emilia-Romano or Baden-Wurttemberg or some may show very weak and 
fragmented system dynamics in other regions in the advanced or developing world 
(Kyrgiafini and Sefertzi 2003, Figueiredo 2007). In any case, an innovation system is 
present in different types of regions with certain production and innovation capabilities 
and its dynamism and efficiency to drive competitiveness is subject to some extent on 
targeted regional innovation policies (Todtling and Trippl 2005).  
 
2.7 The Role of Regional Innovation Systems in National Development 
Given the historic significance of regional agglomeration economies in the 
process of technological improvement and innovation, national innovation system 
                                                 
20 In his ―the dilemmas of regional innovation systems‖ chapter, Heindenreich (2004:363) argues that the 
fundamental dilemma of innovations is that ―satisficing (even if not optimal) results can be obtained with 
previous routines, products, technologies, and institutions, while new routines, products, technologies and 
institutions require extraordinary investments and the outcomes remain uncertain‖. Based on thirteen case 
study regions, he elaborates the dilemma argument and reconstructs four dilemmas territorially bounded 
innovations are confronted with. He also provides different dealing mechanisms according to different 
types of regional innovation systems such as grassroots, networks and dirigiste RISs. 
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construction in developing countries necessitates consideration of regional systems of 
specialization and institutional interaction. Within the context of advanced countries, 
regional and national frameworks have been frequently used as complementary 
frameworks. While the national framework emphasizes  policy making capability and 
power to allocate funds affecting strengths of actors in the system (Niosi 2002), the 
regional framework highlights inherent characteristics of regions with respect to their 
potential to generate and transfer knowledge to create competitive advantages in higher 
scale national and global markets (Ohmae 1995). 
Within the context of developing countries, the RIS literature presents three major 
approaches to the study of how innovation support systems are developed and evolve to 
enhance the technology absorption capacities of regional firms. The first approach 
emphasizes the significance of institutions and policies developing regional innovation 
support systems (Hassink 2002) and absorptive capacities (Asheim and Vang 2005) 
endogenously within the region. It also focuses on improving the capacities and linkages 
between small and medium sized local firms and between these firms extra-firm regional 
support institutions. As Hassink (2002:153) articulates,  
―innovation support systems are … a group of actively cooperating organizations 
that support the innovativeness of SMEs. An innovation support system consists 
of all agencies found in three support stages, namely the provision of general 
information, technological advice, and joint R&D projects, between firms (of 
which technology following SMEs are the main group), higher education 
institutes (HEIs) and public research establishments (PREs). Agencies found in 
these stages try to help to solve innovation problems mainly of technology 
following SMEs by either giving them advice directly or by referring them to 
other agencies in a further stage of support‖.  
This regional innovation support systems approach presents an endogenous model 
to increase technological adoption and innovation within the economic region. However 
in the developing country context, endogenous capabilities are often weak and uneven 
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and outcomes can vary dramatically, even though regions may apply similar innovation 
policy instruments. Their abilities to coordinate policies into integrative support systems 
determine the nature of development. In this model these abilities are shaped by the type 
of political-administrative systems in the regions, the commitment of local leaders, 
collective trust, historical context of development policies and mechanisms supporting 
firms (Hassink 2002). In many middle income countries administrative systems may be 
centralized and the capacity and experience of regional leaders and public and private 
sector actors may be quite limited.   
A second model accepts the fact that local capacities and institutions may be 
limited and highlights the necessity to connect with larger more advanced firms in global 
production networks. This approach stresses an exogenous approach to regional 
development by introducing external knowledge sources and transnational corporations 
as a critical means for technological improvement and capacity building among regional 
firms and institutions (Asheim and Vang 2005). Traditionally, power of regional 
innovation systems framework rests in its potential to mobilize endogenous economic 
and institutional sources. However, in developing country context with potentially weak 
local capacities, external sources of technology, knowledge and capital through 
transnational corporations can serve as a more powerful development channel. Attracting 
transnational corporations to a region and more importantly embedding them within the 
local production networks is seen as crucial in building a regional innovation system. 
However, positioning local firms to link to a participate in global supply networks is 
challenging and requires specific efforts to increase capacities of local firms to build 
traded and untraded interdependencies with transnational corporations. 
According to Asheim and Vang (2005), building regional absorptive capacitates 
necessitates improvements in available physical, social, human and financial capital and 
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it goes beyond simple aggregations of the absorptive capacities of individual firms. In 
this model, building regional absorptive capacity requires a systemic perspective in 
which: 
―absorptive capacity building is about investing in formal training (human capital) 
including vocational training and possibly engaging in collaboration (i.e. 
interactive learning) between firms and universities (not necessarily co-located 
universities due to high reliance on codified practices and modular processes). It 
is also about interacting with other organizations (other firms, universities, 
etc.)…[which] allows firms to develop their internal absorptive capacity as well 
as utilizing other firms‘ and organizations‘ competencies‖ (Asheim and Vang, 
2005: 30). 
The approach emphasizing external links and the building of absorptive capacities in 
existing institutions is valuable in the developing country context with weak local 
capacity. However, this approach is vague about what sort of policies or mechanisms are 
needed to achieve human and social capital upgrading. It can be assumed that central 
governments have an important role in burnishing local assets in developing countries 
considering limited capacities of regional political-administrative systems (Cooke 2001). 
Besides, the prominent role of transnational corporations as a means to achieve regional 
economic development through technology and knowledge spillovers is still the subject 
of intense debate in the literature21. In this respect, it is questionable to assume that 
                                                 
21 Technology spillovers from foreign direct investment have increased attentions of scholars since the 
mid-1970s in many different aspects. (Caves 1974; Globerman 1979; Grether 1990; Harrison 1994; Koko 
1994; Aitken et.al 1996; Blomstrom and Koko 1998; Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1999; Aitken and Harrison 
1999; Djankov and Hoekman 2000). The numerous studies conducted on the subject indicate mixed 
evidence though.  
 
The studies supporting existence of spillovers (Cave 1974, Globerman 1979, Blomstrom and Koko 1998, 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1998) argue that countries try to attract FDI to acquire modern product and 
process technology and marketing and managerial skills. Operation of MNCs increases ―allocative 
efficiency‖, ―technical efficiency‖ and ―technology transfer‖. Allocative efficiency means increasing 
competition in industries with high entry barriers by removing distortions in the market; while technical 
efficiency implies an increase in the level of ‗X-efficiency‖ (same output with fewer resources) in suppliers 
and competitors. Technology transfer, on the other hand, indicates spillovers which are identified by the 
productivity and market access spillovers (Blomstrom and Koko 1998:249). Productivity spillovers occur 
―when the entry or presence of MNC affiliates lead to productivity of efficiency benefits in the host 
country‘s local firms and the MNCs are not able to internalize the full value of these benefits‖. Market 
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simply attracting and attempting to tie multinational corporations to a local economy will 
generate the expected dynamic set of interactions leading to technological growth and 
development (Chaminade and Vang 2006).   
A third strategy is Feser‘s synergy leveraging approach. He argues that regional 
innovation policies be designed ―to leverage synergies amongst businesses and non-
market institutions as a means of increasing policy efficacy‖ in developing and 
transitioning economies (Feser 2008:191-6). As he notes; 
―… attempts to build discrete regional technology clusters as a means to promote 
innovation economy-wide are likely to meet with very limited success in most 
developing and transitioning economy contexts. … The case for exploiting 
interdependencies to improve the effectiveness of innovation programs and 
policies is much stronger conceptually, and regional technology-based clusters 
may very well emerge naturally as a result. The distinction is not a trivial one, 
especially for less favored regions where existing innovation clusters are 
nonexistent or very shallow and the potential for wasting scarce resources is 
great‖.  
                                                                                                                                                 
access spillovers arise due to local firms‘ linkages with export oriented MNCs that ―provide knowledge 
about product and process technologies and foreign market conditions‖. Productivity and market access 
spillovers can be realized through many ways such as forward backward linkage, imitation, training, and 
competition effects. Domestic firms, by providing inputs to MNCs learn their and other international firms‘ 
preferences regarding design, product quality and deliveries times, and follow these in their own 
operations. Local firms through informal channels or some sort of inter-firm collaboration imitate 
technological and organizational practices of MNCs. Domestic firms also take advantage of the training 
effect which occurs when domestic workers build up experience and knowledge in MNCs and then leave to 
set up their own business in order to exploit their accumulated knowledge. Also, existence of MNCs in the 
market may act as incentives for domestic firms to adopt new product and process technologies to compete 
more effectively in the market.  
 
It should also be noted that spillovers do not occur one way, only with the presence of MNCs in domestic 
markets. The characteristics of local firms are also important for the existence of spillovers such as their 
ability and willingness to learn and invest on technology and training depending on the size of 
technological gap between the firms and countries. Lack of willingness to change and explore the 
technological options may cease spillovers. The studies arguing for non-existence of spillovers, (Harrison 
1994, Grether 1999, Djankov and Hoekman 2000) show that spillovers from FDI do not exist due to 
various reasons such as, fewer domestic employee hiring in managerial positions of MNCs, limited labor 
mobility between foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms, limited subcontracting to domestic firms, limited 
R&D activities in subsidiary firms and few incentives of MNCs to diffuse their knowledge. 
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The synergy leveraging approach does not rule out the benefits of innovation 
cluster building among specific businesses in targeted regions, but it is cautious regarding 
real limitations, such as presenting the notion of spatial clusters as the main objective 
instead of focusing on specific economic outcomes they may generate. The emphasis is 
on building upon actually existing institutions, linkages and interactions rather than 
abstract models of local or non-local clusters that may have key missing elements that do 
not apply in general to discrete cases or places.  
Within the context of developing national innovation systems, the synergy 
leveraging approach warrants special attention as it can be adopted as a conscious policy 
tool in developing countries which use NIS framework in their development efforts to 
increase connectivity and interactivity among its actors. Especially in countries where 
regional authorities are endowed with weak administrative and decision making 
capabilities, central authorities can take actions to promote regional collective learning 
and intelligence to overcome ―system failures‖ in various types of regional industrial 
agglomerations22.  It should be noted that in all of these models the bounded rationality of 
policy makers impedes their ability to systematically create and organize a variety of 
institutions in uncertain and shifting market conditions. These intrinsic limits call for a 
more incremental process of policy experimentation and learning. This experimentation 
can pay off with the emergence of an environment of ―competitive cooperation‖ among 
firms which is difficult to foster without specific policies designed with an objective to 
improve cognitive capacities of firms23.  
                                                 
22 Teubal (1998:156) defines a system failure as the ―failure to stimulate in a timely fashion the emergence 
of a new component of a NSI [national system of innovation] which is deemed to be of strategic value for 
the economy. More generally, system failure reflect deficiencies in the set of complex activities which 
should be undertaken both by the policy mechanism of a country and by market forces in order to stimulate 
such a NSI component‖. 
23 According to Larange et.al (2008:829), ―cognitive capacity concerns not only specific and technical 
knowledge, but also other kinds of knowledge, related to markets or produced in business and 
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In developing countries, the innovation potential of firms depend very much on 
their operational environment as their strategies with respect to new product or process 
developments are constrained by both low-cost competitors at one end and by more 
advanced high-tech competitors at another. While low-cost competitors exert an intense 
price pressure and force firms to set their final prices to maintain their existing market 
shares, high-end competitors increase the technological learning threshold for new 
distinctive products or high performance production processes through their incessant 
efforts to build new competences and unique advantages. In any case, knowledge, both 
tacit and explicit, is valuable and it is easy for firms to associate cooperation with 
surrendering knowledge they perceive as fundamental to their competitive position and 
hence survival. It is, therefore, unlikely to expect the spontaneous emergence of 
cooperative competition among firms leading to types of endogenous economic 
development emphasized by the innovative support system approach.  
The synergy leveraging approach, by involving policy makers in patiently and 
iteratively building up the conditions and incentives for interactions is based upon 
actually existing strengths and weaknesses. It emphasizes the slow growth of trust based 
relationships among firms and other non-market institutions in a region. Through their 
increased awareness and learning, firms exploit potentials of the environment they 
function in which may be regional, national international depending on character and 
capacity levels of other actors functioning in the regional economy. Utilizing available 
resources through leveraging synergies in less developed contexts also improves policy 
efficiency by preventing redundant or ineffective investments because the foundation is 
                                                                                                                                                 
organizational practices. It also includes dynamic aspects related to the capacity to change the cognitive 
capacity, involving changing the ―way of thinking‖, the beliefs, the visions, the intangible resources, 
organizational routines and etc‖. 
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improving performance based on existing institutional configurations and strengths, 
identifying and addressing gaps, and evaluating and improving policies over time.  
To sum up, evaluating the three approaches to delineating the key elements of 
policy making to construct regional innovation systems suggests that within the context 
of developing national innovation systems, regional innovation potentials can be better 
leveraged if policies governing regional resources consider not only regional factors 
expected to generate endogenous growth dynamics but also national and global factors 
contributing to the better enhancement and utilization of local capabilities. Additionally, 
during the national innovation systems building process, regional systems contribute as 
an essential level where technological change and innovation are actually realized. Many 
of the earlier state-led development efforts were organized around a central authority and 
national industrial and technology policies with little explicit concern for sub-national 
regions. However in the contemporary setting of rapid technological change and 
globalization of production, national systems must incorporate policies that are tailored 
and oriented to the regional level to more efficiently exploit regional advantages. 
National system building efforts now almost inevitably incorporate a strategy to leverage 
and strengthen regional agglomeration economies.  
 
2.8 Key Questions and Gaps in the Literature This Dissertation Will Address  
This review demonstrates that processes of technological change and innovation 
are now recognized as central to the study of macroeconomic growth. In addition, there is 
a broad consensus that the economic growth process is subject to increasing returns from 
new knowledge generation and increases in human capital in the workforce. The quasi 
public goods nature of new knowledge generation and innovation opens up an explicit 
role for government in supporting and investing in a range of efforts to increase 
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technological progress. Indeed, uneven national growth performance can in part be 
explained by the commitment and capacity of public and private sector institutions to 
generate and implement new product and process innovations or in the case of 
developing countries rapidly adopt leading edge technologies developed elsewhere. In the 
post WW-II era, state-led development efforts have been prominent in a number of 
countries that have rapidly increased their per-capita income and levels of industrial and 
technological development. Understanding the role of the state in the development of 
industrial and technology policies is hence crucial in explaining international growth 
patterns and technological and innovation capacities in individual countries.  The most 
systematic and context sensitive approach to analyzing the institutions and relationships 
that shape technological change at the level of the nation state is the national innovation 
systems framework. 
     The review of the NIS literature in developing countries shows that the NIS 
framework must be employed differently due to the ex-ante nature of technology policy 
development in middle or low income countries. Our understanding of ―system 
construction‖ processes can benefit from additional cases investigating the innovation 
system building characteristics in developing country contexts. This research contributes 
to the literature by providing a case analysis focusing on Turkey, an important middle 
income country that is explicitly employing the NIS framework in shaping its technology 
and innovation policies. This work is also unique relative to existing studies because it 
examines the system building features directly through the eyes of the actors involved in 
the process, including policy makers, innovative manufacturing firms and supporting 
organizations such as university research centers, technology development centers and 
business associations.  
 64 
The late development and developmental state theories show that nation states are 
highly influential in national development efforts; especially technology based economic 
development initiatives.  This is certainly true in the Turkish case where the central state 
has played a leading role from early industrialization efforts at the beginning of the 20th 
century through various plans and initiatives to enhance industrial modernization and 
technological progress since the late 1940s.  In exploring the complex innovation system 
building process, the study first of all investigates the importance and effectiveness of 
plans and policy making in Turkey.  It specifically looks at the historic role of the central 
government in supporting technological development and innovation. It also reviews the 
level of national and technical and industrial development achieved by the end of the 
1990s under numerous post-WW II government technology and innovation planning 
initiatives. The study specifically focuses on the distinct planning, policy and institutional 
initiatives that characterized the new emphasis on building a NIS system beginning in the 
late 1990s. It also explores the specific roles and activities of key public, non-profit and 
private institutions in the current innovation system in Turkey and also the major 
difficulties and problems confronting policy makers in their efforts to accomplish to build 
a more effective national innovation system that improves economic development 
outcomes. 
This will be followed by a more detailed examination of current policy initiatives 
shaping the NIS system construction processes. This study is specifically designed to 
address a significant gap in the development of NIS literature; the limited number of 
studies investigating interactive behaviors of system actors. In both the NIS framework 
and various models of innovation at the regional level discussed above, the quality of 
relationships and interactions is seen as crucial. In these frameworks the mere presence of 
formal linkages reveals little about the capacity and performance of the ―system,‖ or 
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benefits that firms may derive from participation in programs or public-private 
partnerships. This work, explores the system building processes and value of various 
relationships through the eyes of the people directly involved in institutions that make up 
both the production and support structure of the innovation system.  
Because the innovation system construction process is complex and multi-layered 
it is a challenging process to study. A comprehensive analysis would call for an extensive 
process of data collection among a representative sample of participants over some 
reasonably long period of time. This would require multiple scholars working through 
larger research teams. I adopt a more modest approach which focuses on understanding 
the historical context and understanding strengths and weaknesses in the system at one 
period of time based on positions and perceptions of a subset of important actors involved 
in the process in 2006-07. The adopted multi-level approach in this study first of all, uses 
regional and national innovation system frameworks and considers possible 
complementarities and disjuncture between national and regional processes of technology 
upgrading and innovation. 
 It evaluates numerous positions and arguments outlined in the above literature 
review on the relationships between national institutions and relationships and more local 
relationships at the level of the economic region. The study, in this way, investigates 
spatial considerations during system building practices, especially the importance of local 
versus non-local linkages and the importance of local agglomeration economies to the 
efforts of firms to upgrade technologies and generate new product or process innovations. 
The study explores presence and embeddedness of major RIS components posited in the 
literature among innovative manufacturing firms in the main Turkish industrial regions 
and also investigates strength and importance of and inter-regional (including 
international) networks among firms in the Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara cases. The 
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outcomes of this investigation should also shed more light on the role of regions and 
regional agglomeration in technology development in developing countries. The study, 
combining the analysis of national policies and firm linkages and performance at the 
regional level hopes to uncover ways that the national innovation policy can take better 
advantage of existing strengths and capacities at the regional level. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Overview of Research Strategies and Methods 
Drawing upon the rich theoretical insights on the central status of technological 
change and innovation in national development, this work will investigate policy 
development processes at the national level and private firm and extra-firm institutional 
interactions at national, international, and regional levels to gain insights on the national 
innovation system construction processes in a developing country context. Cognizant of 
the strong emphasis in contemporary literature on crucial role of regional agglomeration 
processes in stimulating innovation and competitive advantage and the unique context 
and challenges to accelerating innovation in developing countries, the study utilizes 
regional and national innovation system frameworks as supplements to each other to 
investigate the local and non-local networking patterns of firms and institutions within 
major economic regions. As such, the dissertation aims to capture the dynamic 
interactions among the actors and identify the main barriers to the fuller development of 
regional and national systems of innovation in Turkey. 
To better understand and evaluate the innovation system construction processes in 
Turkey, this study employs an integrated multi-level methodological approach. Given the 
focus and aims of this inquiry, a conjoined approach was required utilizing historical 
documents and analysis, quantitative data from secondary sources and in- depth 
interviews with policy makers, business assistance providers and firms utilizing 
technology and innovation policies and programs. To understand the contemporary 
system construction process at both the national and regional scales it is first essential to 
understand the unique historical context; how the emergence of a strong central state in 
Turkey has shaped the inherited structures and cultures within which technology and 
innovation policies are fashioned and implemented. To provide this context an historical 
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account of central government economic planning and policy making is provided in the 
following chapter. The central state in Turkey (and arguably in all most developing 
countries) has been the main driver of industrial and technology policies, with sub-
national entities playing a distinctly subsidiary role. This chapter of the dissertation 
addresses the first preliminary questions of this dissertation: What is the historic role of 
the central government in supporting technological development and innovation in 
Turkey; and what level of national and technical and industrial development was 
achieved by the end of the 1990s under numerous post WW-II government technology 
and innovation planning initiatives? This analysis establishes the historic context but also 
is an essential baseline to evaluate the contemporary NIS construction process. 
Given the prominent role of the central government in shaping technology and 
innovation policy, it was crucial to understand recent efforts at organizing national 
technology policies around the NIS framework from the perspective of key decision-
makers and policy implementers in the central government. Contemporary government 
reports, documents and legislation is analyzed to better understand the specific policy 
goals, instruments, and funding levels associated with the recent NIS initiatives of the 
central government. A number of key personnel in the relevant national agencies were 
interviewed to delineate the rationale and goals of recent policies and to detail their 
perspectives on successes, failures and needed adjustments to current efforts. 
Furthermore, I was interested in determining how the role of regional specialization and 
agglomeration was viewed by national policy makers and how (or if) regional 
considerations influenced policy development or design. The insights and perspectives of 
these actors were also evaluated in terms of secondary quantitative data on national and 
industrial growth performance, measures of technological improvement such as R&D and 
patent data, and data on regional industrial specialization and change.  This section of the 
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dissertation helps address the following main research questions: What were the distinct 
planning, policy and institutional initiatives that characterized the new emphasis on 
building a NIS system beginning in the late 1990s; and what major difficulties and 
problems currently confront policy-makers in their efforts to accomplish to build a more 
effective national innovation system? 
 The most extensive aspect of this research involves an investigation of the 
―subjects‖ of national innovation policies; private firms and public support institutions in 
the three major economic regions of Turkey. The three major industrial regions of Turkey 
were selected as cases to probe the character and importance of interaction between 
national and regional levels in policy and in the actual innovation activities of firms and 
institutions. These metropolitan regions- Istanbul Izmir and Ankara- were obvious cases 
because collectively they are dominant in terms of their shares of national non-
agricultural economic activity, workforce skill levels and technological performance. 
While there are some other second tier economic regions in Turkey, the presence and 
significance of local agglomeration economies is much more likely to stand out in these 
major regions. For each regional ―case‖ secondary data was used to profile industrial 
specialization and recent patterns of growth and change to provide general evidence of 
agglomerative forces. 
At the regional scale, the RIS framework is referenced to study and evaluate the 
character of innovation networks in concrete technology upgrading and product and 
process innovation efforts (Cooke 2002, Isaksen et.al 2001, Muller 2001, Simmie 2001). 
Of central importance here is understanding whether technical and innovation 
collaborations show a regional or more inter-regional character, focusing on the value 
firms place on their local collaborations versus their non-local collaborations. 
Investigating institutional characteristics in these three regions allowed the interviews of 
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firms and support institutions to evaluate the potential significance of local versus non-
local interactions and the real importance of spatial scale during an early innovation 
system building phase.  
Within each region two sets of institutional actors were interviewed extensively 
using structured interview protocols involving directed and open-ended questions. First, 
in depth interviews were conducted with institutions and service providers supported by 
the public sector (e.g. university innovation partners and technical assistance providers) 
in each of the three regions. Second, eighty-three manufacturing firms that received 
government support for innovation were interviewed in depth to determine firm 
characteristics, products, R&D activities, opportunities and barriers to innovation and 
importance of local and non-local linkages to their operations and innovation efforts.  
More detailed rationales and justifications for this qualitative interview 
methodology will be outlined below, but there are three basic reasons why in-depth 
interviews of the key private and public sector actors is the most appropriate method to 
address the remaining key questions of this dissertation. First in the Turkish context, 
more systematic efforts to support technological upgrading and innovation are quite new 
and rapidly evolving. A broad based mail-out or internet survey of firms or institutions 
would be subject to inaccurate and distorted response because many of the terms and 
question content could be unfamiliar or misinterpreted by respondents.  A more direct 
face-to-face interview process allows for meanings and queries to be clarified and 
reflected upon by the interviewee. Second, because the influence of relationships between 
institutions and actors are seen as crucial to the character and performance of the 
innovation system, the significance of ties and relationships must be evaluated in addition 
to the mere existence of relationships (Markusen, 1994). Understanding the significance 
of specific relationships with customers, suppliers, and public sector support institutions 
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can best be ascertained through an intensive interview process. Third and more 
prosaically, surveying the large numbers of firms necessary to obtain a statistically 
meaningful sample through an intensive face-to-face protocol would have been a 
prohibitively expensive and time consuming endeavor. Following from this overview, in 
what follows I offer a more detailed description and justification of methods focusing on 
the research process, secondary data and evidence, the economic regions and the 
interview samples and methods.             
 
3.2 The Research Process in the Field  
Utilizing the NIS and RIS frameworks together to answer the key research 
questions in this work requires an understanding about factors that influence innovation 
and technical change at the firm level and about how innovation is related to scale and 
space. The research process in this dissertation required an iterative approach where 
strategies and methods were adjusted and refined as the field work was carried out. The 
basic strategy was consistent with the approach suggested by Cooke (2001) for 
conducting field research on regional innovation systems in developing countries.  
The mixed methodology based research design strategy generally followed four 
steps suggested by Cooke (2001) and shared features of the research designs of other 
investigators in this area. The first step was examination and analysis of existing 
documentation on innovation and technology policies at the national level. The policy 
documents and plans were collected and investigated based on their discussion of science 
and technology issues and how to measure and build innovation based capacities and 
capabilities. The second step involved analysis of existing documentation on industry 
structure, industry strengths, employment, exports and any data relevant to 
competitiveness and innovativeness of regions. Simple regional analysis tools - location 
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quotients and shift-share analysis - were used to understand industrial structure and 
specialization in the three study regions.  This stage also included identification of the 
firms that will be included in the empirical analysis and interview process. The third step 
was identification and investigation of organizations participating and contributing to 
technology transfer and innovation in the regions, such as universities, research institutes, 
technology transfer agencies, consultants, and business associations. And the final step 
was examination of a randomly selected sample of innovative firms in manufacturing 
industries that received government R&D support in the major regions in Turkey. This 
stage also included in-depth interviews with representatives of the supporting institutions 
awarding grants and providing services to the firms. 
In concert with these steps of the research design strategy, the fieldwork process 
consisted of three main investigation phases: Phase One: Getting acquainted with the 
parties involved in technology development in Turkey, Phase Two: Conducting in-depth 
interviews and in-depth surveys, Phase Three: Follow-up interviews. The objectives, time 
periods and accomplishments of research activities in each phase are described below. 
 
Phase One: Identifying the Key Parties Involved in Technology Development and 
Developing the Sampling Frame of Innovative Firms in Turkey 
The most important aim of the first phase of the fieldwork research was to get 
acquainted with the parties that  were involved in significant ways with technology 
development and establish contacts with representatives of the major actors in the 
Turkish national innovation system including the science and technology council, key 
state planning organizations, technology development agencies, university research 
centers, public research institutions, innovation relay centers and university 
entrepreneurship development organizations. This was an important and surprisingly 
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challenging task because the rules and roles of older institutions were changing and new 
organizations were being established over the study period. Once the institutions forming 
the national innovation system in Turkey were known, identifying key people in these 
institutions guiding and/or influencing the development and implementation of 
technology and innovation policies was also challenging in the beginning of the field 
research. The introductory phase helped establishing closer relationships with many 
officials in these institutions that helped to establish access to important respondents 
during the data collection phase of the study.  
The first phase was also a preparation stage for the second phase of the study 
specifically for understanding the policy context facing firms and using this information 
to shape the firms interview process. In this respect, data on the industry structure of the 
three regions were gathered from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and were used 
to detail industry specialization and change in the study regions. Even though the 
sampling of the firms was not carried according to regional industrial strengths, knowing 
general characteristics and industrial specialization in the regions provided an 
understanding of the regional context during the data collection and interpretation phases.  
In this phase, the sample universe of innovative firms was also acquired from the 
Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), and Technology 
Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV). This sample consisted of Turkish 
manufacturing firms conducting R&D and receiving support services from the 
government or government supported entities. The receipt of public R&D funding was 
used as an indication that the firms were involved in innovation or technology upgrading 
because these funds are awarded by institutions through a competitive award process. 
The granting agencies typically appoint a board of university professors to monitor and 
scrutinize progress of supported R&D projects. Considering the scope and available 
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resources, the study focused on firms that were actively engaged in innovation and 
upgrading and successful participation in publically supported award programs was seen 
as a reasonable indicator of a firm‘s active commitment to technological improvement 
and innovation. Given the scope and limitations of this study, examining firms actively 
involved in innovation activities offered a better chance to address the key questions in a 
more meaningful way. In this first phase, previously prepared surveys were also applied 
to three pilot firms located in Ankara, based on the outcomes of which the surveys used 
underwent several rounds of revisions. Approximately two months (February-March 
2006) was allocated to accomplish the stated objectives in the first phase of the field 
work research. 
 
Phase Two: Conducting In-depth Interviews and Surveys in Istanbul, Izmir and 
Ankara 
The primary objectives of the second phase of the study were to conduct in-depth 
interviews with officials of various public and private institutions most directly involved 
in shaping the science, technology and innovation infrastructure of the country, and to 
conduct in-person interviews with innovative firms in the manufacturing industry to 
investigate specific regional and national factors that influenced the performance and 
innovative activities of the surveyed firms.  
The first step in the field work was devoted to in-depth interviews with the 
officials of the institutions, mostly the central government ones, located in Ankara. 
Several in-depth interviews conducted with the officials of the TUBITAK and TTGV 
resulted in them providing data and support which greatly enhanced my ability to 
understand policies and programs and select firms that had received competitive support 
from government programs. In the following three months the in-depth interviews with 
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firms and local support institutions were carried out in each region. These in-depth 
interviews were with representatives of universities, public research institutions and the 
selected firms in each of the three study regions (April-July 2006). 
 
Phase Three: Follow-up Interviews with Science and Technology Policy Makers and 
Officials 
Considering fast pace of developments in science, technology and innovation 
related policies in the year when the research was conducted, a second follow up round of 
interviews with the policy makers and officials influencing the direction of these 
developments was carried out a year later. A small but influential group of the original 
interviewees were contacted for a second round of in-depth interviews in July 2007. 
Some of the same questions were asked to understand if responses or perceptions had 
changed and the rest of the interviews focused on on-going changes and their 
repercussions on existing sets of policies and institutions. Documentation of new 
developments including new policy documents and reviews were collected and examined 
to better grasp how policy changes were responding to gaps or needs in the ongoing 
national innovation system building processes in Turkey.  
 
3.3 Research Methods and Instruments 
As noted, this study adopted a mixed methodological approach since both 
quantitative and qualitative assessments are needed to explain the factors that influence 
the decisions and abilities of firms to organize their business strategies around technology 
upgrading and innovation. A quantitative approach was required to examine 
characteristics and patterns of innovative activities of large number of firms and their 
interactions with other actors in the system. A qualitative approach was needed to 
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understand local and non-local linkages and relationships and the character and 
significance of these relationships to the innovative activities of resident firms. Firms, as 
the major end users of public resources and services, were interviewed in-depth in a face-
to-face setting to allow for clarification of terms and questions and to better delineate the 
importance and spatial of characteristics of extra-firm relationships. In some cases it 
would be impossible to extract or meaningfully interpret responses to many queries 
through structured postal surveys. In addition, examination of  policy making around the 
new NIS building strategy at the national level was facilitated through in-depth 
questioning of on-duty and retired policy makers who were directly involved in policy 
making process. In sum, case study, survey and in-depth interview methods were utilized 
and combined to answer the main research questions of this study. 
To investigate the status and importance of the national and regional levels of 
national innovation system building process in Turkey, four ―cases‖ were developed. At 
the national scale, national innovation system studies require by definition an 
investigation of national level goals and policy making processes. Turkey provides an 
appropriate context for assessing emerging innovation system features because the 
country is a middle-income developing country with certain innovation system 
characteristics, which are neither fully developed nor highly limited or fragmented. The 
long science and technology policy and plan making history of the country makes Turkey 
an illuminating case because the innovation system building idea rests on evolutionary 
premises and benefits from existence of a certain set of pre-existing factors that facilitate 
formation of new institutions and relationships.   In addition, Turkey is a centralized 
nation state where all regions are subject to the same regulatory, institutional and 
macroeconomic framework. The national environment, therefore, provides a critical 
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context to assess the relative importance of regional competences and networks during a 
system building phase. 
It is important to recall from the literature that policies and institutions are not the 
only means or resources that constitute innovation systems at the national level. It is the 
interactions, collaborations and resulting ongoing relationships that determine the essence 
and structure of newly forming innovation systems. The novelty of this research rests on 
the investigation of both the institutional framework and the importance and evolution of 
interrelationship between institutions and actors in assessing the performance of the NIS 
in the context of a middle income developing nation. Regions, in this respect represent a 
crucial component of the analysis because the importance of regional agglomeration 
economies and local interrelationships are seen as major factors influencing technological 
change and innovation. The issue is how the regional character of innovative processes 
highlighted in the literature pertains to a case like Turkey at an intermediate level of 
technological capacity and with a long history central government direction in technology 
and industrial policy. 
3.3.1 The Case Study Regions 
The definition of region in the literature is pretty ambiguous, as there is no single 
definition that captures all dimensions of the concept. A region, especially within the 
context of the regional innovation systems, might indicate a scale that is above the nation 
states, embracing territories of multiple nations such as the territory of the European 
Union, or it might be a district within a city that is functionally different than its 
surrounding area. Independent from the level of scale, there have been two approaches to 
‗defining a region‘ that differentiate the ―region‖ from all other dimensions by tying it to 
a developmental perspective. In the words of McDougal et.al (1947): 
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―Some define it [the region] as an organism of component parts, so interacting 
that the whole is different from the sum of the total parts. Others define it as an 
area, determined by a variety of natural and man-made indices, which is 
convenient for planning and administration for specified purposes. On close 
analysis, the difference between these two modes dissolves largely into a matter 
of words. The one has to define its components, and the other its ―indices‖ in 
terms of relatively precise areal characteristics. 
Both require a group of people with certain homogenous attitudes, desires and 
wants; a contagious area with certain geographic unities; a certain base in natural 
and man-made resources, technology and economic institutions; and appropriate 
political and administrative organization. Both agree that the boundaries of a 
region cannot be precisely and permanently marked, that its extent depends upon 
variables that are constantly changing and that it is more important to identify 
core and approximate area than it is to dispute about periphery. In such a 
framework of fundamental agreement, the question of whether the whole is 
something more than the total of its parts is largely metaphysical. The important 
question is which style of definition gives to the people of an area the more 
effective vision of its possibilities of development. It is believed that a 
combination of both styles may best serve this purpose.‖   
This holistic perspective of the region, informed the identification of the regions 
to be included in the study and the designation of their boundaries which appeared to be 
significant for the selection firms engaged in innovative activities. The Istanbul, Izmir 
and Ankara metropolitan regions appeared as the most expletory cases to explore the 
main research questions in this work. These are the three biggest metro areas in the 
country and they house almost all of the prominent institutions engaged in technological 
improvement and innovation. It should be restated that this study intends to use the 
regional innovation system concept as an instrument to evaluate the status of NIS 
construction in Turkey. In this respect, the cases at the regional level are not selected 
because they represent some distinctive types of relatively autonomous regional 
innovation systems as exemplified in the literature. These regions are selected since they 
are inherently part of a centralized administrative structure yet significant and distinct 
enough (in terms of industrial variety, intensity of knowledge and technology, 
agglomeration processes, etc) to evaluate national dynamics in terms of regional 
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processes. Even though the boundaries of these areas are changing and are not known in 
terms of cultural distinctiveness or other attributes, metropolitan areas were used to select 
the study firms. However, in addition to following provincial boundaries for metropolitan 
areas, two additions have been made with the inclusion of Gebze district of Kocaeli and 
also the city of Manisa in the hinterland of Izmir, as they were informative in terms of 
assessing the sources and intensity of regional and national innovation linkages24.  
 
Istanbul 
The case studies were chosen on the basis of their intensity and complexity of 
economic and institutional characteristics. Commonly defined as the primary city of 
Turkey, Istanbul is the largest province of Turkey with a population of almost 13 million 
inhabitants.  It is included in the study as it has always been the center of Turkey‘s 
economic life and located at the juncture of major international trade routes. Istanbul‘s 
population accounts for 17.7 % of the total population in Turkey. In terms of population 
density, Istanbul ranks first with 2,389 people per square km, more than 26 times of the 
national average of 91.  
According to 2001 figures, Istanbul ranks 7th in Turkey with $3,063 per capita 
income, which is 42.7 % higher than the national average of $2,14625. The city ―produces 
almost 27% of national GDP, 38% of total industrial output and more than 50% of 
                                                 
24 Gebze, located on the eastern border of Istanbul, is administratively part of Kocaeli, but highly 
integrated into Istanbul functionally. Gebze houses various big, industrial and innovative firms; the biggest 
public research institute (TUBITAK MAM) in the country and also the prestigious Gebze High Technology 
Institute. Manisa, on the other hand, is evaluated together with Izmir because many firms previously 
located in Izmir moved to the organized industrial zone in Manisa which houses and encourages attraction 
of technologically advanced, national and international firms. Firms in this organized industrial zone utilize 
urbanization and also the localization economies such as port and universities of Izmir. In both cases, it is 
pretty common for the skilled workforce to work in Gebze or Manisa but to live in Istanbul or Izmir 
respectively.  
25 As the latest regional data provided by Turkish Statistical Institute is for 2001, these figures are used in 
the text. 
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services, and generates 40% of national tax revenues‖26. It is also responsible for 55.3 % 
of total exports, and 57.9 % of total imports in Turkey. The unemployment rate in 2001 
which is 11.2 % is slightly over the national rate of 11.0 %. 
As the industrial and financial centre of the country, Istanbul has experienced 
huge inflows of migration from other parts of the country since the 1950s which created 
incredible stress on the physical and economic structure of the city. Economically, it 
spurred informal sector of the economy, which makes up approximately one third of the 
city‘s working labor force, as economic growth was insufficient to provide jobs in the 
formal sector for all the new comers to the city. Istanbul employs 27.7 % of the 
manufacturing workforce in the country, even though the economic structure of the city 
has shifted towards a higher value added and service oriented industries especially after 
the 1980s. Many manufacturing establishments have left the city and relocated in 
Istanbul‘s larger functional area leaving the city with 126,393 manufacturing firms 
constituting 31.4 % of all manufacturing firms in the country. Manufacturing firms are 
concentrated in food processing, textile, oil products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, glass, machinery, automotive and other transport vehicles, paper and paper 
products, rubber, metal ware and leather production. 
The intensity of economic activities in Istanbul results in a large set of extra-firm 
institutions in the city. Industrial organizations, financial institutions, business 
associations, labor unions have a strong presence and are actively involved in city‘s 
politics. Many national public institutions and non-governmental organizations also have 
regional offices in the city even though they are headquartered in the capital city of 
Ankara. Some of the very best technical universities in Turkey are also located in 
                                                 
26 OECD (2008). Accessed at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/62/40317916.pdf 
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Istanbul. There are 30 universities in total of which 7 are public and 23 are private, and 
they make almost 20 % of all universities in Turkey. The total number of faculty 
including instructors and research assistants in universities in Istanbul also constitute 20 
% of all faculties in the country. The biggest public research institute in Turkey, 
TUBITAK Marmara Research Center, is also located in the greater functional economic 
area of Istanbul together with other public research institutions.  
 
Izmir 
Izmir, the third biggest city in Turkey, is located on the western coast of the 
country with a population of 3,795,978, which accounts for 5.3% of the total population 
in Turkey. In terms of population density, with 316 people per square km, more than 
triple the national average of 91, Izmir ranks third in the country. Migration, though not 
severe as in the case of Istanbul, is an important factor that determines the composite of 
the city and also explains the rate of population increase (15‰), despite a declining birth 
rate, which exceeds Turkey‘s average (13.1‰) by 1.9 ‰. 
According to 2001 figures, Izmir ranks 6th among Turkish metro regions with 
$3,125 per capita income, which is 45.6 % higher than the national average of $2,146. 
The city generates 7.5% of national GDP, 9 % of total industrial output and 10% of tax 
revenues. Izmir is responsible for 6% of total exports, and 4.1% of total imports in 
Turkey. 1,171,000 people are employed in Izmir and while 61% of the employed 
population work in the services; 31.5 % work in the manufacturing and 7.5 % work in the 
agriculture sectors. The unemployment rate is 11.8 % compared to the national rate of 
11.0 % in 2001.  
Izmir‘s 28,718 manufacturing establishments make up 7.1 % of all manufacturing 
firms in Turkey and 14 % of all establishments in Izmir. Manufacturing firms in various 
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sectors are mostly located in two free trade zones and 18 organized industrial areas in 
Izmir. Agricultural products, especially cotton, figs, grapes, tobacco, olives and olive oil; 
foodstuff; textiles and apparel; iron and steel are Izmir‘s traditional exports. Electronics, 
automotive, ceramics, chemicals and paper products, and beverages are starting to replace 
the traditional export sectors in terms of trade volume.  
Izmir also hosts numerous chambers and business associations such as Izmir 
Chamber of Commerce, Aegean Region Chamber of Industry, Aegean Free Trade Zone 
(ESBAS), and Aegean Region Association of Industrialist Businessman (ESIAD) which 
play important role in promoting Izmir as a favorable investment location, especially to 
foreign investors. The City promotes its natural port and well-connected hinterland, 
educated workforce and human capital, culture, climate and touristic surroundings.  
Izmir is widely known for high levels of educational attainment and skill in its 
workforce, trained in either one of the seven local universities (which makes almost 5 % 
of all universities in Turkey) or in national universities in other regions. Out of seven 
universities in the metro area, 3 of them are state universities while the rest are private 
universities and 7.7% of all university faculties in Turkey, including instructors and 
research assistants, are employed in Izmir universities. Vocational schools associated 
with universities also supply many sectors with skilled labor. 
 
Ankara 
Ankara, the second biggest city and the capital of Turkey, has a population of 
4,548,939, which accounts for 6.3 % of the total population in Turkey. In terms of 
population density, with 179 people per square km, the city doubles the national average 
of 91 and ranks ninth in the country. Ankara‘s population increase rate is 18.2‰ in 
comparison to Turkey‘s average increase of 13.1‰ per year.  
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According to 2001 figures, Ankara ranks 9th in Turkey with $2,752 per capita 
income, which is 2.8 % higher than the national average of $2,146. The city generates 6% 
of national GDP, 13% of total industrial output and 12% of tax revenues. Ankara is 
responsible for 3.9% of total exports, and 9.8% of total imports in Turkey. Manufacturing 
exports and imports make up 3.8% and 4.7 % of all manufacturing exports and imports in 
Turkey respectively.  
Ankara employs 1,352,000 people and in terms of the employment composition, 
72.4% of the employed workforce is in the services sector while 25.6% and 2% are in the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors respectively. University graduates constitute 14.8% 
of the employed workforce in the city. The unemployment rate is equal to the national 
unemployment rate of 11.0 %. 6.3 % of all manufacturing firms in Turkey are located in 
Ankara, mostly in the Sincan, Akyurt, Cubuk, Ivedik and Ostim industrial areas. 
Manufacturing firms are mainly involved in machinery and metal ware, food processing, 
transport vehicles, furniture and textile production. Software and electronics are also 
among the most important sectors due to the strong presence of defense industry in 
Ankara.   
There are 10 universities in Ankara which represent almost 7 % of all universities 
in Turkey. Two universities in Ankara, one public state university and one private 
university are nationally and internationally prominent in science and engineering fields 
and actively participate in various industry projects, mainly in defense-related sectors. 
These universities also have research institutes which lead the field in their specialized 
areas. The total number of faculty including instructors and research assistants in 
universities in Ankara constitute 20 % of all faculties in the country. The quality, size and 
structure of the Ankara universities and their close ties with the defense industry, fueled 
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the establishment of nation‘s first science and technology parks under a university 
partnership. 
As the capital city, Ankara also hosts major public institutions including 
ministries and public research institutes. The local presence of TUBITAK (Scientific and 
Technical Research Council of Turkey), DPT (State Planning Organization), TTGV 
(Technology Development Foundation of Turkey), KOSGEB (Small and Medium 
Industry Development Organization) and TPE (Turkish Patent Institute) is especially 
important as they influence development of technology and innovation policies across the 
nation. 
 
3.3.2  Public and Private Informants 
As it has been touched upon at the field work chronology section of this chapter, 
this research mainly investigated two major realms of the NIS framework, the public 
organizations that support technological change and innovation and the private 
companies that actually produce innovations. This section will articulate how the specific 
public sector and firm informants were identified and the question and interview 
frameworks that were used to better understand the NIS construction process. 
 3.3.2.1 Institutions that form the NIS Framework in Turkey 
The institutions that constitute the emerging innovation system in Turkey 
resemble in many ways international counterparts in OECD countries. The institutional 
composition of the emerging NIS began to be filled out and connected in the late 1990s, 
through adoption of more deliberate policies and systemic efforts to increase the pace of 
technological improvement to catch-up with the current technological developments in 
international markets, particularly the European Union. New institutional components 
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were put in place to fill gaps identified through analysis and study of technology policies 
and institutions in advanced market economies. Now that the system in Turkey includes 
most of major elements found in OECD countries. However, a central question in this 
research is how the elements are functioning, particularly if significant and productive 
linkages and associations are developing between NIS components. Even though most of 
these system elements have a strong institutional history and heritage and qualified  
 
Table 3.1 Key Institutions in Turkish NIS Development 
Field of 
Organization 
Name of Organization Type of 
Organization 
Subordinate of 
 
Policy  
Making 
Supreme Council of Science and 
Technology (BTYK) 
 Prime Minister 
 Scientific and Research Council of 
Turkey (TEYDEB-TUBITAK) 
Public Prime Minister 
 State Planning Organization (DPT) Public Prime Minister 
Financing Scientific and Research Council of 
Turkey (TUBITAK) 
Public Prime Minister 
 Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade 
(DTM) 
Public Prime Minister 
 Under-Secretariat of Treasury (HM) Public Prime Minister 
 Ministry of Finance (MB) Public Prime Minister 
 Ministry of Industry and Trade (STB) Public Prime Minister 
 Small and Medium Industry 
Development Organization (KOSGEB) 
Public Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
 Technology Development Foundation 
of Turkey (TTGV) 
Non-Profit  
 Venture Companies Private  
Business and 
Entrepreneurship 
Development/ 
Support 
KOSGEB Technology Development 
Centers (TEKMERs) 
Public Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
 KOSGEB Entrepreneurship 
Development Center 
Public Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
 Technoparks Public and Private  
 86 
 Turkish Standards Institute (TSE)  Public Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
 National Metrology Institute (UME) Public Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
Knowledge  
Institutes 
Universities Public and Private Higher Education 
Council (YOK) 
 University Research Centers Public and Private  
 University-Industry Joint Research 
Centers 
Public and Private  
 Public Research Institutes Public  
 TUBITAK Research Centers Public TUBITAK 
Intellectual  
Property 
Turkish Patent Institute Public Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 
 Patent Consultancy Firms Private  
personnel, the institutional cultures, inherited roles, and status in the central state 
bureaucracy make new forms of collaboration challenging.  
It seems that, especially when the broad definition of national innovation system 
framework is adopted to test for systemic interactions, that some institutions will have a 
prominent leadership role (often attached to funding resources) while others will have a 
more subsidiary or symbolic role. While many institutions are nominally involved in 
technology development and innovation generation practices, particular institutions are 
specifically important in the establishment and functioning of the national innovation 
system. In the Turkish case, following institutions have important roles in fashioning and 
maintaining the functioning of the national innovation system. 
 
3.3.2.2 Identification of NIS Support Organizations and Interviewees 
Even as the institutions forming the national innovation system in Turkey were 
delineated, identifying key people in the institutions guiding technology policy and 
innovation was a challenge at the beginning of the field research. Three major lists of 
potential interviewees were prepared based on different data bases. First, major plans and 
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policy documents were examined and the people involved in the preparation of key 
documents or participating in workshops and meetings that led to preparation of 
documents such as the technology foresight document Vision 2023 were identified. 
Repeating names in most of the documents were noted in addition to the names of leaders 
holding offices during the formation of more recent NIS strategies and initiatives. 
Second, major media resources including newspapers, technology and innovation policy 
related journals, magazines and web pages were identified and examined not only for 
knowledge of the policy making process and institutional framework specific to Turkish 
context, but also to validate and expand the list of potential contacts. Third, academics 
actively working on technology development and innovation issues were contacted to 
discuss their research and their perception of national policy directions and to find further 
sources from their own sets of networks. Names that were prominent in all three lists 
were identified as interviewees to contact and newer names, if missing, were added at the 
end of each interview as part of an adopted snow balling technique. During the first phase 
of the field research, government, industry and university contacts and interviews 
included: Turkish Science and Technology Council (TUBITAK); Technology 
Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV); State Planning Organization (DPT); 
Ministry of Industry and Trade; Under secretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign 
Trade (DTM); Small and Medium Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB); 
ODTU Technology Development Center (ODTU TEKMER); Hacettepe University 
Technology Development Center (Hacettepe TEKMER); Ankara University Technology 
Development Center (Ankara TEKMER); Ankara Innovation Relay Center (IRC); Izmir 
Innovation Relay Center (IRC); Ankara Chamber of Industry (ASO); Istanbul Chamber 
of Industry (ISO); Aegean Region Chamber of Industry (EBSO); Aegean Free Zone 
(ESBAS); TUBITAK Marmara Research Center (TUBITAK-MAM); Interdisciplinary 
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Research and Application Center of Middle East Technical University (ODTU-BILTIR); 
Istanbul Technical University Automotive Technology Development Center (OTAM); 
Istanbul Technical University Metallurgical and Materials Engineering Department- 
Surface Technologies Group-; Bilkent University Nano Technology Research Center 
(NANOTAM); and TUBITAK Defense Industries Research and Development Institute 
(TUBITAK-SAGE).  
 
3.3.2.3 Description of Interviews: List of Sample Questions 
The interviews conducted with the representatives of supporting actors in the 
above NIS institutions (including universities, public research institutions, technology 
development centers, university commercialization centers, public institutions, etc) 
combined structured and open-ended questions due to the complex and multidimensional 
nature of the scope of the study. Accordingly, not all questions were used in every 
interview, but the same sets of questions were asked to multiple interviewees affiliated 
with the same institutions (in an attempt to improve the reliability and validity of 
interpretations of institutional positions and perceptions). It should also be noted that 
innovation policy was a hot topic in Turkey when the field research was conducted 
during the March-August 2006. Many developments were taking place in both the legal 
and institutional arena that necessitated another round of interviews with decision and 
policy makers at key institutions in the summer of the 2007. Additional questions were 
used during the second phase of the study to test initial findings and investigate changes 
and accomplishments since conducting of the first set of interviews. The following 
questions were directed to the interviewees in various organizations and in each interview 
the respondents were allowed to expand upon their answers of add additional points or 
elaborations to the questions in the interview frame.  
 89 
Table 3.2 List of Interview Questions  
 
1. How would you define a national innovation system? What is your definition? 
2. How would you describe evolution of the Turkish National Innovation System?  
2.1. Since 1997, when BTYK explicitly called for the establishment of a national innovation 
system, what would you say have been the greatest changes influencing construction of the 
Turkish National Innovation System? 
2.1.1. Have there been changes in existing institutional structure? 
2.1.2. Have there been changes in existing legal framework? 
2.1.3. Have there been changes in existing financing mechanisms? 
2.2. How would you define the roles of your organization in the NIS building process? How 
important was/is your organization? 
2.3. How would you define your organization‘s relationship with other actors in the system? 
2.4. How successful would you define the overall system building process? 
2.5. What would you say are the major missing elements in the system? 
2.6. What would you say are the most successful policies and or measures in the system 
building process? 
3. What would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish National Innovation 
System? 
4. How would you envision the future of the Turkish National Innovation System? Why would 
you say that? 
5. How would you define the major obstacles in NIS development? 
6. How would you define a regional innovation system in Turkey? What would you say are the 
key components?  
7. Is it possible to talk about existence of a regional innovation system in your region? Why? 
Why not? 
8. How would you place your organization in this regional innovation system framework? What 
specific roles does your organization carry out at the regional level?  
9. How would you define relative positions of regional and national innovation systems in the 
country? Are they horizontal or hierarchical? How should it be? 
10. How could co-operative relationships between institutions be improved for future systematic 
innovation? 
11. What would be the main barriers to the improvement of these co-operative relationships? 
 
 
Most of the interviews were taped after getting the consent of the respondents. 
Individual respondents were assured of anonymity by this author on any written 
document produced as a research output, but the identity of the institution could be 
revealed. Interviews typically lasted about 1-1.5 hours on average. Twenty-five in-depth, 
face-to-face interviews were conducted with national policy makers, policy analysts, 
technology consultants, representatives of the technology development centers, 
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innovation relay centers, industrial associations and technopark managers by August 
2006 (and  3  additional in person interviews were carried out during August 2007). 
Besides, 8 in-depth, face-to face interviews were conducted with academicians in 
universities and research centers by the end of the July 2006.  
 
3.3.2.4 The Firm Interview Process  
The scope and extent of this study necessitated  in depth, face-to-face surveys to identify 
interactive nature of firms‘ relationships with other firms and extra-firm institutions and 
the significance of those relationships to the firm‘s efforts to upgrade their technology 
and carry out more distinct product and process innovation. During survey preparation 
phase, goals of this part of the study were identified to structure questions that got at the 
various national and regional dimensions of firm and institutional interactions. As 
innovations are in some sense related to both micro (firm) and meso (regional) level 
outputs the questions to investigate multifaceted dimensions of innovation drew upon 
various approaches that have been developed in the field of innovation surveys27 (UNU-
INTECH, 2004). 
                                                 
27 According to Unu-Intech 2004, the evolution of innovation surveys shows that studies have mainly 
adopted three basic approaches to evaluate the innovation performance of firms. The first approach adopted 
to evaluate firm and larger level (region or nation) innovation performance was the ‗output approach‘ 
which basically used number of patents and R&D expenditures as proxies for innovative activity. Within 
this tradition, the studies focus on learning about the characteristics of firms, sources of innovations, nature 
of innovations (product or process), costs of innovations, impacts of innovations on firm performances, the 
time lag between inventions and innovations and the diffusion of innovations (Myrtal et. al 1967; Edwards 
and Gordon 1984). The second, the ‗activity approach‘, extended the focus of attention from R&D inputs to 
non-R&D inputs including design capacities, prototype development and competencies in identifying and 
testing new innovations in the market. In this approach, the definition of innovation is broadened and R&D 
is no-longer accepted as the primary source of significant innovations (European Community Innovation 
Survey, 1992). The third innovation systems approach, extended the objects of analysis a step further to 
include  not only the firm level factors stimulating innovations, but also the extra firm factors at larger 
scales  that burnished the resources available for generation of new knowledge at the firm level. Innovation 
systems surveys especially focused on measuring connectivity among the regional and national elements of 
the broader system. 
 91 
In the survey preparation phase of the study, major innovation surveys, including 
the OECD‘s Oslo Manual were reviewed and used to identify central factors thought to 
influence issues of technological change and innovation in private firms. In the final 
survey design questions derived from the innovation systems approach were extensively 
used, revised and modified especially the  queries adopted in the studies of Cooke 2002, 
Doloreux 2002, UNU-INTECH 2004, Ronde and Hussler 2005 to extract the knowledge 
required to answer the main research questions.  
The fundamental goal of the firm survey portion of the study was to come up with 
an assessment of contemporary NIS policies in Turkey that were designed and 
implemented to promote linkages, collaborations and networks among different actors of 
the national innovation system. That objective required an understanding of firm 
characteristics and competences, resources and barriers to knowledge generation, types of 
collaborators and geographical location of collaborations and their strengths. The nature 
and scope of collaborations revealed in the surveys illuminated not only the extent and 
importance of regional factors but also the significance of national resources in 
generation of new knowledge and technologies. The surveys also sought to delineate the 
relative importance and intertwined nature of two different realms (regional and national) 
and their specific significance for the upgrading innovative efforts of the firms. 
In this context, the goals of the firm survey portion of the study were as follows: 
1. To explore the characteristics of innovative manufacturing firms in terms of the 
types of goods produced, firm age, geographic history, firm origin, R&D and related 
activities, firm size (employment and revenues), and geographic distribution of sales 
revenues. 
2. To explore the specific technology and innovative activities of manufacturing 
in terms of novelty of innovations, types of innovations (product or process), reasons for 
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investing in technology or product and process innovations, competences of firms in 
carrying out innovations (organizational, technical, collaborative, and financial 
competences),  R&D activities, patents, obstacles and/or hindrances in innovative 
activities, and identifying the importance of various knowledge sources for innovations, 
and understanding the impact of specific government support programs from the 
perspective of participating firms. 
3. To explore the significance of proximity within the context of classic 
urbanization and localization economies.    
4. To identify importance of location specific resources, types of collaborations, 
motives for collaborations and problems associated with local or non-local collaborations 
in innovation efforts. 
Beyond understanding character and history, a principal aim was to explore, in-
depth, particular factors supporting innovation generation at firm level. How do they 
value innovation generation, how do they see the process, do they believe they are 
singular actors or part of bigger networks? If so how do they describe the operation and 
importance of network relationships? Are these relationships mostly with other firms or 
institutions in a metro region or outside the region? Which national means and tools do 
firms employ to improve on their manufacturing and design capabilities? Which 
particular knowledge sources do they value most in their innovation efforts? Are these 
knowledge resources regional, national or international? What firm specific competences 
foster new product development? How do they assess the strengths of these 
competences? What are the major obstacles and hindrances with respect to innovation 
activities and how significant are they? How important, helpful and effective are 
government support programs for their innovation practices? In order to answer all these 
context dependent questions face-to-face surveys were carried out at the micro level.  
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The survey included several close-ended questions exploring the reasons for 
conductive innovative activities, the importance of knowledge sources for innovation; 
organizational competences; obstacles and hindrances for innovative activities; 
government support; the importance of innovation partners in providing technical 
expertise in different regions; the importance of different types of collaborations with 
other firms in different regions; the importance of different types of motives for carrying 
out collaborative activities with various institutions; the importance of specific types of 
collaborations with particular institutions in different regions; the importance of physical 
proximity to other institutions; and the importance of regional factors for the success of 
the firms28.   
For most of these questions, respondents‘ subjective ratings were measured 
through a close ended, 4-point Likert scales, anchored and labeled by two extremes 
either: ―Very Important‖ – ―Not Important‖ or ―Very Significant‖ – ―Not Significant‖. 
The ratings of respondents‘ regional and national embeddedness of firms in innovation 
efforts according to their sources of innovation though similarly measured via a close 
ended, 4-point Likert scales, anchored and labeled by: ―Low‖ and ―High‖. The Likert 
scale questions were adopted after the first version of the survey was pre-tested in Ankara 
in three manufacturing firms. Initially, firm level collaborations and their strengths were 
intended to be measured via asking the frequency of interactions with other institutions. 
However, these questions did not work in any of the pre-test companies as the 
respondents were not sure about the precise number of interactions carried out by other 
parties in the firms. Likert scale responses were used to measure the respondent‘s 
perceptions of innovative activities and relationships, both local and non-local. These 
                                                 
28 The survey is available at Appendix A. 
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responses made it possible to differentiate the strength of various knowledge sources and 
also the collaborators in different scales within the context of new product development 
efforts. The vast majority of interviewees at the firms were either R&D managers or 
R&D project team leaders and they were competent enough to make comparisons among 
different sources.  
 
3.3.2.5 Identification of Firms to Study: The Sample Selection and Survey 
Implementation 
The list of firms to be surveyed was compiled from the TUBITAK-TEYDEB‘s 
and TTGV‘s databases of firms receiving government/public support for their 
technological product development projects. These databases were preferred to identify 
firms engaged in innovative activities because they were involved in projects that had 
already been evaluated by a technical board of academic referees and deemed worthy for 
innovation grants. This seemed to be a viable technique to identify firms active in 
innovation from the universe of all manufacturing firms. The database included the 
names of the firms, names of contact person (only in TTGV database), contact 
information of the firms including physical address of the firms, phone and e-mail of the 
contact person, the size of the firms, and the number of projects in each firm supported by 
TTGV and TUBITAK-TEYDEB programs and funding. The TTGV database was used as 
a secondary source to complement the TUBITAK-TEYDEB database to identify the 
firms that were not receiving government support.  
When the database was retrieved in 2006, there were 1,153 total firms receiving 
some kind of innovation grant from the government. The database revealed that 572 of 
1153 firms (49.61 %) were located in the Istanbul and Kocaeli region, 236 of them were 
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located in Ankara (20.47 %) and 150 of them were located in Izmir and Manisa (13.01 
%). The rest of the firms, 195 of them (16.91 %), were located in other cities all over the 
country. Considering that there are 81 provinces in Turkey, government support to 
innovative firms underscore the strong concentration of activity in the three study 
regions. However, this was in no way an explicit regional innovation policy in Turkey. 
The high regional concentrations were associated with the presence of high numbers of 
firms located in all these cities with higher potentials to compete, export and also explore 
available funding.  
Table 3.3 Number of Firms Receiving R&D Support from TEYDEB in March 2006 
Provinces 
Firms 
Receiving 
R&D Support 
% of 
Total 
R&D 
Support 
to SMEs 
% of 
Total to 
SMEs 
R&D 
Support to 
Large Firms 
% of 
Total to 
Large 
Firms 
Istanbul +Kocaeli 572 49.6 465 51.2 107 43.7 
Ankara 236 20.5 196 21.6 40 16.3 
Izmir+Manisa 150 13.0 121 13.3 29 11.8 
Others 195 16.9 126 13.9 69 28.2 
Total 1153 100.0 908 100.0 245 100.0 
 
Most of the firms in smaller cities are simply not as well positioned to carry out 
new product or process development due to difficulties recruiting a skilled workforce, 
accessing sources of research and information and in drawing on local partners to 
advance their technology or products. They usually do not have the awareness, capability 
or workforce competencies to apply to the government support programs and follow the 
imposed requirements. In addition these firms often rely on their own financial support 
mechanisms, especially family ties to fund their operations, and have little experience 
securing outside funding of any sort.  
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Many of the above mentioned factors are also relevant for the majority of the 
firms in the study regions. The firms applying in government support programs are 
obviously not the only ones that work on new product developments. But they are the 
ones with the awareness of public programs the capability to understand and access these 
programs, and with a stronger emphasis on improving on their technical capabilities to 
expand their businesses. The adoption of the list of publicly supported firms to identify 
the study sample therefore makes sense as the selected firms are already a part of the 
emergent national and regional innovation systems via their efforts to innovate in 
collaboration with other institutions.  
In terms of firm size the breakdown of the support received by firms (Table 3.3)  
shows that 78.8 % of those receiving support are small and medium sized firms, or firms 
with fewer than 150 employees. In Istanbul, the distribution shows that 81.3% of firms 
receiving support were small firms compared to 18.7 % to larger firms. In Ankara, while 
83 % of the firms receiving government support are SMEs, it is 80.6 % in Izmir. 
Although the study regions show similar trends with the national average, the collection 
of all the other cities shows relatively higher R&D support rates for big firms 35.3 % of 
total supported firms in outside the study regions were large firms.  
When we observe the number of projects (versus firms) the distribution is 
balanced more toward large firms, with 44 percent of total funded projects going to large 
firms.  However, the share of support to big firm projects outside the core regions was 
also higher than average at 55.6 %.  This suggests that in smaller cities with more limited 
agglomeration advantages large firms have higher potential, capabilities and resources 
relative to SMEs.  
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Table 3.4 Number of R&D Projects Supported by the Size of the Firms 
Provinces Supported R&D 
Projects- Big 
Firms 
% Supported R&D 
Projects- SMEs 
% 
Istanbul +Kocaeli 577 50.09 772 53.65 
Ankara 195 16.93 308 21.40 
Izmir+Manisa 151 13.11 176 12.23 
Others 229 19.88 183 12.72 
Share of Total 1152 100.00 1439 100.00 
The majority of the government support to R&D goes to firms functioning in 
manufacturing industries. The manufacturing firms receiving government support in 
Istanbul/Kocaeli constitute 63 % of all firms (312 of 495). The percentage is 50.4 % (104 
of 236) and 70.6 % (106 of 150) for Ankara; and Izmir/Manisa respectively. The low 
share of support going to manufacturing in Ankara is mostly due to the high presence of 
applications in software industry in which the city has a solid and growing share 
supported through its technical universities, technoparks and defense industry. The 
majority of firms receiving government support being in the manufacturing industry and 
also the focus of innovation systems literature on manufacturing industry made me 
exclude high-tech service firms and construct the sample among the manufacturing firms 
in the study.  
To identify the firm sample, the selection criteria were reference to the 
manufacturing industry and operation at the establishment. Within these parameters, a 
randomly selected sample of 112 firms in Istanbul was established. For Izmir and 
Ankara, the total manufacturing list of 106 and 104 firms was used respectively. Table 
3.5 exhibits the individual elements of the data collection process. First some of the firms 
were discarded because their contact information was not up-to-date and they could not 
be found out through other resources including the TTGV data base or a simple web 
search. A number of remaining firms explicitly refused to participate in the study as they 
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did not deem the study relevant to their activities; they had a corporate policy of 
declining survey requests; they were unwilling to reveal their innovation processes to 
third parties; and they were survey fatigued.  Another set of firms were impossible to 
reach out after several follow-up calls and e-mails. As a consequence the gross sample 
was reduced to 107 firms in Istanbul, 101 firms in Izmir and 93 firms in Ankara. From 
this sample, 28 Ankara firms declined to participate to the study; 39 firms were 
impossible to reach after several follow-ups and 26 firms participated in the study. The 
consequent response rate was 27.9 % of the population selected in Ankara. In Istanbul, 
only 5 firms declined to participate in the study; 72 were impossible to reach after several 
follow-ups and 28 firms participated in the survey29. In Izmir, 15 firms declined to 
participate in the study, 56 firms were impossible to reach and 29 firms participated in the 
study. The consequent response rates were 26.1 % and 28.7 % of the population selected 
in Istanbul and Izmir respectively30. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 One of the respondents had to cancel the interview in the middle of the meeting due to an emergency in 
the production line. Another survey got cancelled due to the inability of the R&D manager to answer most 
of the questions regarding the competencies of the firm and the extent of its networks. 
30 Compared to the two other regions, concomitant with its bureaucratic culture rooted in being the capital 
city and homing to all sorts of public institutions, Ankara was the most strenuous one in terms of reaching 
out to firms and carrying out the survey as it could be seen through the high refusal rates to participate in 
the survey. The firms which were widely known in terms of their innovative and technology development 
activities, especially the ones receiving national technology development awards, etc., and stated as 
important to talked to by bureaucrats, academicians and consultants in various organizations were given 
extra effort to persuade them to participate in the study. At most two surveys were carried out in a day as 
surveys generally took one to two hours to implement depending on firms‘ range and extent of activities 
and location of the firms in four different parts of the city namely, Ostim, Sincan, Akyurt and Golbasi 
which are considerably distant from each other. In comparison to reach out experience in Ankara, firms in 
Istanbul were easier to persuade to participate but harder to schedule interviews due to vivid business 
culture in the city. Cancellations and rescheduling were frequent. Majority of the firms were located at the 
districts of Umraniye, Kartal, Ikitelli, Pendik, Tuzla, Sultanbeyli (and also Gebze). In Izmir majority of the 
sample firms were located at Cigli, Kemalpasa, Gaziemir (and also Manisa).   
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Table 3.5 Individual Elements of the Data Collection Process 
 Istanbul Izmir  Ankara 
Total number of firms in the list 312 106 104 
Randomly selected firms 112 106 104 
Non-relevant firms (missing information on 
address, name, industry type, bankruptcy) 
5 5 11 
Re-adjusted sample 107 101 93 
Unable to contact 72 56 39 
Declined to respond 5 15 28 
Interviewed firms 28 29 26 
Response rate 26.1 % 28.7 % 27.9 % 
In all three regions, 83 firms were successfully surveyed and they constituted 16 
% of all the manufacturing firms that received government support for innovation. The 
adopted methodology is original in the sense that it brings two conceptual frameworks 
together to explain and evaluate the emergence of the NIS framework in the major 
economic regions of Turkey from the perspective of firms engaged in innovation. 
Through detailed interviews, the importance of regional agglomeration economies and 
specific regional ties and associations are also explored for the firms interviewed. 
Investigating the relative significance of national and regional associations related to 
innovation from the firm perspective allows greater insight into the status and potential 
importance of regional innovation networks in NIS policy making and performance. In 
particular, when contrasted with the history and national policy making record in the area 
of technology and innovation the interviews provide important evidence as to whether 
regional characteristic of innovation are appropriately addressed in national policies. 
In the following chapter, historical records and literature are analyzed to 
understand the dominant role of the central government in Turkish economic and 
technological development. This background provides the context and institutional 
impetus behind the recent strategies organized under the NIS framework. In the next 
section of the dissertation, these recent efforts are analyzed from the perspective of key 
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decision-makers and policy implementers in the key agencies of central government. 
These perspectives are evaluated against government reports, documents and legislation 
to understand the policy goals, program initiatives and funding levels associated with the 
recent NIS initiatives. A special emphasis was put on understanding how the role of 
regional specialization and agglomeration was viewed by national policy makers and how 
regional considerations shaped NIS building in recent years.   
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Chapter 4: Historical Overview of Turkish Industrial and Technological 
Development  
The literature that draws upon the NIS framework emphasizes that the evolution 
of public and private institutions supporting technical change and innovation is shaped by 
the long- term social, political and economic development of nation states. The long term 
national development trajectory is influenced by geography, political culture and 
stability, and relative wealth and position vis-a-vis trade partners or rivals. These broader 
influences shape more specific national elements influencing industrialization and 
technological change including market rules and norms, property rights, government 
investment allocations and so on. 
There are three recurring factors that have shaped industrial and technological 
development in Turkey over the very long term. First, is the historic geographic position 
of the nation, straddling Europe and Asia. This unique position has defined the trade 
relations, allies and rivalries, political structures and the models of economic 
development that have advanced or limited national development. Second, since the 
apogee of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries, Turkey has persistently 
been faced with underdevelopment and ―catch up‖ challenges in relation to its European 
neighbors. Third, the long-term historic pressures of first building and maintaining the 
empire in response to European development, and then to the establishment, restructuring 
and modernization of the new Republic have made the central state a dominant actor. The 
central state, as will be shown, has at times created frictions and fetters for the expansion 
and healthy development of the market economy, but at other times has built and pushed 
forward modernization and the conditions for market based development. These long 
term dynamics have played out in unique ways in the 20th century and in the 
contemporary period as Turkey attempts to integrate more fully with the EU and improve 
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its economic performance by fostering a more endogenous process of technological 
improvement and innovation.               
 
 
4. 1 History of Industrial Development 
4.1.1 The Ottoman Period (1600-1922) 
The Ottoman Empire through its long history was an agrarian based military state 
in which most of the population lived in the countryside and earned their livelihood from 
agriculture. The majority of the state revenue was based on the agrarian sector, the 
productivity of which was dependent on the competencies of local public officials who 
were in charge of the tenancy of state owned agricultural land. Public officials were 
responsible for collecting taxes on the agricultural produce and also the training of 
soldiers in their jurisdictions to support the central administration when military demands 
arose.  In addition, the Empire controlled critical trade routes between Europe, Asia and 
the Mediterranean basin. But the agrarian system, which was called timar or dirlik, 
constituted the main structure of economic production and distribution until the Empire 
started to deteriorate at the end of the 16th century. The reasons for the demise of the 
Ottoman system were many, but most importantly the Empire encountered increasing 
barriers to new territorial acquisition and the rules and technologies necessary for 
intensification of agriculture were not in place. Hence activity and associated revenue for 
the state stagnated. Moreover, increasing wars and internal conflicts resulted in an 
increase in the amount of idle arable land severed from the economy. The chaotic 
atmosphere accentuated corruption in both in the central and local governments and led 
to ineffective timar management by more autonomous and often corrupt officials. 
(Kepenek and Yenturk 1999, Quataert 1993). 
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While the industrial and technological levels of the Empire in the 16th century 
were equal or superior to major European powers, the Ottoman social and governance 
structure was unable to sustain the development level through the enlightenment and 
subsequent industrial revolution. The indigenous manufacturing industry in the Empire 
was developed primarily to meet the demands of the military, especially in the conflict 
ridden 19th century. Civilian manufacturing was carried out by small scale production 
units which prioritized production of consumer goods such as textile and clothing, 
agricultural implements, and construction materials for the local domestic markets. The 
organization and regulation of manufacturing activities in urban settings was dominated 
by guilds dedicated to production of a specific type of good.  
The guilds in Turkey were comprised of mostly ethnic minorities such as Jews, 
Greeks and Armenians who in the Empire were restricted from holding positions in the 
government. In the multiethnic Empire, professional segmentation did not generate major 
social problems for some time since the system functioned smoothly and the diverse 
needs of social groups were generally met. Capital and technological expertise was 
accumulated in the hands of minorities that dominated the memberships of industrial 
guilds. Membership was based on lineage and ethnicity according to the rules and norms 
established within the guilds.  
―Membership acquisition to the guild and guild collective behavior was achieved 
through a framework of rules, rituals and other group norms, partly unwritten yet 
officially recognized and partly laid down in official regulations and orders. The 
rules fostered a variety of monopolies and restrictive practices, and the rituals and 
other group norms created a sense of trust among guild members‖ (Riddle 
2001:45). 
The guild system prevailed until the late 1800s and the domestic manufacturing 
system provided non-agricultural goods to markets in the Empire. The influx of cheap 
European imports produced by technologies developed during the Industrial Revolution 
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challenged the Ottoman manufacturing industry in general and the guild system in 
particular as the nineteenth century progressed (Kepenek and Yenturk 1999). In the early 
19th century, there were some attempts to build a national industrial base in the Ottoman 
Empire to accomplish the Ottoman Industrial Revolution.  
―In the hopes of spurring on an Ottoman Industrial Revolution, Mahmut II [1808-
1839] and his descendants established several large industrial projects, designed 
and operated by European and American manufacturing experts. Efforts to 
transform the ailing Ottoman economy through state-led production can best be 
described as too little, too late. An Ottoman industrial revolution failed to 
materialize, and as Empire resources lessened, state factory production was 
limited and in some cases abandoned‖ (Riddle 2001:48).  
Later in the century, close connections with Germany reanimated the national 
industry formation ideas, but efforts remained ineffective and the necessary support 
mechanisms such as establishment of financing organizations and banks could not be 
developed due to rising national independence movements and fragmentation within the 
Empire (Kepenek and Yenturk 1999). 
As the military defeats and territorial losses accumulated the tax revenues of the 
state continued to decline, the Ottoman Empire began to rely more on external debt to 
pay for imports. Meanwhile, the European powers attracted by the size of the Ottoman 
market forced the Empire to relax strict trade restrictions and allow special trade 
concessions in return for loans and grants. (Riddle 2001:47). These special considerations 
left the Ottoman manufacturing industry totally unprotected and domestic industry 
suffered against cheaper and better European goods produced under larger scale and more 
modern conditions. The concessions also included demolishing of the guild system in the 
Empire as guild monopolies were inconsistent with the core assumptions of the free trade 
agreements (Kepenek and Yenturk 1999:16). By the late 1800s, the guild system had 
totally collapsed under the pressure of new government policies and the influx of 
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European imports. An ―ethnic division of labor‖ and the dominance of minorities and 
foreigners in industry and trade, on the other hand, continued to prevail until the early 
1900s.  
The legacy of the guild system and the decimation of domestic industry presented 
enormous challenges to the new Turkish Republic, founded in 1923 after the dismantling 
of the Ottoman Empire. First of all, ownership of existing manufacturing and trading 
companies by Armenian and Jewish minorities, slowed the impeded development of a 
broader entrepreneurial class that incorporated the ethnic Turkish majority. Turks were 
historically more engaged in agricultural activities and were detached from more modern 
urban manufacturing and trade that were at the heart of capitalist transformation (Bugra-
Kavala 1994). In the long period of turmoil culminating in the fall of the empire, many 
minority owners and managers of industrial and trading companies left or fled the 
country. The loss of these groups due to pressure and chaos meant the loss of an 
accumulated knowledge base for a new industrialization drive in the Republic. Lack of 
experience in modern production methods and techniques appeared as a serious challenge 
for the new state that set industrialization and economic modernization as primary 
objectives for the new Turkish Republic.  
 
 
4.1.2 The Early Republican Period (1923-1960) 
4.1.2.1 Liberal Era (1923-1929) 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the ―sick man of Europe,‖ the Ottoman 
Empire, was defeated in many battles including World War I. The economic and political 
system of the Empire was almost completely bankrupt and national sovereignty was in 
question. After defeat of the Central Powers the Allied forces controlled Turkey and the 
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reigning Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamit was forced to sign the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, 
which officially accepted the end of the Empire. After signing the Sevres, Abdulhamit 
left the country and moved to London. His absence increased political discord and 
turmoil throughout the Turkey but also stirred burgeoning support to the national 
independence movement started by the General Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk).  
 The War of Independence (1920-1923) pitting the national independence 
movement  against shifting alliances including Greeks, Armenians and other European 
forces ended with the reestablishment of a significant autonomous Turkish nation 
recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Treaty acknowledged Anatolia and 
Istanbul as the new territory of the Turkish Republic. In economic terms, the biggest gain 
was the abolishment of the special concessions granted to European states during the 
Ottoman period. Special free-trade concessions were eliminated but low tariffs and 
restrictions against quotas remained valid until 1929 which forced the new Republic to 
follow more liberal economic policies. 
The period between 1923 and 1929 can be defined as a reconstruction period.  
Government structures and institutions inherited from the Ottoman Empire were so 
decayed that renovation was indispensable under the ideals and aspirations of the new 
Republic. The chief economic objective of the new state was development of a strong 
private sector capable of achieving the industrialization objectives of the Republic that 
revolved around the desire to build a modern secular state comparable to European 
counterparts. As previously noted the period of turmoil left the nation without an 
entrepreneurial class and management expertise for modern industry. In this vacuum the 
Turkish government assumed the primary role in forcing economic modernization. This 
was an enormous challenge as the financial and human capital of the country was 
depleted during the long period of war and instability.  
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In a process broadly evocative of Gerschenkron‘s theory of state-led development 
in backward economies, the Republican government established a plan for modernization 
and industrialization at the Izmir Economics Congress in 1923. Tying a strong push for 
industrialization to the theme of economic independence, the Congress urged the 
establishment of financial institutions to provide loans and grants to domestic businesses; 
the improvement of basic infrastructure, most importantly rail transport and 
communication networks; and the formation of industrial training organizations. The 
government took measures that supported the suggestions of the Congress and first 
established the State Industry and Mining Bank (Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi) in 1925 to 
provide loans and grants to private sector. The government also strove to increase public 
and private partnerships and to take a management role in state owned enterprises 
temporarily until they are passed on to private sector firms. Furthermore, the government 
enacted the Law for Stimulation of Industry (Sanayii Tesvik Yasasi) in 1927 which 
included exemptions from income and custom taxes, reduced fees and duties, the 
provision of free land, and telephone and telegraph services to businesses. The law also 
provided government support of up until 10 % of annual production and discount prices 
on the transportation of production technologies transferred from abroad (Kepenek and 
Yenturk 1999:44-45). 
When the Law was enacted in 1927, the composition of the industry was 
dominated by the production of agricultural products. There were approximately 65,000 
business enterprises, 43.5 % of which processed agricultural products, 23.9 % of which 
produced textile and related products and 22.6 % of which operated in the mining and 
machine production. The aggregate size of the enterprises was relatively small. The 
percentage of the businesses with more than 5 employees was 8.9 % of total enterprises, 
while business with more than 100 employees were only 0.23 percent of the total 
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(Kepenek and Yenturk 1999:45). The composition and capacity of the industry was not 
capable of meeting the demands of the internal market. Even though, textile was the 
second biggest sector, textile and apparel imports constituted 41.5 % of all imports into 
the country in 1927.  
This period involved much trial and error and rebuilding from a state bureaucracy 
that had limited experience and capacity in more systematic economic development 
planning. One thing that was commonly agreed upon was the need to develop domestic 
consumer industries to reduce reliance on basic consumer goods imports. As part of this 
process the release of restrictions on tariffs in 1929 encouraged adoption of more direct 
import substitution policies. The Great Depression affecting the global economy and 
associated domestic problems in Turkey combined with the model of Bolshevik central 
planning brought about a paradigm change and toward a stronger ―etatist‖ 
industrialization program in the 1930s and 1940s.   
 
4.1.2.2 Etatism in Turkey: State Organized Industrialization (1930- 1949) 
During the first seven years of the Republic, the government followed a relatively 
liberal economic policy that emphasized the development of financial mechanisms and 
capital access for private firms, revival of decaying state enterprises and some education 
and training of an industrial workforce. These development projects and the success of 
the nascent private sector depended on international funds and credits that dried up with 
the outbreak of the Great Depression (Ekiz and Somel 2005). The models of western 
capitalist economies that shaped the policies of the new Republic were in crisis. In these 
conditions the government had to reconsider external realities as it tried to adjust its 
internal economic policies. Meanwhile, Soviet Russia had started a fast and extensive 
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industrialization process through the adoption of state directed central planning. The 
Turkish government, pressured by political discord associated with the economic crisis 
decided to follow a more state directed and centralized industrialization strategy to 
accomplish a more rapid drive to economic independence (Ekiz and Somel 2005). The 
etatism31 which characterized almost 20 years of state led economic development in 
Turkey had its own peculiar characteristics. It incorporated certain state planning 
elements from the socialist model but did not include socialist rhetoric, mass 
expropriations of property or collectivization of agriculture. The political rhetoric was 
primarily nationalism and industrial modernization, not socialism.  
However in the Etatist era, the state appeared as the dominant coordinator and 
driver of economic development. In order to nurture and protect domestic private 
industry, the state not only restricted entrance of foreign investors in to the country but 
also encouraged domestic production of inputs that used to be imported by the 
enterprises.  To build up indigenous primary and capital goods sectors it established and 
operated SEEs (State Economic Enterprises) according to the suggestions of Five Year 
Development Plans in the textiles, iron and steel, mining, cement, chemicals and paper 
sectors. The first two five year development plans were put into place in the years of 
1934 and 1938. Rather than being comprehensive development plans, both of these plans 
were more like targeted investment project bundles.  The first plan prioritized 
development of consumer and producer goods industries while the second five year 
development plan emphasized investments in intermediate and primary goods (Ekiz and 
Somel 2005:104, Boratav 1976).  
                                                 
31 Etatism (or statism) in economic realm asserts that states as major institutions have legitimate powers to 
direct and regulate the economy, either through state owned enterprises or through strategic economic 
development planning.  
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State Economic Enterprises grew to dominate manufacturing production with an 
objective of meeting domestic demand as in the case of ―Sumerbank‖ in textile industry 
(Riddle 2001:52). Both state and private enterprises grew under an import-substitution 
manufacturing policy as the government instituted high tariffs on imports. State 
Economic Enterprises, equipped with imported state of the art technologies32, fueled the 
economy by generating growth and stimulating structural change in the targeted sectors. 
For instance, by the end of 1930s, domestic textile production was capable of meeting 
almost 80 % of internal demand. And, cement production, as a result of the expropriation 
and restructuring of private enterprises and establishment of new factories increased by 
15 fold (1,428 %) between 1927 and 1935.  
Until the beginning of the World War II, Gross National Income (GNI) 
continuously increased33.  This growth was strongly associated with the growth in 
manufacturing industry, which averaged a 9 % annual growth over this period (Kepenek 
and Yenturk 1999:78). Although Turkey was not a belligerent in WW-II, the massive 
disruption of the war years buffeted the Turkish economy and between 1939 and 1945, 
national income in industry decreased by 34 %. These war disruptions occurred in the 
context of the massive destruction of all European economies.  
At the end of the war, Europe began a huge rebuilding and economic 
transformation process which influenced and changed production dynamics in countries 
on the European periphery. In response Turkey adopted an Urgent Plan (Ivedili Plan) in 
1946 to cope with the changing needs of the post-war era. Pressured by the terms of 
                                                 
32 According to Tekeli 2006, the main technology transfer policy of the time was getting technologies from 
different countries which have different technological trajectories. While textile production technology and 
know-how was primarily adopted from the Soviet Russia, sugar production technologies and know-how 
was acquired from the Western countries. The peculiar pragmatic nature of the Turkish Etatism revealed 
itself at these technology transfers. 
33 There was only a 2.4 % decrease in 1935 in national income in constant prices.  
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Marshall Plan during reconstruction phase of the Europe, the Urgent Plan had to be 
revised and was replaced by the Vaner Plan in 1947. The biggest difference between the 
Vaner Plan and the previous plans was a fundamental change of vision and focus for the 
further industrialization in the country. The drive for state directed heavy industrialization 
was replaced by an emphasis on private sector liberalization and agricultural and 
infrastructural development (Ekiz and Somel 2005: 106-108).  
 
4.1.2.3 Rebirth of Liberal Policies: Development without State Planning (1950-1960)  
The aftermath of WW II and associated international developments were the 
major determinants of change in the industrial policies of Turkey. However there were 
corresponding internal shifts that contributed to the collapse of etatism. Etatist policies 
were linked with the single party administration in Turkey in the Republican period. In 
1950, a multiparty system was established and voters ascribing the war time economic 
hardship on the single party administration gave an electoral majority to the newly 
founded Democrat Party (DP). The followers of the new party were mostly peasants, big 
land owners and trading enterprises. The last of the two interests amplified their powers 
through capital accumulation associated with the specific economic opportunities of the 
War. As a result, the new government prioritized agricultural and infrastructural 
development to address the demands of its main constituency.  
In addition, under the Marshal Plan framework Turkey assumed a critical role 
supplying consumer and primary goods, most importantly food, to Western Europe to 
overcome severe food shortages and to provide inputs to European industrial 
reconstruction. Endowed with this new role and operating under the more liberal 
framework of post war international economic agreements and institutions, the 
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government started a new investment strategy focused on the encouragement and 
development of the private sector. The planning ideals and strong central government 
steering of the etatist era were left behind and more liberal, market based development of 
investment projects were promoted and mostly funded through foreign borrowing.  
In order to increase the capabilities of the private sector, the government 
encouraged public-private partnerships in many sectors including, food, machinery and 
mining, textile and transportation (Cakmakci, 1999). State Economic Enterprises still 
played a major role in the production of capital and intermediate goods and were 
equipped with relative modern production technologies developed in the 1930s. The 
private sector grew more on the basis of consumer goods such as foods and textile. These 
partnerships and the opportunity to supply the rebuilding economies of Europe 
contributed to increases in the value added of manufacturing industry, despite the 
increased attention and investment poured into the development of agriculture at the time.  
The more market based development of industry and prioritization of agriculture, 
which later lost its pace as the driving force of development, led to funding of investment 
projects through large scale external borrowing. Borrowing began to outpace the capacity 
of the production system to generate revenues, especially export revenues (Ekiz and 
Somel 2005:110). A huge external payments deficits crisis occurred in 1954 and it 
continued to deepen until the end of the decade. An urgent need was seen to  develop 
more sophisticated fiscal policies tied to coherent mid and long term macro-economic 
policies (Ekiz and Somel 2005:110). The macro-economic and domestic investment 
policies that came out of the external debt crisis relied on foreign economists and the 
input of international economic institutions. These key factors shaped economic and 
industrial policies for the next 20 years.  
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4.1.3 Import Substitution Industrialization Period (1960- 1980) 
The ruling Democrat Party‘s increased use of religion to hold the support of the 
agrarian masses. In addition, the development of policies challenging the republican 
reforms favoring the secular state heightened the tension between the ruling party and the 
opposition and resulted in the first military coup in 1960 in Turkey. The military 
government started a new institutionalization process, initiated with the preparation and 
adoption of a new constitution. The State Planning Organization (DPT) was established 
to set the principles of ―development planning‖ in Turkey to guide development of the 
national economy around major industries. The macroeconomic framework was the then 
popular Keynesian economic growth model. Development planning, in this respect, was 
not just a bundle of investment and infrastructural projects but was tied to 
macroeconomic growth objectives. In 1960, the Turkish government introduced an 
import-substitution oriented development strategy which prevailed until the end of 1970s. 
The swing back to import substitution industrialization policies were mainly caused by 
high inflation rates and the balance of payments crisis in the 1950s. To overcome this 
payment crisis, the government adopted an industrial strategy to expand domestic growth 
through increasing domestic protection which would overcome the growth constraints 
stemming from negative payments balances.  In this respect, the industrial strategy 
prioritized mobilizing available industrial capital through restricting international 
purchases and increasing domestic sales within a protected environment. 
 The five year development plans34 of this period fostered the execution of big 
public investment programs to increase domestic capacity and capabilities in the 
manufacturing industry. State economic enterprises (SEE) continued to be supported to 
                                                 
34 Five year development plans of State Planning Organization were ―guiding‖ instead of ―mandatory‖ 
documents. 
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produce capital and investment goods while foreign investors and the private sector were 
given incentives to produce consumer durable and non-durable goods. Import substitution 
industrialization strategies in the 1960s were dependent on the strength of the existing 
domestic market and thus were not as clearly transformative as the strategies adopted 
during the early years of the Republic (Ekiz and Somel 2005). Still, the most significant 
characteristics of the development plans were their prioritization of industrialization to 
achieve economic growth. 
The First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967) explicitly stated the need for 
protection of the domestic industry until it is mature enough to compete in international 
markets. Emphasis was put on the limited and presumably temporary character of 
industry protection while attaining the targeted industrial growth rates. In order to 
achieve the expected 7 percent aggregate annual growth in the economy, the targeted 
industrial growth rates were explicitly specified in the first two Five Year Development 
Plans. The manufacturing sector, with an estimated 12.9 % and 11.1 % growth rates 
respectively assumed the largest role in the growth strategy in these first two plans. 
Although, quantitative targets were stated, qualitative measures such as production 
technologies or business scale or organization associated with growth targets were not 
addressed in the Plans (Kepenek and Yenturk 1999:78).  
The Third Five Year Development Plan (1973-1977) was qualitatively different 
from the first two plans. The biggest difference was the influence of relationships with 
then named European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union (EU). 
Turkey had became an associate member of the EEC in  1963, and an adjustment period 
was seen as necessary before signing the customs union and full membership agreements. 
The adjustments required included substantially increasing the industrial and social 
development levels of the country.  An additional protocol (Katma Protokol) signed in 
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1973 set a 1995 target date to accomplish the required socio-economic improvements to 
be full member of the Customs Union. Responding to the promise of fuller integration 
with Europe the Third Plan shifted away from the fast industrial growth objectives of the 
previous plans to something more qualitative involving socio-economic and cultural 
catch-up with industrialized Western nations (Kepenek and Yenturk 1999, Onis 1999). 
On the one hand, the import substitution based development policies had 
significant success in achieving substantial growth and industrialization over a 20 year 
period. Industrial growth averaged 6% per annum between 1960 and 1980. However, the 
expected transformation in the economic structure to high levels of international 
competitiveness was not achieved during the import substitution period as the quality and 
pricing of the manufacturing goods did not reach the expected standards in international 
markets. This led at the end of the period to stagnant exports matched with increasing 
imports required for industrial production, particularly dependence on imported raw 
materials, especially energy and modern capital goods from the now more advanced 
OECD countries (Taymaz 2001, Kepenek and Yenturk 1999). The oil shocks of the 
1970s added to these mounting pressures and deepened an ongoing economic crisis in the 
country.  
 
 
4.1.4 Export-oriented Industrialization Period (1980-Present) 
The second oil shock in 1979 forced economic planners to take some fundamental 
steps toward changing the inward oriented policies of the prior twenty years. On January 
24, 1980, a new rightist government announced a reform (stabilization) program aimed at 
liberalizing trade and changing policies to promote exports. It emphasized reducing the 
state role in the economy, realistic exchange rates and monetary policies; and increased 
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foreign direct investment. The January 24th Program, included not only reductions in 
import tariffs and quotas but also increases in several export promotion policies.  
The government‘s export promotion policies included export tax rebates, 
production or value added tax exemptions on final goods, easily accessible export credits, 
exemptions from custom duties for production technologies or capital goods used in 
production of exports and conditional exemptions on corporate profit taxes. These 
policies initiated a dramatic shift toward a more export oriented economy. Turkey‘s 
export share of GDP rose from 3 % of GDP in 1979, to 20 % in 1996. (Riddle 2001:57, 
WB World Development Indicators). These export promoting policies were accompanied 
by currency devaluations, restricted domestic demand, increased capacity utilization rates 
and export credit subsidies. A qualitative change also took place in the composition of 
exports which shifted to manufacture of processed foods, textiles and motor vehicles. 
These dramatic increases in manufacturing exports were not triggered primarily through 
improvements in technology or manufacturing value added. Improved export 
performance was rooted in the full utilization of existing capacities, improved 
management of enterprises and more favorable wage and currency exchange rates vis-a-
vis major trading partners.   
The export promoting policies also stimulated emergence of a new group of 
private entrepreneurs in the Turkish economy who gained capacity and experience by 
entering into new domestic and international markets through promotion policies. These 
entrepreneurs were at the stage of selling low and middle tech goods at competitive prices 
in international markets, but they were not positioned to move up value chains through 
technology and knowledge based investments. In this period they were also not given 
incentives to upgrade technology and there were few extra-firm support mechanisms to 
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upskill the workforce or foster technology building processes (Kepenek and Taymaz 
1998).  
The January 24th structural adjustment program and the subsequent developments 
during the 1980s achieved considerable success as it reduced external deficits and 
increased economic growth. The success was predicated on increased foreign direct 
investment, export promotion and privatization policies. Among all these conditions, 
privatization experiments were defining for the reorganization or reconstitution of the 
state, as the SEEs (State Economic Enterprises), despite their low performances and 
operating losses, accounted for more than 50 % of total fixed capital formation and 40 % 
of total value added in the manufacturing industry (Onis 1991:164). While the need for 
organizational reform to overcome inefficiencies was crucial, SEEs were the drivers of 
the manufacturing industry and 
―neither privatization, nor the liberalization of SEEs, involving their opening up 
to greater external competition, elicited widespread acceptance. They had been 
established in Kemal Ataturk‘s time, and constituted an important historical 
legacy. They had been part of a broader project of national reconstruction 
undertaken by bureaucratic elite with a clear mission to act as the ―guardian of the 
national interest‖. That the state economic enterprises were considered to be part 
of the Kemalist era, constrained the possible transfer of ownership from the public 
to the private sector. The debates surrounding SEE reform and the orientation of 
policy reflected the strength of the traditional bureaucracy. This highly centralized 
bureaucracy and the associated state tradition undoubtedly influenced the course 
of public sector reform at that time‖ (Onis 1991:164-165). 
The World Bank became actively involved in transformation of SEEs in Turkey 
between the years 1980 and 1984. Through its structural adjustment loan programs, the 
Bank aggressively but incrementally pushed forward public sector reform. First of all, it 
worked towards improving short term financial positions of the enterprises. Second, it 
redirected financing of investment programs out of government budget resources and 
third, changed the tasks imposed on SEEs to support private sector firms by providing 
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subsidized intermediate goods (Onis 1991:165). The SEEs were reformed internally to 
operate more like private enterprises and to generate their own profits to support 
investment. 
During the 1990s, the signing of the Customs Union Agreement with the 
European Union that was  effective as of January 1996, influenced the competitive nature 
of  not only the public but also [and most importantly] the private sector. Most enterprises 
in order to compete with the high-tech more efficient European producers in both 
domestic and international markets were forced to upgrade their production capabilities 
by investing on newer technologies. However, the objective of diversifying the export 
base through medium and high-tech products did not generate the expected 
transformation in the production structure. More forward looking and coherent industrial, 
trade and technology policies such as those implemented in other newly industrializing 
countries such as South Korea were not developed in Turkey.  Efforts to increase export 
potential in European markets mostly relied on more traditional mechanisms including 
devaluations and export incentives that did not qualitatively improve the productive 
infrastructure (Rodrik, 1995). For instance, while the aggregate GDP‘s of the Turkish and 
South Korean economies were pretty close to each other at the early 1980s, the Korean 
economy grew to almost triple the size of the Turkish economy at the end of the 1990s. 
Consequently, real GDP per capita in South Korea increased 447.42 percent between 
1980 and 2010 while Turkish per-capita GDP increased only 97.79 % since the 1980. 
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Table 4.1: GDP, current prices, (US Dollars, Billion) ** 
Countries 1980 1990 2000 2010* Growth 
80-90 
Growth  
90-00 
Growth 
00-10 
Argentina 209.02 141.34 284.33 344.14 -11.18 51.22 44.92 
Brazil 162.62 507.78 644.28 1,910.50 16.62 28.48 40.08 
China 309.27 390.28 1,198.48 5,364.87 142.86 169.63 161.26 
Denmark 69.71 135.84 160.08 313.83 22.81 29.22 6.58 
France 691.23 1,248.56 1,333.38 2,668.79 27.07 21.64 13.07 
Germany 826.14 1,547.03 1,905.80 3,332.80 25.53 22.73 5.94 
Greece 53.64 92.20 127.60 325.08 7.08 26.05 30.72 
India 177.08 313.73 461.91 1,367.22 72.13 71.89 102.68 
Ireland 21.23 47.77 96.87 216.11 32.52 97.82 29.31 
Israel 22.64 55.09 124.75 199.46 45.02 75.12 33.18 
Italy 460.63 1,135.54 1,100.56 2,121.12 26.77 17.04 2.27 
South Korea 64.39 270.41 533.39 991.15 152.90 88.25 47.51 
Mexico 205.66 262.71 628.85 995.92 20.27 40.70 17.77 
Netherlands 178.38 295.46 386.20 797.45 24.78 35.18 13.48 
Norway 63.71 117.62 168.29 433.30 28.21 43.88 18.83 
Poland 56.62 62.08 171.26 479.03 -1.38 44.65 44.88 
Portugal 31.18 75.97 112.98 225.97 44.73 34.28 5.33 
Spain 224.50 520.71 582.38 1,424.69 33.93 32.96 22.44 
Taiwan 42.23 164.97 326.16 418.21 108.51 83.04 40.37 
Turkey 94.26 202.38 266.44 710.74 65.75 43.35 41.00 
UK 542.45 1,017.79 1,480.53 2,222.63 30.75 28.45 15.61 
USA 2,788.15 5,800.53 9,951.48 14,799.56 37.59 39.73 19.28 
Data: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 
**GDP constant prices in national currency are used to calculate the growth rates in order to take into 
account the country inflation.  
*IMF Estimates 
Even if Turkish economic growth since 1980 has not matched highly successful 
east- Asian or select Latin American countries, the nation did attain the status of an upper 
level middle income county. Its post WW-II economic development history is one of 
turbulence but relative success in terms of economic growth and industrialization. 
However in the 1990s, with strenuous efforts to push forward European integration it 
became clear that a more aggressive transformation oriented to higher value added 
production, higher technical standards and a more meaningful role for endogenous 
innovation was needed. Most recently the Turkish economy recovered rapidly after the 
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2001 recession and registered significant growth of 40.5 percent between the years 2002 
and 2008 (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2010). Meanwhile, national exports increased 
more than 4 times from $36,059 million in 2002 to $ 132,003 million in the same period 
(Taymaz 2009). 
Table 4.2: GDP per capita, current prices, (US Dollars)** 
Countries 1980 1990 2000 2010* Growth 
80-90 
Growth  
90-00 
Growth 
00-10 
Argentina 7,478 4,345 7,730 8,493 -23.69 33.73 31.57 
Brazil 1,372 3,464 3,762 9,886 -5.68 9.96 24.15 
China 313 341 946 3,999 109.66 143.23 146.85 
Denmark 13,610 26,454 30,034 56,790 22.49 24.49 2.80 
France 12,865 22,017 22,576 42,414 20.40 16.80 6.14 
Germany 10,750 19,593 23,168 40,679 22.18 17.81 6.37 
Greece 5,563 9,073 11,662 29,060 1.62 17.05 27.86 
India 256 364 443 1,124 38.28 42.14 73.78 
Ireland 6,243 13,626 25,562 48,578 28.56 83.01 10.15 
Israel 6,014 12,204 20,504 26,843 20.92 29.93 9.04 
Italy 8,169 20,029 19,293 35,231 26.09 16.32 -3.11 
South Korea 1,689 6,308 11,347 20,265 124.90 71.68 41.78 
Mexico 3,044 3,157 6,419 9,168 -2.36 19.53 6.21 
Netherlands 12,606 19,761 24,250 48,224 18.08 26.92 9.29 
Norway 15,569 27,677 37,391 88,590 23.46 35.85 9.35 
Poland 1,591 1,625 4,454 12,575 -8.14 43.70 46.25 
Portugal 3,192 7,600 11,082 21,185 41.46 31.66 0.67 
Spain 6,005 13,408 14,464 30,960 28.93 28.25 7.13 
Taiwan 2,363 8,086 14,641 17,927 82.60 67.63 34.05 
Turkey 2,235 3,860 4,245 9,950 33.31 19.76 23.89 
UK 9,630 17,782 25,142 35,721 28.67 24.85 9.41 
USA 12,249 23,198 35,252 47,702 25.25 23.77 8.53 
Data: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 
*** GDP per capita constant prices in national currency are used to calculate growth rates in order to take 
into account inflation in countries.  
*IMF Estimates 
The high growth rates in the 2000s were mainly driven by the medium-tech 
automobiles (motor vehicles) and consumer electronic sectors (TV/radio receivers) which 
increased their exports significantly between 2002 and 2008 (510.5 % and 192 % 
respectively). However, given the recent crises in the world economy, export of motor 
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vehicles has slowed down and export of TV/radio receivers has significantly diminished 
after 2005 (88.7 % and -31.25 % respectively) due to lack of interest in international 
markets, mostly in EU countries. The most recent crises once again highlighted the limits 
of purchasing or imitating foreign technologies (with a lag)  and the inadequacy of 
enhancing competitiveness of domestic firms by reducing costs, cutting real wages, 
lowering taxes and subsidizing inputs (Taymaz 2009). For sustained competitiveness of 
the country35, it again appeared that domestic firms have to be encouraged and supported 
to make moves towards higher value added products and services.  
As Turkey attempts to move toward European integration and advance into the 
club of high income countries, the nation‘s history of industrialization presents both 
barriers and opportunities. The long term history is clearly dominated by a state-led 
development pattern with major shifts in the fundamental policy framework between 
inward-looking infant industry building and import substitution policies and more open 
export oriented policies. This history has generally placed private sector firms in a 
dependent and reactive mode vis-a-vis state policy and may have stifled, to some extent, 
efforts to improve inter-firm organization and collaboration. In addition, the strong role 
of the central state in the design and implementation of macroeconomic, trade and 
industrial policies did not incorporate any clear ideas about the role of regional 
specialization or agglomeration. These patterns of top down economic management 
present formidable challenges for more effectively designed, industry specific science 
and technology policies. On the other hand, over the course of Turkish modernization, 
especially in the post WW-II period, the central government has made significant 
                                                 
35 According to the World Economic Forum‘s Global Competitiveness Reports,  Turkey‘s historical 
Global/Growth Competitiveness Rankings among other countries are as follows: 2001(54); 2002 (65); 2003 
(65); 2004 (66); 2005 (66); 2006-2007 (58); 2007-2008 (53);2008-2009 (63). 
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investments in higher education, workforce training, and in the establishment of national 
institutions associated with science and technology. These investments provided an 
important initial foundation to support more systematic efforts to accelerate technical 
change and innovation in the current period. The following sections will review the 
historic evolution of the institutional and policy framework supporting the development 
of science, technology and innovation. A special emphasis will be placed on how the 
historic evolution of these institutions and policies has both helped and hindered 
contemporary efforts to build up the elements of a national innovation system. 
 
 
4.2 Developmental History of Turkish Science, Technology and Innovation Policies 
4.2.1 Recognition of Science and Technology as a Separate Realm:  The Planned 
Period of 1960-1977 
The identification of science and technology as a distinct realm of national policy 
did not really come to the foreground until the late 1940s. In particular, the idea that 
public sector investments and polices related to higher education and publically financed 
research and development was central to national security and economic growth 
performance was novel. The notion of a discrete realm of science and technology policy 
first emerged with the work of Vannevar Bush and other scientists and engineers in the 
U.S. and Europe who had been engaged in the war effort.  Bush and others argued that 
government had an important steering role in supporting technological innovation and 
entrepreneurship to ensure both economic and geopolitical security (Zachary 1997). It is 
noteworthy that the early proponents of a government leadership role in technology and 
innovation were some distance ahead of neoclassical economists in fully recognizing the 
substantial public goods nature of research and development and the prominent role of 
science and innovation in national growth performance.  In the late 1940s and early 
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1950s in the U.S. and elsewhere, national scientific bodies linked to central governments 
promoted and invested in higher education, research and development based on national 
security and national competitiveness rationales. The discrete field of science and 
technology policy was hence born in this period. 
 In Turkey both the discourse and the public sector actors that began to discuss a 
national science and technology policy emerged as byproducts of the planned era and the 
Republican modernization project. As touched upon in the previous sections, the 
objective of the new Republic was to create an industrialized modern state, in an 
environment of limited capital and government revenue. The founders of the Republic 
drew upon the ideals of science to guide their modernization objective and focused on the 
establishment of universal education as an essential step in transforming a peasant society 
with low levels of literacy and education.  Outstanding high-school graduates were given 
scholarships to be educated in basic and applied sciences in Europe and USA, and some 
of these graduates returned to start their own factories and build up of new industrial 
sectors, as in the case of sugar production. (Tekeli 2006). Moreover, a number of 
universities with medicine and engineering departments were established and developed 
with a large infusion of foreign faculty. Targeted recruitment policies were directed 
especially towards Jewish professors fleeing from the Nazi Germany. Many of these 
refugees later became very influential in developing the modern university system in the 
country. In addition to enhancing the scientific level of the higher education system, 
technological transformation also took place through extensive public expenditures and 
infrastructure investments including desiccation of swamps, war on epidemics, the 
establishment of power plants and more advanced communication and railroad networks. 
Consequently, the scientific visions of the ruling elite and their strong commitment to 
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progress transformed the society‘s perceptions on science and technology in a way that 
had never occurred in the policy making arena in Turkey.   
But it was only at the beginning of the 1960s that science and technology was 
highlighted as a separate realm which would itself contribute to the development 
objectives of the First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967). In this respect, the Plan 
recommended establishment of TUBITAK (Scientific and Technical Research Council of 
Turkey) for the purposes of organizing, coordinating, and promoting basic and applied 
research.  TUBITAK also had responsibility to set research priorities according to the 
targets of the Plan (DPT 1962). This new lead institution was unfortunately given 
responsibilities without corresponding resources and could not meet goals such as 
improving the research base in higher education institutes and promoting private sector 
R&D. The objective of doubling government expenditure on R&D (GERD) to 0.6 % of 
GDP could not be achieved and remained as an unrealistic target.  
The third five year plan (1973-77) shifted the focus of attention from the 
development of basic science capacities to applied science and technology projects 
targeted to selected sectors. It suggested greater integration of technology policy with 
industry, investment and employment policies to enhance the technological capabilities 
of select industrial sectors that were opened to international competition. In this respect, 
the Plan encouraged increases in the number and quality of technical personnel; the 
buildup of technology transfer mechanisms; establishment of new graduate programs in 
sciences and engineering departments in universities, and the development of high 
technology in internationally competitive export sectors (DPT 1972).  The principles of 
technology transfer and property rights received much more emphasis in this plan than in 
previous plans. The third plan criticized previous technology policies for their inability to 
establish institutional mechanisms to accelerate technology transfer and 
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commercialization or build a system supporting generation of novel technologies (DPT 
1972). The following governments, on the other hand, condemned this third plan and 
located the problems in the limited incentives for protected industries to invest and 
develop new technologies in the era of protectionist import substitution policies. 
 
4.2.2 The Puzzle: Compelling Science and Technology Plans and Poor 
Implementation the 1979-1996 period 
The fourth plan, prepared for the years between 1979 –1983 coming out of the  
military takeover years, mainly criticized the existing technological level of the country 
by condemning the negative impact of import substitution policies of the previous 
decades. Inefficient resource allocation for R&D activities, lack of sustained relationships 
between R&D institutions and industry, high cost of technology transfer and the low 
technology absorption and assimilation capability of industry were stated as the main 
problem areas in the Plan. All of these shortfalls were seen as endemic to a situation 
where national industries were shielded from international standards and competition. For 
the first time in the history of the country, a separate science and technology plan, 
Turkish Science Policy: 1983-2000, was prepared and published. The Plan suggested 
establishment of the Supreme Council for Science and Technology (BTYK) as the main 
national decision making body. The BTYK was organized to design of science and 
technology policies with broader participation of politicians, bureaucrats and non-
governmental organization representatives from the relevant socio-economic fields of 
activity (TUBITAK, 1999). The Plan specifically emphasized the necessity for the design 
of technology policies based on the specific needs of different sectors regarding 
technology development and transfer. The Plan also explicitly addressed the need for 
better legal arrangements on industrial/intellectual property ownership rights, national 
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quality control techniques and specialized employment programs. Unfortunately, the Plan 
could not be implemented due to political instabilities and lack of a strong government 
will and vision on technology development. 
The fifth plan (1985-89) set out the need to prepare a science and technology 
master plan based upon the Turkish Science Policy 1983-2000 document. This policy 
document focused on establishing centers of excellence in some areas of basic and 
applied science, encouraging better university-industry relations, and establishing a 
national quality control system. The university-industry partnership idea emerged for the 
first time in Turkey with this plan. The Plan also highlighted  the dependence of  the 
country on imported technologies as domestic  industry was more inclined to purchase 
technology from abroad than investing  in endogenous research and development 
activities. In an attempt to stimulate domestic R&D two tax incentive schemes were 
adopted to encourage private investment in R&D: Decree on Tax Postponement to 
Support R&D (1986) and Support for R&D Investment (1986). Although inefficient and 
limited in scope and funding, direct tax incentives were at least an informed response to 
the acknowledged dependency problem in the Plan. The most important practical 
achievement during the course of the fifth Plan was the first meeting of the Supreme 
Council for Science and Technology (BTYK) in 1989 as the lead institution in charge of 
national science and technology policies. BTYK, established as part of the Master Plan 
linked to ―Turkish Science Policy: 1983-2003‖ in 1983, was supposed to meet twice a 
year. The BTYK did not in fact meet until 1989 and its recommendations did not get 
implemented. The first meeting of BTYK simply underscored the importance of science 
and technology policies and lack of action by the Turkish government and private sector 
partners. This poor performance with respect to technology development was contrasted 
with rapid advances in both the industrialized and newly industrializing Asian countries. 
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Yet, the Supreme Council did not meet second time till 1993 as little momentum toward 
major reforms or new investment was generated. 
The sixth plan (1990-1994), similar to previous plans, proposed new science and 
technology development paths for the country and called for the adoption of advanced 
technology transfer and technology building mechanisms and knowledge collaboration 
and diffusion instruments such as technology incubators and technoparks.  To better 
nurture university-industry collaborations, the Plan prescribed the foundation of five 
technoparks and two advanced technology institutes. The plan gave precedence to 
specific advanced technology areas like ICT, bio-technology, microelectronics, nuclear 
technology, and advanced materials. Also, in order to meet emerging demands in 
intellectual property right and quality control developments, the Plan suggested the 
creation of the Turkish Patent Institute and National Metrology Institute (DPT, 1989). 
During the period of the sixth plan, one initiative, the World Bank‘s Technology 
Development Project (1991), significantly influenced the evolution of the science and 
technology institutional infrastructure of the country. The Technology Development 
Project (TDP) aimed at: 
 
―(i) bringing the MSTQ [(Metrology, Standardization, Testing, Quality)] system 
in Turkey to OECD standards, ii) supporting private sector investment in 
industrial technology development by providing seed capital and subsidized 
grants/loans, and iii) developing a venture capital industry by establishing a legal 
and regulatory framework, rationalizing the tax treatment of venture capital funds 
(VCFs), and financing through the IFC [(International Finance Corporation)] a 
role model VCF and management company.‖ (Taymaz, 2006:1) 
In accordance with its objectives, TDP established several new institutions. These 
included the Technology Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV), National 
Accreditation Council and the Venture Capital Fund/Venture Capital Management 
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Company. The TDP also influenced the legal and regulatory framework that was 
fundamental for proper functioning of these institutions in Turkey. 
The implementation failures of science and technology plans until the mid-1990s 
were related to macroeconomic instability including high inflation rates and boom-bust 
cycles, and a fragile banking system not positioned to expand private sector lending. In 
these conditions the institutional restructuring and institution building needed to 
significantly advance performance could not get off the ground In the early 1990s, the 
Turkish government had to again reiterate the importance of science and technology 
policies in its economic growth goals as the rules of the games in international markets 
were changing with the revolutionary developments in information and communication 
technologies. In this context the Supreme Council for Science and Technology (BTYK) 
became active again; meeting for a second time in 1993. They approved a new 
framework, the Turkish Science and Technology Policy: 1993-2003, which formed an 
integral part of the 7th Five Year Development Plan (1996-2000) in Turkey. This plan 
also failed to take hold but finally the BTYK met a third time in 1997. After this third 
meeting, pressured by the rapid technological change in global information and 
communication technologies, the government finally realized the crucial need to 
prioritize technological development to sustain national competitiveness. With the need 
to reform science and technology policies in a rapidly changing global economy the 
finally recognized BTYK became more effective in designing and actually implementing 
new policies. Most noteworthy, the BTYK explicitly called for the establishment of a 
national innovation system (NIS), indicating a paradigm shift in the conception of   
science and technology policies in Turkey. Starting from 1997, the Supreme Council has 
held its meetings regularly and set and monitored policy targets in accordance with the 
national development plan. 
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After generally being put to the side in prior five year development plans the 
―Science and Technology Policy: 1993-2003‖, became  the most comprehensive strategic 
document  delineating industry, innovation and technology strategies and specific goals 
for the country. The strategy document contained somewhat familiar calls to  enhance the 
intellectual capacities; upgrading the R&D ability of the country in the new pervasive 
generic technologies (information technology, advanced materials, biotechnology, 
nuclear technology and space technology); using these new abilities in economic priority 
areas. However, the strategy focused much more directly on accelerating diffusion of 
technologies in target areas and transferring basic and applied research results to meet 
economic and social priorities. 
Most significant, the new policy document set four specific outcome targets for 
the years 1993-2003: 1) to increase the number of researchers per 10,000 people from 7 
to 15; 2) to raise the GERD36 (Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D) to GDP ratio from 
0.3 percent to 1.0 percent; 3) to move up in the rank of scientific publications from 40th 
to 30th position; and 4) increase the share of business in total GERD from 18 percent to 
30 percent. (Taymaz 2006:4). Further, to achieve the stated targets, the ―Science and 
Technology Policy: 1993-2003‖ was converted into a specific action plan, ―The Project 
of Impetus for Science and Technology‖ (TÜBİTAK, 1996), within the scope of 
Structural Transformation Projects in the 7
th
 Five Year Development Plan. The 7
th
 
development plan emphasized greater involvement of private sector in R&D investments, 
establishment of national R&D networks and technology development zones, greater 
involvement of academicians in R&D activities, generation and support of venture capital 
structures and government procurement of technological products.  
                                                 
36 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) includes expenditure on research and development by 
business enterprises, higher education institutions, and government and private non-profit organizations. 
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The review of the plans and projects undertaken within the scope of science and 
technology development in Turkey especially during the 1980s and early 1990s show that 
scientific and technological development had always been prominent in the planning 
discourse. However, science and technology policy was never prioritized in national 
economic policy and never received the attention or investment commitments to push 
change.  This is especially clear when efforts in Turkey are contrasted with the much 
more massive and systematic efforts in East Asian industrializing countries. The policies 
and actions that did influence technological change and innovation were mostly reactive. 
After the liberalization of foreign trade policies in 1980s and subsequent international 
agreements with GATT/WTO (1989) and European Customs Union (ECU -1996), 
Turkey adopted a number of policies to promote competition including export subsidies. 
In order to replace direct export subsidies with subsidies for R&D that were legal under 
GATT TUBITAK initiated an industrial R&D support program in 1995. These R&D 
subsidies were also a response to more open trade competition.  
When Turkey and the EU signed the customs union agreement in 1996 this 
allowed most industrial goods to trade freely between Turkey and EU countries. While 
access to broader markets provided a great opportunity for Turkish firms, it also made 
them vulnerable to technologically advanced products competing in domestic and 
international markets. The effects of the Customs Union agreement made both public and 
private sector leaders realize that Turkish industry needed to upgrade its low-tech, labor 
intensive products to higher value added and high quality products. The final major event 
that happened at the end of the 1990s and influenced many major developments in 2000s 
was Turkey‘s recognition as a candidate for full membership to European Union at the 
end of the 1999. To accede to the EU, Turkey was first expected to successfully complete 
negotiations with the European Commission on each of the chapters of the acquis - the 
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total body of EU law. In this process, negotiations started with the science and research 
chapter in 2005.The chapter is closed with the assessment that Turkey has the legal and 
institutional grounds and conformity to implement the science and research objectives of 
the EU acquis in 2006.  
The more serious efforts to prioritize science and technology policy which began 
in the early 1990s culminated in the 8th national development plan, Mid-term Program 
(2006-2008) and National Science and Research Strategy: 2005-2010. This plan 
committed to a 113 percent increase in the state budget in 2005 to fund research 
initiatives. These documents also evaluated existing strategic plans and administrative 
success at implementing the innovation oriented science and research objectives in 
Turkey.  
 
4.2.3 The Systems Perspective: Late 1990s - Present 
So far we have reviewed the evolution of five-year development plans and 
associated science, technology and innovation policy documents. This planning 
framework is itself an artifact of the state led planning era, but has provided some 
positive and consistent impetus to consider the status of science and technology policies 
in light of economic and development challenges facing the country37. The plans set the 
basic framework and indentify the main objectives and targets for the planning period. 
The State Planning Organization (DPT) is responsible for the organization of specialized 
committees in each area, including science and technology, and their participatory 
configuration at the highest level. Since 1997 the science and technology planning 
process has become more systematic and has become a major priority in national 
                                                 
37 Only the 9
th
 Plan, the last development plan covering the period (2007-2013), is prepared for 7 years to 
adjust to European Union‘s planning period.  
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economic and industrial policy. The concrete objectives and strategies of the 
development plans are reviewed and amended with mid-term and annual programs. And 
specific action and implementation plans are prepared and implemented by the individual 
institutions represented in the Supreme Council of Science and Technology (BTYK).  
The Supreme Council of Science and Technology (BTYK) now has both an 
advisory and executive role in the preparation and implementation of development and 
mid-term plans. BTYK decisions are accepted as a Circular of Prime Ministry and they 
are binding over the actions of public institutions. The strategic plans prepared by these 
public institutions not only guide their own implementation practices but also inform 
BTYK and enrich its advisory position in preparation of development plans and mid-term 
programs.  
The systems perspective in the design of science, technology and innovation 
policies in Turkey has continued with the 8th (2001-2005)38 and 9th (2007-2013) national 
development plans. These contemporary plans elaborated and built upon the major 
objectives of the first major systematic plan ―Turkish Science and Technology Policy: 
1993-2003‖. These plans introduced new strategies, the implementation of which were 
scrutinized through implementation plans and other strategic documents such as ―Vision 
2023: Science and Technology Strategies‖, ―National Science and Research Strategy: 
                                                 
38 The 8th five-year development (2001-2005) set the main targets for the first half of the 2000s as 
becoming an information society and achieving competitiveness in international markets with the driving 
force of science and technological development. In this respect, the main policy priorities were determined 
as increasing university and public-private sector cooperation; increasing public support to research; and 
supporting research projects mainly on priority areas of advanced new materials, bio, nano, information, 
clean energy, nuclear, and aerospace technologies. The measures taken in the noted areas are expected to 
increase GERD to GDP ratio to 1.5 percent (0.79 %) and number of full-time R&D personnel per 10,000 to 
20 (24.5) in 2005 (The numbers in parentheses show the real values in 2005. In 2008, Turkish Statistical 
Institute recalculated the GDP series and according to new figures GERD to GDP ratio decreased to 0.59 % 
in 2005). 
 133 
2005-2010‖, ―National Innovation Strategy: 2008-1010‖ and ―International Science, 
Technology and Innovation Strategy: 2007-2010‖.  
Despite considerable developments since late 1990s, the country‘s ability to 
generate knowledge and utilize it for socio-economic development remained low in 
comparison to most advanced countries. A sober assessment of science and technology 
measures and their impact on industrial competitiveness  motivated policy makers to 
approach the problem holistically and to create a shared science and technology vision 
among  private and public science and research actors. On December 2001, the Supreme 
Council for Science and Technology (BTYK), approved the first foresight project entitled 
―Vision 2023: Science and Technology Strategies‖ to create an innovative economy by 
the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. This Vision process 
adopted a bottom up approach that was novel to Turkish planning and governance 
traditions. The goal was to determine priority areas to enhance national competitiveness 
and to introduce system actors to each other and increase actors‘ motivation and 
willingness to implement the adopted policies. The new project became an important 
driver of the developing national innovation system as it promoted the value of horizontal 
interactions among actors with respect to formulation and implementation of innovation-
oriented policies.  
Vision 2023 was mainly a technology foresight initiative together with 3 other 
sub-projects aimed at collecting and evaluating data on the technological capacity, R&D 
manpower and R&D infrastructure of the country. TUBITAK, as the responsible 
institution for the organization and implementation of the project, organized a steering 
committee which consisted of 65 representatives from 27 governmental organizations, 9 
universities and 29 industrial organizations and NGOs. Regarding the execution of the 
project, 12 technology foresight panels in education and human resources; environment 
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and sustainable development; information and communication; energy and natural 
resources; health and pharmaceuticals; defense, aeronautics and space industries; 
agriculture and food; machinery and materials; transportation and tourism; textiles; 
chemicals and construction and infrastructure were formed which conducted more than 
200 meetings.  A two-stage Delphi survey was carried out to support panel deliberations 
that evaluated the opinions of thousands of professionals and experts to assess the 
likelihood of achieving envisioned technology developments in different 
technology/industrial areas. The prepared synthesis and evaluation reports documented 
94 technology roadmaps in priority fields. The final strategy document, adopted on 
March 2005, identified eight strategic technology areas: ICT; bio and genetic research; 
energy and environment; materials; nanoscience; design; production and machinery 
technologies and mechatronics.  
The Vision 2023 Project was a major development in that it expanded 
participation outside the state bureaucracy to multiple voluntary stakeholders. These 
stakeholders were  motivated and encouraged by  the possibility of generating a 
sophisticated technology foresight document that incorporated knowledge and expertise 
from a large number of actors in science and technology and that  would be  implemented 
and supported through a strong government commitment and coordination. The project 
did have its critics who argued that wide participation led to identification of too many 
priority fields given the limited financial and technological capacities of the country, its 
neglect of necessary feedback mechanisms with respect to the development of fast paced 
technologies and its lack of emphasis on public R&D support programs. Despite these 
criticisms, the Vision 2023 strategic document was translated into concrete actions with 
the National Science and Research Strategy: 2005-2010.  
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The National Science and Research Strategy: 2005-2010 defined a set of seven 
actions to meet national objectives and new targets for the year 2010 which included 
increasing Gross Expenditures on Research and Development (GERD) as a percentage of 
GDP to 2% (from 0.73 in 2008), with half of GERD coming from the private sector and 
raising the number of full-time equivalent researchers by 40,000 (from 53,000 in 2008). 
The adopted set of actions were to enhance awareness of science and technology in the 
society, to educate more researchers and enhance their capabilities; to support outcome 
oriented and qualified research which can be translated into innovation and productivity 
gains; to coordinate and manage national science, technology and innovation system 
more efficiently and effectively; to strengthen research and technology development 
performance of private sector; to improve research environment and infrastructure; and to 
enhance national and international linkages.  
The identified action areas mainly reflected weaknesses of the developing 
national innovation system.  The government backed the strategy and allocated additional 
funding of approximately $650 million for the years 2005 and 2006 from the national 
budget. This represented a major breakthrough. For the first time there was a substantial 
national commitment to build up the national science and technology base with $1.5 
billion budgeted for the initiatives in the strategy in 2008 The increased R&D funding 
resources supported a number of policy instruments and programs, which will be 
discussed in detail Chapter 5 in regards to the characteristics and performance of the NIS.   
But the 9th and last development plan (2007-2013) adopted some bold general objectives 
in science and technology development including: an  increase in overall R&D 
expenditures to 2 % of GDP by 2013 ( from 0.73 in 2008);  commitment to  raise the 
share of private sector spending in R&D to 60 % (from 44.2 % in 2008);  expand the full 
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time equivalent number of researchers to 80,000 (from 53,000 in 2008); and augment the 
internet penetration rate to 60 % of households by 2013 (from 20 % in 2008).  
To date, planning and investment in the Turkish science, technology and 
innovation framework emphasized progress toward basic outcome measures of science 
and technology performance (such as R&D/GDP ratios and others noted above).  This 
view of science and technology policy success is valid because basic capacities have to 
be built up in the public and private sector institutions and basic experience in integrating 
ongoing research and development into actual technology upgrading and innovation 
activities is a necessary foundation for the further evolution of the NIS. Building more 
efficient and effective interactions through better orchestration of NIS actors could not be 
achieved without meaningful resources, capacity and initial experience. It was also 
critical to show that support systems were durable, and most importantly build up an 
awareness of the value of research and development commitments for firm growth and 
profitability. The basic metrics in the last three plans emphasized improvement in private 
sector‘s R&D capacity and demand together with private and public sector cooperation, 
including universities. Such cooperation was not present in previous periods.  
In the current period the NIS construction process has begun to address more 
direct economic versus science and technology performance outcome measures for 
national policies such as  patent activity, international competitiveness indexes, 
percentage of high-technology products in total exports, etc. These economic measures 
have remained relatively low and have not clearly responded to improvements in the key 
science and technology indicators over the past 10 years. Moving on to focus on these 
measures has forced policy makers to focus national strategy documents on the character 
of public private relationships and organizational barriers to technology 
commercialization. The National Innovation Strategy: 2008-2010, for instance identified 
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the six major objectives as entrepreneurship, efficiency and innovation; science and 
technology transfer to private firms; competitiveness; research infrastructure and 
environment; governance and international cooperation, the last of which was further 
elaborated in the International Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy: 2007-2010 
document.  
Each objective is analyzed and a number of action areas are identified in the 
document. These action items are directed toward building knowledge, know-how and 
relationships among the actors in the system, including creating an awareness that  R&D 
and research  commercialization was essential for the long term competitiveness of 
private firms; improving  the human resources within the firms  and developing policy 
designs to accelerate technology and knowledge transfer;  developing world class ICT, 
especially e-commerce; improving the active seeding and management of innovation 
activities in technoparks; and business incubators; improving coordination among 
organizations that fund R&D activities.  Each of the fields requires a level of detailed 
policy development and management of human resources and funding that suggests a 
further evolution of the NIS. 
In sum the articulation and serious government commitment to a national science 
and technology policy did not really occur until the mid-1990s. After several stops and 
starts, Turkey‘s mediocre industrial and growth performance combined with external 
pressures stemming from the EU integration project pushed the central government to 
prioritize science and technology policy. This led to a more serious and coherent series of 
plans and initiatives to improve the nations technological and innovative capacities. 
However, given the long history of central state dominance over industrial and 
technology policies and the somewhat dependent and reactive status of private firms in 
advanced industrial areas, building capacities for technology upgrading and innovation 
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necessitated transcending an entrenched bureaucratic structure and expanding 
participation in policy making and implementation. Another interesting byproduct the 
history of centralized Turkish industrial and technology planning is the absence of any 
focus on regional industrial specialization, agglomeration or innovative capacity. The 
following chapter will examine the contours of the recent technology and innovation 
policy making from the perspective of those actively involved in the process. The more 
specific barriers and possibilities for further development and articulation of the NIS in 
Turkey from the perspective of policy makers and those actually implementing programs 
will be carefully analyzed. This assessment will then be compared and contrasted with 
the actual activates and experiences of firms that have begin to participate in the new 
technology and innovation programs fostered by the plans. 
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Chapter 5: Evaluating the NIS Construction Process in Turkey 
As emphasized in the prior chapter, the evolution of industrial and science and 
technology policies in Turkey can be characterized by three major transitions.  The first 
was the change in national macro and trade policy from the strong protection of domestic 
markets with import substitution policies of 1960s and 1970s, to the reduction in 
protections and export-led growth strategies of the 1980s and to the present period.  The 
second transition, that further exposed Turkish industry to international competition, was 
centered on the acceleration of the EU integration project in the mid-1990s with planned 
entry into the Customs Union and subsequent initiatives. This process put into sharp 
relief the need for a serious focus on science and technology policy backed with real 
public sector investment to compete against European firms in higher value added and 
more technologically advanced product and service markets.  The third transition, the 
development of a systematic science and technology strategy at the dawn of the 21st 
century, was associated with more liberal trade policies and EU integration, but involved 
for the first time a focus, and real resource commitments, to a coherent NIS construction 
process. This chapter will concentrate on the 1997-2007 period of policy making, 
institution building and efforts to generate complementarities and associations between 
the individual elements of the emerging NIS.  
In a developing country context, adoption of NIS framework to shape science, 
technology, and innovation policies is premised on the prevalence of market failures in 
the domains of technology development and innovation.  As noted in the literature 
review, positive externalities and information failures are prevalent in R&D and 
technology adoption processes. Addressing these market failures through strategic 
interventions that valorize the social benefits of R&D and improve the quality and 
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efficiency of information flows is fully consistent with the allocative efficiency 
advantages of markets.  The NIS framework is actually a mid-way between the ―pure 
market view‖ that is deeply skeptical of the efficacy of state involvement in addressing 
R&D market failures and more traditional ―state-led development‖ models where 
government planning organizations strongly direct industrial investment and the 
technology development of domestic firms (Teubal 2002). The roles attached to actors in 
public and private sector institutions in the NIS framework are contingent on context. To 
understand more deeply the NIS construction process in Turkey the prior experiences of 
the public and private sectors must be considered as well as the initial levels of 
institutional capacity.     
As articulated in the theory and literature review chapter, new developmental state 
theories emphasize that nation states have diverse choices in their efforts to stimulate 
innovation-based industrial growth. Some cases, such as Israel and Taiwan have linked 
science and technology policies more tightly to targeted industrial development policies. 
A distinctly different example is Ireland which focused much more on attracting foreign 
technology and high-tech firms and linking domestic science and technology institutions 
to these lead firms through partnerships and joint ventures with local firms. National 
innovation systems share a number of common framework elements but the development, 
relationships and specific interactions among the elements depend on the unique 
structures and historic patterns shaping  productive forces and capabilities in a specific 
nation state (Breznitz 2005, Freeman 1987, Evans 1995). However, the literature also 
shows that  innovation based growth actually emerges  at the specific ―industrial sector 
level and at the level of particular state agencies‖ rather than at the national level, because 
they have more direct impact on firm strategies and investment decisions that demark the 
move toward innovation led growth (Breznitz 2005: 315). 
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Turkey is an unusual case of a country with a long history of central government 
direction of the economy, but with little history of a strong, targeted industrial policy. As 
a developing country without a coherent industrial policy, it is aiming to advance its 
economic growth and competitiveness objectives by providing technology and innovation 
support to firms and sectors based on perceived capacity and likelihood of success rather 
than industrial or product specialization. In a certain sense the developing innovation 
system then becomes a leading shaper of industrial growth and change as it selects the 
firms and institutions seen to have the greatest prospects for technology upgrading and 
innovation. Clearly, application of an NIS conceptual framework to influence firm and 
institutional behaviors is not an easy task and necessitates substantial policy making and 
implementation capabilities which transcend goals of simply targeting improvement in 
major science and technology indicators. Achieving growth and competitiveness targets 
requires that system elements function over time to actually increase the pace of 
technological change and innovation in firms delivering products and services to markets. 
For every nation, there is continual experimentation with the design of the NIS 
and nations with clear objectives and a durable commitment handle better the evolution 
of these complex formations. National goals and challenges transform the priorities, 
policies, programs, and funding mechanisms of the countries and as experience is 
gathered and as policy learning is achieved, new elements are incorporated into the 
system and others are diminished or discarded. The first objective of this chapter is to 
review the basic resource base underpinning the NIS construction project in Turkey – the 
major science and technology indicators in Turkey and their relationship to indicators 
other middle and upper income countries. Given this base, the second major aim is to 
understand how the contemporary NIS construction process is trying to bring science and 
technology assets to bear to actually enhance innovation performance in firms and R&D 
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institutions.  In this area the major discussions on the Turkish NIS construction and 
design processes, institutionalization, strengths and weaknesses of existing programs will 
be analyzed. Finally, the views of officials and leaders of programs engaged in the NIS 
construction process will be evaluated on issues including the applicability of the concept 
in Turkey; major institutional, legal and financial restructuring challenges; and the 
difficulties of aligning public institutions and specific support programs with the 
capacities and needs of private sector partners.   
 
5.1. Major Science and Technology Indicators in Turkey 
 A decade after the first appearance of the NIS concept in the national policy 
discourse, Turkey‘s gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of 
GDP reached to 0.76 % in 2006 in comparison to 1.88 % in EU-15 and 2.26 % in total 
OECD countries, reflecting major room for improvement relative to EU or OECD 
averages. But, this share is similar to or higher than other middle income countries such 
as Portugal (0.83 %), Mexico (0.50 %), Poland (0.56 %) and Greece (0.50 %) and its 
growth rate is considerably higher than those of all these countries. Even though GERD 
has increased substantially over the years, with a growth rate of 69 % from 0.45 % in 
1996, it is still well short of the 2 % of GDP target for 201339.  
The review of major science technology and innovation policy documents in 
Turkey shows that increasing business expenditure on R&D (BERD) has been a major 
policy objective especially during the NIS construction phase as businesses account for 
                                                 
39 In interpreting and comparing growth rates between countries, it must be remembered that GERD to 
GDP ratio reflects changes in countries‘ nominal spending on R&D and changes in their economic growth. 
In other words, diminished R&D intensities could be linked to either decreasing R&D spending and/or 
faster growing GDPs. Therefore, nominal spending accounts must be interpreted in context as they don‘t 
reflect the efficiency and effectiveness of spending and as well the features contributing to absorption, 
creation, and diffusion of knowledge. 
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majority of the R&D performed in advanced countries. Business-performed R&D is 
usually associated with the creation of new products and techniques rather than the 
research performed in universities and public research institutions.  
 
Figure 5.1 GERD as a % GDP, 2006 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Growth of GERD as a % GDP, 1996-2006 
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In Turkey, BERD as a percentage of GDP increased significantly from 0.12 % in 1996 to 
0.28 % in 2006, but it remains low in comparison to many other EU and OECD 
countries, even though the increased share is similar to what is found in many middle 
income developing countries such as Poland (0.17 %), Portugal (0.35 %) and Mexico 
(0.25 %).  
Figure 5.3 BERD as a % GDP, 2006 
  
 
Figure 5.4 Growth of BERD as a % GDP, 1996-2006 
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Variations in BERD intensity among countries are primarily caused by their 
industrial specialization and demographics of their businesses as some industries are 
more R&D intensive than others, and some countries have bigger shares of large R&D 
performing firms in their business population. In most countries with high levels of 
business R&D intensity, R&D is concentrated in firms with more than 500 employees.  
 
Table 5.1 R&D Expenditure by Type40, 2006 
 
Countries GERD BERD GFRD HERD HERD-Industry   
Turkey 0.76 0.28 0.37 0.39 23.8 
Canada 1.94 1.06 0.63 0.69 8.4 
China 1.42 1.01 0.35 0.13 36.6 
Czech R. 1.54 1.02 0.60 0.25 0.7 
Denmark 2.43 1.62 0.68 0.63 2.4 
Finland 3.45 2.46 0.87 0.65 6.6 
France 2.11 1.34 0.82 0.38 1.6 
Germany 2.53 1.77 0.70 0.41 14.1 
Greece 0.57 0.17 0.27 0.27 8.9 
Ireland 1.32 0.89 0.40 0.34 1.8 
Israel 4.65 3.64 1.03 0.62 7.6 
Italy 1.09 0.54 0.55 0.33 1.4 
Japan 3.39 2.62 0.55 0.43 2.9 
Korea 3.23 2.49 0.74 0.32 13.7 
Mexico 0.50 0.25 0.23 0.14 1.1 
Netherlands 1.67 0.96 0.64 0.49 6.8 
Norway 1.52 0.82 0.67 0.46 4.7 
Poland 0.56 0.18 0.32 0.17 5.4 
Portugal 0.83 0.35 0.44 0.29 1.2 
Russian F. 1.08 0.72 0.66 0.07 29.31 
S. Africa 0.92 0.53 0.35 0.18 11.59 
Spain 1.20 0.67 0.51 0.33 7.9 
Sweden 3.73 2.79 0.89 0.76 5.2 
United K. 1.78 1.10 0.57 0.47 4.8 
USA 2.62 1.84 0.77 0.37 4.9 
EU-15 1.88 1.20 0.63 0.42 6.6 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008.  
                                                 
40 GERD: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D; BERD: Business Expenditure on R&D; GFRD: 
Government-financed R&D; HERD: Higher Education Expenditure on R&D 
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More than 80 % of business R&D in Germany, Japan, Korea and USA is 
undertaken in large businesses (OECD, 2008). The ratio is 67 % in Turkey which is 
considerably high in comparison to Greece (34.4 %), Portugal (50 %) and Poland (49 %) 
(OECD, 2008). Even though R&D is concentrated in large firms in advanced countries, 
SMEs are still important players, especially with the increasing R&D investment in the 
services sector. Low R&D intensity among SMEs in Turkey which constitute the 
majority of the business population is recognized and addressed in policies such as SME 
Strategy and Action Plan (2007-2009) to increase SMEs interest in product development 
and boost their capacities through training programs and incubators to ease their access to 
global suppliers and national universities.  
Government-financed R&D (GFRD) in Turkey also remains low compared to EU 
or OECD norms and is far below rapidly growing countries such as Israel and South 
Korea. GERD increased from 0.26 % in 1996 to 0.37 % in 2006. Especially after 2004 
when the central government pushed a large increase in public R&D budget, increased 
government expenditure has been criticized for causing an artificial increase at BERD.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 HERD as a % of GDP, 2006  
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Perhaps the most interesting element of these indicators is the relatively large 
share of higher education R&D expenditures (HERD) in Turkey (0.39 %). As the most 
prominent sector of R&D, higher education is a central element in the newly forming 
Turkish NIS. Government is the biggest funder of R&D in the Turkish university system 
but private sector support for university R&D is strong as well. The share of HERD 
financed by industry appears as an indicator of important linkages business and higher 
education sectors, and these interactions are noteworthy for the construction of a dynamic 
NIS in Turkey. The relatively high share of HERD financed by industry for Turkey, 28.3 
% of total HERD in 2006, show that at minimum there is a pattern and history of 
partnerships and knowledge transfer between those two sectors.  
 
Figure 5.6 HERD financed by industry, 2006 
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in 1996 in comparison with EU or OECD countries, growth over the 1996-2006 period 
has been has been robust (see Table 5.2). Total R&D personnel per thousand total 
employment went up to 2.4 percent in comparison to 10.2 in EU-27 countries and 10.3 in 
South Korea. Likewise, there was healthy growth in engineering degrees as a percentage 
of total new degrees and engineering PhDs per million population, which were 11.9 % 
and 6.0% in 2005 in Turkey. This was higher than many middle income countries, but 
lower than rapidly developing countries such as Israel with 11.81 % and 12.9% 
respectively and 27.07 % and 47.1% in South Korea. 
Table 5.2 R&D Personnel per Thousand Total Employment, 2006 Average Annual 
Growth Rate of R&D Personnel between 1996 and 2006 
Countries R&D Personnel 2006 Growth of R&D Personnel (1996-2006) 
  Researchers  Other S&T Researchers  Total 
Turkey  1.9 0.5   9.0  9.5 
Canada  7.7 4.6   4.2  4.2 
China  1.6 0.4   8.4  6.5 
Czech R.  5.2 4.2   7.3  7.3 
Denmark  10.2 5.9   5.5  3.5 
France  8.2 5.9   3.1  1.1 
Germany  7.2 5.3   2.1  0.8 
Greece  4.3 3.3   6.9  6.4 
Ireland  6.0 2.7   6.6  5.8 
Italy  3.4 3.8   0.8  2.3 
Japan  11.1 3.5   1.4  0.5 
Korea  8.7 1.6   7.2  5.8 
Mexico  1.2 1.0   10.4  11.4 
Netherlands  5.5 5.8   2.6  1.6 
Poland  4.4 1.0   1.3 - 1.2 
Portugal  4.1 0.9   5.9  4.9 
Russian F.  6.8 6.6  - 1.9 - 1.9 
Spain  5.8 3.7   8.4  8.0 
United K.  5.8 4.8   2.4  2.1 
EU-27  6.0 4.2   3.1  1.9 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008.  
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Table 5.3 Triadic Patents per million population, 2005 and Growth Rates of Patenting 
1997-2004 (Growth Rate of Patent Cooperation Treaty filings at EPO) 
Countries Triadic 
Patents 2005 
High and 
Medium 
High-tech 
Medium Low and 
Low Tech 
Growth in Total 
Patenting – All 
Industries 
Turkey 0.76 0.42 0.21 0.39 
Brazil 1.02 0.17 0.15 0.16 
Canada 1.94 0.07 0.03 0.06 
China 1.42 0.45 0.33 0.44 
Czech Republic 1.54 0.17 0.27 0.17 
Denmark 2.43 0.09 0.08 0.09 
France 2.11 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Germany 2.53 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Ireland 1.32 0.11 0.06 0.10 
Israel 4.65 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Italy 1.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Japan 3.39 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Korea 3.23 0.30 0.29 0.30 
Netherlands 1.67 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Poland 0.56 0.24 0.33 0.25 
Russian F. 1.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 
South Africa 0.92 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Spain 1.20 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Sweden 3.73 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
United 
Kingdom 
1.78 0.03 0.01 0.03 
United States 2.62 0.03 0.02 0.03 
EU-25 1.79 0.04 0.03 0.03 
OECD 2.26 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008.    
Regarding more direct scientific and technical output measures such as the 
number of scientific articles per million population and triadic patents, Turkey has also 
shown significant improvement since mid-1990s in concert with her increasing R&D 
expenditures. While the patent outcomes remain low relative to EU and OECD countries, 
annual growth rates of patenting between 1997-2004  in both high and medium high-tech 
and medium to low-tech industries have been impressive and among the highest in this 
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sample. This is perhaps the most powerful circumstantial evidence that the NIS 
construction process is beginning to influence technological change and innovation in 
Turkish public and private institutions.  
Finally, the number of scientific articles per million population increased 
significantly between 1995 (27.8) and 2005 (108.4) as an outcome of basic research 
supporting science and technology policies in Turkey. While the country was one of the 
countries contributing less to the total world scientific articles in 1995, it significantly 
improved its position in 2005. 
     
Figure 5.7 Country % in World Scientific Articles, 200541 
 
 
This review of science and technology development indicators show that with the 
adoption of the NIS framework, major indicators showed positive growth trends in line 
with the objectives of adopted policies and plans in Turkey. However, the advancement 
in these output measures did not translate into measurable improvements in competitive  
                                                 
41 USA produced the 28.9 % of total world scientific articles in 2006, dominating all the other country 
figures. For visual purposes, it is left out of the data for Figure 5.7. 
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Table 5.4 Scientific Articles per million population and Country Share in WSA, 1995- 
2005 
Countries Scientific 
Articles 
2005 
Scientific 
Articles 
1995 
Growth Rate 
1995-2005 
Country Share 
in TWSA, 2005 
Country 
Share in 
TWSA, 1995 
Turkey 108.4 27.8 289.8 1.1 0.3 
Australia 779.4 721.4 8.0 2.2 2.3 
Brazil 53.7 21.6 148.3 1.4 0.6 
Canada 800.6 810.2 -1.2 3.6 4.2 
China 31.8 7.5 325.2 5.9 1.6 
Czech R. 309.7 189.2 63.6 0.4 0.3 
Denmark 930.1 827.9 12.3 0.7 0.8 
Finland 917.2 798.2 14.9 0.7 0.7 
France 482.5 485.5 -0.6 4.3 5.1 
Germany 535.3 461.0 16.1 6.2 6.7 
Greece 386.4 1,93.5 99.7 0.6 0.4 
India 13.3 10.3 29.4 2.1 1.7 
Ireland 511.0 338.2 51.1 0.3 0.2 
Israel 910.4 1,035.4 -12.1 0.9 1.0 
Italy 420.5 314.5 33.7 3.5 3.2 
Japan 434.1 375.2 15.7 7.8 8.3 
Korea 340.6 84.3 303.9 2.3 0.7 
Mexico 37.6 21.3 76.8 0.5 0.3 
Netherlands 851.0 782.0 8.8 2.0 2.1 
Norway 788.4 670.0 17.7 0.5 0.5 
Poland 179.3 118.9 50.9 1.0 0.8 
Portugal 275.8 98.7 179.5 0.4 0.2 
Russia 100.5 125.9 -20.2 2.0 3.3 
S. Africa 51.0 59.6 -14.3 0.3 0.4 
Spain 422.5 287.3 47.1 2.6 2.0 
Sweden 1108.7 1052.1 5.4 1.4 1.6 
Switzerland 1166.4 1019.6 14.4 1.2 1.3 
United K. 756.8 784.1 -3.5 6.4 8.1 
USA 691.4 725.2 -4.7 28.9 34.2 
OECD 493.3 450.4 9.5 81.4 86.9 
EU27 477.4 410.3 16.4 33.1 34.7 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008.  
 
 152 
position of the country in international markets within the last 10 years42 as the linkages 
between research and economic development are highly complex. We must look 
underneath the aggregate innovation indicators to better understand the specific elements 
of the NIS contribute or constrain processes of technological change and innovation at 
the level of industry and firms.   
 
5.2 Building the Institutional Structure and the Systems Perspective 
A national innovation system is a set of institutions functioning within the industrial, 
educational research and political realms of a country which individually and jointly 
foster the creation, development and diffusion of new knowledge and technologies 
(Metcalfe 1995; Teubel 1997; Nelson 1993; Lundval 1992; Arnold and Kuhlman 2001). 
The quality of government policies which provide a framework for all these institutions 
and the competency of policy makers and implementers shape the rate and direction of 
technological learning and the innovation process in a country (Patel and Pavitt 1994).  
The health and performance of an NIS is determined by how well the components of a 
system are established and the strength and durability of the relations among the elements 
of the system (Edquist 2005). Having major system actors effectively fulfilling the 
different needs of a properly functioning system together with national institutions 
establishing infrastructure and framework conditions are essential during a NIS 
construction phase.  
Turkey‘s NIS institutional structure at the end of 2000s broadly includes the 
elements denoted in the above model as a result of the adopted policy initiatives targeting 
                                                 
42 According to the World Economic Forum‘s Global Competitiveness Reports,  Turkey‘s historical 
Global/Growth Competitiveness Rankings among other countries are as follows: 2001(54); 2002 (65); 2003 
(65); 2004 (66); 2005 (66); 2006-2007 (58); 2007-2008 (53);2008-2009 (63). 
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establishment and restructuring of NIS institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the 
1990s, several institutions were established and reorganized such as Technology 
Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV), the National Metrology Institute (UME), 
Small and Medium-sized Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB) and 
TUBITAK-TIDEB (currently known as TUBITAK-TEYDEB a key provider of R&D  
grants to private firms). In addition various laws were passed including new laws 
regulating intellectual and industrial property rights and laws designating technology 
development zones/technoparks.  Public research institutions, such as TUBITAK-MAM, 
were granted more autonomy to support more applied R&D and market oriented product 
development.  
 
Figure 5.8 NIS Model  
 
Source: Arnold and Kuhlman 2001. 
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After the mid-2000s, this restructuring process continued with the adoption of   
additional policies and initiatives targeting interactive relations among system actors. 
Unfortunately, this process of framework and institution building though necessary, does 
not guarantee the emergence of well-functioning NIS unless accompanied by a collective 
understanding of the significance of technological change and innovation among the 
sectors and actors involved in the system, in particular private firms with limited histories 
in leveraging technology and knowledge in their business strategies.  
 
Table 5.5 Institutions Influencing Construction of NIS in Turkey  
Field of 
Organization 
Name of Organization Duties and Responsibilities of 
Organization 
Policy  
Making 
Supreme Council of Science and 
Technology (BTYK) 
Implementation of the Turkish Science 
Policy and assisting the government in 
determination of long termed S&T policies, 
identification of targets, elaboration of plans 
and programs43 
 Scientific and Research Council of 
Turkey- Innovation Monitoring 
Agency (TUBITAK-TEYDEB) 
Administration of direct public R&D and 
Innovation Funds 
 State Planning Organization (DPT) Advising the government in determining 
economic, social and cultural policies and 
targets of the country; preparing long-term 
development plans (including regional and 
sectoral plans); developing future-oriented 
strategies by working closely with 
international institutions; helping reduce 
uncertainties in the medium and long term 
for the private sector by making policy 
recommendations in cooperation with the 
private sector44 
Financing Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade 
(DTM) 
Providing grant fund for the private sector 
projects 
 Ministry of Finance (MB) Providing tax reduction for the R&D 
expenditures of private firms by a ratio of 
40% 
 Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(STB) 
Providing funds for SMEs through 
KOSGEB 
                                                 
43 Accessed at: http://www.tubitak.gov.tr/sid/1003/pid/547/index.htm  
44 Accessed at: http://mevzuat.dpt.gov.tr/khk/540/spo.html#duties 
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 Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Organization 
(KOSGEB) 
Increasing the competitiveness, 
effectiveness and scale of Turkish SME's 
through various support programs such as 
technology and innovation supports; 
entrepreneurship development supports; 
market research and export promotion 
supports, etc.45 
 Technology Development 
Foundation of Turkey (TTGV) 
Supporting the development of 
technological innovation capacity 
international competitiveness of Turkish 
industry by participating in the planning 
process and by providing loan funds for 
firms and providing financing for start-ups  
 Venture Companies  
Business and 
Entrepreneurship 
Development/ 
Support 
KOSGEB Technology 
Development Centers (TEKMERs) 
 
 KOSGEB Entrepreneurship 
Development Center 
 
 Technoparks  
 National Metrology Institute (UME) Providing software, equipment and 
prototype production services to industry 
Knowledge  
Institutes 
Universities  
 University Research Centers  
 University-Industry Joint Research 
Centers 
 
 Public Research Institutes  
 TUBITAK Research Centers  
Intellectual  
Property 
Turkish Patent Institute (TPE) Responsible for intellectual & property right 
issues 
Innovation 
Intermediaries 
Innovation Relay Centers IRC-Ege and IRC-Anatolia  
                                                 
45 Accessed at: http://www.kosgeb.gov.tr/English/index.aspx 
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5.3 Perceptions of the NIS Construction Process from Public Sector Participants 
Based on the formal elements of the NIS in Turkey as shown above, a key aim of 
this dissertation was to evaluate the process from the perspective of participants in the 
construction and implementation process. Thirty three participants were interviewed. 
Interviewees included those working (or in a few cases formerly working)  for key 
institutions in the NIS such as TUBITAK, DPT, DTM, STB, TTGV, KOSGEB, 
TUBITAK-MAM, TEKMERs, (25) and university research and innovation and technical 
support and relay centers (8). In general terms, this group of key public sector actors were 
aware of the NIS concept and described the concept, elements and goals in similar ways 
and consistent with the way the concept is explained in the literature. The frequent 
emphasis on the words such as orchestration, harmonization, synergy, collaboration, 
interaction, linkages and networks revealed that the participants and their organizations 
were involved in similar sets of discussions with respect to system construction and/or 
were influenced by similar materials such as OECD and/or World Bank documents on 
NIS.  Many interviewees defined NIS as an entity emerging out of the interactions and 
collaborations between a number of institutions in education, finance, research and many 
other policy fields whose activities influence innovative capabilities of firms and research 
institutions. The general awareness and consistency of views among these multiple actors 
in regards to the NIS concept was a noteworthy finding of this interview process 
suggesting that the individual goals of their policies and programs were understood as 
part of the broad NIS construction project.  
The central emphases emerging out of the interviews with respect to the 
applicability of the NIS concept in Turkey were the challenges of fostering a basic 
cultural awareness of the importance innovation, of building a systems perspective 
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among program implementers and program clients and of meaningful information sharing 
and collaboration across bureaucratic boundaries. 
In explaining the evolution of NIS, most interviewees emphasized the lack of a 
history or culture of innovation as the starting point for the development of new policies 
to enhance the capacity of actors to undertake technology upgrading and innovative 
activities in Turkey. According to many informants, innovation culture and awareness 
just started to develop in the mid-1990s as national policy makers and industry leaders 
recognized that the country had to launch on a new economic strategy in the face of rapid 
global technological developments and increasing competition from developing countries 
in lower tech sectors. Firms and institutions needed to amend their strategies and build up 
their absorptive capacities to efficiently learn new technologies and design new products 
and processes based on these technologies. The objective of the NIS construction strategy 
was not only to develop basic and applied R&D capabilities, but also the organizational 
capabilities that would sustain the adoption and generation of new technologies. A 
national innovation system in this respect was seen as necessary to help build an 
innovation culture and awareness across society and within firms in all sectors of the 
economy. The state was expected to assume a ―developmental role‖ in mobilizing various 
resources and demonstrating a strong and durable political will to effect a long term 
cultural change and accomplish stated technological development objectives through a 
targeted and strategic institution building. One informant emphasized that cultural change 
was a very long-term and fundamental project beginning with general education and 
socialization. 
 
―Creating a sustaining innovation culture within firms starts with establishing this 
culture within the society and your fundamental means to achieve this objective is 
your education policy. Even though, it may be seen as extending the scope of the 
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NIS discussion, designing an education system where inventions and innovations 
are emphasized from the early school years determines the quality of your human 
capital in the future. Turkey, as a country with significant young population, can 
establish this innovation culture, thinking ability, etc... by getting her young 
population exposed to this culture as early as possible. Hopefully, educated with 
these ideals, they will be endowed with the capabilities and skills to start new 
innovative businesses in the future, or blend in an organization culture where 
innovation is the main motive for making profits‖. (Interview with one of the ex-
directors of TUBITAK-MAM). 
However, a number of interviewees stressed the core challenge as changing the 
culture, and building essential awareness and capabilities within private firms. As noted, 
technical change and innovation in Turkey has historically been centered in a relatively 
small number of large firms. And unlike Ireland, for example, the level of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Turkey has been low and opportunities for technology transfer from 
international firms have been relatively limited. Informants emphasized that a crucial 
challenge in NIS construction is changing the awareness and competitive practices of 
firms in most segments of the economy.     
―For a well functioning national innovation system in a developing country 
context, you have to start the process with an innovation awareness rising 
movement among the firms. Developing new technologies, searching new 
markets for these new products necessitates a bundle of skills on the part of the 
firms. Firms should be willing to create new knowledge, they should be willing to 
reach for knowledge that will generate increased value-added, (a significant 
problem of Turkish consumer products industry), and they should be willing to 
hire new talent and invest on this new talent‖.  
―In a developing country context, you can‘t expect all of this emerging out of 
nothing. You have to teach firms, you have to persuade firms that they have to 
increase their productivity, efficiency and effectiveness through better 
technologies and increased learning capabilities. You have to teach them how and 
why to make R&D: design, project implementation etc. You have to teach them 
about the importance of marketing. You have to encourage them to invest in 
technology intensive areas of activities. In Istanbul, there is an exceptional culture 
of entrepreneurship. Firms can find and access various sources of money, 
investment, etc. However, as they don‘t know have the expertise in technology 
intensive production, they invest in other areas. The national innovation system 
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should be arranged in a dynamic way to accelerate the sources to reach out to 
these firms and nourish their capabilities through existing science and technology 
sources of the country including universities and research centers...‖ (Interview 
with a coordinator at TTGV-Istanbul) 
―Creating an innovation culture within the firms is not an easy process. My 30-
year experience in Turkish bureaucracy taught me that in a developing country 
technology based growth takes time. It is evolutionary. Even though, you want 
this to be revolutionary, invasive, happening real quickly, it is not possible. At 
least it is not possible through the mediums that have been adopted until so far in 
Turkey. Not that I‘m saying nothing has been done to create this innovation 
culture within the firms, many things have been done of course, such as allocating 
R&D loans and grants to firms starting mid- 1990s, but these were insufficient to 
generate the expected impact as they were not backed up by a strong political will 
that put technology based economic growth at the core of everything‖ (Interview 
with an ex-policy maker in TUBITAK).  
Another general theme from the informants in terms of the NIS construction 
process was the ongoing challenge of coordination and communication between 
institutions and actors in the system. Systemic-identity awareness was mentioned with 
respect to how system actors define their role in a functioning NIS and how their 
bureaucratic culture permits collaboration with other organizations especially with 
respect to reorganization of existing programs and needs. The lack of a performance or 
outcome based culture in the public sector and the lack of systems perspective on 
technology related problem identification and solutions were seen as significant ongoing 
barriers to the evolution of the NIS in Turkey.  
―When you look at the actors involved in national innovation system of Turkey, 
you see that every institution that has some importance for Turkey is included in 
that structure and identified as crucial for the system. However, it should be 
simpler. It should be simpler because the system itself is so complex that its 
design requires some creative thought and action unique to Turkish context. It 
should be operable, dynamic and designed to accomplish the expected targets. 
This does not mean that some actors whose main field of interest is highly 
technical are unimportant. But, if you believe in their importance for the system 
and define them as one of the major components of the system, then you ought to 
make sure that these institutions understand this as well and contribute to system 
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construction process and influence the development and diffusion of innovations‖. 
(Interview with a manager in TTGV-Ankara) 
 
―We have all the actors but we cannot make them work together. This is maybe 
because we do not believe in institutions without concrete structures, working in 
harmony in a systems perspective such as national innovation systems. Systems 
perspective brings in newly defined roles, responsibilities and contributions for 
actors. Systemic collaborations introduce new division of labor among institutions 
and stimulate different activities to fulfill new needs and demands. In Turkey, 
most NIS actors are not ready to adopt and embrace new roles and responsibilities 
as most of the innovation based milestones are introduced by international treaties 
or frameworks‖. (Interview with a technology expert in TTGV-Istanbul) 
 
―[The] innovation system of Turkey includes too many actors who do not 
communicate or who do communicate but in limited terms. Yet, you still want to 
believe that their existence will generate the desired interactivity and 
collaboration, and this collaboration will generate the expected outcomes. 
Unfortunately, this doesn‘t happen automatically. The invention-to-innovation 
transition is a complex process and necessitates simultaneous and active 
involvement of many institutions such as technologically mature private firms, 
university research centers, technology commercialization offices, etc. Not only 
the existence but also the excellence of them is essential. In Turkey, we need 
creative policy makers working on policies that encourage collaboration and 
effective communication among universities, research centers, venture capitals, 
etc that challenge the sustaining organizational cultures with respect to the 
breadth and frequency of interactions.‖ (Interview with a science and technology 
planner in DPT). 
Fragmentation and institutional insularity among NIS elements are not uncommon 
in very high income innovative countries, but in a developing country such as Turkey 
with a very short history of coherent technology development policies, a ―habitis‖ of 
collaboration and cooperation may be particularly hard to develop. The establishment and 
rapid evolution of technology adoption and innovation practices is dependent on how 
countries can successfully design and implement programs that encourage co-evolution 
and collective learning among innovation system actors. The fact that interviewees were 
honest and sober in their assessments of the degree of collaboration and harmonization 
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among key institutions may be a relatively positive indicator that actors recognize the 
need for better communication and joint effort. The expected outcome, especially during 
the early phases of system building, is that the NIS idea and policy mix will ignite 
―system effects‖ which will make actors recognize the cumulative benefits of 
harmoniously functioning and adopting organizational strategies that will support 
transformative system objectives. 
 
5.4. General Framework of Policies and Programs Targeting Innovations 
Innovation policies and programs targeting NIS development in developing 
countries focus both on mobilizing resources and promoting change by developing 
learning capabilities of multiple institutions. The constructive process involves the design 
of a context-specific system which not only encourages firms to conduct R&D through 
increased resources such as talent and capital investment but also encourages firms to 
establish new relationships that improve their capacity to learn about new technology and 
market opportunities46.  
The existing policy mix in Turkey which has been developed since the early 
1990s  focuses on four main categories: (1) increasing the rates of expenditure on R&D 
and technological innovation in private enterprises, (2) intensifying R&D cooperation 
among public research institutes; universities; and enterprises (3) increasing the number 
                                                 
46 A dynamic approach to adaptive policies and programs supporting the invention--innovation--growth 
model also demands inclusion of certain industrial policies to track global innovation trajectories and 
business models to facilitate domestic firm‘s integration into global value chains (Auerswald and 
Branscomb 2008). As articulated by the new developmental state theories, nation states can influence their 
developmental patterns and competitiveness through some structures which provide necessary support for 
their private enterprises to become part of globally networked innovation networks (O‘Rien 2004, Breznitz 
2005). The competitiveness objectives of the countries thus becomes not only an issue of how well the 
policies and programs  promote the internal interconnectivity of institutions forming NISs, but also how 
well NISs, as dynamic instruments, as parts of clearly defined industrial policies that position its business 
sectors for new technologies and for global markets.  
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of new innovation intensive enterprises (science and technology based start-ups) created 
and increase their survival rates, and (4) increasing the direct commercialization of 
knowledge created by public research institutes and universities (INNO-Policy Trend 
Chart Turkey, 2009). Until 2006, technology and innovation policies mostly emphasized 
the first two categories, and since then the policy mix has been amended by a greater 
emphasis on the last two categories.  
These categories of policies mostly touch upon the major activities in an 
innovation system such as provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process 
through encouraging creation of new knowledge in technical fields and the buildup of  
human capital and talent;  encouraging entrepreneurship and creation of new science and 
technology based enterprises; provision of new interactive learning  through  networking 
between knowledge institutions and enterprises; provision of financing and consulting on 
innovative activities and marketing and  commercialization activities. Most of these 
activities when translated into major taxonomy of innovation policies emphasize  supply-
side measures which seek to reduce the cost of acquiring knowledge, technology and 
marketing expertise versus  demand-side measures such as  market creating regulation or 
government procurement (Georghiou 2003, 2006). In what follows, the specific NIS 
policies and programs established over past 15 years will be reviewed from the 
perspective of those involved in the implementation and management of the programs. 
These program areas can be viewed as subcomponents of the emerging NIS in Turkey 
and I questioned the key factors associated with each program area about the objectives, 
challenges and successes in their areas.  
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Figure 5.9 Policy Measures According to Start Date in the NIS  
Institutions  Before 1995 1995-2004 2005-2010 
TUBITAK The Support 
Program for 
Scientific and 
Technological 
(Academic) 
Research 
Projects 
The Support Program for 
Industrial R&D Projects 
(GRANT); 
Patent Application Promotion and 
Support Program; 
Techno-Entrepreneurship Funding 
Program; 
Support Program for First R&D 
Projects of SMEs; 
Support Program to Build Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation 
Networks and Platforms; Rapid Support 
Program; Support Program for 
Research Projects of Public Institutions; 
Global Researcher Support Program; 
The Participation Program for 
International Scientific Research 
Projects; National Young Researcher 
Career Development Program; Support 
Program for Project Brokerage Events; 
Support Program for International 
Industry R&D Projects; Support 
Program for National Aerospace 
Research; Support Program for 
National Defense Research Projects; 
TTGV  Technology 
Development Support 
Program (LOAN); 
Commercialization Project Supports; 
Joint Technology Development 
Projects; Environmental Project 
Support Programs; Risk Sharing 
Facility Support; Start-up Support; Pre-
incubation Support Program; 
KOSGEB Research and 
Development 
and 
Technological 
Innovation 
Support 
Program; 
Establishment of 
Technology 
Development 
Centers 
(TEKMERS); 
Consultancy 
Support for 
SMEs; 
Training Support 
(General and Special); 
Industrial Property 
Rights Support; Young 
Entrepreneur 
Development Program; 
Machinery Equipment 
Support for Common 
Use by SMEs; Software 
Support; Supports for 
Hiring Qualified 
Personnel by SMEs; New 
Entrepreneur Support; 
Consultancy Support for 
SMEs; General 
Entrepreneurship 
Training; Quality 
Development; Market 
Research and 
Improvement of Export; 
Electronic Signature Support; E-
commerce Support; 
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MoIT  Law on the 
Establishment of 
Technology 
Development Zones 
(Technoparks);  
Industrial Thesis Projects; Patenting 
Support Program; Industrial R&D 
Investment Support Program; Industrial 
R&D Products Marketing Support 
Program; 
Ministry of 
Finance 
  R&D Tax Exemption 
 
5.4.1 Supply-Side Finance Measures 
5.4.1.1 Grants and Loans for Industrial R&D 
During the system construction process, public grants for industrial R&D played 
an important role in stimulating the research and technological adoption capabilities of 
private enterprises. In Turkey, TUBITAK-TEYDEB has managed the Support Program 
for Industrial R&D projects since 1995. The program was launched as a result of the 
strong efforts of TUBITAK officials who were concerned about the technological 
capabilities and technology based growth potentials of the country. However, the 
Undersecretary of Foreign Trade (DTM), was the actual funder of the program, and 
viewed it through a distinctly different lens. DTM saw the grants as a means to promote 
and subsidize exports after direct export subsidies were banned by GATT trade 
agreements. An ex DTM official was quite explicit about the objectives of this grant 
funding in the earlier years. 
―When we first established the TIDEB (currently known as TEYDEB), we were 
not mainly interested in developing technological or research capabilities of the 
firms. Bounded by international demands on export subsidy elimination, we just 
wanted continue to distribute money to firms via different instruments. We 
wanted to support firms but we couldn‘t do it explicitly and we used R&D support 
to replace our export subsidies. Our objective was pretty much the same: to 
increase exports of the country through the provision of subsidies. If new 
subsidies could increase the technological capabilities of the firms, this would be 
an additional gain for the country‖ (Interview with an ex-policy maker YM). 
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DTM‘s position on exports was actually another manifestation of export 
promotion policies linked to a strategy of devaluations and export incentives with little 
investment in productive infrastructure improvements. Starting in 2005, the funding of 
the program increased significantly and is now mostly financed (75%) from the 
TUBITAK‘s own resources (from the national budget). This funding switch increased 
overall funding and sharpened the focus on industrial R&D and firm innovation, but 
placed considerable stress on policy makers with respect to program implementation.  
―Until recently, TUBITAK which usually had limited resources had the ritual of 
asking for more money from the government. We explained them why we need to 
invest on technology, why we need to build on our capabilities, why we need to 
innovate, etc. This was a ritual for us. However, when the government actually 
decided to allocate more money to R&D, we suddenly realized that we really 
don‘t know what to do with this big chunk of money. This increased the pressure 
on us because the government had cut the budget of the National Intelligence 
Organization and increased the OTV (private consumption tax) 1 % to generate 
the extra amount. We had to be successful as this was coming with an opportunity 
cost and we had to generate the expected outcomes to assure the sustainability of 
the funds. And the safest bet for us was to continue on what we were doing. We 
supported each and every project application (obviously the proper ones) without 
any selectivity‖ (Interview with a specialist in TUBITAK-TEYDEB). 
TEYDEB‘s R&D support program is a horizontal program (direct support of all 
services and technologies) serving mainly for two purposes: (1) to reduce the R&D cost 
of firms and increase their R&D efficiency; and (2) to increase the internal investment by 
firms in R&D activities. Regarding the implementation of the program, it is the largest 
funded program influencing technological behaviors of firms. Research projects are 
supported up to 3 years with the condition that the amount of support provided cannot 
exceed 60 % of the total R&D costs (including labor, material and machinery, training, 
external expertise, patenting, etc.). To encourage private sector spending a private match 
from the firm must be at least 40%. The increased program resources, accompanied by 
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promoting and raising awareness about technology and innovation, caused a surge in the 
number of project proposals from 260 in 2000 to 809 in 2007. The number of proposed 
projects that were awarded grants rose from 180 in 2000 to 566 in 2007. In monetary 
terms, TEYDEB support for R&D was $19.7 million in 2000 while private sector‘s 
contribution was $71.7 million. These amounts reached $128.1 million and $199.4 
million respectively in 2006, reflecting an increased commitment to R&D activities on 
the side of the firms. In terms of accelerating public investment and leveraging private 
investment in R&D, this grant program can be viewed as successful.  
Unfortunately, the real impact of the program is unknown due to lack of 
structured evaluation and monitoring assessments47. 
―The structured evaluation of the program take-off does not exist for the R&D 
support program. However, based on our interviews with firms, we know that 
grants are increasing their interest and changing their behavior towards product 
development. We can say that firms are not only ―learning‖ to develop new 
capabilities but they are ―learning‖ to apply for available R&D grants. They are 
becoming more aware of the existing opportunities. As they become more 
competent and get more involved in the process, their grant applications will 
increase. Our objective is to reach to a wide range of new firms and persuade 
them to develop products and processes that help to reduce the import dependency 
of the country.‖(Interview with a policy maker in TUBITAK). 
 
―Under the TIDEB Program (currently known as TEYDEB) more than $300 
million was spent on R&D activities between 1995-2000 and we just don‘t know 
what kind of an impact it did create on the developing NIS. The political authority 
interprets NIS as a black-box. It pours money in, something happens inside but 
you don‘t know what. What is the outcome of the system? We need to conduct 
studies that not only evaluate impacts of the implementation programs but also 
studies that illuminate operation of the system identifying its failures. This is the 
only way we can transform support programs according to the needs of the whole 
system‖. (Interview with a specialist working on technology and innovation 
policies in TUBITAK). 
                                                 
47 The importance of evaluation and monitoring techniques on program assessment is acknowledged and 
efforts are started to investigate international experiences. 
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The program prioritizes and encourages technology and product development in 
small companies; hiring of highly educated researchers; collaboration with universities 
and research centers; and development of certain technologies by providing additional 
support incentives in certain product areas. However the broader transformative impacts 
of this program are seriously questioned by many actors.  
―An important question that should be addressed is who benefits most from the 
current innovation system in Turkey? For me, it is the institutions including 
private firms which know what kind of support structures exist and how they can 
benefit from them. They are the ―users‖ of the system. Many firms, especially 
SMEs, apply to these programs to get some in monetary or in-kind support. They 
certainly are ―aware‖ of the system. However, their participation in these 
programs does not mean that they are aware of the benefits of innovation-based 
growth or that they know what they ―need‖ to achieve their objectives. Support 
programs, maybe together with other programs, should turn these firms into 
―producers‖ of the system by treating them as players in a targeted industrial 
policy. At this point, this is the only way you can transform the existing ―system 
awareness‘‖ of many firms into ―innovation awareness‖ (Interview with a 
specialist working on industry support programs in ASO). 
Major criticisms of firms and policy experts with respect to implementation of the 
program focus on a wide range of issues including the non-selective/non-targeted nature 
of the project assessment process (firm type, sector,  industry technology status and 
opportunities, etc); complex and tedious application procedures for firms; long project 
assessment timeframes; lack of support on capital/construction expenditures tied to 
innovations; long disbursement times and lack of serious evaluation (especially 
concerning  success in marketing improved or improved products linked to the grants). 
While some of these issues can be addressed through minor to major policy justifications 
such as timing and access, others need major modifications on program design. There 
was, in particular, serious questioning of the horizontal nature of the program and its lack 
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of connection to specific industrial or technology development policies among current 
and former officials and program managers.  
―Unfortunately, innovation has always been perceived as equivalent to science 
and technology in Turkey. The current science and technology emphasis in the 
system makes the system more like ―science and technology management system‖ 
instead of NIS as there is no coordination between science, technology and 
industry policies. In other words, science and technology has always been 
considered as an ―objective‖ without articulating its connections with industry and 
actual innovation. Science and technology is actually an ―instrument‖.  The 
prioritized science and technology fields in the major plans and policies could not 
be achieved as their connections with the industry could not be established. 
Consequently, due to lack of industrial guidance, the support programs carried out 
by State Planning Organization (DPT) and TUBITAK have adopted a bottom-up 
approach, structured around the quality of the suggested project proposals. 
Existing capabilities and accumulated knowledge in the institutions in this way 
have determined the path of growth and competitiveness of the country (the lock-
in effect). Even though project assessments pay attention to projects targeting 
prioritized technology areas, through the adopted approach in support programs, it 
is highly unlikely to expect to achieve the socio-economic development objectives 
of the country‖ (Interview with a specialist working on science and technology 
policies in DPT). 
―Programs supporting project development and R&D capabilities of firms are 
mainly horizontal and show no sectoral, technological or regional selectivity in 
Turkey. There are basically four types of firms that receive R&D support: (1) 
firms that need technology just to meet basic needs of their customers; (2) firms 
that are interested in technology development but not enough to change their 
organizational routines; (3) firms that are aware of global technologies and 
working in that direction; and (4) firms that develop globally competitive 
products and technologies. Obviously, needs and contributions of these firms are 
very different from each other. Yet, existing support programs treat these firms as 
if they are same through their generic support mechanisms. Policies and programs 
need restructuring according to relevant technology typologies, as identified in 
Vision 2023 foresight document, not only to generate advancement in targeted 
technologies but also to initiate ―learning‖ about the firms working on similar and 
different technologies.‖ (Interview with a manager in TTGV-Ankara). 
 
―You know that you have some firms in your country that design robots that are 
new to the world. You also know that some firms in your country develop 
products that have been widely used in world for almost 20 years. And you 
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consider both types of these firms as innovative and support their product 
development and innovation processes through the same generic means. Turkey 
needs to restructure its institutions according to technology typologies and say for 
instance that TTGV and TUBITAK will no longer support similar firms. 
TUBITAK will focus on high-tech firms and TTGV will deal with the rest, etc.; 
or will establish/develop new institutions or entities that focus on different 
technology typologies, etc‖ (Interview with a technology monitoring expert in 
TUBITAK-TEYDEB). 
There were also a number of comments on the cumbersome and time consuming 
process of grant applications and funding decisions. 
―Project assessments take long time, usually between seven to twelve months and 
that is true. This is mostly because the assessment process follows particular 
steps. Once the project proposal is received, it is sent to the related technology 
group48 and a technology expert is assigned to each project. Meanwhile, three 
academics usually from different universities are assigned to individually assess 
the eligibility of the project. Their assessment goes on another round of evaluation 
at the sectoral boards and final decision on support is made here in these boards. 
The decision on support does not come with the disbursement of funds though. 
Firms continue on their research activities with their own resources. This is OK if 
firms had enough resources or already working on projects that are somehow 
generating money. However, if the success of the project depends on TEYDEB 
payments; if they had given monetary promises to other parties depending on the 
scheduled disbursements, they‘re in trouble. Payments are usually made 6 months 
later than the affirmed date and firms usually have to look for other resources to 
meet their expenses. Things get worse for firms if their innovative activities 
necessitate some capital investment because TEYDEB does not assess the 
associated construction costs as part of the eligible R&D costs, reflecting the need 
for another important alignment between the innovation and industry policies‖ 
(Interview with a technology monitoring expert in TUBITAK-TEYDEB). 
 
Besides TUBITAK, TTGV is the next most important institution which has 
supported and advanced the R&D financing and innovation assistance in Turkey. Until 
very recently, Technology Development Support Program was the main support program 
                                                 
48 There are 5 technology groups in TEYDEB: (1) Machinery and Manufacturing, (2) Electrical and 
electronics, (3) Material, Metallurgical and Chemical, (4) Biotechnology, Agricultural, Environmental and 
Food, (5) Information Technologies.   
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of TTGV, which was launched under the framework of World Bank‘s Technology 
Development Project-I (1990-97). This program provided $170 million to 480 
manufacturing and software projects in the form of soft loans. Starting in 1995, TTGV 
started to support private sector R&D projects with additional DTM funds. Between 1996 
and 2007, TTGV supported 254 firms with $86.2 million (DTM funds) with the main 
objective of increasing the R&D capacity in the private sector.   
The Technology Development Support Program is very similar to TEYDEB‘s 
R&D support program with respect to the objectives and implementation of the program, 
assessment of projects, defined eligible costs49, and upper limit of total R&D costs 
supported etc. The only difference is the mode of finance and the currency of the support. 
While TEYDEB offers grants, TTGV provides soft loans which were preferred to bank 
loans, especially when the inflation rate was high in the country. TTGV also provides 
loans in US $ currency in order to protect itself from macroeconomic instabilities and this 
(getting credits in another currency) is usually evaluated as high-risk by firms, impeding 
their undertaking of more risky but rewarding projects (Correa et.al 2008:78).  
Until a few years ago, critics of the Technology Development Support Program 
focused on the program‘s resemblance to the TEYDEB and for supporting the same base 
of firms funded through TUBITAK. TTGV was also criticized for not reaching out to 
young, high-tech companies which were usually unable to provide the collateral asked as 
a guarantee for the loans. TTGV, to better serve the identified needs, extended its 
program portfolio and adopted support programs targeting underfunded areas of the 
innovation policy such as start-up support, risk-sharing facility support, pre-incubation 
support, commercialization project support and environmental project support.  
                                                 
49 Construction and overhead costs related to R&D activities are not eligible for support in TTGV as well. 
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―We‘re aware that economic value-add of the traditional support program 
[Technology Development Support Program] is very low. When you use the 
resources of other institutions [DTM] you‘re obliged to follow certain principles 
and it‘s pretty difficult to create your own niche in the system. TEYDEB supports 
projects up to 60 % of their eligible R&D costs, TTGV supports up to 50 %, 
neither of the programs encourage rapid growth of idea based, small high-tech 
firms because TTGV asks for collateral and TEYDEB lack the means to address 
the needs of these innovative firms such as commercialization, risk-sharing, etc. 
Therefore, we have developed new programs through TTGV‘s own resources 
(which make up almost 25 % of its total resources) to support people with really 
good ideas or small high-tech firms endowed with high qualities but limited 
resources to accomplish their objectives (Interview with a technology expert in 
TTGV-Istanbul). 
―We really wanted to bring in an additional value to the innovation system in 
Turkey. We thought about the missing but needed innovation support instruments 
and asked two basic questions: 1) what would happen if we didn‘t provide the 
funding through our own resources but searched for resources from other 
institutions? 2) would the system generate similar programs if we didn‘t invest in 
these areas? After careful consideration we decided that TTGV should restructure 
itself and support more risky plans and areas‖ (Interview with a manager in 
TTGV-Ankara). 
The new programs launched in 2006 were quite small and only a few projects 
were funded at the time of this study. In 2008, $2.8 million was allocated to 
commercialization support, and $2.5 million to joint technology development between 
universities, research centers and private firms. Only one project was supported under the 
pre-incubation support program and three under the start-up support program. These 
programs continue to develop and they do suggest that TTGV‘s adapted its policies and 
programs to meet needs in the less supported and more risky areas of incubation and 
small firm R&D projects50.  
                                                 
50 TTGV‘s newly identified support areas initiated adoption of similar programs by TUBITAK in 2007. 
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5.4.1.2 Supports for Public Sector Research Institutions and Training and Mobility 
Initiatives 
Support for public sector research, training and mobility are also important 
dimensions of supply-side measures to promote technology development and innovation. 
Public sector research institutions have positive externalities that, among other things, 
lower the costs of knowledge acquisition and technology adoption for private firms. 
Training of managers and workers is likewise justified on externality grounds and it 
lowers the cost of knowledge and skill acquisition that benefit both the individuals 
trained and their co-workers (through transfer of skill and knowledge). The State 
Planning Organization (DPT) is the primary agency providing funds to public research 
institutions, including universities in Turkey. DPT determines the budget allocations of 
the major investment projects of public organizations through meetings and consultations 
with the government to coordinate public sector investment decisions with national 
development plans. Administration of the national R&D budget in this respect lies within 
the responsibility of DPT. In 2008, DPT allocated approximately $131.6 million to 
universities and $48.7 million to TUBITAK research centers for R&D investments.  
DPT‘s adopted investment model formally follows a bottom up approach as it 
calls for project proposals from ministries, universities and other institutions.  It then 
evaluates proposals according to their impact on national socio-economic development. 
Specifically, DPT prioritizes projects that contribute to the achievement of targets 
articulated in the national development plans. Due to lack of connection between 
industrial and innovation policies, its role is more an allocator of resources than an active 
planner and developer of priority technologies for industrial development as is the case in 
Taiwan or Israel. (Breznitz 2005, Kennedy 1989).  
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As the priorities in NIS construction started to become clearer among various 
institutions, DPT‘s project based approach has evolved into more of a program based 
approach. Human capital development and establishment of R&D infrastructures 
supporting collaborative relations between public and private sector organizations 
became the main objectives of DPT support. DPT supported collaborative research 
projects between the public and private sector in identified priority fields to improve 
capabilities. Together with a major technical university, DPT started the YUUP Program 
(Extended National and International Projects) to identify similar R&D efforts and 
capabilities in different universities and firms and to encourage specific collaborations 
based on capabilities and needs. DPT also launched the ―advanced research and 
education program‖, which supported graduate students during their research studies and 
also the ―industrial doctorate program‖ which promoted joint research and support 
between universities and their doctoral students and the private sector.  
Through all these programs DPT emphasized in its policies and directives that, 
that given the limited resources of the country, project depended upon effective 
collaborations to attain the latest technologies in priority areas. As major centers of basic 
science and applied research, universities should play a lead role in this process; 
organizing and efficiently utilizing their infrastructure and enhancing human capital-- and 
research capacities in less developed institutions. 
―These projects are more like need - matchmaking projects. Two groups of 
universities exist in Turkey. The first groups are the ones that are high quality, 
endowed with good resources, infrastructure, faculty and researchers. The other 
group is newly developing universities. There are capable researchers in the new, 
periphery universities who have been funded during their doctorate studies in 
international universities with the condition to come back and work in these new 
universities. So, there is research capacity in these institutions but a limited 
research infrastructure. With these projects, we wanted to assure that researchers 
in new universities can access the resources of the best technical universities 
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while working on the problems of the industry or institutional partner. The 
projects funded in this area are usually small scale, basic and applied research 
projects. The type of interaction between the partners depends on the nature of the 
project. Sometimes, the project outcomes directly transferred to the industry 
partner and sometimes services are provided by the industry as in the case of 
production of prototypes. With these projects, we try to initiate collaboration 
between university and industry. However, how much these projects are 
contributing the competitiveness of private companies is another question and 
definitely should be assessed as these projects mature.‖ (Interview with a science 
and technology specialist in DPT). 
 
―These selected projects are among the proposed projects that happen to be 
generally in a priority technology area. So, selection is bottom-up. You‘re not 
calling for specific projects in specific priority areas. Currently, which option is 
better for Turkey, I‘m not sure as we don‘t have an industrial policy fostering 
development of specific technologies in accordance with developments in global 
markets. Without such expertise, targeting specific technologies might be more 
problematic in terms of allocation and utilization of limited resources.‖ (Interview 
with an industry specialist in DPT). 
 
The Small and Medium Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB) and 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, are the two other important institutions that provide 
support for training and mobility in private firms via supply-side measures in the Turkish 
NIS. KOSGEB was established in 1990 with the objective of enhancing the low 
competitive capacity and slow technology adaption processes in the SMEs. Its programs 
support smaller firms with limited internal resources with a wide range of services. 
KOSGEB provides a hiring subsidy to SMEs‘ to ―hire qualified personnel‖ that are either 
university or vocational high school graduates to improve the performance and technical 
capacity of small firms. Between 2003 and 2006, KOSGEB granted $29 million to hire 
4,680 graduates with the Supports for Hiring Qualified Personnel Program. The upper 
limit of the hiring subsidy was a onetime payment of $14,000 for university graduates 
and $9,500 for vocational high school graduates for a duration of 18 months.  
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KOSGEB also finances the general and specialized training of SME managers 
and technical personnel the necessary hard and soft skills to adopt and apply new 
technologies. The upper limit of finance provided is around $5,000 per company per year 
for this special training program. For general training the upper limit varies according to 
the development level of the region where the SME is located. Between 2003 and 2006, 
19,392 general projects were financed with approximately by $4.6 million dollars in 
funding. 
KOSGEB also provides more structured entrepreneurship training and 
consultancy support for SMEs. Entrepreneurship training is targeted for entrepreneurs 
planning to apply for ―new entrepreneur support program‖ which aims to financially 
support growing entrepreneur-based enterprises. Between 2003 and 2006, KOSGEB 
allocated almost $3 million to 516 firms as part of its ―new entrepreneur support 
program‖.  
As part of its training and mobility measures, KOSGEB through its ―quality 
development program‖ provided grants to firms to support product certification, testing, 
analysis, audits and CE marking costs51. Industrial Property Rights protection of SMEs 
(the IPR program) is also promoted through financial support for patents, useful model 
and industrial design applications. Roughly 77 projects received $72,417 under the IPR 
support program between 2003 and 2006. KOSGEB‘s ―market research and improvement 
of export program‖ also provided grants to SMEs to participate in national and 
international fairs that are considered important sources of market knowledge for their 
new product development activities. Between 2003 and 2006, approximately $6 million 
was granted to 754 firms in this program. 
                                                 
51 The CE marking certifies that a product is in congruence with the EU consumer safety, health or 
environmental requirements.  
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In sum KOSGEB offers a wide range of services and focuses on niches where 
there is significant need and where other parts of the NIS are not strongly focused 
(especially in the area of training and technical assistance to SMEs). Unfortunately, 
specific outcomes in terms of improved product development and marketing are not 
known, due to lack of systematic program evaluation and monitoring. Most generally  
despite the diverse services offered  the impacts of these grants, financing and technical 
assistance efforts in transforming the low-technical capacity of Turkish industry 
according to the targets set in major policy and planning documents is unclear.  
 
―The major approach with respect to technology and innovation support in Turkey 
is ―doing more of the same‖. Programs, after careful assessments and evaluations, 
should be differentiated according to the specialties of major institutions. 
KOSGEB, for instance, as an industry oriented organization, should develop 
programs that structurally challenge the existing low-tech formations in line with 
the industrial policy. Other institutions should confront the existing culture on 
technology in the society. The pace of change in your technological capacity 
should not depend on existing pace of change in the culture of   innovation in your 
society. Institutions should collectively challenge this and reassess their 
contributions in the system.‖ (Interview with an administrator in KOSGEB) 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), other than financing support 
programs of its affiliate KOSGEB, has not been heavily involved in technology and 
innovation policies and programs until very recently. However, MoIT created the San-
Tez program in 2006 and started to appear as an actor in research and technology 
development related discussions. It views its role as supplementing the work of 
TUBITAK in promoting new and more effective collaborations between universities and 
private industry. The San-Tez program was designed to bridge the gap between industry 
and university cultures in order to increase the low technology absorption capacities of 
private firms by establishing new venues for communication and cooperation.  
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―There is a huge knowledge gap between the universities and industry in Turkey 
and we wanted to establish a program that would ease the flow of accumulated 
knowledge in universities to private firms. The program started with couple of 
different intentions. The first one was to contribute to development of a ―common 
language‖ between universities and the firms. Because of their different 
capabilities, in general, both the universities and the industry are reluctant to 
approach each other. Firms, unfortunately, treat universities like engineering 
design companies. They tend to approach universities when they have a problem, 
or are in need of consultation services, etc. They don‘t see the benefit of carrying 
out joint projects that would improve the level of their productivity, product 
development capabilities, etc. Firms criticize universities for being too slow, not 
understanding the connection between money and time, etc. Universities, on the 
other hand, condemn the low technological development in firms and usually see 
no value in collaboration that would have little-impact on the quality of their 
ongoing research. So, we wanted to provide incentives to bring them together, to 
start communication. Second, we wanted to transform the basic graduate level 
research to focus more on innovative products with commercialization potential. 
And third, we wanted to create relationships between graduate students and the 
firms to extend future hiring opportunities. With these intentions, we started 
calling for joint project proposals, conditioning private firm financing 25 percent 
of the total project budget [Firms match 25% of total project costs]‖ (Interview 
with a San-Tez official in MoIT). 
 
No evaluation with respect to the program implementation or success is available 
yet, but $10 million was allocated from the budget in 2007 for San-Tez projects and 111 
projects were supported in 2008 as part of the Program. MoIT‘s involvement in R&D 
related activities was increased in 2007 with the Law on the Amendment of MoIT‘s 
Organization and Tasks. This law allowed the ministry to design new support programs 
targeting to the R&D and innovation capabilities of the private firms. 
 
5.4.1.3 Fiscal Measures and Equity Support 
The new R&D Law which was enacted in February 2008, together with the Law 
on Technology Development Zones (TDZ), created a new and expanded framework for 
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tax incentives and other fiscal R&D subsidies in Turkey. The new R&D law, the details 
of which are outlined given in Table 5.6 profiles tax incentives for private firms 
conducting R&D activities and is especially important for private firms which are located 
outside of a technopark development. Firms located in a technoparks were also granted a 
range of incentives with the Law on TDZs.  
 
Table 5.6 Main Features of the New R&D Law 
Features Identified Issues 
R&D discount 
(volume of R&D) 
100% of R&D and innovation 
expenditures made by technology centers‟ 
enterprises, by R&D centers, in R&D or 
innovation projects supported by public 
administrations or international funds, is 
discounted in the calculation of corporate 
earnings 
Big companies with over 
50 full time R&D personnel can 
benefit from incentives. For 
SMEs, companies getting 
support from TUBITAK, „TTGV 
and KOSGEB (and Intl 
agencies) are eligible. 
R&D discount 
(Increment of R&D) 
Half the amount of increase compared to 
previous year in R&D and innovation 
expenditures made by R&D centers which 
employ more than 500 full time equivalent 
R&D personnel is discounted (in addition 
to 100% of R&D expenditures) in the 
calculation of corporate earnings 
Large companies with over 500 
R&D personnel can use the 
incentive. 
Tax exemption for 
R&D personnel 
The income tax of R&D and support 
personnel working for technology centers‟ 
enterprises, in R&D centers and for R&D 
and innovation projects which are 
supported by public administrations or 
international organizations or for those 
projects which are carried out by 
TUBITAK, those working in pre-
competitive research projects and in those 
enterprises benefiting from 
Technopreneurship capital support will 
not be paid at a rate of 90% for those with 
doctorate degrees and 80% for others. 
Large companies with over 50 
R&D personnel can benefit 
directly from incentives for 
SMEs, only those getting 
support from TUBITAK, TTGV 
and KOGEB (and Intl agencies) 
are eligible. 
Social security 
payments for R&D 
personnel 
Half the amount of social security 
payments which is required to be paid by 
the employer of R&D personnel working 
for technology centers‟ enterprises, in 
R&D centers and for R&D and innovation 
projects supported by public 
administrations or international 
organizations, or implemented by 
Large companies with over 50 
R&D personnel can use the 
incentives directly. For SMEs 
companies getting support from 
TUBITAK, TTGV and 
KOSGEB (and Intl agencies) are 
eligible. 
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TUBITAK will be covered by the 
Ministry of Finance for five years. 
Stamp tax 
exemption 
Any documents to be prepared for R&D 
and innovation activities within the 
framework of this law shall be exempt 
from stamp tax. 
 
Technopreneurship 
support 
Public administrations can provide one 
time Technopreneurship capital support up 
to TRY 100,000 without collateral. 
Only recent university graduates 
can benefit from the support. 
Pre-competitive 
research 
Budgets created for pre-competitive 
projects will not be treated as income for 
the partner organization holding the 
special account on behalf of the other 
partners 
 
Tax exemption for 
R&D incentives 
Grant support provided for R&D activities 
of companies will not be considered as 
income if kept in a special fund. 
 
Source: Correa et.al 2008, pp.108 
 
Lack of equity finance support is often identified as ―one of the weakest links‖ of 
the Turkish innovation system.  Innovation finance from venture capital (VC) and 
business angels is very limited in Turkey. Public financial incentives have not been 
designed to promote VC investments. There is no public VC program as in other 
countries, such as Israel, which significantly influenced rapid innovation in its IT sector 
(Teubal 2002). There are only three VC funds with public sector participation in Turkey, 
and the total fund size for VC and private equity (PE) funds is only around  400 million 
dollars52 (Correa et.al, 2008). The existing VC support misses early stage funding and 
tends to be more oriented to support of second and third stages of low-tech investments.   
 
―There is no real venture capital mechanism supporting high-risk, early and first 
stage, technology-intense projects in Turkey. However, the problem is not unique 
to technology-intense sectors. . Unfortunately, VC is very limited, and Business 
Angels are almost nonexistent. The existing VCs are not supporting technology-
based small firms as due diligence is an expensive process and justified for big 
investments. One successful VC investment was UNO-Bread. Investment in a 
                                                 
52 TTGV is a partner in two VC funds (Is-Girisim and Turkven) and in a Start-Up fund (Teknoloji Yatirim 
A.S.) 
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bread company is actually tragicomic in a country where flour factories in almost 
every city are working with idle capacity.‖ (Interview with a technology expert in 
TTGV-Istanbul). 
 
5.4.2 Policies and Programs to Foster Collaboration and Networking 
The systemic perspective of NIS construction demands first and foremost strong 
collaborations between institutions on the development and commercialization of 
technologically advanced, innovative products, diffusion of which is expected to increase 
the competitive position of Turkish industry. Policies and programs directed to facilitate 
collaborations and networking mostly involve direct and indirect measures to increase 
and deepen collaborations between public sector institutions and private firms some of 
these were highlighted in the previous sections when programs and program managers‘ 
perspectives were analyzed such as the TUBITAK-TEYDEB TTGV R&D support 
programs, MoIT San-Tez program, etc. During the last couple of years, other programs 
supporting joint research projects of public institutions and the defense industry 
(KAMAG and SAVTAG) and cooperative networks including pre-competitive 
cooperation among firms were developed foster collaboration.  
An additional noteworthy set of initiatives involve geographically defined 
technology development and incubation centers such as  technoparks, the principles of 
which are determined by Technology Development Zones (TDZ) law, technology 
development centers (KOSGEB-TEKMERs); business incubators (KOSGEB-DTIs); and 
university-industry joint research centers (USAMPs) all aim to  sustain continuity of 
collaboration among private and public institutions to  foster knowledge transfers for  
new product development within a structured framework. Additionally, there are 
university research service centers such as ODTU-BILTIR, ITU-OTAM, EGE-
EBILTEM, etc., that develop R&D research projects with private firms in various or 
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selected sectors. Universities also support existence and development of innovation relay 
centers (IRCs) and technology transfer offices (TTOs) through their infrastructures, 
though they (especially the old, strong and structured public universities) are not yet 
willing to promote commercialization of supported R&D projects. 
The establishment of technoparks and their functioning in Turkey is organized by 
MoIT, under the general principles of enacted TDZ Law in 2001 which aims to promote 
presence of technoparks and research centers associated with universities. The 
technopark model is prominent internationally from Research Triangle and Stanford 
Research parks in the U.S., Tsukuba Academic Town in Japan, Daejeon Science park in 
South Korea and so on. The basic idea is that positive externalities resulting from 
clustering research oriented firms, universities and research center in close proximity will 
reduce the cost of knowledge and technology acquisition for resident firms and 
entrepreneurs. It is also argues that such local clusters will create attractive labor pools 
and supportive environments for start-up firms. Following international examples, an 
additional objective of the technopark and research center initiatives was to bridge the 
gap between the industry and academia by attracting R&D firms close to universities and 
providing incentives to academicians to start communication with these firms and/or to 
start their own businesses near their university base of operations. In this respect, 
considerable tax incentives (both R&D and non-R&D) are granted to the firms working 
in technoparks.  Academicians who participated in technopark and research center 
activities were exempted from making payments from their outside work to university 
revolving funds, which is a normally a major impediment to  contract based university-
industry research.   
Especially before the passage of the new R&D Law (noted above), tax incentives 
in technoparks were incredibly appealing for firms, as income, corporate profits the 
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incomes of the R&D personnel working in technoparks were exempted from all taxes 
until 2013. The new Law is expected to reduce the demand for offices in technoparks as 
significant tax incentives are also provided for R&D firms outside technoparks.  Until the 
recent amendments to the law, demand for technoparks was so high that hundreds of 
firms were on the waiting lists of all the major technopark developments. The very 
lucrative tax incentives may have stimulated demand from firms that were more 
interested in the tax windfalls than in technology development and collaboration per se. 
The high demand for space also led to significant increases in technopark office rents that 
in some cases went far beyond the value of the infrastructural services and location 
advantages provided. 
 
―The METU-Teknokent was the first-established technopark in Turkey and we 
were one of the first firms to locate in Teknokent. When we first moved, the 
infrastructure wasn‘t prepared and it wasn‘t complete. No communication 
infrastructure, no air-conditioning etc. was available. We worked on all those 
things because we were sure that it would pay off. We wanted to be close to 
academics in METU-Electronics Department, as we work for the defense industry 
and the Department has a culture of working with defense firms. We wanted to be 
within their close proximity. However, this is quite uncommon for most of the 
firms located in this park.  Most have limited collaborations both with the 
academics and the other firms in Teknokent. We also do not have much 
collaboration with other firms but we are working on it. There is another firm 
right across the hall, and they are just perfect for one of the projects we‘re  about 
to launch.  So, the culture, the system is evolving but 2013 is not that far away 
and before the tax incentives change firms should have some other reasons 
justifying their presence in technoparks. Otherwise, it is not worth it to pay these 
high rents for those limited services and collaborations.‖ (Interview with the 
manager of a TUBITAK Technology Awards recipient firm). 
There are now 39 approved technoparks in Turkey but only 18 are known to be 
active, serving to 890 firms in 2008. The number of personnel, projects and patents in 
technoparks did increase significantly with the increased government tax, R&D support 
and technical assistance of various forms. Most firms in technoparks are software or other 
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tech service companies, as manufacturing firms usually do not support the idea of having 
R&D personnel distinct from their production establishments.  
KOSGEB TEKMERs (local business incubators) also aim to support and develop 
research and development activities of SMEs, usually co-locating them with research 
centers or programs in universities.  There are 20 active TEKMERs in Turkey, which 
have supported 1,546 projects with $35 million between 2003 and 2006.  The support for 
incubator rent and services is for two years but financing continues for another year when 
needed.  
 
―In order to start an application to TEKMERs, firms should register themselves in 
the KOSGEB database and prepare a ―strategic roadmap‖. After this initial 
application, they prepare their project proposals and submit it to the TEKMER. 
Project evaluations are conducted in two steps by two committees. The first 
committee is the assessment committee and the second committee is the execution 
committee; this is the technical one. In the first assessment we look for ideas, and 
assess whether it can be commercialized. We also assess whether the project 
demands appropriate resources, etc. If we believe that the project has the 
potential, then we send it to academicians in our university for technical 
evaluation. If the project receives positive evaluation, we support it with various 
measures: we provide space in TEKMER buildings for up to 3 years, finance 80 
% of the expenses of materials and equipment up to 200,000 TYL, [around 
170,000 $], support consultancy, conferences and fair expenses, provide start-up 
and business development capital. Moreover, if they successfully ―graduate‖, we 
communicate with technopark management and try to secure a place for them, 
and help finance their technopark rents. So, the supports are extensive but they are 
not usually strong enough to attract academicians to start a business as their 
interest is pretty limited.‖ (Interview with METU-TEKMER) 
Bureaucratic duplication, the fragmented structure of the support schemes, lack of 
coordination among the players, and lack of sectoral differentiation between different 
TEKMERs were mentioned by several informants as significant problems.  
 
―The supports we provide in TEKMERs are similar to other institutions‘ support 
schemes, such as TTGV and TUBITAK. In order to track the duplicity in 
applications, to better assess the needs of the firms, we thought about creating an 
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online database between KOSGEB, TTGV and TUBITAK. Unfortunately, we 
couldn‘t achieve it; we couldn‘t establish a consensus among the institutions and 
this sustained fragmented structure hinders innovation system in Turkey‖ 
(Interview with Hacettepe-TEKMER). 
 
―First, we wanted to influence the composition of TEKMERs, together with 
technoparks, according to the strengths of universities. METU would support 
software firms, Hacettepe would support bio-medical, bio-technology and 
pharmaceutical firms, and EGE would support textile firms, etc. to accelerate the 
cooperation between the university and industry. However, since the system is 
determined by the proposals that are submitted, we‘re tied to whatever comes 
from below‖ (Interview with Ankara TEKMER). 
 
Several informants summed up the strengths and weaknesses of existing 
TEKMERs. Firms definitely benefitted from R&D support and tax benefits, but also the 
infrastructure and expertise of the universities.  However collaborations and consultancy 
relationships among firms‘ remains fairly limited in incubator and technopark 
developments. 
Another mechanism for establishing and supporting research collaborations 
between universities and private firms is university research service centers. Especially 
the major universities are establishing and restructuring those centers to improve 
connections and relationships public institutions and private firms. These university 
research centers aim to solve problems of the industry through their research 
infrastructures; quality faculty and researchers and basic and applied research project 
work. The key challenge here is to transform the prevailing consultancy-intense approach 
and introduce more durable joint and collaborative research efforts promoting the 
research and product development capabilities of the firms. Depending on which 
university they belong to, research service centers adopt different structures. While some 
prioritize multidimensional, interdisciplinary approaches by bringing together academics 
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from different expertise such as METU-BILTIR to address the needs of firms, others 
prioritize sector based research to enhance the capabilities of a certain industry as in the 
case of ITU-OTAM and automotive industry. Others emphasize the organizational 
restructuring needed to address the identified technology access problems of private firms 
in certain regions. This is done by bringing together all the institutions influencing 
different phases of innovations as in the case of EGE-EBILTEM. However, all these 
university R&D centers try to influence the ―autonomy vs. relevancy of basic research in 
universities‖ discussion in favor of relevancy. Collaborations with private sector are still 
condemned by many academics because of decades of policies and rules favoring basic 
research not influenced by forces outside the disciplines or the university. Currently, the 
research centers structurally challenge this long established culture by persuading 
academicians to participate in the two-way knowledge flow between the university and 
private firms. Unfortunately, for many academics, there is still not much of an incentive 
to develop collaborations as their academic success is still primarily evaluated by the 
number of research papers published53.   
 
5.5 The strengths and Weaknesses of the Developing NIS in Turkey from the 
Prospective of Policy Makers and Program Managers  
The evaluation of NIS construction processes in a developing country context 
necessitates understanding the process at numerous scales and in many dimensions. The 
broad policy objectives in terms of priority goals and technology development areas are 
set by a select set of central government institutions. This is no doubt a result of a long 
history of central government attempts to direct the pace and character of national 
                                                 
53 The section about university research centers are written based on the interviews conducted with METU-
BILTIR, ITU-OTAM and EGE-EBILTEM representatives. 
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economic development. The specific institutional roles and programmatic responsibilities 
are evolving and changing as different agencies and departments claim turf and 
resources, but also as public institutions learn and burnish their capacities to stimulate 
technological change and innovation in specific areas and segments.  On balance, the 
perceptions and insights of the informants interviewed for this study about the successes, 
failures and ongoing challenges in their individual program areas was encouraging. Most 
informants were not simple boosters of their policies or programs or overly defensive 
about the dearth of meaningful outcome measures in their areas. Most offered critical and 
analytically sophisticated assessments of their programs and their relationship to the 
development of the NIS system in general. The responses of these interviewees suggest 
that a learning culture is operative on some level and that the NIS construction process is 
changing and evolving as shortfalls, failures and unmet needs are identified. 
Indeed the rapid development of public institutions and the serious 
implementation of support mechanisms in all areas of the NIS system is an important and 
somewhat surprising finding. This study focuses on about the period (1995-2008) 
beginning when the Turkish state first developed a coherent strategic vision to accelerate 
growth in technology development and innovation in response to strong international 
trade pressures.  It took another 7-8 years before this vision was concretized into a 
coherent NIS based strategy that was backed up by substantial government resources for 
implementation. The density and diversity of programs and institutions, filling virtually 
every area or element in common NIS model diagrams, have developed in a rapid and 
relatively systematic manner. Structures have been developed in the legal area, in 
numerous areas of R&D support and tax subsidy, in an array of technical support and 
assistance areas, in firm-university collaborations and partnerships, and in spatially based 
technoparks and business incubators.  Services are directed to numerous industrial 
 187 
sectors, to large and small firms, and to entrepreneurs and business startups. Of course 
this has not been a seamless or even process; major gaps and serious performance 
problems were identified throughout the system. Yet the fact that most of these 
institutions, programs and projects were developed and implemented over the past decade 
is surprising. And even with all the problems identified, there appears to be a degree of 
coherence in the overall structure and business participation has been in most cases has 
been strong. 
In addition, the institution building and public investment associated with the NIS 
construction project over the 14 years was at least associated with positive movements in 
key national science and technology indicators over the period. Growth in various 
categories of R&D, especially private sector R&D investment was relatively robust. This 
corresponded to an increase in R&D personnel and the production of scientific articles. 
Most significant was the relatively strong increase in patenting activity that was 
associated with positive movements in the other indicators. While there is almost no 
evaluative data tying various policy changes and program interventions to these 
aggregate science and technology and innovation indicators, it can be said that the change 
in government commitment and the change in the environment related to NIS 
construction did contribute to a move toward more technology based growth over the past 
decade. 
The analysis and interviews did put into relief common concerns and perceived 
limitations of the current NIS strategy. Criticisms were directed to both strategic goals 
and elements and more tactical matters of program design and implementation hurdles. 
At the strategic level the most prominent concern was the detachment of the NIS 
construction process for any coherent industrial strategy tackling industrial objectives 
such as increasing the competitiveness of current or potential export industries through a 
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broader science and technology framework was seen as a major flaw in the national 
strategy. The core assumption is that if the state invests in science and technology assets 
at the national level, the general competitiveness of the country will increase. The failure 
to strategically link new and emerging technologies to specific industrial development 
goals may be more risky in terms of inefficient resource use than some of the well 
rehearsed pitfalls of industrial policy (e.g. betting on the wrong industry). The issue is not 
moving to apply older forms of 1960s or 1970s industrial policy, with strong state 
direction, but in matching science and technology development with the science and 
technology bases of specific growth industries. For example, it seems sensible to 
encourage biomedical firms to locate in technoparks and link with research centers near 
clusters of universities, research and medical centers with specific research strengths 
valuable to the biomedical industry. NIS related R&D and technical support could be 
usefully structured and targeted in this instance to build up these natural relationships. As 
several commentators noted a more sophisticated industrial targeting and linkage strategy 
could also limit overlap and redundancy among programs.  The risk of the bottom up 
approach with little industrial targeting is shown above in the extreme case of the large 
VC investment in a bread company, an industrial sector with slow growth and excess 
capacity. 
In a related sense, the scope of policies and programs reflect the dominance of 
supply side measures and lack of demand side policy levers such as procurement and 
regulation and standards policies.  Public procurement of innovative goods and support 
for private procurement policies do not exist outside of the defense sector mostly due to 
lack of an industrial policy. The lack of a sectoral emphasis on demand side measures is 
compensated for in the Turkish NIS through technology platforms to coordinate 
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development among actors interested in or working on similar technologies. However, 
like many others, this initiative is too new and not continuous. 
The most common and troubling criticism of participants in the area of NIS 
program implementation is the absence of any serious or systematic monitoring and 
evaluation of programs and projects. Much of the literature on national science and 
technology and industrial policies emphasizes the crucial need for monitoring, evaluation 
and program learning and revision. Evaluation should be built into program design so that 
program goals are clear and match larger strategic goals of the national investment 
program. Almost all of the informants that were interviewed highlighted this concern in 
various ways.  The link between the objectives of increasing national competitiveness 
and how well the new system is addressing this objective is not evaluated in a timely and 
systematic manner.  Most informants emphasized the need for serious assessments and 
critical reports at the policy and plan making level with respect to how the current system 
is serving the stated objectives, how and in what ways the adopted NIS system promotes 
the development of comparative advantages, and what factors place Turkish industry on a 
competitive footing in international markets. 
As the discussions evolve on the future models of global innovation and 
innovation networks, successful future NIS construction demands adaptive policy makers 
with monitoring and evaluation systems that create critical information and feedback for 
policy making, learning, and policy revision. The NIS construction process in Turkey has 
been strongly influenced by other international models and has been developed under the 
strong influence of international organizations including the GATT, Customs Union with 
EU, World Bank Development Programme and various EU integration initiatives. While 
this international influence strengthened the systemic nature of NIS construction through 
careful analysis of other country examples, the absence of evaluative information 
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provides policy and program managers with little insight on how the Turkish context 
affects the success of failure of these imported models. In fact, the one element 
emphasized in the international literature and program reviews is the need for serious 
program evaluation as NIS elements are put in place and integrated.   
Any constructive NIS evaluation demands a holistic approach on whether existing 
measures advance the broader national development goals. However, the crucial 
mechanism influencing national development is increased technological change and 
innovation in private firms. Thus, the main goal of the following chapters is profiling and 
analyzing this key locus: the private firms, their technology and innovation strategies, 
interactions with external public and private institutions, and their local/regional 
environment. In this chapter we looked at the system from the purview of program 
designers and program managers. In what follows the character and perspective of the 
key subjects of the NIS elements will be examined. These chapters intend to articulate the 
major barriers and opportunities for technology adoption and innovation in firms - and 
how well they are addressed with the current policies and programs in the system. 
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Chapter 6: Evaluating the Innovation Processes of Turkish Firms 
 
This chapter explores the processes of technological change and innovation in 
Turkish manufacturing firms in the Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul regions. To understand in 
concrete terms how NIS institutions and resources are influencing the technology 
adaption and innovation activities of private firms, survey and in-depth interview results 
are presented and analyzed for all 83 firm respondents. Specifically the findings of the 
surveys and interviews will be used to profile the organizational practices and 
performance of these private firms in regards to technological adoption and innovation, 
the extent and importance of external linkages, and the importance of local versus non-
local relationships on the firm‘s capacities for technological change and innovation.   
Regional characteristics and differences between firms across the three study areas are 
examined in more detail in chapter 7.   
As shown in the previous chapter, policy makers, planners and technology experts 
emphasized that the NIS construction project was launched in an environment where the 
culture for innovation within firms was weak and the institutional interrelationships 
supporting technological advance and innovation were spotty and fragmented. As 
emphasized in the literature review, almost all theories of national and regional 
innovation emphasize the central importance of two core factors: 1) a diversity and 
density of institutions directly or indirectly supporting processes of technological 
adoption and innovation in private firms (R&D support institutions such as universities, 
technical support institutions such as technical assistance organizations and incubators, 
supplier and producer networks, supportive financial institutions such as VC and angel 
investors,  and business and industry associations); and 2) specific and durable 
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relationships between firms and public and private institutional actors that serve to 
advance the capacities of firms for technological improvement and innovation.  
The aim of this chapter is to profile and analyze the innovation processes of 
Turkish firms highlighting their innovative activities and outcomes and the nature and 
importance of collaborations with external entities. This evidence from a large set of 
firms that have received government innovation grants and loans can provide valuable 
information on both the presence and importance of specific external linkages for the 
innovative activities of the firms. It can also provide useful information on the 
importance and strengths and weaknesses of evolving NIS structures and institutions 
from the perspective of the participating firms. 
In this chapter, I begin by outlining key characteristics of the sample firms in 
terms of employment size, industry affiliation, age, and ownership structure.  In the 
second section the actual innovation strategies and performance characteristics of the 
sample firms are analyzed including the pressures and motivations to implement R&D 
and product and process development projects. In the third section, the sources and 
information and know-how that sample firms draw upon to carry out technical upgrading 
and innovation are explored. In particular, the relative importance of internal firm 
resources versus external sources is analyzed through the survey information. In the 
fourth section, the perceptions of the firms regarding competencies most important for 
successful technological adoption and innovation are examined including competencies 
within the firms and competencies and capabilities to acquire resources and knowledge 
outside the firm and through external collaborations. In the fifth section barriers to 
innovation and effective collaboration are studied. In the sixth section we look at survey 
results detailing the geographic characteristics of linkages and external relationships, 
specifically the extent to which linkages and relationships are within the host region of 
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the firms or at the national or international scale. In the concluding section these results 
will be summarized in reference to the literature on the importance of institutional 
―density and diversity‘ and external linkages on innovation performance.   
 
6.1 Profile of the Surveyed Firms 
In the survey aspect of the research, 83 firms were surveyed in total in all regions. 
As far as the distribution of the sample is concerned, the highest concentration of firms 
lies in 4 sectors: manufacturing of machinery and equipment (30.1 %); computer, 
electronic and optical products (14.5 %); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (12 %) 
and chemicals and chemical products (14.5 %). The rest of the firms are distributed 
unequally among 12 sectors: manufacturing of electrical equipment (8.4 %); fabricated 
metal products; and rubber and plastic products; (both 4.8 %); non-metallic mineral 
products; pharmaceutical products and preparations; other transport equipment; and other 
manufacturing; (all 2.4 %) and manufacturing of food; and basic metal (1.2 %). 
According to their technological bases, 27.7 % of the firms can be classified high-tech 
firms; 54.2 % of them medium-tech firms; 13.3 % of the firms are low-tech firms and 4.8 
% of them are resource based-firms54. All the firms, as the recipients of TEYDEB and/or 
                                                 
54 There are many approaches to categorize products by technology. Here I adopted the categorization used 
by Lall (2000), where he develops a categorization combining the approaches that make a distinction 
between “high tech” and “low-tech” according to R&D intensities; and also the OECD (1987) classification 
where the products are differentiated as resource based; labor-intensive; scale intensive; differentiated and 
science based manufactures. Lall‟s categorization differentiates manufactures as resource based; low 
technology; medium technology and high technology. Resource based: mainly processed foods and 
tobacco, simple wood products, refined petroleum products, dyes, leather (not leather products), precious 
stones and organic chemicals. Low-technology: such as textiles, garments, footwear, other leather products, 
toys, simple metal and plastic products, furniture and glassware. Medium technology: mainly automotive 
products, most industrial chemicals, standard industrial machinery, and simple electrical and electronic 
products. High technology: fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals, complex electrical and electronic 
machinery, aircraft and precision instruments. 
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TTGV R&D supports can claim to be engaged in some form of innovative activity, 
though the range and type of innovation or technology adoption varies significantly. 
Many of the firms are specialized. For example the product lines included industrial 
robots for the automotive industry; electronic control systems; orthopedic surgical 
implants; air ionizers and filters; special purpose machinery for process control and  
assembly lines; flat and plasma TVs; glass fibers; branded generics of antibiotics; custom 
designed heat treatment plants; electronic warfare and intelligence; independent 
unmanned air-vehicles; aircraft manufacturing; micro-biological safety cabinets; 
anesthesia and intensive care unit systems;  industrial powder coatings, etc. 
A majority of the sample firms are larger, independent family firms, established 
as independent start-ups by current owners - 42.2 % of the sample have more than 250 
employees; and 32.5 % of the firms are family firms; reflecting a significant 
characteristic of  Turkish industry. The organizational form of the surveyed firms show 
that sample firms are dominated by independent firms (63.8 %), 32.5 % of which are 
independent family firms. Firms that are joint ventures or that have equal partnerships 
with foreign firms comprise 9.6 % of the whole sample.  
Over eighty percent of the firms began their operations as new independent start-
ups and in terms of age, 61.4 % of the sample firms are founded after 1981: 32 firms 
(38.6 %) started their operations before 1981. Of the firms founded more recently, 21 
firms (25.3 %) were founded between 1981 and 1990; and 30 firms (36.1 %) between 
1991 and 2006. Firms‘ main types of business activities at the establishment level (within 
the establishment surveyed) included manufacturing (92.8 %), management (90.4 %), 
sales (91.6 %), and marketing (67.5 %) suggesting a degree of vertical integration. More 
firms produced final products (81.8 %) than intermediate products (35.1 %). Over 43 % 
of the firms reported a sales volume more than $50 million. It is noteworthy that 92.8 %  
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Table 6.1 General Characteristics of the Sample Manufacturing Firms 
 
General Characteristics 
Number  
N=83 
Percentage 
% 
Industry Classification   
Machinery and Equipment 25 30.1 
Computer, Electronic and Optical Products 12 14.5 
Motor Vehicles and Trailers 10 12.0 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 12 14.5 
Electrical Equipment 7 8.4 
Fabricated Metal Products 4 4.8 
Rubber and Plastic Products 3 3.6 
Pharmaceutical Products; Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products, Other Transport Equipment; Other 
manufacturing  
8 9.6 
Food Products; Basic Metals 2 2.4 
Employment Size   
Less than 50 20 24.1 
50-250 28 33.7 
Over 250 35 42.2 
Firm Type   
Large Firm (Over $25 million in sales)  43 51.8 
SME (Employment < 250 & Sales < 25 Million) 40 48.2 
Foundation Date   
<1950-1980 32 38.6 
1981-1990 21 25.3 
1991-2006 30 36.1 
Corporate Status   
Independent Firm 26 31.3 
Independent Family Firm 27 32.5 
Headquarter of a Firm 15 18.1 
Joint Venture and Equal Partnership 8 9.6 
Types of Activities   
Manufacturing Final Products 63 81.8 
Manufacturing Intermediate Product 27 35.1 
Marketing 56 67.5 
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of the surveyed firms sell in international markets, mainly Europe, Middle-East, Russia, 
Central Asia and Northern Africa. 
 
6.2 Innovative Practices of the Surveyed Firms 
Innovation is a complex process which encompasses much more than just 
technology. And over the years, many typologies have been proposed to provide better 
insights of this complex process. Schumpeter (1934) as an early and founding contributor 
identified five forms of innovation carried out by business firms-new product; new 
sources of supply; new methods of production; new market exploitation; and new 
business organization) Schumpeter‘s types, or categories of innovation strongly 
influenced the typologies and definitions found in the  Oslo Manual  (OECD)55, 
containing the most prominent  international guidelines explaining the collection and use 
of innovation data in various industries. Technology management literature also shows 
that while some firms emphasize distinct innovations types (such as product innovation), 
others embrace a blend of innovation activities (for instance product, process and 
organizational innovations) that determine the success of their innovation processes 
(Patel and Pavitt 1987; Granstrand 1998). As such, firms, especially technology oriented 
firms, characterize their overall innovation processes differently. In a general sense, 
however, the innovation process of firms starts with identification of a market and/or 
                                                 
55 According to Oslo Manual (2005) there are 4 types of innovations: product, process, organizational and 
marketing. Product innovations are goods and services that are ―new or significantly improved with respect 
to its characteristics or intended uses. This includes significant improvements in technical specifications, 
components and materials, incorporated software, user friendliness or other functional characteristics‖. 
Process innovations are ―implementation of a new or significantly improved production or delivery 
method. This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or software.‖ Organizational 
innovations are ―implementation of a new organizational method in the firms‘ business practices, 
workplace organization or external relations‖. Marketing innovations are ―implementation of a new 
marketing method involving significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, 
product promotion or pricing‖.   
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associated technology opportunity; develops or adapts an existing technology that fulfills 
the observed opportunity; and, if successful, moves the new technology or product to the 
market by commercializing it directly, or transferring the technology to other institutions 
(Jain and Triandis 1990). 
In this study, all the sample firms were selected on the basis of some form of 
―product‖ innovation since the sample was drawn from companies that had won 
competitive government grants for specific innovation projects. This ―predefined‖ sample 
was useful in understanding the factors supporting technological activities (mostly R&D) 
and technology-based products in the Turkish NIS construction process. In this respect, 
firms were asked a number of questions about their new product development processes. 
The firms were asked if they have introduced any technologically new or improved 
product into the market during the last three years. As expected, all firms in the sample as 
the recipients of TEYDEB-TTGV supports, affirmed introduction of a new product into 
the market within the stated span of time. Half of the firms reported having introduced 1 
to 5 new or technologically improved products into the market, while 31.2 % of the firms 
introduced more than 10 new products providing at least some evidence that these firms 
had adopted a relatively aggressive innovation strategy even though innovations were 
incremental. A large majority of the firms (89.2 %) emphasized that new product 
introductions were a first of their kind in Turkey, which was congruent with the export 
expansion–import contraction objectives of the government innovation support programs. 
Only a small fraction, 13.3 % of the firms, reported the novelty of their products as a first 
of their kind in the world market. This is consistent with the expectations that limited 
capital and human resources, industrial experience and research capabilities, and cutting 
edge technical and market knowledge, made globally leading innovations rare in the 
context of Turkey‘s overall level of technical development. 
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Table 6.2 Types of R&D Activities 
R&D Activities Number of Firms Percentage 
Basic Research  1   2.4 
Applied Research 56 67.5 
Processes Development 66 79.5 
Product Design 78 94.0 
Prototyping 64 77.1 
Product Testing 74 89.2 
 
In order to understand the composition of firms‘ product innovation efforts, firms 
were asked questions about the type and extend of their research and development 
activities56. The firms‘ emphasis on basic research, applied research and experimental 
development varied significantly. There was in some circumstances a lack of clarity in 
the respondent‘s minds about the meaning and definitions of these categories. Definitions 
were given in the interview process but some ambiguity may have remained. Aside from 
one big defense firm, none of the firms mentioned conducting basic research. A large 
majority of the firms asked for a clearer definition of basic research as they wanted to 
make sure that it was different from their applied and experimental product development 
research.  
 
―Basic research is the kind of research that aims to provide new scientific 
knowledge and understanding. This is the kind of research that is done in 
universities and is mostly funded by governments. I can say that in [name of the 
                                                 
56 According to OECD Frascati Manual (2002:30), ―Basic research is experimental or theoretical work 
undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable 
facts, without any particular application or use in view‖. ―Applied research is also original investigation 
undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific 
practical aim or objective‖. ―Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge 
gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, products or 
devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already 
produced or installed. R&D covers both formal R&D in R&D units and informal or occasional R&D in 
other units‖. 
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company] we indirectly conduct basic research as we hire and support 
engineering PHDs without any strings on their research topics. Defense is a very 
specialized field with diverse areas of interest including communications, 
tracking, surveillance, navigation, etc. and the most important thing is to have the 
best people. Once you have them, once you bring their knowledge in the 
company, one way or another, it shapes the scope of your future R&D projects.‖ 
 
―The distinction between basic and applied research is blurry for us. We employ 
graduate students of Professor [name of the professor] in [name of the university] 
who has been providing consultancy services to our firm for years. Our objective 
in this arrangement is to make sure that solutions to some of our problems are 
researched extensively by quality researchers in longer periods of times. But, do 
we conduct basic research in this way?, I‘m not sure… Because what is basic 
research in one year; becomes an applied research in another year in this 
arrangement.‖ 
 
  Over 67 % of the firms interviewed declared applied research as an important 
type of research activity for themselves. This is somewhat less than the share of firms that 
reported conducting experimental development as in the form of process development 
(79.5 %), product design (94.0 %), prototyping (77.1 %) and product testing (89.2 %). In 
general, applied research translates into the more speculative and risky phase of an 
innovation process in which firms invest in inventive work to come up with technological 
advances that are viable and potentially marketable. As all the firms in the sample 
performed some form of product innovation, in explaining their innovation processes, 
they emphasized either their applied research or product design processes. Process 
development in this context was usually mentioned as part of their general capital 
investment process that was mostly needed for the development and testing of new 
product prototypes or needed to move to the production phase for a new product. 
 
―Process development? Of course. If you define yourself as innovative, process 
development is an inevitable consequence.. a natural component of your product 
development effort. You need new software in the design phase, or new CNC 
lines in the production phase.. Buying them does not make you innovative, using 
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them, creating new values in your product makes you innovative and 
competitive.‖ 
The majority of the firms in the sample believed that their ability to innovate was 
primarily related to their technical expertise and competency rather than organizational 
and managerial proficiency in selecting and managing projects and bringing a new 
product to the market. Most firms in the sample, in other words, associated technological 
change with technical capacity and overcoming technical problems. It is noteworthy in 
this context that 54.2% of the firms noted that they engaged in reverse engineering in 
their product development efforts. ―Steal and develop‖ was a frequently stated phrase 
especially among small machinery firms to indicate more ―development‖ than ―research‖ 
in R&D activities. However, all of the firms emphasized that they were not simply 
copying, but were taking advanced products developed elsewhere, adapting the core 
technology concept, but making significant changes to meet the specific needs of their 
customer base. Firms were less interested in other areas of innovation such as introducing 
new marketing techniques (50.6 %) or changing existing management routines (24.1 %), 
reflecting more of a project-based versus  a more systemic and structured technology 
management approach.  
 
―We‘re much less interested in introducing new marketing techniques because we 
don‘t start a project if it‘s not intended for a customer. In this respect, 
management‘s attitude towards risk is very conservative. We undertake risky 
projects on the technical but not the sales side… As I said, this is a family firm. 
The owners are two brothers who are in their early 50s and graduates of METU 
Electrical Engineering Department. They have an incredibly connected network 
as METU EE alumni are everywhere and hold key positions in a lot of key 
institutions. In this sense, our managers through their networks make intuitive 
decisions/inferences about possible market opportunities. Who are technology-
driven customers, how easily they adopt and invest on new technologies, etc. But 
no, we don‘t employ marketing people or work with marketing firms that make 
market analysis to guide our investment decisions.‖ 
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―Changing management routines are hard. It‘s usually harder in family companies 
as who makes the company are your father, brother or sister. Family members 
usually hold managerial positions in small firms and it‘s really hard for them to 
step-down unless there is a personal reason. This has positive and negative 
aspects. On the positive side; depending on management‘s orientations and 
willingness toward R&D, persuading them to launch innovative projects is easier 
especially if you‘re supported by another family member. On the negative side, if 
two-out of three managers say they are against it then you have to work really 
hard to convince them, say you have to look for government support, etc. In this 
sense, changing existing management routines are hard to achieve as the 
professional relations are more personal and intertwined‖.  
 
With respect to their R&D expenditure which obviously is an important measure 
of R&D activity, 64.5 % of the firms spent less than 5 % of their sales revenue on R&D, 
while a large proportion of the firms (35.5 %) spent between 2-5 % on R&D activities. 
Only 16.1 % invested more than 10 % of their sales on R&D, while 9.7 % invested less 
than 1 % of their sales. The mean value of R&D expenditure over total employment 
among the survey firms is $24,871. This ratio was$14,127 dollars for SMEs and $39,335 
dollars for big firms, reflecting the higher intensity of R&D activity among the large 
firms. 
Another important measure of a basic commitment to technology adoption and 
innovation is the employees directly dedicated to R&D activities. A majority of the firms 
(80.5%) perform their innovative activities using less than 20 dedicated employees, while 
35.4 % of the firms support between 6 and 10 dedicated R&D personnel. Only 9.8% of 
the firms have more than 100 R&D employees. Considering that a significant share of 
firms in the sample are  large firms (42.2 %), the share of the labor force dedicated to 
R&D  remains relatively small in comparison to their total workforce.  
Patent data provides an imperfect but very concrete measure of the outcomes of 
R&D and innovation activities. Half of the sample firms, 42 out of 83,  applied for 
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patents57  over the past three years as a result of their R&D and innovation efforts and 26 
firms out of the 42 firms that applied (66.7 % of  firms applying for patents or about 31% 
of all sample firms) were awarded patents in the same time period. Of the 26 firms 
granted a patent, sixteen  (61.5 %) were awarded patents issued by the Turkish Patent 
Office, while 7 out of 26 firms (26.9 %) were issued patents by the European Patent 
Office (EPO). Big firms were significantly more active in the patenting process. While 
large firms with more than 250 employees represented only 42 percent of the total 
sample, about 54 % of all firms that were awarded patents were big firms.  
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from this patenting data without clear 
benchmarks from other Turkish or international firms. However, the broad claim that 
firms participating in R&D support programs were just using funds as a general firm 
subsidy or that most funds were going to support ongoing incremental product 
improvements is refuted by these data on patenting. About half of all firms had developed 
new or improved products that were viewed as patent worthy innovations and close to a 
third of all firms had received patents on their products.  
On the other hand, a significant subset of firms did not view patenting as an 
important outcome of their supported projects58. Major reasons for lack of interest for 
patenting were:  a lack of patentable outputs; expensive and onerous application 
processes; and firms‘ ‗no-patent policies‘ due to skepticism that patent protection would 
effectively protect their property rights in domestic markets. Typical statements include: 
―Patent applications are not one of our priorities. We produce customized 
machineries which are new for our firm and also for our customers in many ways. 
Our customers come to us with an idea, in most cases with a blurry one, and after 
                                                 
57 Some of the firms also included in their success model applications, as they were not sure about the 
exact distribution. 
58 During the interviews, only a small portion of firms seemed enthusiastic to explain their patent process 
and its value and significance for the firm‘s competitive position. Many respondents were unable to convey 
exact figures, reflecting the limited importance given to patent applications within their firms. 
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rounds of discussions we stretch our limits and shape their needs. In some 
instances, we promise products with features that we have no prior experience 
producing. You can‘t imagine the amount of uncertainty in the beginning. It‘s so 
chaotic, so ambiguous and so experimental. But we love the process, looking for 
the unknown… Such an enjoyment and of course stress… When we‘re finally 
done with the product, in a majority of the cases, it is not patentable. There are 
many firms out there, foreign firms, old firms with great industrial experience that 
make machines with similar features… It is new to us but not to them..‖ 
 
―The patent application process is expensive and also there is so much red-tape. 
That is very discouraging.. On the other hand, with the increasing government 
support for patent applications, many patent firms are established.. These firms 
employ lawyers and technical staff and they evaluate the congruity of your 
application to TPE (Turkish Patent Institute) requirements. At this point, we‘re 
(management) not sure we want to go through this process; we don‘t want to 
convey information about ourselves to third parties‖. 
 
―Patents are very sensitive to sectors and the composition of the sectors in the 
country. Patents laws, their proper application, etc. are secondary. You see this 
palm-sized package; it is used for insulation purposes in the construction industry. 
It is a market shattering product. [Explains the advantages of the product in 
comparison to conventional insulation technologies] Can we get patents for it? Of 
course.. But we don‘t want to. Because once we get the patent; it will be available 
to our competitors. With minor changes in the product, they will enter into the 
market. At this point, we don‘t want to disclose our know-how to everyone. It is 
in our best interest to keep it to ourselves‖.  
 
6.3 Reasons for Innovating 
In order to understand the reasons prompting firms to make commitments to 
innovation activities companies were asked to indicate the importance of their reasons for 
conducting innovative activities on a Likert scale from 1: Very Important to 4: Not 
Important. Firms were asked a number of questions about why they carried out 
innovation projects. The most commonly stated reasons for undertaking innovation 
projects were related to improving sales by bringing better or new products to the market. 
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These basic motivations included complying with the demands of customers (m=1.19); 
increasing product quality (m=1.27); extending product range (m=1.31); and dealing with 
competitors at home (m=1.84).  
A great majority (80.7 %) of the firms noted that complying with the demands of 
customers was very important, while 19.3 % of the firms‘ indicated that it was 
moderately important. Uncertainty in the success of developing new products was 
alleviated to a degree if they understood the concrete needs of their customers and had 
some confidence in their ability to improve products or innovate in ways that met specific 
customer demands. The ability to target innovation activities to meet concrete needs 
articulated by existing customers has been highlighted as a critical stimulus in some of 
the innovation literature, most notable Von Hippel‘s studies of the importance of users in 
the innovation process (Von Hippel, 1988). Firms, once they understand the specific 
needs of customers, are much more inclined to launch new projects. In this way, they are 
less prone to risk and uncertainty if they understand specific demands instead of 
generating a new product for a sometimes poorly defined or uncertain market. The 
qualitative information and open ended responses from the interviews gave the clear 
impression that innovation in the Turkish context was much more commonly a ―demand 
pull‖ versus a ―supply push‖ process. 
 
―A previous customer of ours in Iran asked for new metal processing machinery. 
[He explains how the new machinery was different from their current products]. 
That was a machine requiring new technology that we didn‘t know but I could see 
ourselves accomplishing the project with the involvement of our strategic partner 
in the USA. That was a risky move. Anyways, I gave them a call and they agreed 
to be involved in the project. I made the deal with our customer, but after a short 
while I received a call from our partner stating that legally it is impossible for 
them to get involved in any kind of technology transfer activity with a firm in 
Iran. I immediately went to the USA to sort things out with our partner. They said 
there‘s nothing that they can do. And, I said at least tell me how I should do it. 
They refused and said they don‘t want to go to jail. I was so frustrated. When 
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everybody was away, an old design engineer showed me on the back of an 
envelope how I should think about it. Our engineers and I worked on the project 
for nights, got some help from a consultant and finished the product. That felt so 
good but I highly doubt if I ever would like to be in such a position again.‖ 
 
Table 6.3 Firms‘ Reasons for Innovating 
Reasons For Innovating Likert Mean 
Comply with the demands of customers 1.19 
Increase product quality 1.27 
Extend product range 1.31 
Achieve market leadership 1.65 
Deal with new competitors at home 1.84 
Decrease production costs 2.17 
Availability of government support 2.22 
Deal with new competitors in export markets 2.23 
Decrease processes costs 2.42 
Comply with local laws or standards 2.67 
Develop more environmental friendly products or processes 2.75 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
 
Increasing product quality and extending product range were the next two most 
important reasons for innovating as mentioned by 75.9 % of all firms. Typical statements 
included: 
―Primarily, we innovate to differentiate from our competitors. A product‘s life in 
our sector is pretty short so we have to remain competitive by increasing the 
quality of our [name and type of products] to exist and establish in the market. 
Mostly, our customers are loyal as they know we keep improving the quality of 
our products.‖  
 
―Most of these reasons are important components of any innovation process… 
The structure of our firm, its financial and administrative capacity is too limited to 
set the goal as achieving market leadership. That would be very unrealistic. But 
we do product development and we do it well. We mostly take an existing idea, 
an existing product and try to expand it in better and cheaper ways. We try to 
understand the specific customer needs, in our case mostly the municipalities and 
try to offer something better, something unavailable or unmet in the market.‖ 
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The least important reasons for innovation activities indicated in the surveys and 
interviews were developing more environmental friendly products or processes (m=2.75) 
and complying with local laws or standards (m=2.67). It is also important to emphasize 
that government demand side measures such as regulations, standards and norms did not 
appear to be important factors influencing the innovation practices of the firms. Roughly 
60 % of the firms declared that complying with local laws or standards was only slightly 
important or not important for their innovative activities. However as EU integration 
efforts continue and Turkish firms attempt to more aggressively penetrate European 
markets attention to quality control and standards is becoming much more intense. In 
certain ways, these demand side pressures related to the European integration project 
have substituted for domestic demand side/ industrial policy measures to drive 
technology adoption and upgrading. 
 
―The turning point in our product development efforts was to continue to exist in 
the European markets. When the existence of brake pads with asbestos was 
banned in Europe, we had to make a choice: to stay in or exit from the European 
markets. Our managers are visionary people and they are fast movers. They saw 
this as an opportunity and eliminated the use of asbestos in the production. We 
searched for other materials, ceramic etc. to replace asbestos. The transition 
process necessitated acquisition of a lot new knowledge, technique, materials, and 
artifacts together with organizational restructuring. But it paid for itself. A lot of 
firms are now struggling to adjust themselves to new market conditions.‖ 
 
Availability of government support also appears to be a significant, but not 
primary factor in motivating firms to carry out innovation projects (m= 2.22). Firms 
which considered government support very important make up 19.3 % of the whole 
sample, while 42.2 % of the firms thought availability of government support a 
moderately important factor motivating innovation projects. While a clear majority 
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(61.5%) saw government support as very or somewhat important, 36.1 % of firms 
thought support slightly important while only 2.4 % of the firms said the availability of 
government support was not important.  
Firms‘ responses were mixed depending on how they value the existing 
government support and their ability to access it for the success of their innovative 
product and process efforts. The organizational structure of the firms; their positioning of 
innovative products for market leadership; their age and size ; financial strength and the 
capacity to reach out to other financial resources all appeared as relevant factors 
(combined with the efficiency and effectiveness of the innovation programs) influencing 
their evaluation of the importance of government support programs.  
The interview process provided additional information on why firms saw 
government support as valuable to their innovation efforts. Many small, conventional and 
financially challenged manufacturing firms highlighted the crucial contribution of 
support programs to their product development efforts. Many could not have mobilized 
the resources to carry out dedicated product development projects without government 
encouragement and subsidies.  However, smaller firms also mentioned the difficulty of 
the application process, the challenges they went through to compile the application 
package, and problems with the irregularity of the payment process.  
 
―We use TUBITAK‘s R&D support program and we‘re extremely happy about it. 
It covered a big part of our expenses and we managed to hire a new engineer who 
later became one of our own. The application process is tedious, that is true, but 
you‘re getting free money. Can you imagine how much you would have to work 
to earn for it? I believe everything comes with a cost and that‘s it. TUBITAK is 
just trying to make sure that the allocated money will be used for the intended 
purposes.‖ 
  
―The government is promoting the R&D idea lately. TUBITAK has been involved 
in a wide range of awareness rising activities such as organizing seminars; 
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presentations on government support programs; technology award competitions 
etc. The more we hear about those, the better we understand that we‘re actually 
R&D firms. What‘s highlighted is what we have been doing for years. So, why 
not to apply for government R&D funds? Well, the experience showed us that 
there is a reason, an important one.. The process is too burdensome. There are so 
many documents, multiple copies of which you have to provide to make an 
application. Somebody is always working on the application package. Sometimes 
I feel like I have to hire another person to keep track of our TUBITAK files‖. 
 
―Oh well, yes, preparing the package, the application materials, really keep you 
busy. Lots of firms refuse to get involved in this process both because they don‘t 
have any experience or time and they hire a consultant who is actually specialized 
in preparing packages to TUBITAK. It is something like hiring an accountant. 
Good wording and presentation increases firms‘ chance of receiving ―free money‖ 
which in majority of the cases firms needs most‖.  
 
Relatively big and/or technologically sophisticated firms which have been the 
recipients of these awards emphasized the importance of  government support programs 
in putting product development projects in front of firm leaders  and  convincing the 
upper management to start a new project. Getting upper management to approve projects 
was definitely facilitated by the fact that government was subsidizing almost half of the 
project costs. The financial strength of larger firms made problems with the payment 
schedule of grants less of an issue because the day-to-day progress of their projects was 
not contingent upon the money coming from the government. Some new technology 
firms, on the other hand, which were ambitious about creating and entering new markets, 
criticized the uniformity of support program design, especially the lack of clear 
distinctions between projects that aim for simple improvements in product and process 
technologies; and projects that target to bring in new technologies that create new 
markets in Turkey. 
―We obviously don‘t start a project just because there is government support for 
it. But we (R&D engineers and manager) use the availability of funds as an 
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opportunity to convince the upper management. We usually find ourselves 
explaining: see if you invest [that much] the government will cover the rest. It is 
well worth trying as the project topic is very promising and presents a good 
opportunity, etc.‖  
 
―We all, three partners of this firm, used to be working at [name of the company] 
in USA. After more than 10 years of experience, we decided to come back to 
Turkey to start a new business based on our [name of the company] experience. 
The timing was great as the communication and Internet infrastructure was newly 
developing in the country. Our objective was to be one of the first movers in the 
Turkish market by offering products that addresses domestic needs with high 
quality technologies before the international companies dominate the market. 
Government support at this phase was so important for us. Unfortunately, the 
support system was so static that it was no use at all… We actually got ourselves 
into trouble by believing in the official payment schedules‖. 
 
The in-depth interviews with innovative firms showed that a certain 
categorization of technology firms is needed to get a deeper understanding and better 
analysis of the innovation processes of the firms, their capacities, knowledge sources and 
their geographic orientations. Technology firms are usually defined based on certain 
categorizations or metrics in the literature. Specifically, a firm was noted as a high 
technology firm when it belonged to certain industries such as computer, software, 
aerospace, computer-aided design etc. or a low technology firm if it belonged to an 
industry with low average technical standards such as the textile industry (Dunn et.al. 
1991). In a developing country context, these classifications are less illuminating. In 
Turkey there are many firms in the software industry performing minor product 
improvements or just distributing software produced elsewhere, while highly specialized 
textile companies are producing high-tech fibers that may be unique in the world market. 
The most common  factors  that define technology firms are :  above average ratios of 
R&D activities and expenditures (Pavel and Pavitt 1984; Medcoff 1999); high ratios of 
skilled employees typically  engineers, scientists and technicians as a share of the total 
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workforce (Itzak and Ilan 2004);  the complexity of products produced (Mac Donald 
1985);  the emphasis on the applied research versus product development (Ansoff and 
Stewart 1967); the new products and their innovative characteristics (Deeds et.al 2000);  
management‘s attitude and commitment towards R&D, change and risk (Shanklin and 
Ryans 1987;Von-Gilnow and Mohrman 1990; Easingwood and Beard 1996); and a flat 
and integrated organizational structures (Mohrman et al. 1992).  
For the purposes of this research, I wanted to categorize firms according to their 
orientation towards R&D and new product development, their ability to produce complex 
products, and to differentiate types and strengths of their external networks. Four 
categories were developed to clarify the firm‘s motivations for undertaking innovation 
projects, their level of technological capacity and the commitment to technology 
upgrading among the firms in the sample. These categories are based upon the 
suggestions of a technology expert in TTGV, who has an intimate knowledge of Turkish 
industries and of product developing firms because of his involvement in TTGV‘s R&D 
support program. After investigating firms‘ orientations towards R&D activities and 
investment through common survey questions, and evaluating their significantly different 
product development stories through open ended questions and interview queries, firms 
were classified according to the following categories: 
 
A. Firms that are not generally interested in developing new products, but are 
under pressure to improve or extend their existing products to meet demands of their 
customers and remain competitive in their traditional markets;  
B. Firms that are developing an interest in new product development but have 
limited experience and limited commitment to applied research; 
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C. Firms that are actively searching for and developing new products based on 
advanced technologies that exist in global markets; 
D. Firms that are involved in cutting-edge technology development practices and 
projects, (which is usually is very rare in the Turkish context).  
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Firms‘ Reasons for Innovating According to Their Orientation towards Product 
Development 
Reasons For Innovating Mean  
all 
groups 
Mean 
 group  
A 
Mean 
group 
B 
Mean 
group 
 C 
Mean 
group 
D 
Comply with the demands of customers 1.19 1.19 1.24 1.17 1.33 
Increase product quality 1.27 1.41 1.29 1.14 1.33 
Extend product range 1.31 1.67 1.29 1.08 1.00 
Achieve market leadership 1.65 2.22 1.53 1.33 1.00 
Deal with new competitors at home 1.84 1.93 1.35 1.97 2.33 
Decrease production costs 2.17 2.00 2.18 2.28 2.33 
Availability of government support 2.22 2.30 2.47 2.08 1.67 
Deal with new competitors in export 
markets 
2.23 2.81 2.35 1.78 1.67 
Decrease processes costs 2.42 2.37 2.47 2.44 2.33 
Comply with local laws or standards 2.67 3.04 2.82 2.33 2.67 
Develop more environmental friendly 
products or processes 
2.75 3.04 2.82 2.50 2.67 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
According to this classification 27 of the surveyed firms were assigned to the first 
category; 17 firms to the second category; 36 firms to the third category and 3 firms to 
the fourth category. This sort of classification made the aggregated data more legible and 
explanatory in several ways. For instance the importance of extending product range; 
achieving market leadership; and dealing with competitors in export markets become 
more important reasons for engaging in innovation as the firms‘ orientation towards 
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product development-oriented R&D increased. Likewise, availability of government 
support was more important for firms in group C and D engaged in more real new 
product development activities or more advanced and cutting-edge technology 
development.  In light of this classification framework, government support assumes 
more significance as firms engage in more aggressive attempts to expand markets 
through the development of new products and technologies. It is noteworthy that this 
finding is consistent with the core goals of the current phase of Turkish innovation policy 
and investment in the NIS that include the promotion of new product development and 
entry into new market areas (see Table 6.4, above). 
 
6.4 Competencies Associated with Innovative Practices 
The core competencies of a firm are the unique skills and capabilities that give the 
firm its competitive advantage. They include capabilities such as the quality if its people; 
information exchange and learning processes within the firm; the capability to acquire 
know-how from outside sources, etc. that enable the firm to deliver valuable products to 
its customers. In order to identify the emerging and divergent needs associated with the 
developing NIS, firms were requested to assess their organizational, technical, financial 
and collaborative competencies associated with their innovative activities through a 
number of queries.  
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Organizational Competencies 
Table 6.5 Organizational Competencies 
Organizational Competencies (% of firms) VI MI SI  NI Mean  
Identification of the knowledge and strategic 
know-how 
51.8 44.6 3.6 0.0 1.52 
Identification of the people holding strategic 
know-how 
60.2 27.7 12.0 0.0 1.52 
Pooling of knowledge from across the firm 47.0 51.8 1.2 0.0 1.54 
Organizing  the company around innovative 
projects 
42.2 37.3 19.3 1.2 1.80 
Encouraging joint project teams to innovate 38.6 38.6 16.9 4.8 1.88 
Incentives to formulate new ideas 26.5 53.0 18.1 2.4 1.96 
Making everybody aware of the need for adapted 
training 
25.3 47.0 18.1 9.6 2.12 
Rewarding the ideas that have been selected 8.4 20.5 32.5 38.6 3.01 
Evaluation of the impact of training on the 
innovation process 
4.8 21.7 39.8 33.7 3.02 
Rewards for useful training 3.6 1.2 8.4 86.7 3.78 
VI: Very Important, MI: Moderately important, SI: Slightly Important, NI: Not Important 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
Overall, firms‘ most important organizational competences focus on identification 
of the people that hold knowledge and strategic know-how; and pooling of knowledge 
from various parts of the firm. Knowledge pooling was emphasized by interviewees as 
optimizing existing firm resources by utilizing everyone‘s expertise and experience when 
needed in different projects. Consistent with other findings in the firm interviews, many 
respondents specifically highlighted exploitation of internal resources as the main source 
of strength in any kind of innovative activity. In most cases, they interpreted the pooling 
of knowledge and identification of strategic know-how within the context of their own 
firms, not through external links or sources.  
Some firms also mentioned that even though they do not have the ability to 
identify outside sources of knowledge critical to their technology and innovation 
strategies they do have the capacity to reach out to secondary parties to secure 
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information or establish necessary connections. Depending on the circumstances, these 
parties can be consultants who are often academicians, and the firm‘s customers.  These 
responses reinforce the findings that internal sources of information and knowledge 
acquisition were generally viewed as both more common and more important than 
external sources or relationships to the innovation process.   
In terms of organizational competencies, the issues related to training are 
interesting and potentially problematic. Nearly 60 % of the respondent firms noted that 
they have introduced both internal training programs and external training programs for 
their workforces. The internal training programs were associated with the continuous 
internal training philosophy of most of the firms. However, these programs were often 
not structured and they were typically offered on an informal basis. A subset of firms 
noted participating in external training programs, especially the organizational ones such 
as those offering classes on CE59 marking procedures and patenting. Advertisements for 
technical training programs were mentioned, but firms screened these offerings carefully 
and participated in them only if they met an important need. In a majority of the cases, 
the contents of external program were disseminated to the relevant part of the workforce 
through internal presentations to employees. 
Even though most firms are good at disseminating the information on existing 
training programs among their workers and make everybody aware of the adapted 
training programs (m=2.12), serious evaluation of the impact of training programs on 
innovation processes are not seen as a common practice or important competency 
(m=3.02). The link between the technology and innovation activities and skills or 
management training is pretty weak in a majority of the firms. Also, useful training is not 
                                                 
59 The CE marking certifies that a product is in congruence with the EU consumer safety, health or 
environmental requirements.  
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directly rewarded through training subsidies or monetary benefits in most firms 
(m=3.78).  A number of firms stated that training was a reward in itself for their 
employees. 
 
Technical Competencies 
When respondent firms were asked to evaluate their technical competencies they 
valued the effectiveness and quality control of their production process as the most 
important (m=1.27) followed by technological evaluation of potential products (m=1.53) 
and processes (m=1.69) which the company is likely to produce. Almost every firm 
emphasized the importance of quality control in their production process as very 
important for themselves. Firms put more emphasis on technological evaluation of 
potential products over evaluation of processes, which is not surprising as product 
innovations are more common than process innovations among the firms. Especially after 
the Customs Union agreement in 1996, the policies promoting high quality production 
through standards and norms, laboratory tests and various certification requirements 
created an increased awareness on quality control and technology evaluation among the 
firms.  
Table 6.6 Technical Competencies 
Technical Competencies (% of firms) VI MI SI  NI Mean  
Effectiveness and the quality control of the production 81.9 12.0 3.6 2.4 1.27 
Technological evaluation of the products which the 
company is likely to produce 
55.4 38.6 3.6 2.4 1.53 
Technological evaluation of the processes which the 
company is likely to adopt 
43.4 45.8 9.6 1.2 1.69 
Carrying out a technological assessment of the company 30.1 45.8 15.7 8.4 2.02 
VI: Very Important, MI: Moderately important, SI: Slightly Important, NI: Not Important 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
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Financial Competencies 
Knowing the private and public sources of finance for innovation was reported as 
the most important financial competency among the sample firms (m=1.82). It is very 
important to note that none of the firms mentioned an external private source of 
innovation finance as part of their product development activities. Other than their own 
family or other internally generated firm resources, they highlighted the TUBITAK-
TEYDEB or TTGV innovation support as a key source of external finance since all were 
recipients of these grants and loans. Also, excluding the straightforward R&D 
government support program application procedures, a majority of the firms (57.8 %) do 
not think it is important (slightly and not important) to have a communication strategy 
towards potential financial partners of innovation projects.  
 
Table 6.7 Financial Competencies 
Financial Competencies (% of firms) VI MI SI  NI Mean  
Anticipation of the full costs of innovation projects 22.9 51.8 20.5 4.8 2.07 
Knowing the private and public sources of 
innovation finance 
37.3 45.8 14.5 2.4 1.82 
Communication strategy towards potential financial 
partners of innovation projects 
14.5 27.7 37.3 20.5 2.64 
VI: Very Important, MI: Moderately important, SI: Slightly Important, NI: Not Important 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
For most firms, anticipation of the full costs of innovation is related to the 
estimates of revenues that will be generated by the newly developed products. Unless 
there is a clear market, or concrete demand from customers, firms are very conservative 
about investing in riskier new product development projects. Once they believe in the 
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market sales potential of new products, firms estimate the innovation project costs and 
then take action.  
These financial competency responses show that innovation financing 
mechanisms are limited to TUBITAK and TTGV‘s traditional support programs. Taken 
together these results reinforce the conclusion that private venture and seed finance for 
technology adoption and innovation is a rarity in the Turkish case and that the 
government grant and loan programs are filling a clear gap. The absence of other third 
party financial mechanisms was noted in the previous policy evaluation chapter. Lack of 
private financing mechanisms and the associated lack of culture and expertise in banking 
and other finance capital institutions limit financing of new product development projects 
to internal investment capacities of the firms and their ability to secure public matching 
grants and loans.  
 
Collaborative Competences: Customers  
As one of the top sources knowledge for firms, customers and clients are given 
high importance in firms‘ product development efforts. For almost all firms; their 
competencies in analyzing the nature and needs of their customers were fundamental to 
their innovation efforts (m=1.54) and collecting the after-sales reactions of customers was 
essential for their further product development efforts (m=1.64). Over 89 % of the firms 
mentioned that they use customer feedback as a source of evaluating and changing their 
current product designs. The company‘s innovation image is also perceived as an 
important factor shaping the collaboration with customers (m=1.88). However, 
advertisement of (50.6 %) and especially special offers (69.9 %) for new products were 
not identified as very important forms of interaction with customers among a large 
majority of firms.  Consistent with other responses, this suggests that the majority of 
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firms innovate to retain or expand their existing customer base rather than to aggressively 
seek new potential customers or markets. This again supports the prominence of a 
demand pull process for innovation in the Turkish context. 
 
Table 6.8 Competences in Collaborating with Customers 
Competences in Collaborating with Customers VI MI SI  NI Mea
n  
Analyzing the nature and the needs of the customers 56.6 36.1 3.6 3.6 1.54 
Collecting customers reactions at after-sales services or 
retailers 
48.2 43.4 4.8 3.6 1.64 
Using the product as a source of information about the 
customers satisfaction 
51.8 37.3 7.2 3.6 1.63 
Special offers for new products 9.6 20.5 16.9 53.0 3.13 
Determination of the target, the media and the type of 
message for advertising new products 
14.5 34.9 20.5 30.1 2.66 
Company’s innovation image 41.0 39.8 9.6 9.6 1.88 
VI: Very Important, MI: Moderately important, SI: Slightly Important, NI: Not Important 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
 
Collaborative Competences: Suppliers 
A crucial aspect of technological change and innovation involves interaction with 
and learning from suppliers of key components and technologies (Von Hipple, 1988). 
Regarding their competences in interacting with suppliers, the respondent firms  
highlighted their capacities in absorbing the knowledge and technology incorporated in 
equipment and components of suppliers as the most important of the competencies 
related to collaborating with customers (m=1.86). Obviously, the nature of supplies and 
equipment and the technology embedded in them vary greatly across different sectors. 
However, in general firms evaluate their internal capacities to understand and adapt new 
technologies from suppliers as greater than the competencies of the supplier firms 
themselves. This was especially true of the companies whose supplier base was 
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dominated by domestic firms offering generally unsophisticated, less advanced 
components or equipment. The wide belief among these sample firms is that that the 
quality and technical sophistication of domestic supplies among firms indicates a real 
need for development of policies targeting supply-chain linkages and management in the 
NIS construction process.  
Firms also affirm the importance of  rapid adoption of technologically new 
equipment (m=2.07) and supplies (m=2.10) for their innovative activities However a 
number of interviewees interpret these competencies with caution as they place higher 
value on the reliability of new equipment and supplies than on their technological 
novelty. As the firms‘ technical competency and competitiveness increase, the emphasis 
they place on the rapid and effective adoption of supplies and equipment increase as well. 
It seems that learning from the technology provided by suppliers was prevalent mostly 
with foreign suppliers from the EU or other OECD countries.   
Table 6.9 Competences in Collaborating with Suppliers 
Competences in Interacting with Suppliers VI MI SI  NI Mea
n  
Fast adoption of the technologically new equipment 32.5 38.6 18.1 10.8 2.07 
Fast adoption of  technologically new supplies 31.3 36.1 24.1 8.4 2.10 
Subcontracting for acquisition of R&D 4.8 8.4 16.9 69.9 3.52 
Absorption capacities of the knowledge incorporated 
in the innovative equipment and components 
31.3 55.4 9.6 3.6 1.86 
VI: Very Important, MI: Moderately important, SI: Slightly Important, NI: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
Subcontracting or acquisition of R&D from suppliers is not a common practice in 
Turkish industry. A great majority of the firms (69.9 %) indicated subcontracting or 
acquisition of R&D from suppliers as unimportant (m=3.52) and specifically stressed the 
lower technological and organizational competencies of the supplier firms in meeting 
their demands. They highlighted unidirectional flow of knowledge from the major 
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manufacturing firms to supplier firms and emphasized importance of the major OEM 
firms in the supply chain, especially the automotive industry, in raising the quality of 
their supplier bases by increasing suppliers‘ design capabilities. Suppliers‘ importance as 
knowledge sources was often explained through their capacity to convey information 
about changes in technology in the market area of the firms acquiring components or 
equipment.  
 
Collaborative Competences: Competitors 
Analyzing the characteristics of competitors products (m=1.54) and knowing 
competitors‘ technologies (m=1.81) appeared as the most important competences of firms 
in relation with competitors. Other than these, responses in all areas appeared as either 
slightly important or not important. Joint ventures, various strategic alliances and forms 
of cooperation with competitors (m=2.61) came out as the most frequent type of 
collaboration – most commonly with international competitors. With respect to 
technology development, on the other hand, R&D alliances with other companies were 
almost non-existent (m=3.51) and 69.9 % of all firms specifically reported that R&D 
alliances with competitor firms were not important. The respondent firms also mentioned 
analyzing patents of the competitors as slightly important (m=2.83 The most common 
reason for not analyzing competitor‘s patent activity was a lack of significant patent 
activity of firms‘ competitors. However, as firms‘ interest in technology development 
increase, the importance of analyzing patents of their competitors‘ increases as well. 
Firms also noted the minimal importance of using external inventions of competitors such 
as licenses and patents (m=3.35).   
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Table 6.10 Competences in Collaborating with Competitors 
Competences in Collaborating with Competitors VI MI SI  NI Mean  
Analyzing competing products 61.4 27.7 6.0 4.8 1.54 
Analyzing patents of the competitors 13.3 28.9 19.3 38.6 2.83 
Knowing competitors technologies 37.3 49.4 8.4 4.8 1.81 
R&D alliances with other companies 4.8 9.6 15.7 69.9 3.51 
Using external inventions (patents, licenses) 7.2 15.7 12.0 65.1 3.35 
Joint ventures, various strategic alliances and forms of 
cooperation 
22.9 27.7 14.5 34.9 2.61 
VI: Very Important, MI: Moderately important, SI: Slightly Important, NI: Not Important 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
The overall evaluation of competencies with firms shows that even though firms 
are cognizant of their competitors‘ activities in terms of knowing their product range and 
their existing production technologies, any collaboration with competitors in general or in 
the form of specific technology development partnerships is almost non-existent in 
domestic markets. Another important reason for the absence of pre-competitive 
collaborations is the perception that Turkey does not have a strong system of industrial 
property rights. For this reason, firms become suspicious about any kind of activity that 
will promote knowledge spillovers to competitor firms. They are also concerned that 
collaborations in R&D might involve loosing skilled personnel to competitors. The firms 
in this sample were therefore very conservative about protecting their product 
development initiatives and their production technologies. 
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6.5 Sources of Information and Know-How for Technological Change and 
Innovation 
The survey results strongly suggest that Turkish firms in the sample relied on 
internal resources and capacities and interactions with a limited number of external 
sources to acquire information and know how to support their innovation projects.. A 
majority of the firms in the sample reported internal R&D departments (m=1.28), 
specialized literature (m=1.45), customers and clients (m=1.49), fairs and exhibitions 
(m=1.58), the Internet (m=1.63), and the study of their market (m=1.64) as the most 
important knowledge resources for their technology and innovation efforts. Universities 
and government R&D support register as significant, but not critical sources of 
knowledge and information acquisition.  It is very important to note that among the least 
important knowledge resources were certain extra-firm institutions highlighted in the NIS 
and RIS literature focused on high income countries. Extra-firm institutions that are 
emphasized in much of the regional development and innovation literature including 
chambers of industry and commerce, competitors, marketing firms, public research 
institutions, corporate partners or joint ventures, and suppliers are not seen as important 
for this sample of Turkish firms involved in innovation and technology adoption.  
Table 6.11 Knowledge Sources 
Knowledge Sources  Very 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Slightly 
Important  
Not  
Important 
Mean  
Firm R&D 
Department 
81.9 10.8 4.8 2.4 1.28 
Specialized Literature 60.2 34.9 4.8 0.0 1.45 
Customers & Clients 66.3 21.7 8.4 3.6 1.49 
Fairs and Exhibitions 56.6 33.7 4.8 4.8 1.58 
Internet Information 47.0 43.4 9.6 0.0 1.63 
Market Evaluations 45.8 45.8 7.2 1.1 1.64 
Govt. Support 
Programs 
21.7 44.6 27.7 6.0 2.18 
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Universities 32.5 28.9 9.6 28.9 2.35 
Consultants 18.1 42.2 3.6 36.1 2.58 
Suppliers 14.5 22.9 27.7 34.9 2.83 
Industry Associations 10.8 16.9 26.5 45.8 3.07 
Partners 24.1 7.2 1.2 67.5 3.12 
Public Research 
Institutions 
8.4 10.8 8.4 72.3 3.45 
Marketing Firms 4.8 9.6 8.4 77.1 3.58 
Competitors 4.8 7.2 8.4 79.5 3.63 
Chamber of Industry 1.2 0.0 10.8 88.0 3.87 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
Mean equals Likert mean value. 
 
Other than customers and fairs and exhibitions, firms mostly mentioned codified 
knowledge sources such as technical literature and the Internet as important to their 
innovation efforts suggesting weak linkages of knowledge and information exchange 
with other private or public sector organizations. A majority of the firms identified 
universities (61.2 %) and consultants (60.4%) as very and moderately important 
knowledge sources.  On the other hand, they viewed suppliers as insignificant knowledge 
sources for technological learning and innovation even though strong relations with 
suppliers for basic production were seen as important. Firms also reported government 
innovation support programs as relatively important because the project monitoring 
committees made-up of academicians guided the firms though their projects and in many 
instances they became a significant source of collaboration and feedback as they were 
engaged in R&D projects.  
The importance that firms put on to internal R&D department, specialized 
literature, universities, and fairs and exhibitions and government support programs as 
important knowledge resources increases as firms intensify their technology development 
efforts. On the other hand, the importance given to customers and clients increases as 
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firms‘ competency in technology development decreases. Yet, customers still remain as 
one of the most important sources of information for all firms. 
Table 6.12 Firms‘ Knowledge Resources According to Their Orientation towards 
Technology 
Knowledge Sources  Mean  group A    Mean group B Mean group C Mean group D 
Firm R&D 
Department 
1.41 1.29 1.19 1.00 
Specialized 
Literature 
2.00 1.35 1.11 1.00 
Customers& Clients 1.26 1.59 1.61 1.67 
Fairs and Exhibitions 1.78 1.53 1.50 1.00 
Internet Information 1.63 1.71 1.61 1.33 
Market  1.85 1.47 1.58 1.33 
Govt. Support 
Programs 
2.41 2.35 1.92 2.33 
Universities 3.22 2.12 1.92 1.00 
Consultants 3.04 2.19 2.53 1.33 
Suppliers 3.15 3.29 2.42 2.33 
Industry Associations 3.33 3.18 2.89 2.33 
Partners 3.22 3.12 2.97 4.00 
Public Research 
Institutions 
3.89 3.18 3.39 1.67 
Marketing Firms 3.81 3.59 3.39 3.67 
Competitors 4.00 3.47 3.39 4.00 
Chamber of Industry 3.93 3.94 3.81 3.67 
Group (A)- Firms that are not generally  interested in developing new products, but are under pressure  to 
improve or extend their existing products to meet demands of their customers and remain competitive in 
their traditional markets; Group (B) - Firms that are developing an interest in new product development but 
have  limited experience and limited commitment to applied research; Group (C) -Firms that are actively 
searching for and developing new products based on advanced technologies that exist in global markets; 
Group (D) - Firms that are involved in cutting-edge technology development practices and projects, (which 
is usually is very rare in the Turkish context). Mean equals Likert mean value for each group. 
In order to understand their future knowledge acquisition means, firms were also 
asked about their plans to increase their access and use of new sources of knowledge. A 
majority of the firms reported participation in fairs and exhibitions (92.8 %); and 
cultivating linkages with other actors (77.1 %) among their most important new channels 
of knowledge and information. Training employees internally (61.4 %) and externally 
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(55.4 %) were also mentioned by firms, however these figures were similar to the shares 
that had actually introduced internal and external training programs (both 57.8 %) during 
the last five years.   
The distribution of data according to technology development intensity of firms, 
show that as firms become more competent, their inclination to cultivate linkages with 
other external actors does in fact increase. While only 63 % of firms less interested in 
technology development prioritize future collaborations, the percentages in other 
categories are 70.6 %; 88.9 % and 100 % respectively. This offers some support for the 
idea that higher levels of technological learning are required to understand the importance 
of, and exploit more intensive relations with extra-firm institutions.  
 
6.6 Obstacles and Barriers to Innovations  
An additional battery of structured and open ended questions asked the firm 
respondents to indentify key barriers to their innovation activities. In order to identify 
barriers to innovation activities, firms were first asked to evaluate a number of obstacles 
and/or hindrances in their innovation efforts during the last three years.  Then, at the end 
of the survey-interview, they were asked to describe the three most important obstacles or 
hindrances to innovations within the context of their companies. In the structured 
question, firms emphasized unfavorable domestic macroeconomic conditions (m=1.53) as 
the most significant barrier to their innovation activities. Many respondents stated that 
especially during recessionary periods, R&D expenditures were the first to cut to provide 
resources for regular ongoing production activities. 
―The last economic crises in Turkey hit our company pretty hard. A big lay-off 
was announced including a significant number of high-paid engineers and 
researchers. Before the lay-off, we, the R&D department, lobbied for some 
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internal restructuring as we knew it was going to happen. We proposed salary 
reductions for a limited time, no bonuses, etc. to prevent job losses and we were 
successful to some extent. We engaged in this activity not only to prevent job 
losses but also to carry on the R&D department and culture in the firm. Because 
we knew, given the financial difficulties, the management could easily settle more 
on the conventional low-tech dyes for which there is always a big mass consumer 
market.‖  
 
Firms identified lack of strong customer demand as the second most important 
obstacle to innovation (m=1.80), suggesting again that most firms may not view new 
innovations as having the potential to open up large untapped markets. Once again, a 
significant number of firms asserted that their innovation activities were dependent on the 
existence of a clear market that could justify the firm‘s investments in specific innovation 
projects. Related with that, high cost of developing new products and processes was 
identified as a restrictive but relatively less restrictive factor in firms‘ innovation 
activities.  
―Unless there is a high customer demand, there is no way we could start a new 
research project. I think no one can afford it in this market as the uncertainties 
associated with R&D activities aggravate most in a fragile economy.‖ 
 
―You‘re as innovative as your customers. If your customers do not demand high-
tech products and prefer the cheapest products available out there, there is no 
logic in investing on R&D. At the end, the fundamental objective of every firm is 
to make money. In our firm, with the increasing buzz on R&D, new investments 
were made on nanotechnology products. The management presents these as their 
prestige products even though they constitute only a minor fraction of the 
revenue. And the future of nano-products seems to be dependent on the prolonged 
interest of the automotive industry.‖ 
 
―The customer demand is the starting point of everything. Customers come with 
an idea we elaborate it and then finalize the process with a tangible product. The 
main thing here is whether we have the capacity to finish the product on time. As 
long as the scope of the affirmed project is within the capabilities of the firm, the 
management goes for it even though there are problems with cash-flow… 
Because they know that they‘re going to make money at the end.‖ 
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―For this escalator project, I got TTGV support and also sold three of my houses 
which by the way made my family very angry. I did it anyways because I knew 
that I would earn more money and buy more houses. I knew that there was a 
demand in the Turkish market and there were no domestic firms meeting this 
demand. Starting the project was risky but towards the end, we were having 
frequent visitors, some of which had become our most loyal customers.‖ 
 
―We mostly develop what we call ―sure products‖. We contact with seven or eight 
customers and try to understand the specific features they need. Accordingly we 
develop the new product knowing that there will be a customer for it. We also 
develop products that are directly funded by customers. In that case, the 
innovative character of the product is defined by the customer. Our most 
important responsibility in that case is to finish the product on time.‖ 
 
Firms assessed most of the other potential obstacles as not significant, including 
most categories of linkage or relationship with actors or institutions outside the boundary 
of the firm. Potential obstacles such as lack of financing, risk and investment capital (m= 
3.18); lack of external technical and consultant support services (m= 3.17); lack of access 
to expertise in universities and higher education institutes (m= 3.35); lack of access to 
expertise in research institutions (m= 3.41); lack of information on research and technical 
programs (m= 3.20); lack of information on technology (m= 3.20); lack of networking 
with other firms and institutions (m= 3.46); and ineffectiveness of legal conditions 
supporting innovation (m= 3.49); were not identified as significant obstacles to 
innovation.  
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Table 6.13 Obstacles and Hindrances Firms Face in their Innovation Activities 
Obstacles and Hindrances in Innovation Activities VR MR SR  NR Mean  
Unfavorable domestic macroeconomic conditions  56.6 34.9 7.2 1.2 1.53 
Lack of strong customer demand 41.0 44.6 8.4 6.0 1.80 
High cost of developing new products and processes 24.1 37.3 22.9 15.7 2.30 
Lack of qualified or skilled personnel 16.9 28.9 25.3 28.9 2.66 
Lack of marketing capability 3.6 26.5 28.9 41.0 3.07 
Lack of financing, investment and risk capital 12.0 12.0 21.7 54.2 3.18 
Lack of external technical and consultant support 
services 
4.8 16.9 34.9 43.4 3.17 
Lack of access to expertise in universities and HEI 2.4 14.5 28.9 54.2 3.35 
Lack of access to expertise in research institutions 2.4 13.3 25.3 59.0 3.41 
Lack of information on research and technical 
programs 
3.6 19.3 30.1 47.0 3.20 
Lack of information on technology 2.4 18.3 36.6 42.7 3.20 
Lack of networking with other firms and institutions 2.4 10.8 25.3 61.4 3.46 
Ineffectiveness of legal conditions supporting 
innovation 
1.2 10.8 24.1 63.9 3.49 
Long administrative/approval procedures 1.2 10.8 24.1 63.9 3.51 
Lack of information on government support programs 1.3 1.3 13.8 83.8 3.80 
VR: Very Restrictive; MR: Moderately Restrictive; SR: Slightly Restrictive; NR: Not Restrictive. Mean 
equals Likert mean value for all in each category. 
 
The most important obstacles with respect to new product development in Turkey 
come from the orientation of R&D and innovation initiatives toward existing markets and 
the existing structure of demand. At this phase of industrial or technological development 
Turkish firms do not generally undertake technology adoption and innovation projects to 
aggressively move into new market areas or develop new products to meet new or 
untapped market needs. Relatively low levels of technology and capital investment 
determine the structure and pace of new product development practices, and as noted, 
there are few private sources of venture finance available for riskier or more aggressive 
projects to develop new markets. The obstacles for innovations  highlighted by firms 
mostly focus on prospects in the firms existing markets and improving or enhancing 
existing product lines rather than knowledge networking, IPR, or commercialization 
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needed for generation of new products. In other words, the firms‘ responses overall 
indicate that, in contrast to emphasis put on strong networking with extra firm institutions 
found in the literature on NIS and RIS studies in the advanced market economies, 
Turkish innovative firms do not see absence of networking opportunities as an important 
barrier to their innovation activities.  
 
―The problem is not the lack of access to other institutions or programs. The 
problem is firms‘ lack of ability to organize their R&D system in the firm. This 
influences everything including the sustainability of your future R&D projects. In 
our case, developing technology is the least important component. We have 
highly skilled engineers, researchers, connections etc.  But unfortunately, we 
cannot make them work in the most productive and efficient manner. We 
somehow cannot establish the necessary organizational routines that go beyond 
the current scope of the firm.‖  
 
This statement suggests that there may be a set of common internal and external 
constraints not fully revealed in the structured question framework. The open ended 
question that investigated the  three most important obstacles to innovations for the 
individual survey firms revealed some clustering of  common responses and themes could 
be coded under 3 different categories: resources (financial, organizational, human 
resources and infrastructural); networking; and policy (Table 6.13).  
In the context of the open ended question, the majority of the firms identified the 
most important obstacle for innovations as the financial resources (31.3 %) which is 
followed by organizational resources (24.0 %); human resources (22.9 %); networking 
(16.9 %); policy (10.0 %) and infrastructural resources (1.2 %).  
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Table 6.14 Most Important Obstacle Firms Face in Their Innovation Activities 
Obstacle Categories  
1. Resources  
        Organizational Resources 
Lack of a well structured R&D department 
system; lack of long-term R&D plans and 
programs; uncertainties associated with R&D 
activities; lack of support from other 
departments in the firm; limited marketing 
capabilities; lack of knowledge on new and 
emerging markets; pace of technology 
development and limited ability to cope with 
pace; intensity of global competition; limited 
ability to cope with big-firms in international 
markets; pace of product development; vision 
of upper management on innovation (it 
influences pace of activities); existing 
business culture; existing level of education, 
culture, vision in the firm; ownership structure 
of the firm: usually problems affiliated with 
family-firms; lack of personnel conducting 
benchmarking studies; lack of relationships 
with consultants in foreign countries; lack of 
long-term planning due to macroeconomic 
instability; limited institutional memory.  
        Financial Resources 
Financial constraints (especially high cost of 
developing new technologies), limited 
financial capabilities of the firms, limited 
financial strength to support and hire R&D 
personnel; limited investment on capital, 
production technologies; limited finance 
allocated to R&D activities.  
        Human Resources 
Limited time allocated to R&D activities; less 
time on research more time on production 
related problems; limited personnel allocated 
to R&D activities; lack of very specialized 
personnel; lack of experienced and specialized 
personnel; lack of industrial experience; 
especially for electronics and software 
sectors: difficulty of hiring these engineers 
due to defense industry dominance; lack of 
experience in production technologies; low 
efficiency and effectiveness of qualified 
personnel; difficulties in attracting best talent 
to cities other than Istanbul. 
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        Infrastructural Resources 
Physical infrastructure problems (lab 
equipments, etc.); testing facilities; testing 
environment   for new or improved products 
2. Networking 
Customer relationships; demands of 
customers; low customer demand to high-tech 
products; non-innovative market demand; lack 
of spatial proximity to suppliers, lack of 
regional R&D support mechanisms; lack of 
guidance of universities in new technology 
areas; lack of more university collaboration; 
lack of government policies promoting 
interactive relations among firms; lack of 
communication between industry and 
university; lack of joint work with 
competitors.  
3. Policy 
Limited and slow innovation financing 
mechanisms, inefficient government R&D 
support policies; lack of strategic and targeted 
government technology policies; lack of 
dynamic innovation support to attract 
attention of upper management; dependence 
on regulations generating markets; late 
regulations compared to other countries; low- 
level of industrial development in Turkey and 
lack of addressing industrial policies; lack of 
IPR protection: auditing mechanisms for 
copied products; fear among firms with 
respect to sector-specific problems; 
improvement of standardization institutions; 
lack of efficient government procurement 
policies. 
 
Table 6.15 Categorization of Most Important Obstacles and Hindrances  
Obstacles and Hindrances in Groups Number Percentage 
Financial  (FIN) 26 31.3 
Organizational (ORG) 20 24.0 
Human Resources (HR) 19 22.9 
Networking (NW) 14 16.9 
Policy (POL) 8 10.0 
Infrastructural (INF) 1 1.2 
Most firms indicated that they have limited financial capabilities to cope with the 
high cost of new product and process development processes and to support ongoing 
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R&D projects involving experienced and qualified engineers and technical workers. 
Limited financial capabilities of the firms was frequently mentioned as an excuse to forgo 
new risky projects and investment in new capital and production technologies which were 
fundamental for launching new projects.  
Related to this, many firms noted that they had low organizational capabilities to 
implement a strategy centered on the development of innovative products. Organizational 
visions and long-term technology planning capabilities are limited within firms, 
especially within family firms. In most cases, firms do not have a well-established R&D 
system promoting long-term R&D plans and programs. 
 
―Everybody is talking about R&D and its importance for growth nowadays. You 
know… TUBITAK supports, seminars etc. Influenced by those, a lot of firms 
now just removed ―project development‖ tags on the doors with ―R&D‖ without 
making any substantial change on the internal organization of technology 
development and management.‖ 
 
Many firms‘ business models and culture are primarily directed to maintain or 
expand their existing customer base in light of global completion and new opportunities 
in international, especially EU markets. Yet, beyond these exigencies the majority of 
firms do not see themselves endowed with the internal investment capabilities to generate 
and promote globally competitive technologies as well. The relatively low technology 
base across industries (relative to higher income OECD countries) does not encourage 
firms to produce high-tech products, because many other Turkish firms or customers do 
not demand products with high or new technological parameters. Turkish firm‘s distrust 
in the quality of domestic firms‘ products accompanied with low marketing capabilities 
also discourages firms to start new risky projects.  
 
 233 
―We‘re the first domestic firm that produces industrial robots in the country. I 
developed the core technology during my graduate study and then received 
government support in various forms including grants; office space in technopark, 
etc. The biggest challenge was though marketing and advertising of the product. 
Nobody believed in its quality and we literally spent two full years to convince 
other firms that our product was as good as its international counterparts… 
Government support at this point would be crucial considering that they already 
supported emergence of the technology.‖ 
 
―We produce mass production lines; flexible production systems. When we first 
heard that [name of the company- a big consumer goods company] was going to 
establish a factory in this industrial zone, we decided to be one of their suppliers 
as we knew once we got into that network we would thrive. We approached them, 
tried to understand what they were looking for etc.; and started working on the 
product. For two years, we were in deep debt, couldn‘t earn a single dime.. But 
we trusted our product and addressed the specific features the customer was 
looking for.  Promoting it was another story but we succeeded…‖ 
 
Obstacles related with human resources mostly focused around the themes of 
ineffective use of high skilled workforce; lack of specialized personnel and lack of 
industry specific experience. Contrary to expectations based on some strands in the 
literature, firms did not mention high skilled workforce as a crucial obstacle against new 
innovative product development. Firms usually believed in the quality of their workforce 
but criticized the environmental factors impeding their full utilization such as the 
intensity of time allocated to production specific problems over research required during 
product development phase. Quality issue emerged mostly with respect to the experience. 
 
―Our engineers are very talented and highly skilled. Most of them are graduates of 
the best universities, such as METU and ITU, and the others have been with us 
for so long that they are as qualified as others. They accomplish the tasks that are 
given to them per se. But if you ask if they would be good enough for more 
advanced tasks in a new area, they would probably lack the required experience. 
This is not a problem specific to our firm. This is the problem of the country.‖ 
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―We have young and highly skilled engineer team. We for sure are not using them 
to their fullest extent. Most of these bright kids are swamped with so many 
production related problems that they have limited time, energy and motivation 
left for doing research.‖ 
 
―We‘re happy with our workforce. Otherwise we wouldn‘t be together with them. 
We also accept that most of them lack some specialized skills we occasionally 
need. To address this problem, we hired a ME graduate of Bogazici University in 
the past. Unfortunately, he didn‘t stay long with us as he said the general work 
load did not challenge him much.‖ 
 
Firms that emphasized networking related problems as the major obstacles 
focused on customer relations; low demands or knowledge of customers for high 
technology products; the problems associated with university-industry collaborations 
such as lack of communication between firms and universities or lack of interface 
organizations easing these collaborations. Lack of government policies promoting 
interactive relations among firms such as joint work between competitors in the name of 
developing a technology was also mentioned as an important obstacle.  
Evaluating these open ended qualitative responses, it appears that the government 
support programs associated with the NIS construction process over the past decade has 
been crucial in stimulating firms to ―get their feet wet‖  in launching specific R&D and 
technology upgrading projects. The majority of the firms find R&D support grants and 
loans very or moderately important within the context of their ongoing projects. 
However, there is little evidence that the majority of firms see their existing projects as 
transforming their basic strategies or their existing competitive position. Many firms 
mentioned the need for strategic and targeted industrial policies, and investment schemes 
that would expand markets for product changes or new products resulting from their 
R&D initiatives.  The obstacles stated by firms indicate that an NIS construction process 
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in a developing country necessitates holistic interpretation and implementation of 
industrial, educational and innovation policies. Governments should set their priorities 
and expectations clearly, design strategies to achieve their priorities; and implement them 
effectively. In general, these responses indicate that moving from a relatively low 
technical culture with little experience in developing and marketing new innovate 
products to a culture where innovation becomes a more common and central to the 
competitive strategy of firms is a long term, step by step process.  In this process policy 
makers must closely communicate with firms, monitor progress and gaps as firms build 
competencies, and be prepared to redesign, discard and add new instruments as the 
process evolves.  As noted in the previous chapter, the policy evaluation and feedback 
frameworks in the current NIS effort remains weak and immature. 
 
6.7 Regional, National and International Collaborations and Embeddedness 
6.7.1 Geographies of External Innovation Collaborations 
In the NIS literature, private firms are accepted as the core element of the system 
and it is seen as crucial to understand both the micro-behavior and also the wider setting 
within which the firms operates (Lundvall 2007:95). As widely known, an important 
aspect of the wider setting is formed and defined through firms‘ external linkages and 
cooperative innovation activities. The previous sections in this chapter delineated the 
characteristics of the manufacturing firms engaged in innovation and technology adoption 
via government grants, the capabilities these firms and the barriers and obstacles they 
face in executing their  innovation projects. This section intends to identify the geography 
of actors and institutions that the sample firms connect with in their innovation activities. 
The importance of these collaborators is explored according to their geographic locations 
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to highlight their value for firms‘ learning and innovation activities in the emerging 
national innovation system where knowledge resources are relatively limited.  
For these purposes, firms were asked to indicate the importance of the 
organizations providing technical expertise to them during the last five years and the firm 
responses clearly showed that that firms‘ innovation activities (as indicated through the 
number of collaborations in comparison to total number of firms at all geographical 
scales) were not strongly influenced by their interactions with customers, universities, 
consultants and suppliers. Firms‘ collaborations with customers, which are one of the 
most important knowledge sources, were more numerous at the national (n=61; m=1.51) 
and international scales (n=62; m=1.30) in comparison to regional scale (n=32; m=1.28). 
But as the Likert scores suggest, firms do attach high importance on these relatively few 
regional collaborations as proximity seems to ease the flow and exchange of knowledge 
with customers.. The higher numbers of collaborations with national and international 
customers, on the other hand, show that firms try to access to knowledge irrespective of 
their customers‘ proximity.  
 
Table 6.16 Geographical Distribution of Innovation Collaborators 
Collaborations with Customers 
Aggregated data (n=83) 
Number of 
Collaborations 
Likert Mean 
Within Region 32 1.28 
Outside Region, Within Nation 61 1.51 
Outside Nation 62 1.30 
 
Collaborations with Suppliers 
Aggregated data (n=83) 
Number of 
Collaborations 
Likert Mean 
Within Region 22 1.94 
Outside Region, Within Nation 26 1.65 
Outside Nation 54 1.36 
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Collaborations with Universities 
Aggregated data (n=83) 
Number of 
Collaborations 
Likert Mean 
Within Region 53 1.60 
Outside Region, Within Nation 51 1.35 
Outside Nation 7 1.43 
 
Collaborations with Consultants 
Aggregated data (n=83) 
Number of 
Collaborations 
Likert Mean 
Within Region 33 1.85 
Outside Region, Within Nation 14 1.71 
Outside Nation 20 1.50 
In comparison to customers, firms attach less value to collaborations with their 
suppliers as identified in previous sections. Collaborations with international suppliers 
(n=54; m=1.36) appear as an important technology transfer mechanism considering that 
most of the export sectors in the country are more dependent on intermediate-good 
imports which are more likely to embody advanced technologies. Regional and national 
supplier collaborations are mostly evaluated based on their availability and quality and 
the importance attached to domestic suppliers‘ increases as their geographic scale extend.  
The aggregated data also shows that firms collaborate with universities 
nationwide and value highly the contributions of these collaborations in new product 
development efforts (n=51; m=1.35). Firms value collaborations with universities outside 
the regions somewhat higher than their collaborations with local universities.  
Considering that all three study regions have a significant higher education infrastructure 
and host what are considered top flight universities, the high numbers of collaborations 
nation-wide represent firms‘ desire and ability to search for and identify key knowledge 
and people that can contribute to new product development efforts. As expected, firms 
have fewer contacts with foreign universities (n=7; m=1.43). With respect to 
collaborations with consultants, firms prefer collaborating first with regional consultants 
(n=33; m=1.85) and then with international consultants (n=20, m=1.50). But technical 
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expertise received from regional consultants is evaluated relatively less important when 
compared with international, especially European consultants.  
The overall evaluation of geographies of external innovation collaborations show 
that urban regions appear as an important scale for external collaborations with 
consultants and universities while national and international contexts emerge as important 
for collaborations with customers, suppliers and again at the national scale, universities. 
 
6.7.2 Regional and National Embeddedness of Innovative Firms 
Geographies of external  collaborations and the importance attached to them show 
that firms engage in technical interactions with their customers and suppliers, universities 
and consultants and value them highly as part of their product development strategies. 
However, a deeper understanding of firms‘ embeddedness in the regional and national 
scales is needed for better assessment of the geographic contours of the emerging 
innovation systems and the collaborative environment they provide for generation of new 
and/or technically more advanced products. This section explores the general patterns of 
cooperation at the regional and national and international scales by some key dimensions 
including: the implementation of innovation (individualistic or interactive); inter-firm 
relations (competitive or cooperative), customer-suppler relations (market or preferred 
suppliers), supply chain (fragmented or integrated) and support infrastructure (isolated or 
networked) 60. For this section firms were asked to complete a chart, which is developed 
                                                 
60 For this section firms were asked to complete a chart, which is developed by Cooke (2002), to indentify 
systemic degrees of their innovative practices both at the regional and national scales. Firms were asked to 
categorize their implementation of innovations on a scale of 4 (1: High, 2: Fairly High, 3: Fairly Low, 4: 
Low) ranging from interactive to individualistic. Likewise, they were asked to classify their inter-firm 
relations from ‗cooperative to competitive‘; customer-supplier relations from ‗preferred suppliers to 
market‘; supply chains from ‗integrated to fragmented‘ and support infrastructure from ‗isolated to 
networked‘. So, the mean scores are between 1 and 4. As the scores get closer to 1, they represent high 
interaction, cooperation, preferred suppliers, integration and networked structures. As they get closer to 4, 
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by Cooke (2002), to indentify systemic degrees of their innovative practices both at the 
regional and national scales. Cooke (2002) suggests that regional innovation systems 
become stronger as firms‘ embeddedness in the region increases and this is articulated 
through more interactive rather than individualistic innovation implementation processes; 
more cooperation/collaboration infused competitive inter-firm relations; more preferred 
suppliers with which transaction costs are diminished and technology spillovers are 
increased rather than general market suppliers; more integrated supply chain in which 
time transaction costs are limited and there is more harmonious order of production 
alignments among firms rather than a fragmented structure; and more networked support 
infrastructure where public and private institutions know the regional actors and provide 
services to support innovations in congruence with the developing innovation culture in 
the region rather than in an isolated way.  
Firms were asked to assess their position in these categories both as regional and 
national actors to shed light on key features of interaction at local and non-local levels in 
the emerging innovation systems that nurture their new product developments. They were 
asked to categorize their implementation of innovations on a scale of 4 (1: High, 2: Fairly 
High, 3: Fairly Low, 4: Low) ranging from interactive to individualistic. Likewise, they 
were asked to classify their inter-firm relations from ‗cooperative to competitive‘; 
customer-supplier relations from ‗preferred suppliers to market‘; supply chains from 
‗integrated to fragmented‘ and support infrastructure from ‗isolated to networked‘. So, as 
the mean scores get closer to 1, they represent high interaction, cooperation, preferred 
suppliers, integration and networked structures. As they get closer to 4, they indicate high 
                                                                                                                                                 
they indicate high individualism; competition; more suppliers from the general market; fragmentation and 
isolated structures. 
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individualism; competition; more suppliers from the general market; fragmentation and 
isolated structures. 
Firms in this sample identified their implementation of innovation as fairly 
individualistic both at the regional (m=2.99) and national level (m=3.00), supporting the 
dominance of codified sources of knowledge and in-house research and development 
efforts in firms found in the other parts of the survey. They acknowledge interactions 
with universities, research institutions and consultants, but they typically ―own‖ the 
innovation implementation process especially if the interactions do not take place in a 
mutual, continuous and sustainable form as in the case of joint research contracts. Firms 
also recognized inter-firm relations as fairly competitive at both scales (m=3.18; m=3.07) 
as cooperative relations on technology development are rare due to the aforementioned 
property and appropriation issues. In order to keep their know-how to themselves, firms 
rarely interact intensively with other firms, especially with their competitors in 
innovation activities. Firms noted the newly developing support infrastructure, including 
financial, legal, environmental knowledge services, as pretty isolated both regionally and 
nationally to the extent they are available and accessible to any extent (m=3.37; m=3.37).  
Table 6.17 Regional and National Embeddedness Evaluation of Innovative Firms 
 Regional 
Mean 
National 
Mean 
Implementation of innovation (interactive-
individualistic) 
2.99 3.00 
Inter-firm relations (cooperative-competitive) 3.18 3.07 
Customer-suppler relations (preferred suppliers-market) 2.82 2.55 
Supply chain (integrated-fragmented) 3.08 2.95 
Support infrastructure (networked-isolated) 3.37 3.37 
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Customer-supplier relations appeared as the only category that firms made a 
distinction between the region and the nation. In contrast to RIS expectations, firms in 
this sample had a greater preference for suppliers outside the home region (m=2.81 local; 
m=2.55 national). The low technology base of the country made firms to seek specialized 
suppliers irrespective of their locations. A typical and revealing statement in most 
interviews included:  
 
―Who wouldn‘t want to have his suppliers around? Unfortunately, there is no 
local supplier meeting our demanded product specifications‖.  
 
Firms collaborated more with their preferred suppliers as the technological 
intensity of the products they searched for increase. For the rest, cost of the supplies was 
determinant. The majority of the firms also identified their supply chain as fragmented at 
both scales (m=3.08; m=2.95). Firms frequently mentioned that even though their supply 
chain is more integrated with their preferred suppliers, their first responsibility is to 
ensure the timely delivery of a proper product to their customers. Firms in most cases do 
not have the pre-planning ability to construct the integrated supply chain in a sustainable 
manner.  
The mean values for the categories that represent the embeddedness of firms at 
different spatial scales suggest that firms‘ innovations do not emerge out of well 
connected relationships with diverse actors at either the regional or national scale.  As 
firms tend to innovate in isolation the quality of the products becomes more prone to their 
specific capabilities. The two scale embeddedness data also shows that for the study 
regions, emerging innovation systems do not display a distinct regional character or 
degree of embeddedness outside classic local economies of agglomeration.  
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Regional networks or interactions do not suggest any different or distinct behavior 
relative to national relations outside the region. But firms tend to identify themselves as 
more national than regional actors as they note a need to expose themselves to more 
widespread innovation resources to support their innovation projects. Whether at the 
regional or national scale, the structural industrial and market problems associated with 
lower technical capacity determine the extent of firms‘ innovations. 
6.7.3 The Problems with Exercising Collaborative Activities 
The important but relatively limited collaborations of innovative firms with 
external organizations demand a better understanding of existing problems associated 
with developing interactions as the policies targeting collaborative practices can only be 
improved through such an understanding. In this respect, respondent firms were asked to 
address a number of possible problems with their ongoing collaborations with external 
actors. 
Table 6.18 Problems Associated with Collaborative Activities 
 Collaborative Activities With 
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Problems with Project Management 9.6 1.2 0.0 3.6 0.0 
Budgeted Cost Overrun 8.4 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 
Unintended Knowledge Drain 6.0 1.2 3.6 4.8 0.0 
Coordination Difficulties 33.7 0.0 1.2 4.8 0.0 
Different Capabilities 45.8 0.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 
Confidential Relation/Secrecy 3.6 1.2 6.0 9.6 0.0 
Loss of Independence 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 
Lack of Schedule Effectiveness 54.2 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 
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The respondent firms associated most of the problems with collaborative activities 
in their relations with universities. ―Lack of schedule effectiveness‖ was reported as a 
major problem for 54.2 % of all firms in their partnerships with universities which was 
closely followed by ―different capabilities‖ (45.8 %) and ―coordination difficulties‖ (33.7 
%). Firms interpreted the lack of schedule effectiveness, different capabilities and 
coordination difficulties as an indication of different cultural, organizational and 
operational capabilities resident in university settings. According to many firms, most 
problems center on unresponsiveness of universities to industry needs; different work 
ethics and culture; inapplicable, highly theoretical, long-term, complex R&D projects; 
unsatisfactory previous experiences; and inadequate financial and physical infrastructure. 
  
―It‘s incredibly difficult to find an academic to work with comfortably. I 
understand that they work in a different setting, they‘re part of a different culture 
but some academics based on our previous experiences just don‘t have the ability 
to perform things efficiently; they don‘t have the ability to adjust to a 
predetermined schedule. They‘re incredibly slow to act in fulfillment of 
objectives of private firms.‖  
 
―I‘m sure universities do very good basic research but it is useless for us. There is 
no match between our and their interests. Most of the topics that interest us make 
no spark for them. Most of the things that they would like to do have no 
economical applicability.‖ 
 
―Academics are incredibly slow! Research takes so much time and unfortunately 
we can‘t afford it. We don‘t have the luxury of trying many things over and over 
again as each of these trials means cease of production and loss of lots of money 
for us.‖ 
 
―We really would like to work with universities and our upper management is 
very willing for that. Unfortunately, academicians approach us with very risky, 
long-term research projects for which we have neither the financial nor the 
physical resources and capabilities.‖ 
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Other than universities, few firms noted collaborative problems with other firms 
mainly on the issues of confidential relations/secrecy (9.6 %) and different capabilities 
(7.2 %).   
 
―Specific to main industry-supplier relations, firms have different knowledge 
complexities and in-house R&D capacities. They have different professional 
management systems, different organizational structures, etc. When the gap 
between the firms on some of these issues increases secrecy appears as an 
important problem, as the suppliers can easily, intentionally or unintentionally, 
reveal project specific knowledge.‖    
 
These data strongly suggest that existing efforts to improve communications and 
linkages among firms and universities need to be continued and expanded as in the case 
of industrial R&D support programs or USAMs but more integrated policies should also 
be adopted, new interfaces should be developed targeting these specific communication 
problems.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
The aggregated data collected from firms in the three study regions reveal that the 
main strength of the Turkey‘s innovation system is a long history of building 
foundational science and technology institutions and policies since early 1960s. In a 
certain sense, the major structures and institutions are in place to accelerate R&D and 
innovation activity by private firms. But while the sails for the boat have been built, the 
winds to propel more intensive innovation remain somewhat weak. This set of firms in 
the interview sample is committed to innovative projects, and reasonably active in 
patenting. In this sense the government subsidy and support for innovation is registering 
some success in this set of firms and in terms of national science and technology outcome 
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measures. However, the analysis of these aggregated firm data, clearly show that 
innovative practices of firms are shaped by the level of industrial development, 
inexperience in developing and exploiting external relationships, and difficulty finding 
and cultivating markets for new more technically advanced products. This in turn 
suggests that the construction of extra-firm institutions and initiatives to intensify 
interaction across elements of the NIS has not, to date, had a major effect on actual firm 
capacities and behaviors.  
Even the largest firms or the firms with higher capabilities  for research and 
development  of  globally significant technologies do not have all the resources and 
capabilities to compete aggressively with existing complex, leading edge technologies. 
Although there is a significant subset of firms engaged in innovation to improve their 
performance on international markets by substantially upgrading their technologies and 
products or attempting to develop substantially new products for new markets; most firms 
in this sample were focused on expanding their existing customer base rather than 
innovating for new and or non-traditional markets. Thus most firms in this sample 
undertook technology and innovation projects for minor or major product improvements. 
Their knowledge acquisition and R&D projects are highly contingent upon the quality of 
their customers and existing customer demands. 
Firms do not innovate in isolation and certain external linkages are important, but 
innovation at this stage is very endogenous to the vast majority of the firms. Firms, use 
more codified knowledge resources such as the specialized literature, in-house R&D and 
the Internet. Customers together with international suppliers are also an important 
reference and source of information. External linkages with public institutions are 
growing and are becoming more important as they have encouraged firms to ―get their 
feet wet‖ in a culture where innovation and technology upgrading were not common to 
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most firms. External linkages with other private sector actors or institutions such as 
knowledge service providers, financial institutions etc., on the other hand are very weak 
and not seen as important. 
Linkages and collaborations are at an early stage of development and exhibit 
certain problems and frictions. The NIS construction process moving forward must pay 
attention to how to build on and diversify existing linkages supporting technological 
change and innovation. Customer and supplier linkages are more external to the firm‘s 
home region, and in many cases to the nation.  Local links are important, especially new 
external relationships with consultants and to some extent with universities. Moving to a 
higher stage of new product and new market development calls for intensifying networks 
and external knowledge sources and collaborations. When the sample firms were 
categorized in four groups based on their technology capacity and product development 
strategies, firms that were more engaged in new, more technologically sophisticated 
product development viewed external relationships as more important.   Therefore, if the 
main objective of the NIS programs is to stimulate new product and market development, 
the institutions must move beyond just subsidizing firms to invest. The institutions must 
be engineered more to tie innovation to efforts to encourage external collaboration and to 
build thicker innovation networks. As noted in earlier chapters, initiatives to build 
―relationship networks‖ is commencing in the Turkish NIS. But the findings in this 
chapter suggest that there is a long way to go and more careful evaluation of efforts to 
foster collaboration is crucial at this stage.  
The aggregated sample data delineated here will now be broken out by region to 
articulate more carefully key dimensions and characteristics of local linkages and existing 
strengths and weaknesses at the regional level. But this aggregated survey data clearly 
demonstrates that few elements of what has been characterized as regional innovations 
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systems in the literature seem to exist in Turkey. The degree of embeddedness found in 
studies of certain high tech regions in OECD countries is not present in the most 
advanced Turkish regions.  The next chapter will analyze the key dimensions and 
differences in innovation practices between the three study regions, highlighting more 
specifically urbanization and localization economies and their presence with respect to 
innovation potential and performance in the three regions.  
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Chapter 7: The Role of Regional Networks and Agglomerations in 
Innovations in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara 
 
This chapter will concentrate more directly on the regional dimension of the 
technology adoption and innovation processes. As noted, a large and important segment 
of the literature on innovation systems highlights the central role of the metro region as a 
locus and support system for innovation and firm competiveness. Dynamic competitive 
advantages stem from the knowledge and capacities residing within the firm combined 
with resources and knowledge bases outside the firm which can be accessed and 
leveraged. The importance of extra-firm resources and institutions puts into relief the 
possible significance of geographic concentration and proximity for innovation and 
competitiveness.  Classic economies of urbanization are seen to benefit all firms in larger 
urban regions due to reduced costs of supplier matching and shared infrastructure. In 
addition, economies of co-location benefitting groups or firms in the same or similar 
industries are tied to lower unit labor costs due to labor pooling, reduced cost of inputs 
and localized knowledge and technology spillovers. 
 These classic local economies of agglomeration have been further detailed and 
expanded upon in recent decades, especially in the area of technology and knowledge 
spillovers. Positive externalities from knowledge spillovers can occur across different 
spatial scales, but as highlighted in Chapter 2 a large body of research has shown that 
innovation and learning are often stimulated by firms‘ incremental efforts to leverage 
existing stocks of knowledge within their regions. Knowledge spillovers take place 
through joint projects, consultations, personal contacts, workforce mobility among local 
firms and even gatherings where managers and workers from different firms and 
institutions have the opportunity to discuss their experiences face-to-face.  In addition, 
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other regional institutions such as specialized venture and other finance capital firms, 
legal and marketing firms specialized to local industry needs, local R&D institutions, and 
local development support institution have been seen as important aspects of regional 
agglomeration economies and innovation performance. These specific forms of 
knowledge spillover and specialized institutional capacity, and the density and quality of 
local relationships and interactions in these domains, constitute the main focus of the 
Regional Innovation System (RIS) approach detailed in earlier chapters. 
In this chapter, I probe the regional contours of innovation in the Turkish context 
more deeply. In the prior chapter it was shown that the innovating firms interviewed drew 
on both local and national and international resources in their efforts. The interview data 
also demonstrated that firms in aggregate relied on internal capacity and codified 
knowledge sources, while relationships involving more consistent face-to-face interaction 
with external agents were less frequent and viewed as less important by the firms.  These 
findings provide some circumstantial evidence that any policy attempt to establish RIS 
from scratch should be given some serious consideration. 
Gaining a better understanding of the three economic regions investigated in this 
work and the regional or interregional linkages and relationships has very important 
policy implications for the NIS construction process in Turkey.  Given Turkey‘s history 
of central government control and direction of economic and science and technology 
policy, there has been to date limited attention and resources targeted to understanding 
unique regional economic structures and building up regional policies tailored to specific 
regional assets or regional gaps. However, the various players in the emerging Turkish 
NIS are beginning to struggle with the regional dimensions of competitiveness, 
technological change and innovation. In particular, the examples from other OECD 
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countries, especially the EU, are being studied and discussed with increasing frequency 
among policy leaders and program officers. 
In this chapter, I will search for the factors contributing to and impeding firms‘ 
innovative capabilities at the regional level; benefits related to more classic local 
economies of agglomeration as well as specific links and relationships to local knowledge 
sources and specific collaborations with other local institutions. In addition, I will try to 
identify whether firms view themselves as being ―regionally embedded‖ in the sense that 
they see regional assets and collaborations as being important their innovation activities 
and overall competitive positions.  
After outlining the basic industrial structure and dynamics of each region- 
Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul - I will attempt to understand what types of interactions at 
different geographical scales are occurring and how the firms‘ evaluate the importance of 
these different spatial interactions efforts in their technology upgrading and innovation 
efforts. This will involve, in part, looking for differences in the patterns and importance 
of regional versus extra-regional linkages between firms located in the three regions.  
Gaining insights into how innovating firms leverage local agglomeration economies and 
rely on regional national and international relationships to foster their efforts can 
contribute to the emerging discussion on  if more decentralized innovation policies 
should be designed and applied in Turkey and what specific needs or gaps more 
regionalized policies might address. Considering that current innovation policies in 
Turkey are highly centralized, but the decentralization emphasis at the planning level is 
burgeoning as a result of the EU integration process, it is important to assess the potential 
role and value of more regionally targeted innovation policies. 
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7.1 Profiles of Regional Industrial Structure and Dynamics in the Three Regions 
Manufacturing Industries 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 above, the regional cases (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir) 
are chosen on the basis of their dominant positions in the Turkish economy and the 
density and complexity of their economic and institutional relationships. In terms of the 
national status of these regional economies, Istanbul stands out as the primary city of the 
country.  The city ―produces almost 27% of national GDP, 38% of total industrial output 
and more than 50% of services, and generates 40% of national tax revenues‖61. Istanbul is 
responsible for 55.3 % of total exports, and 57.9 % of total imports in Turkey. Istanbul 
employs 27.7 % of Turkey‘s manufacturing workforce within 126,393 manufacturing 
firms constituting 31.4 % of all manufacturing firms in the country. 
Ankara and Izmir the second and the third biggest cities in the country 
respectively but are have much smaller regional economies in comparison with Istanbul. 
Izmir generates 7.5% of national GDP, 9 % of total industrial output and 10% of tax 
revenues. It is also responsible for 6% of total exports, and 4.1% of total imports in 
Turkey. Izmir‘s 28,718 manufacturing establishments make up 7.1 % of all 
manufacturing firms in Turkey. Ankara, on the other hand, generates 6% of national 
GDP, 13% of total industrial output and 12% of tax revenues. Ankara is responsible for 
3.9% of total exports, and 9.8% of total imports in Turkey. Its manufacturing firms 
constitute 6.3 % of all manufacturing firms in Turkey. In is also important to note that 
Ankara is the seat of the national government and has a much larger share of public 
employment in its economic base.  
                                                 
61 OECD (2008). Accessed at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/62/40317916.pdf 
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In order to understand the trajectories of the manufacturing industry, the 
composition of the industry, as well as recent industrial growth trends are analyzed over a 
period of time in all three regions62. 
7.1.1  Istanbul 
Istanbul‘s export base is specialized in the manufacturing industries of  apparel 
(except fur); knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles; pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemicals and botanical products; other electrical equipment; plastics products; jewelry 
and related articles; cutlery, hand tools and general hardware; soap and detergents, 
cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations; footwear; other 
fabricated metal products; and television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line 
telephony and line telegraphy in 200163.  
Between 1992 and 2001 employment change was positive in most of the top 
export industries, but employment losses were experienced in manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted fabrics and articles; footwear; other fabricated metal products; and television 
and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy. The shift of 
employment in each industry, as articulated by the shift-share analysis technique; could 
be attributed to the overall growth rate in the national economy; the growth rate of the 
                                                 
62 When the research was conducted, the latest available data with respect to the composition of the 
manufacturing industry in the country was for the year 2001.  The most recent 10 year period of the data 
(1992-2001) is used to calculate location quotient values and to conduct shift-share analysis in the 
manufacturing industry. 
63 The Location Quotient (LQ) is a ratio of an industry‘s share of the local economy to the industry‘s share 
of the national economy and it basically indicates whether an industry is specialized in the local economy. 
An increasing LQ would indicate that the regional share of the industry grows more than the national share 
of the industry. When an industry has an increasing LQ, then the region is becoming more dependent on the 
export of the industry. When the LQ decreases, then the nation is more self-sufficient on that industry and 
is relying less on the specific region to export the industry. The ―greater than 1‖ values for the identified 
industries in Istanbul indicate that the city continues its self-sufficiency in these industries and exports rest 
of its production that is consumed by its inhabitants. 
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industry in the national economy; and the growth rate of the industry in the local 
economy64.  
Table 7.1 Key Export Base Industries in Istanbul 
Industry 
Code 
Total Export  
Employment 
2001 
LQ 
2001 
Employment  
Change 
1992-2001 
National 
Share 
Industry 
 Mix 
Regional 
Share 
1810 38,308 1.91 21,810 6,532 37,540 -22,263 
1730 10,050 2.49 -4,804 2,400 -4,391 -2,814 
2423 7,552 2.45 1,735 1,226 3,565 -3,056 
3190 3,101 2.55 4,445 74 1,153 3,218 
2520 2,856 1.38 3,391 784 5,182 -2,575 
3691 2,795 3.07 3,154 110 3,295 -251 
2893 2,733 2.69 193 462 -111 -158 
2424 2,731 2.26 1,810 343 694 773 
1920 2,700 2.12 -879 665 -997 -547 
2899 2,573 1.53 -1,774 1,019 -358 -2,435 
3220 2,520 2.13 -2,264 778 -1,989 -1,053 
ISIC Rev. 3 Codes: 1810: Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel; 1730: Manufacture of 
knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles; 2423: Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products; 3190: Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.; 2520: Manufacture of plastics 
products; 3691: Manufacture of jewelry and related articles; 2893: Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and 
general hardware; 2424: Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, 
perfumes and toilet preparations; 1920: Manufacture of footwear; 2899: Manufacture of other fabricated 
metal products n.e.c.; 3220: Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line 
telephony and line telegraphy. 
Among Istanbul‘s top export industries, only manufacture of other electrical 
equipment and manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, 
perfumes and toilet preparations increased their shares both nationally and regionally. In 
the meantime, all the other top export industries lost their regional shares evidencing the 
                                                 
64 In Community Analysis and Planning Techniques, Klosterman calls this component the “constant-share” 
because it assumes a constant rate of growth for all industries.  He argues that this is rarely the case, and the 
“shift” of employment in each industry must be accounted for, thus the “shift-share” components. The 
industry mix component explains the number of jobs that were created/lost in the industry in considering 
the difference between the growth rate between the industry (nationally) and the national growth rate.  
Regional shift component accounts for the difference between the growth rate of the industry in the local 
economy and the growth rate of the industry in the national economy and thus the number of jobs created 
as a result of the region‟s competitiveness.   
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shift in Istanbul‘s manufacturing industry to neighboring cities (OECD 2008). The 
manufacturing of apparel (except fur); pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products; plastics products and jeweler and related articles increased their 
shares nationally but lost their shares regionally, suggesting loss of advantage to other 
Turkish regions.  
The cross-match of the Istanbul‘s top export industries with internationally 
competitive sectors of Turkey (according to their strengths such as low; on the edge; and 
high competitive) delineates that industries that are losing share in Istanbul such as 
manufacture of wearing apparel (except fur); jewelry and related articles; other fabricated 
metal products, footwear and knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles are highly 
competitive for Turkey65. That is, the region, as the main driver of the Turkish economy 
needs some encouragement in certain competitive sectors, possibly with policies which 
influence technology levels of the sectors and hence the country. Istanbul also shows 
growth in some sectors with limited competitive advantage in Turkey such as electrical 
                                                 
65 The competitiveness of the manufacturing industries in Turkey for a relatively similar period of time, 
covering the years between 1995 and 2005, are identified by Kucukkiremitci (2006) by adopting Vollrath‟s 
(1987, 1989,1991) revealed competitive advantage concept and measures. Vollrath (1991:275) reveals 
three measures to represent alternative definitions of revealed comparative (competitive) advantage.RCA8
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particular commodity from those that do not”. In his analysis, while a positive RCA value indicates a 
comparative advantage, a negative RCA shows a comparative disadvantage. Kucukkiremitci (2006) 
reinterprets Vollrath indexes to identify competitiveness of industries in a particular country by eliminating 
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sector) is neither high nor low but it is just on the border. Accordingly, when RCAa > 0, the 
competitiveness of a particular commodity (or an industry) is high and when RCAa < 0, the competitiveness 
of a particular commodity (or an industry) is low; respectively. By calculating RCA values for ISIC Rev.3, 
4 digit industries, Kucukkiremitci (2006) identifies competitiveness of manufacturing sectors in Turkey 
according to their strengths. 
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machinery and apparatus; chemicals and chemical products; radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus; machinery and equipment; medical, precision 
and optical instruments, and other transport equipment. Specifically, manufacture of 
other electrical equipment, among Istanbul‘s top export industries and in which the 
country shows growth, has low competitive advantage vis a vis global trade partners. 
Considering that Turkey, as a developing country, has low competitive advantage in 
various high-tech sectors, Istanbul‘s growing share in some of these sectors strengthens 
its prospective status in technology development policies. Istanbul, however, needs 
further encouragement in top-export industries such as pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemicals and botanical products; which is declining regionally but growing nationally 
with specific emphasis placed on in technology insight policies.  
 
7.1.2  Izmir 
The other regional case, Izmir is specialized in the manufacture of tobacco 
products; plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber; processing and preserving of 
fruit and vegetables; refined petroleum products; apparel; paints, varnishes and similar 
coatings, printing ink and mastics; vegetable and animal oils and fats; parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles and their engines; plastics products; corrugated paper and 
paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard. 
Between 1992 and 2001 employment change was positive in the top export 
industries of manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber; refined 
petroleum products; paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics; parts 
and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines; plastics products; and corrugated 
paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard; but it was negative in 
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the of manufacture of tobacco products; processing and preserving of fruit and 
vegetables; wearing apparel, except fur apparel; and vegetable and animal oils and fats.  
Table 7.2 Key Export Base Industries in Izmir 
Industry 
Code 
Total Export  
Employment 
2001 
LQ 
2001 
Employment  
Change 
1992-2001 
National 
Share 
Industry 
 Mix 
Regional 
Share 
1600 7,388 6.29 -1,864 1,183 -6175 3,128 
2413 4,247 8.83 4,750 4 51 4,694 
1513 3,042 2.40 -320 615 89 -1,024 
2320 1,551 3.51 695 164 -254 786 
1810 1,539 1.12 -134 1,649 9,475 -11,258 
2422 905 2.46 408 124 653 -369 
1514 854 2.24 -605 239 -802 -42 
3430 845 1.53 835 177 -177 835 
2520 822 1.35 1,393 199 1316 -122 
2102 624 1.85 377 109 579 -312 
1600: Manufacture of tobacco products; 2413: Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic 
rubber; 1513: Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; 2320: Manufacture of refined petroleum 
products; 1810: Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel; 2422: Manufacture of paints, 
varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics; 1514: Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils 
and fats; 3430: Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines; 2520: 
Manufacture of plastics products; 2102: Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers 
of paper and paperboard.  
 
The shift-share analysis of the Izmir‘s top export industries shows that among the 
negative employment change industries, manufacture of tobacco products should be 
carefully examined as the industry is declining nationally but growing regionally. The 
other industries experience job loss include, processing and preserving of fruit; and 
vegetables and apparel. Among the top export industries which show positive 
employment growth, manufacture of plastics products; corrugated paper and paperboard 
and of containers of paper and paperboard; and paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing ink and mastics need further encouragement as these industries are growing 
overall in Turkey but declining in Izmir. The industry of manufacture of petroleum 
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products raises a red flag as the industry is shrinking nationwide but growing in Izmir. 
And finally, the manufacture of plastics in primary forms and synthetic rubber industry 
should be expanded as it not only shows positive employment growth and intense 
specialization but also simultaneous national and regional growth.  
The overlay of the competitiveness status of sectors with the regional shift-share 
matrix in Izmir also shows that the top export sectors in such as manufacture of tobacco 
products and manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 
are highly competitive sectors in international markets. Among the less competitive 
sectors, Izmir shows growth in the manufacture of plastics in primary forms and synthetic 
rubber industry. Unfortunately, Turkey‘s plastics sector has limited competitive 
advantage in international markets, and highlights a potentially important role to actively 
engage in sectoral technology development policies in the region. As in Istanbul, the 
increasing share of the region in high-tech but competitively low sectors such as 
machinery and equipment; medical, precision and optical instruments; electrical 
machinery and apparatus brings forward Izmir as a potential geography to invest in 
regional policies targeting competitiveness of the region and also the nation.  
 
7.1.3  Ankara 
The top export base industries of Ankara, the capital city, are manufacture of 
structural metal products; weapons and ammunition; television and radio transmitters and 
apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy; aircraft and spacecraft; bearings, gears, 
gearing and driving elements; machinery for mining, quarrying and construction; bakery 
products; printing; manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster; furniture; and 
instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other 
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purposes, except industrial process control equipment. The development of the key  
export industries of the city, especially the machinery and equipment, goes back to the 
early days of the establishment of the Republic and Ankara‘s replacement of Istanbul as 
the new capital city of the country. During the Turkish War of Independence, Ankara was 
the headquarters of the Turkish nationalists‘ resistance movement and it became the new 
Turkish capital city with the establishment of the Republic. New investments took place 
to accelerate the functions of the new capital city whose main industries were agriculture 
and livestock. The establishment of the head office of the General Directorate of Military 
Factories (which later renown as MKE Mechanical and Chemical Industry Institute) and 
some other state owned industrial enterprises such as Sumerbank and Etibank and their 
factories in Ankara, encouraged establishment of a private supplier base in the region. 
Over the years, in addition to significant government sector and employment, proximity 
to some central government agencies made the government a more important customer 
for some Ankara firms, especially the firms doing business in defense industry.  
The shift-share analysis of manufacturing sectors in Ankara shows that among the 
top export industries of Ankara, manufacture of weapons and ammunition; machinery for 
mining, quarrying and construction; articles of concrete, cement and plaster; and printing 
should be expanded as these industries grow both regionally and nationally. Industries of 
manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line 
telegraphy; and manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements, on the 
other hand should be given careful attention as these industries are growing regionally 
but declining nationally. The industries of manufacture of structural metal products; and 
furniture may need support as these industries are losing their regional share in Ankara. 
The aircraft and spacecraft industries show a similar declining trend yet it is hard to 
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consider these as declining industries as private stakeholders in these sectors   are limited 
and the industry is highly important for national security purposes.   
Among the top export manufacturing industries of Ankara, the manufacture of 
articles of concrete, cement and plaster; furniture; and structural metal products are the 
industries in which Turkey has high competitiveness in international markets. The 
competitiveness levels of these industries support encouragement suggestions of these 
industries in Ankara, yet strategic decisions with respect to their technology 
improvements rest at the hands of national decision makers.  
Table 7.3 Key Export Base Industries in Ankara 
Industry 
Code 
Total Export  
Employment 
2001 
LQ 
2001 
Employment  
Change 
1992-2001 
National 
Share 
Industry 
 Mix 
Regional 
Share 
2811 3,620 6.82 1,745 277 1,547 -79 
2927 2,805 8.18 921 253 388 280 
3220 2,801 7.51 852 264 -675 1,263 
3530 1,782 13.18 -436 263 -285 -414 
2913 1,558 12.25 974 80 -84 978 
2924 1,459 9.15 1,081 62 416 603 
1541 1,368 2.48 -385 297 -226 -456 
2221 1,261 5.16 1,390 19 145 1,226 
2695 1,078 2.90 1,266 42 220 1,004 
3610 949 1.81 449 187 1,787 -1,525 
3312 904 7.21 -383 159 -181 -361 
2811: Manufacture of structural metal products; 2927: Manufacture of weapons and ammunition; 3220: 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy; 3530: 
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft; 2913: Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving 
elements; 2924: Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction; 1541: Manufacture of 
bakery products; 2221: Printing; 2695: Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster; 3610: 
Manufacture of furniture; 3312: Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, 
testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment. 
 
The location quotient and regional shift-share analysis of manufacturing 
industries in three case study regions were important to understand the general economic 
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structure and dynamics of the case regions. Even though, the survey firms were not 
selected according to the strengths of the industries or their importance for the 
competitiveness of regions; the knowledge of economic structure of the regions were 
necessary to reach out to the companies who belonged to the industries that were both 
regionally important and nationally prominent  in technology development and 
generation.  
 
7.2  Profiles of the Surveyed Firms  
Key characteristics of the surveyed firms were delineated in the prior chapter. 
However there are interesting similarities and differences among the firms across the 
three economic regions66.  In terms of the industrial concentration of the firms in each 
region, the interviewed firms were distributed over the major manufacturing sectors. In 
Ankara and Istanbul there were more firms in higher tech sectors, Computer, Electronic 
and Optical Products and Pharmaceutical Products than in Izmir67  (See Table 7.4 below).  
                                                 
66 It is important to recall that the sample firms do not reflect a representative sample of manufacturing 
firms in the three regions. Therefore, regional differences in firm characteristics only underscore 
differences within this particular sample of firms which received R&D financing from the government and 
may help explain different patterns of local linkage and relationships among the firms. In other words we 
cannot say that the patterns of local relationships are typical of firms in each region, only that they are 
typical of the particular firms interviewed in each region. 
67 In the survey aspect of the research, 28 firms were surveyed in Istanbul. As far as the distribution of the 
sample is concerned, the highest concentration of firms lies in 4 sectors: manufacturing of machinery and 
equipment (28.6 %); computer, electronic and optical products (21.4 %); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers (14.3 %); and chemicals and chemical products (10.7 %). Rest of the firms operates in the sectors of 
electrical equipment; non-metallic mineral products; rubber and plastic products; fabricated metal products; 
and pharmaceutical products and preparations. Within 29 surveyed firms in Izmir, the highest concentration 
of firms lies in the sectors of manufacturing of machinery and equipment (27.6 %); chemicals and chemical 
products (24.1 %); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (10.3%) and rubber and plastic products (10.3 
%). Rest of the firms functions in the sectors of computer, electronic and optical products; electrical 
equipment; fabricated metal products; and food products. In Ankara, 26 firms were surveyed and the 
highest concentration of firms lies in the sectors of manufacturing of machinery and equipment (26.9 %); 
computer, electronic and optical products (15.4 %); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (11.5 %) and 
electrical equipment (11.5 %). 
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This may reflect Izmir‘s specialization in more traditional manufacturing sectors detailed 
in the regional economic profile above. In terms of firm size there is general similarity 
across the regions, with the Ankara sample having a somewhat larger group of firms with 
fewer than 50 employees. Likewise, the age of the sample firms is similar across the 
regions, with the exception of Ankara were the sample had a younger age profile68.  
One notable difference is the ownership characteristics, where the sample firms in 
Izmir and Ankara are more dominated by independent and family run firms, while the 
sample in Istanbul had more firms with corporate ownership, more headquarters firms 
and more joint venture activity.  The difference in the Istanbul sample may reflect the 
status of this metro region as the primate city and main economic and trade center of the 
nation, but again we can make no confident generalizations from this sample.  It is 
reasonable to account for the fact that Istanbul‘s sample firms have a more corporate 
form and are engaged in a greater number of international joint ventures when assessing 
their innovation practices and patters of regional linkages69.    
 
                                                 
68 A majority of the sample firms in all regions are larger, independent family firms, established as 
independent start-ups by current owners.  42.9 % of the firms have more than 250 employees in Istanbul, 
while the percentages are 44.8 % and 38.5 % for Izmir and Ankara respectively. In terms of age, 62.5 % of 
the sample firms are founded after 1981 in Istanbul: 13 firms (46.4 %) started their operations before 1981; 
3 firms (10.7 %) within 1981-1990; and 12 firms (42.8 %) within 1991-2006. In Izmir, 73.1 % of the firms 
are founded after 1981: 12 firms (41.4 %) started their operations before 1981; 10 firms (34.5 %) within 
1981-1990; and 7 firms (24.1 %) within 1991-2006. And in Ankara, 72.4 % of the firms are founded after 
1981: 7 firms (26.9 %) started their operations before 1981; 8 firms (30.8 %) within 1981-1990; and 13 
firms (42.3 %) within 1991-2006. 
69 The current corporate statuses show that 42.8 % of the sample firms are independent firms and half of 
these firms are independent family firms (21.4 %) in Istanbul. In Izmir, and Ankara the percentages of the 
independent firms and independent family firms is higher than Istanbul. 72.4 % of the survey firms are 
independent firms and more than half of these firms (57.1 %) are independent family firms (41.4 %) in 
Izmir while 76.9 % of the survey firms are independent firms and 44.9 % of these firms are independent 
family firms (34.6) in Ankara. Firms that are joint ventures or that have equal partnerships with foreign 
firms comprise 17.9 % of the whole sample in Istanbul. The percentages are 6.8 % and 7.6 % for Izmir and 
Ankara respectively.  
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Table 7.4 General Characteristics of the Sample Manufacturing Firms 
 
General Characteristics 
Istanbul 
(%) 
Izmir 
(%) 
Ankara 
(%) 
Industry Classification    
Machinery and Equipment 28.6 31.0 30.8 
Computer, Electronic and Optical Products 21.4 6.9 15.4 
Motor Vehicles and Trailers 14.3 10.3 11.5 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 10.7 24.1 7.7 
Electrical Equipment 7.1 6.9 11.5 
Fabricated Metal Products 3.6 6.9 3.8 
Rubber and Plastic Products 3.6 6.9 0.0 
Pharmaceutical Products; Non-Metallic 
Mineral Products, Other Transport 
Equipment; Other manufacturing  
10.7 3.6 15.5 
Food Products; Basic Metals 0.0 3.4 3.8 
Employment Size    
Less than 50 21.4 17.2 34.6 
50-250 35.7 37.9 26.9 
Over 250 42.9 44.8 38.5 
Firm Type    
Large Firm 55.2 57.1 57.7 
SME  44.8 42.9 42.3 
Foundation Date    
<1950-1980 46.4 41.4 26.9 
1981-1990 10.7 34.5 30.8 
1991-2006 42.8 24.1 42.3 
Corporate Status    
Independent Firm 21.4 31.0 42.3 
Independent Family Firm 21.4 41.4 34.6 
Headquarter of a Firm 32.2 10.3 11.5 
Joint Venture and Equal Partnership 17.9 6.8 7.6 
Types of Activities    
Manufacturing Final Products 78.6 79.3 80.8 
Manufacturing Intermediate Product 42.9 31.0 30.8 
Marketing 82.1 55.2 65.4 
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Firms‘ main types of business activities at the establishment level include 
manufacturing, management, sales, and marketing, suggesting a degree of vertical 
integration in all three regions. Perhaps related to the difference in firm structure, 
marketing is less common among the firms in Ankara and Izmir. In Istanbul, 82.1 % of 
the firms reported engaging in marketing while in Izmir, only 55.2 % of the firms got 
involved in marketing activities, and 65.4 % of the firms in Ankara. There was at least 
some suggestion in the open ended interviews that independent and family owned firms 
(more common in Ankara and Izmir) did not sharply distinguish between sales and 
marketing and may not have been engaged in more sophisticated corporate marketing 
activities (see Table 7.4 above).   
The survey data indicated that more firms produced intermediate products in 
Istanbul (42.9 %) than the firms in Izmir (31.0 %) and Ankara (30.8 %), a finding that 
perhaps supports the notion that the massive regional economy of Istanbul contains a 
richer supplier base than in the smaller agglomerations of Ankara and Izmir. However, 
sample firms in all regions were active in international markets with 89.3, 96.6 and 92.3 
percent of all firms in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara respectively selling their products in 
international markets.  
 
7.3  Innovative Practices of the Surveyed Firms 
In understanding the product and process development efforts of the firms, the 
number of new products that are introduced into the market within a specific period of 
time reveals important information about the innovative characters of the firms as it 
shows whether firms are developing technologies on a consistent basis. All the sample 
firms in all regions introduced a new product into the market during the last three years, 
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while 44.4 % of the firms reported that they introduced within 1 to 5 new or 
technologically improved products into the market in Istanbul. The figures were 37.9 % 
of firms in Izmir and a significantly higher 70 % of firms Ankara introducing between 1-
5 new or improved products respectively.  As will be outlined below this higher pace of 
new product introduction in Ankara is not explained by higher R&D effort or other 
innovation input variables and may hence be related to the younger age of Ankara firms 
and more recent engagement with government R&D and innovation support programs 
With respect to their R&D expenditure, average expenditure of sample firms is 
3.11 % of total sales in Istanbul, 3.43 % of total sales in Izmir and 13 % of total sales in 
Ankara70.  However, in terms of R&D expenditures relative to total sample firms in 
Istanbul  expanded  $ 34,858 in R&D funds per employee, while in Izmir the ratio was 
$27,938 dollars per employee and in Ankara $14,688 dollars per employee. The 
significantly lower R&D/employment intensity in Ankara may be related to several 
factors. As noted Ankara sample firms are slightly smaller and younger and hence may 
be more labor intensive than more established Istanbul and Izmir firms. More 
speculatively, their greater involvement in government markets may involve a greater 
propensity to develop and test products developed elsewhere or may bring other public 
subsidies to supplement formal R&D spending.   
                                                 
70 Among the firms in Istanbul professed to carry out formal R&D activities: 46.4 % of the firms spent less 
than 5 % of their sales on R&D, while a large proportion of the firms (21.4%) spent between 2-5 % on 
R&D activities in Istanbul. Only 3.6 % invested more than 10 % of their sales on R&D, while 7.1 % of the 
firms invested less than 1 % of their sales. In Izmir, 51.7 % of the firms spent less than 5 % of their sales on 
R&D, while a large proportion of the firms (34.5%) spent between 2-5 % on R&D activities in Izmir. 13.8 
% of the firms invested both more than 10 % and less than 1 % of their sales on R&D. In Ankara, 52.2 % of 
the firms spent less than 5 % of their sales on R&D, while a large proportion of the firms (23.1%) spent 
between 2-5 % on R&D activities. 19.2 % invested more than 10 % of their sales on R&D, while none of 
the firms invested less than 1 % of their sales.  
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Some support for the somewhat unique stature of Ankara sample firms is 
provided by the patterns of reverse engineering reported in the firm surveys. A significant 
share of firm respondents declared that the practice of reverse engineering played a 
significant role in their product development processes. This share was 46.4 % in 
Istanbul, 55.2 % in Izmir and 61.5 % in Ankara firms. This again suggests that Ankara 
firms may be somewhat more active in further development and testing of products 
developed elsewhere.  The highest percentages of Ankara in reverse engineering could be 
associated with its lower scores in performance of applied research as well.   
As noted in the previous chapters the introduction of new innovative products is 
contingent upon more than just R&D investment and activity, but involves other changes 
in firm organization and activity. In the survey, firms were also asked if they had 
introduced new marketing techniques, changed management approach, adopted reverse 
engineering, or introduced any internal or external training programs for their employees. 
Around 30 % of the firms responded that they had introduced new marketing techniques 
in Izmir and Ankara, while the percentage moved up to 60 % of the firms sampled in 
Istanbul. The higher percentage of introduction of new marketing techniques in Istanbul 
is understandable as marketing was a more common activity among Istanbul firms in 
comparison to other regions. Also changing existing management routines were more 
common within Istanbul firms (28.6 %) as opposed to Izmir (17.2 %) and Ankara firms 
(26.9 %). This was also at least partially related to firm organizational structure because 
as family ownership decreases, change in existing management routines increases within 
innovative firms.  
Internal and external employee training was also significantly more prominent in 
the Istanbul sample firms than in Ankara or Izmir. In the sample, 78.6 % of Istanbul firm 
reported active internal training programs while 67.9 % reported involvement with 
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external training programs for their employees. These totals were lower in Izmir with 
roughly 45% involved with both internal and external training and in Ankara 50 % of 
sampled firms reported internal training and around 61% were involved in external 
training. These data again suggest that Istanbul firms were more focused on upgrading 
the skills of their workforces as a key element of technology adoption and innovation. 
The higher range for employee training in Istanbul may also be related to the more 
―modern‖ corporate organizational form of the sample firms and greater labor pooling 
type agglomeration effects in the larger Istanbul complex.  
In order to understand why firms conduct innovation activities, firms were asked 
to indicate the importance of their reasons for conducting innovative activities as well. 
This set of questions tried to gain a better understanding of why firms are making 
changes including R&D investments, training, and management and marketing reforms to 
accelerate innovation71. Consistent with the aggregate sample findings in Chapter 6, 
complying with the demands of customers emerged as the most important reason for 
innovating for firms in Izmir (m=1.10) and Ankara (1.19).  While meeting customer 
demands ranked very high among Istanbul firms as well, extending the firm‘s product 
range (m=1.14) and increasing product quality (m=1.18) ranked higher for firms in 
Istanbul. Achieving market leadership (m=1.32) and dealing with competitors at home 
(m=1.55) also emerged as important reasons for innovating for firms in Istanbul, while 
they became less important for firms especially in Ankara (m=2.15; m=2.46).  These 
contrasts also lend more support to the idea that Istanbul firms with more corporate 
ownership patterns have more extensive and sophisticated motivations for technological 
change and innovation.  They are less directly shaped by demands of existing customers, 
                                                 
71 Firms were asked to assess their reasons for conducting innovative activities on a scale of 1 to 4. 1: Very 
Important 2: Moderately Important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important.  
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but are implementing strategies more oriented toward finding and exploiting new markets 
for their new and improved products.  As also noted earlier, as Istanbul firms are more 
involved with marketing related activities, their interest in extending their product range 
increases and their dependence on the demands of customers declines. 
 The least important reasons for innovation activities in Istanbul and Izmir firms 
were developing more environmental friendly products or processes; and complying with 
local laws or standards. Decreasing processes costs also appeared as one of the least 
important reasons in Ankara (m=2.77). The least important reasons show that among 
government‘s demand side measures, regulations, standards and norms are not strong 
enough measures to make changes on innovation practices of the firms as well.  
Table 7.5 Firms‘ Reasons for Innovating 
Reasons For Innovating Istanbul 
mean 
Izmir 
mean 
Ankara 
mean 
    
Comply with the demands of customers 1.29 1.10 1.19 
Increase product quality 1.18 1.31 1.31 
Extend product range 1.14 1.28 1.54 
Achieve market leadership 1.32 1.52 2.15 
Deal with new competitors at home 1.57 1.55 2.46 
Decrease production costs 2.18 1.90 2.46 
Availability of government support 2.21 2.28 2.15 
Deal with new competitors in export markets 2.29 2.00 2.42 
Decrease processes costs 2.43 2.10 2.77 
Comply with local laws or standards 2.43 2.93 2.65 
Develop more environmental friendly products or processes 2.64 2.55 3.08 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
 
7.4  Obstacles and Barriers to Innovations 
In order to identify barriers to innovation activities, firms were first asked to 
evaluate a number of obstacles and/or hindrances in their innovation efforts during the 
last three years.  Then, at the end of the survey-interview, they were asked to describe the 
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3 most important obstacles or hindrances to innovations within the context of their 
companies. The most important obstacles to firms‘ innovations in all three regions were 
unfavorable domestic macroeconomic conditions and lack of strong customer demand in 
the structured question. Lack of strong customer demand emerged as a more restrictive 
barrier for firms in Izmir (93.1 %) and Ankara (92.3 %) in comparison to firms in 
Istanbul (71.4 %), supporting the prior evidence suggesting more dependence on existing 
customers among Ankara and Izmir firms72.  
Table 7.6 Obstacles and Hindrances Firms Face in Their Innovation Activities 
Obstacles and Hindrances in Innovation Activities Istanbul 
mean  
Izmir 
mean  
Ankara 
mean  
Unfavorable domestic macroeconomic conditions  1.39 1.45 1.77 
Lack of strong customer demand 2.07 1.62 1.69 
High cost of developing new products and processes 2.39 1.83 2.73 
Lack of qualified or skilled personnel 2.86 2.45 2.69 
Lack of marketing capability 3.11 3.24 2.85 
Lack of external financing, investment and risk capital 3.14 3.34 3.04 
Lack of external technical and consultant support services 3.18 3.00 3.35 
Lack of access to expertise in universities and HEI 3.21 3.34 3.50 
Lack of access to expertise in research institutions 3.25 3.41 3.58 
Lack of information on research and technical programs 3.25 3.07 3.31 
Lack of information on technology 3.26 3.07 3.27 
Lack of networking with other firms and institutions 3.32 3.45 3.62 
Ineffectiveness of legal conditions supporting innovation 3.43 3.48 3.58 
Long administrative/approval procedures 3.68 3.34 3.50 
Lack of information on government support programs 3.85 3.74 3.81 
Likert Scale: 1- Very Restrictive 2- Restrictive 3-Slightly Restrictive 4-Not Restrictive 
 
                                                 
72 The scale used for the obstacles and hindrances question was 1: Very Restrictive 2: Restrictive 3: 
Slightly Restrictive and 4: Not Restrictive. The percentage values that identify an obstacle/hindrance as 
important and/or restrictive reflect the sum of ―Very Restrictive‖ and ―Restrictive‖ values.  
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High cost of developing new products and processes was also identified as 
another important barrier for firms in Izmir (82.7 %)73, Istanbul (57.1 %) and Ankara 
(42.3 %). Despite the emphasis on high cost of developing new products, lack of 
financing, investment and risk capital was only identified as a restrictive factor by 21.5 % 
of the firms in Istanbul, 17.2 % of the firms in Izmir and 34.6 % of the firms in Ankara, 
showing perhaps a lack of an institutional culture/existence of seeking financing 
resources other than firms‘ own resources in the regions. 
Interestingly, lack of qualified or skilled personnel, an important obstacle as 
identified in many studies (Doloreux 2002; Kaufmann and Todtling 2000; Wiig and 
Isaksen 1998) was found as restrictive for 35.7 % of the firms in Istanbul, 55.2 % of the 
firms in Izmir and 46.2 % of the firms in Ankara.  The significantly lower figure for 
Istanbul could again be related to the superior and more extensive pool of skilled labor in 
the much larger Istanbul complex. Also, firms did not identify access to expertise in 
universities and research institutions as restrictive barriers in all regions per se. However, 
more firms in Istanbul (28.6 %) reported access to universities as a restrictive barrier to 
their innovations than firms in Izmir (13.7 %) and Ankara (7.6 %). Lack of networking 
with other firms and institutions also emerged as a more restrictive obstacle for firms in 
Istanbul (21.5 %) than for firms in Izmir (10.3 %) and Ankara (7.6 %). It is an open 
question whether this pattern reflects more advanced firms in Istanbul being more aware 
of and concerned about the potential importance of university links and networking, or 
fewer barriers to university and networking collaboration in the other two regions. There 
                                                 
73 Izmir‟s accent on high cost of developing products could be related with the novelty of the technologies 
and products that were developed as Izmir was identified as the region which introduced the highest 
number of products in to the market but also as the region in which the incremental and process technology 
changes were the highest and radical technology shifts were the lowest. 
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is at least some information in the open ended interviews that the former factor bets 
explains this regional divergence.   
The open ended question that investigated the most important obstacles to 
innovations for the individual survey firms revealed some clustering of common 
responses and themes that could be coded and synthesized under 3 different categories of 
resources (financial, organizational, human resources and infrastructural); networking; 
and policy (Table 7.7, below). Lack of a well-structured R&D department and 
management system, problems associated with ownership structure of the firms, 
especially problems emerging out of family type structures; and existing business culture 
and vision of upper management appeared among the most important organizational 
obstacles in all regions. 
 
Table 7.7 Most Important Obstacle Firms Face in Their Innovation Activities 
Obstacle Categories Regions 
Resources Istanbul Izmir Ankara 
        Organizational  
Limited marketing 
capabilities; Lack of a 
well structured R&D 
dept/system; Existing 
business culture; 
Ownership structure 
of the firm; Fast pace 
of technological 
developments (fierce 
global competition, 
etc); Dependence on 
partners 
Lack of a well 
structured R&D 
dept/system; Lack of 
knowledge on new 
and emerging markets; 
Problems associated 
with being a family 
firm; Mass 
production- 
production in large 
quantities; Devotion 
of time to production 
related problems 
Military/defense 
industry specific 
problems; Vision of 
upper management; 
Lack of a well 
structured R&D 
dept/system 
        Financial  
Financial constrains; 
Inadequate R&D 
finance and personnel 
Financial constrains; 
Limited capital 
investment 
Financial constrains; 
Inadequate R&D 
finance and 
personnel; Limited 
investment in 
production 
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technologies; High 
corporate taxes 
        Human  
Inadequate R&D 
finance and personnel; 
Lack of experienced 
and specialized 
personnel 
Limited time and 
personnel allocated to 
R&D activities; Lack 
of experienced and 
specialized personnel  
Inadequate R&D 
finance and 
personnel; Lack of 
experience and 
capability; Limited 
time and personnel 
allocated to R&D 
        Infrastructural  
  Testing limitations 
Networking 
Market related 
problems (low 
customer demand, 
assessment of market 
needs, low market 
demand for high tech 
products, etc); 
Distance from 
suppliers; Lack of 
guidance by 
universities on new 
areas; Limited 
feedback from 
marketing firms; Lack 
of more firm type 
interface institutions 
Market related 
problems (low 
customer demand, 
assessment of market 
needs, low market 
demand for high tech 
products, etc); Lack of 
more firm-type 
interface institutions 
Customer 
relationships; Trust 
among firms  
Policy 
Lack of discretion of 
policy makers; Lack 
of strategic and 
targeted government 
technology and 
innovation policies; 
Late regulation 
practices compared to 
world experience 
Lack of strategic and 
targeted government 
technology and 
innovation policies 
Limited innovation 
financing 
mechanisms; 
Ineffectiveness of 
government 
innovation policies 
 
In all three regions, a great majority of the firms identified financial 
constraints/limitations, together with limited R&D finance and personnel as the most 
important obstacles for innovations. In the structured obstacle and hindrances question, 
lack of external financing, investment and risk capital choice was addressed to firms to 
understand their use and/or need of external financial institutions such as banks, venture 
capitals, etc. in financing their new product development process. The high mean scores 
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showing intensity of slightly restrictive responses in this statement supported most firms‘ 
utilization of internal, family or government resources. This relatively isolated innovation 
financing status of the firms supported financial constraints as the primer impeding 
reason in engaging new product development efforts. In Izmir and Ankara, firms 
specifically mentioned the limited capital investment and limited investment on 
production technologies as major barriers. In Ankara and Izmir, limited time given to 
high skilled researchers and technical workers to dedicate specifically to R&D projects 
was specifically mentioned as a significant obstacle to innovation projects. The 
organizational structure and the allocation of workload among existing workforce 
resulted in less-time for new innovative projects generally. Most firms, because of that 
problem, did not question the skill sets of their workers; rather they emphasized 
constraints on dedicating skilled labor new projects. Firms conveyed the time allocation 
problem among the most important obstacles and hindrances for new innovations, rather 
than the quality and experience of their human capital per se.  
Market related problems, specifically the problems emerging out of relationships 
with customers; the types of emerging demand; the dependencies between the existence 
of a customer and the launch of a new project, were mentioned as barriers for innovative 
activities in all three regions. Lack of intermediary institutions between the firms and 
universities that would help build and manage relations in major technology areas were 
also commonly mentioned in Istanbul and Izmir. Among the policy related obstacles, lack 
of strategic coherence and targeted government technology and innovation policies were 
mentioned in Istanbul and Izmir. In Ankara, limited scope of the financing mechanisms 
and also the ineffectiveness of current capital access programs were highlighted as the 
most important barriers to innovations.  
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Table 7.8 Categorization of Most Important Obstacles and Hindrances 
Obstacles and Hindrances in 
Groups 
Istanbul (%) Izmir (%) Ankara  (%) 
Financial  (FIN) 20.0 37.9 34.6 
Human Resources (HR) 13.3 27.6 26.9 
Organizational (ORG) 26.7 17.2 26.9 
Networking (NW) 23.3 13.8 11.5 
Policy (POL) 16.7 3.4 7.7 
Infrastructural (INF) 0 0 3.8 
In the context of the open ended question, the majority of the firms in Izmir and Ankara 
identified the most important obstacle for innovations as the financial resources (37.9 % 
and 34.6 % respectively) whereas the majority of the firms in Istanbul identified the most 
important obstacle as organizational resources (26.7 %).  
 
7.5  Regional, National and International Collaborations and Embeddedness 
A central theme in the broad innovation literature is that innovation emerges not 
only from the knowledge that is created by firms through their internal resources, but also 
from the way firms interact with external organizations and institutions. Innovation 
cannot be achieved in isolation, exclusively relying on firms‘ internal resources. This call 
for an investigation of the main sources of information for firms‘ innovation activities; 
location of their external collaborators; and also the value firms attach to these 
collaborators in their innovation efforts. What are the main sources of information for 
firms‘ innovation activities? Where are firms‘ innovation collaborators located? Do firms 
tend to collaborate more intensely with regional, national or international partners? If 
intra-regional collaborations are important in frequency, how embedded are regional 
actors in their local milieus and how systemic are local relationships and collaborations? 
Closer study of the significance of regional factors in technology adoption and innovation 
also provides insights on the potential importance of regional proximity and regionally 
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tailored policies in a developing country context. Which regional economies of 
localization and urbanization do firms consider most important for their success in the 
Turkish context? What do these tell about the importance and shape of potential policies 
seeking to leverage regional leakages and relationships? 
 
7.5.1  Sources of Information for Innovation 
The data on the knowledge sources of firms broken out by region reaffirms a key 
finding in Chapter 6 - Turkish firm engaged in innovation projects rely mostly on their 
own internal knowledge and capabilities  and mostly sources of codified information and 
knowledge including: specialized literature; the Internet; fairs and exhibitions. This again 
suggests that the process of technology adoption and innovation in the Turkish context 
does not rely on the frequent and intense associations and collaborations with actors and 
institutions outside the firm emphasized in the literature in regional innovation systems. 
The general patterns across sample firms in the regions indicates that external sources are 
significant and important in some cases, but the level of association and embeddedness is 
at a more intermediate stage reflecting the fact that experience with new product 
innovation and more cutting edge R&D is new and limited compared to leading global 
technology regions such as Silicon Valley or the Cambridge research park.  
Nevertheless in the Turkish NIS construction process which has heavily promoted 
firm university relationships, the role of universities as a source of knowledge and 
expertise is significant.  In Ankara 73 % of the firms found universities as important 
knowledge sources for their innovation activities while the share in Istanbul was 67% and 
Izmir, 44.8%. The fact that Izmir has a slightly thinner infrastructure of major universities 
and technical departments and a set of sample firms that focus more on traditional 
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manufacturing may explain the lower importance placed upon universities. Consultants 
also represented the next important sources of information more than 70 % of all firms 
noted this, with Izmir sample firms again placing less emphasis on this external source.  
 
Table 7.9 Knowledge Sources in Innovation Process 
Knowledge Sources  Istanbul Mean  Izmir Mean  Ankara Mean  
R&D Departments 1.11 1.55 1.15 
Literature 1.14 1.72 1.45 
Customers & Clients 1.89 1.31 1.27 
Fairs and Exhibitions 1.61 1.59 1.54 
Internet 1.43 1.72 1.63 
Market 1.50 1.59 1.85 
Universities 2.29 2.62 2.12 
Consultants 2.36 3.03 2.31 
Suppliers 3.21 2.45 2.85 
Industry Associations 2.93 3.52 2.73 
Partners 2.89 3.28 3.19 
P. Research Inst. 3.29 3.69 3.35 
Marketing Firms 3.50 3.59 3.65 
Competitors 3.64 3.69 3.54 
Chamber of Industry 3.82 3.97 3.87 
The information sources data shows that even though firms greatly emphasize the 
importance of their own internal resources, they do utilize and find important different 
channels of knowledge as part of their innovation activities. The dependencies between 
firms and customers with respect to the launch of innovative projects as articulated in 
Chapter 6 highlight customers as crucial information sources in all regions. Moreover, 
given the less developed industrial base (relative to OECD countries) of the country, 
lower importance is placed on suppliers as knowledge collaborators in all regions, though 
Izmir puts higher importance on suppliers than the other two regions. 
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7.5.2  Geographies of External Innovation Collaborations 
The significance of collaborations in the innovation process is rather well 
established in the innovation literature and placed at the core of the innovation systems 
approach. In order to identify the extent and importance of these collaborations, firms 
were asked to report their collaborations with customers, suppliers, universities, 
consultants, competitors, corporate group firms, partners, technical school, public 
research institutions, industry associations, science and technology parks, chambers of 
industry and commerce, marketing firms and venture capitalists located in different 
geographies in the last five years and were asked to attach an importance value to their 
collaborations within the context of their innovation processes.  
Overall, firms surveyed in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara was engaged in innovative 
collaborations and the results obtained clearly demonstrate that innovation takes place via 
interactions with customers, suppliers, consultants and universities. As shown in Table 
7.10 below, there is a general degree of similarity between the geographic frequency and 
importance of these collaborations across the regions. The most prominent divergence is 
the greater frequency of within region collaborations among sample firms in Istanbul 
(over 47% of total collaborations). This is consistent with the much greater scale and 
scope of agglomeration economies and external institutions in the primate city.  
Table 7.10 Geographical Distribution of Innovation Collaborators 
Collaborations  
Istanbul 
Within Region Outside Region, 
Within Nation 
Outside Nation Total 
 n % m n % m n % m n % 
Customers 15 28.3 1.27 17 32.1 1.58 21 39.6 1.19 53 27.9 
Universities 20 55.6 1.60 12 33.3 1.33 4 11.1 1.50 36 18.9 
Consultants 16 64.0 1.88 2 8.0 1.50 7 28.0 1.57 25 13.2 
Suppliers 7 35.0 2.14 0 0.0 0.0 13 65.0 1.69 20 10.5 
Total 
Collaborations 
 
90 
 
47.4 
 
1.76 
 
37 
 
19.5 
 
1.57 
 
63 
 
33.1 
 
1.56 
 
190 
 
100.0 
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Collaborations  
Izmir 
Within Region Outside Region, 
Within Nation 
Outside Nation Total  
 n % m n % m n % m n % 
Customers 6 11.3 1.33 24 45.3 1.29 23 43.4 1.17 53 27.3 
Universities 14 35.9 1.79 24 61.5 1.25 1 2.6 2.00 39 20.1 
Consultants 4 28.6 1.75 5 35.7 1.6 5 35.7 1.6 14 7.2 
Suppliers 6 13.3 1.67 13 28.9 1.30 26 57.8 1.26 45 23.2 
Total 
Collaborations  
 
47 
 
24.2 
 
1.70 
 
79 
 
40.7 
 
1.36 
 
68 
 
35.1 
 
1.27 
 
194 
 
100.0 
 
Collaborations  
Ankara 
Within Region Outside Region, 
Within Nation 
Outside Nation Total  
 n % m n % m n % m n % 
Customers 11 22.4 1.27 20 40.8 1.70 18 36.7 1.61 49 21.0 
Universities 19 52.8 1.47 15 41.7 1.53 2 5.6 1.00 36 15.5 
Consultants 13 46.4 1.85 7 25.0 1.85 8 28.6 1.37 28 12.0 
Suppliers 9 24.3 2.00 13 35.1 2.00 15 40.5 1.26 37 15.9 
Total 
Collaborations  
 
81 
 
34.8 
 
1.70 
 
82 
 
35.2 
 
1.71 
 
70 
 
30.0 
 
1.35 
 
233 
 
100.0 
Within this framework there are interesting patterns and some subtle interregional 
differences. Collaborations with customers are the most frequent and the most important 
in total, consistent with the other findings in this research.  Collaborations with customers 
within the region are less frequent, but as or more important than extra-regional 
collaborations. The importance of local collaboration with customers suggests at least 
some degree of local linkage and embeddedness in the innovation efforts of these firms. 
The exception is the greater frequency and importance of international collaborations for 
the firms in Istanbul and Izmir.  This finding indicates that the sample firms in Istanbul 
and Izmir are more engaged in international markets and draw on international sources. 
Their counterparts in Ankara, perhaps more tied to central government customers are less 
linked to international partners. 
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The second most prominent from of collaboration is with universities in terms of 
both frequency and importance. Once again Izmir, with a smaller set of major universities 
and research departments exhibits fewer ties than Istanbul and Ankara. However, taken 
together these results do suggest that government efforts over the past decade have 
stimulated important relationships between universities and private firms in technology 
upgrading and innovation. 
Collaborations between consultants and firms are less frequent and generally 
somewhat less important. The role of collaborations with consultant is somewhat more 
frequent and important in Istanbul as noted above and may be related to the more 
corporate and international character of Istanbul firms in the sample. Collaborations with 
supplies are the less frequent and important with the notable exception of Izmir. As 
previously noted, Izmir stands out as the only region where supplier relationships stand 
out as significant external ties. It is especially interesting that ties with international 
suppliers are so significant for firms in the Izmir sample. This might in part be explained 
by the prominent role of firms in the Chemicals and Chemical products sector where 
international value chains may be more interlinked. 
The extent of collaborations in all regions shows that firms‘ major external 
relationships are with customers, suppliers, universities and consultants. The other actors 
of innovation systems such as public research institutions, industry associations, science 
and technology parks, chambers of industry and commerce, marketing firms, competitors, 
and partners are rarely emphasized as important innovation collaborators. International 
customers, suppliers and to a great extent consultants were highly valued in all regions 
with respect to the quality of information they bring into the innovation process, adding a 
new dimension to proximity and knowledge transfer discussions within the context of 
developing regional innovation policies in developing country settings. Institutional 
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partners from scientific communities as in the case of universities are more confined to 
regions if the institutional thicknesses of the regions are high. International collaborations 
with universities, on the other hand were less favored as the collaboration process 
requires more complex organizational skills of knowledge searching and also networking.  
 
7.5.3 Regional Embeddedness of Innovative Firms  
As building blocks of emerging systems, understanding firms‘ embeddedness in 
their own regions is also important to assess whether local institutions, relationships and 
cultures provide unique supports for technology adoption and innovation. As the 
relationship between innovation and regional development became clearer, many 
countries adopted more technology oriented regional development policies, not only 
supporting local research and development institutions and activities but trying to build 
deeper and more durable associations between public and private sector institutions that 
evolve into local cultures of competitiveness and innovation (Muldur 2002). It has also 
been acknowledged that one-size-fits-all national policies are not effective as firms and 
regions have diverse characteristics and unique assets, gaps and needs (Todtling and 
Trippl 2005). In order to better mobilize economies of agglomeration and the innovation 
potentials of regions, more comprehensive and regionally tailored innovation strategies 
and development policies have been adopted that address firm needs within the unique 
local environments where they operate. In many regions, firms were encouraged to form 
cooperative associations and institutional clusters around certain economic activities in 
order to enhance their learning capabilities and the capacities of complementary 
institutions and actors. 
 280 
In more renowned regional innovation systems supply side actors (universities, 
public research institutions, consultants, labor training institutions, etc.), demand side 
actors (local launch markets, public procurement policies, etc.) and support infrastructure 
actors (intermediary organizations such as technology transfer centers, techno-parks, 
financial institutions such as venture capitalists, industry associations, innovation relay 
centers, etc.) are designed to some extent to foster complementarities and synergies.  To 
the extent that durable and effective relationships develop and evolve over the medium to 
long term these links and relationships can be characterized as a regional innovation 
system with certain features (local culture, identity, entrepreneurship, collaborations, 
dynamic innovation supporting market, regional administrative structure, capabilities of 
the regional policy makers, quality of education and training institutions, etc.) (Cooke et. 
al.2000). But these systems are open to the national and global economies and 
interactions with higher level innovation systems also influence the performance of firms 
and regions as well.  
In poorer functioning regional agglomerations, administrative authorities are 
typically weak in establishing development visions and coherent strategies for regional 
development. Without strong leadership and coordination regions with certain gaps (such 
as missing some important external economies of localization and urbanization) have 
difficulty in building up local relationships and synergies into more integrated and 
durable partnerships. This section explores the sample firms‘ embeddedness74  in regional 
institutional and organizational context and extent that regional agglomeration economies 
and associations and collaboration with regional partners influence the ability of firms to 
                                                 
74 The history of the concept of embeddedness goes back to early works of Karl Polanyi (1947) and Mark 
Granovetter (1973; 1985) but economic geography has adopted and spatialized the concept since the early 
1990s (Dicken and Thrift 1992, Grabher 1993) with an understanding that economic activity cannot be 
detached from the wider institutional and social context.  
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upgrade their technology and innovation performance. The objective was to understand 
whether firms evaluate their capacities and innovation projects as outcomes of emerging 
local innovation networks or more traditional technology development practices based on 
capacities resident within the firm and also the region. Examining elements of local 
agglomeration economies and the importance of deeper and more durable local 
relationships can provide insights on the status of learning and proximity from the 
perspective of the region as well.  
Agglomeration economies primarily rest on the ideas of economies of scale and 
networking as geographical agglomerations, to a certain extent, enjoy the positive 
externalities from being located at the same place. Economic agglomerations reveal 
themselves as different types of clustering and there are systemic and structural 
differences between urban and non-urban clusters (Lorenzen and Frederiksen 2008). 
Some of the most important benefits of co-location of related firms are; 1) specialization 
of labor which gives rise to a local abundance of worker skills,  and increasing efficiency 
through competition for labor among firms with related knowledge bases; 2) 
specialization of value-chains, networks and projects where firms use each others as 
subcontractors and customers when short delivery times and higher variety of products 
needed; 3) specialization of institutions providing services to related industries and 
regional knowledge base as in the forms of universities, vocational and technical schools, 
technology centers and other institutions that help deepening of the knowledge base and 
the technical culture in the region; 4) evolution of informal institutions shaping  norms 
and values, like trust among firms, that lower transaction and time costs and increase 
learning efficiency. 
In order to understand the importance of localization economies to the overall 
success of innovative firms, i.e. not specific to their newly developed products in the 
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three study regions, firms were asked to evaluate the impacts of availability of local 
labor; availability of skilled labor; existing regional entrepreneurial culture (emergence 
and strength of new firms in related industries and their success in creating wealth, 
growth and employment); technical culture (availability of technology oriented education 
system including vocational training programs, technical school, universities and their 
contributions to industrial production and new firm and skill development); industrial 
specialization; trust among firms (the importance of trust in their regional competitive 
and also collaborative relations); and proximity to customers; competitors; suppliers; 
consultants and R&D collaborators. The most important elements of economies of co-
location or localization common to all three regions are the supply of skilled labor75, 
technical culture76, industrial specialization77 and relationships of trust78.  These results 
suggest that firms do recognize and benefit from local pools of skilled labor and technical 
expertise and that regular association do contribute to trust and possibly lower transaction 
costs as suggested by the agglomeration economics literature. However, proximity to 
                                                 
75 In Istanbul, 89.3 % of the firms noted availability of skilled labor as important for their success (50 % of 
the firms identified skilled labor as very important and 39.3 % as moderately important); while the 
respective percentages are 89.7 % in Izmir (3.4 % very important and 86.2 % moderately important) and 
73.1 % (30.8 % very important and 42.3 % moderately important) in Ankara. The distribution of very 
important and moderately important responses shows that availability of skill labor are more important for 
Istanbul firms as skilled labor is more abundant in Istanbul.  
76 In Istanbul, 82.1 % of the firms noted technical culture as important for their success (21.4 % of the 
firms identified technical culture as very important and 60.7 % as moderately important); while the 
respective percentages are 69 % in Izmir (3.4 % very important and 65.5 % moderately important) and 42.3 
% (23.1 % very important and 19.2 % moderately important) in Ankara.  
77 In Istanbul, 96.4 % of the firms noted industrial specialization as important for their success (28.6 % of 
the firms identified industrial specialization as very important and 67.9 % as moderately important); while 
the respective percentages are 58.6 % in Izmir (0 % very important and 58.6 % moderately important) and 
53.8 % (11.5 % very important and 42.3 % moderately important) in Ankara.  
78 In Istanbul, 71.4 % of the firms noted trust as important for their success (25 % of the firms identified 
trust as very important and 46.4 % as moderately important); while the respective percentages are 58.6 % in 
Izmir (3.4 % very important and 55.2 % moderately important) and % 61.5 (11.5 % very important and % 
50 moderately important) in Ankara. The majority of the moderately important responses in all three 
regions indicate that even though considerable amount of firms indicate the importance of trust in their 
interactions, there is still room for facilitating trust relationships for collaborative relationships. 
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specific external institutions and actors seems less important across the three regions. The 
advantages from proximity to competitors, R&D collaborators and customers seem to be 
of minor importance to many firms (Table 7.11, below). This is consistent with the other 
findings that highlight the significance of extra regional collaborations and the general 
reliance on internal resources, customers and sources of codified knowledge in the 
innovation process. 
There are a few significant and interesting differences across the regions. 
Localization economy effects were more significant in Istanbul. For instance, the 
presence of an entrepreneurial culture is viewed as very important, but this factor is not 
seen as important by sample firms in other regions. And in Ankara, unlike other regions, 
the most important localization economy is concerned with proximity to suppliers, 
though in most cases these suppliers are identified as non-specialized or non-strategic for 
innovation activities yet important for firms‘ existing production line79. In comparison to 
other regions, firms in Izmir evaluated the importance of localization economies 
(especially proximity to specific external institutions) to their success less than the other 
firms (m=2.86) (Table 7.11).  
The advantages of localization economies identified by the sample firms are the 
more traditional forms identified in the literature labor pooling and knowledge spillovers 
associated with the general technical culture and trust relationships with local institutions. 
However, specific proximity induced advantages that may reduce the costs of inputs or 
lead to specific knowledge or technology transfer from local suppliers, R&D 
collaborators and consultants are less prominent.  Major collaborators with specific 
institutions seem to span geographic scales to a greater extent than anticipated in much of 
                                                 
79 During the interviews, the respondent firms in Ankara stressed the importance of proximity to their 
customers and suppliers if any emergency arises in production or marketing/sales and hence the 
hypothetical convenience of having regional suppliers. 
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the RIS literature in advanced regions in OECD countries. The importance of localization 
advantages depicted in these responses raise questions about the important role of 
physical proximity in the process of innovations in developing countries. 
 
Table 7.11 Importance of Localization Economies to Firms 
Importance of Localization Economies to 
Firms 
Istanbul 
mean 
Izmir 
mean 
Ankara 
mean 
Technical Culture 2.04 2.31 2.54 
Trust 2.07 2.48 2.54 
Industrial Specialization 1.75 2.48 2.42 
Availability of Local Labor 2.57 2.28 2.77 
Availability of Skill Labor 1.64 2.07 2.15 
Entrepreneurial Culture  1.86 3.21 2.96 
Proximity to Competitors 3.39 3.86 3.52 
Proximity to Consultants 2.50 3.72 2.92 
Proximity to Customers 2.64 3.14 3.00 
Proximity to R&D Collaborators 2.86 3.24 2.69 
Proximity to Suppliers 2.43 2.62 1.96 
Mean 2.34 2.86 2.68 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
 
Urbanization economies, on the other hand, denote the positive externalities that 
firms enjoy being located in an urban area. Instead of co-location with other firms, firms 
benefit from existing industrial, institutional, infrastructural and cultural diversity and 
intensity of the urban scale. In order to understand the importance of urbanization 
economies to the overall success of innovative firms, not limited with their new product 
development processes in the three study regions, firms were asked to evaluate their 
location in terms of access to markets; diversity of economic activities; quality of 
physical infrastructure; communication networks and labor education; proximity to 
institutions providing services; banking and venture capital services; and cultural 
amenities. Across the three regions, sample firms designate classic advantages of urban 
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scale as important to their competitiveness performance. The quality of communication 
networks, the physical infrastructure, and labor education and training rank high in all 
three regions.  Access to the local market ranks very high in Istanbul and Izmir, but is 
less significant in Ankara80.  It is possible that the existence of big ports in Istanbul and 
Izmir and the reliance on government markets in Ankara helps explain this divergence if 
local firms do not perceive government markets as ―local‖. The least important 
economies of urbanization are again related to the general availability of more specific 
services. Proximity to cultural amenities banking and venture capital services or general 
services were not seen as highly important to firms competitiveness in any of the three 
regions. The ranking by sample firms of the significance of urbanization economies show 
that, as in the case of localization economies, firms value traditional urban and 
agglomeration economies the most. Firms like to have access to good physical 
infrastructure as it supports the competitiveness of their production logistics and 
distribution and also good communication infrastructure to communicate and collaborate 
with partners in different locations. Good quality of labor education in all regions 
supported the availability of human capital, the most critical source for the innovation 
activities.   
At the regional level, among the advantages of localization and urbanization 
economies, physical proximity to specific system actors were not considered crucial for 
the success of firms in any of the three major economic regions in Turkey. These findings 
were consistent with the geographic profiles of external collaborations which showed that 
                                                 
80 In Istanbul, 89.3 % of the firms noted access to markets as important for their success (53.6 % of the 
firms identified access to markets as very important and 35.7 % as moderately important); while the 
respective percentages are 86.2 % in Izmir (48.3 % very important and 37.9 % moderately important) and 
53.8 % (15.4 % very important and 38.5 % moderately important) in Ankara. 
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firms in all regions appreciated contributions of national and international collaborators, 
especially the value-chain collaborators, as much or more than the regional collaborators. 
This was true even though regional collaborations were still viewed as important for their 
innovative activities. These results call for a deeper understanding on the specific 
characteristics of collaboration and interaction of actors in order to better understand the 
nature of local collaboration and real degree of embeddedness of innovative firms in 
developing regional systems.  
Table 7.12 Importance of Urbanization Economies to Firms 
Importance of Urbanization Economies Istanbul 
mean 
Izmir  
mean 
Ankara  
mean 
Quality of Physical Infrastructure 2.25 1.62 2.23 
Quality of Labor Education 2.04 2.03 2.50 
Quality of Communication Networks 1.71 1.62 1.88 
Proximity to Institutions Providing 
Services 
2.93 3.45 2.54 
Proximity to Banking/ Venture Capital 
Services 
3.29 3.86 3.38 
Diversity of Economic Activities 2.04 2.79 2.85 
Cultural Amenities 3.03 3.03 3.12 
Access to Market 1.57 1.72 2.62 
Mean 2.36 2.52 2.64 
Likert Scale- 1: Very Important 2: Moderately important 3: Slightly Important 4: Not Important 
To gain some insights of the deeper nature of innovation related interactions, I 
again employ the embeddedness framework developed by Cooke (2002) which queries 
firms in developing countries to define the integrity of their innovation process on the 
dimensions of implementation of innovation; nature of inter-firm relations; extent of 
customer and supplier relations; character of the supply chain and scope of the support 
infrastructure.81 Cooke (2002) suggests that regional innovation systems become stronger 
                                                 
81 Cooke (2002) also uses the source of innovation dimension (regional versus global) to explain the 
regional embeddedness of the firms‘ innovation process. Unfortunately, identification of the source of 
innovation is very difficult to explain and majority of the survey firms in our study were unclear about 
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as firms‘ embeddedness in the region increases and this is articulated through more 
interactive rather than individualistic innovation implementation processes; more 
cooperation/collaboration infused competitive inter-firm relations; more preferred 
suppliers with which transaction costs are diminished and technology spillovers are 
increased rather than general market suppliers; more integrated supply chain in which 
time transaction costs are limited and there is more harmonious order of production 
alignments among firms rather than a fragmented structure; and more networked support 
infrastructure where public and private institutions know the regional actors and provide 
services to support innovations in congruence with the developing innovation culture in 
the region rather than in an isolated way.  
In the study regions, the high mean scores in all categories indicate that regional 
embeddedness of firms with respect to their innovation activities is fairly low as majority 
of the firms identified their implementation of innovation as individualistic, regional 
inter-firms relations as competitive; customer-supplier relations as dispersed in market, 
supply chain as fragmented and the support infrastructure as isolated. It is demonstrated 
in the geographies of external collaborations section that 47 %, 24 % and 35 % of all 
collaborations in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara respectively are in fact regional 
collaborations. However, only 32.1 % of the firms in Istanbul, 13.8 % of the firms in 
Izmir and 50 % of the firms in Ankara defined their innovation implementation process 
as interactive reflecting the tendency of the firms‘ to draw on internal resources and 
codified knowledge sources in their innovation/new product development processes82. 
                                                                                                                                                 
defining the source of their innovations. Therefore, this category is omitted in our analysis as it did not 
contribute much to embeddedness discussion in the study regions. 
 
82 The percentages reflect the sum of ―high‖ and ―fairly high‖ interactive implementation of innovation 
responses.  
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Moreover, a large majority of the firms in all regions identified the relations between the 
firms as mostly competitive.83 
Table 7.13 Regional Embeddedness in Innovation Process  
Regional Embeddedness in Innovation Process  
Istanbul 
mean 
 
Izmir 
mean 
 
Ankara  
mean 
Ankara 
Istanbul 
Izmir  
mean 
Implementation of innovation- Interactive 2.89 3.31 2.73 2.99 
Inter-firm relations- Cooperative  3.07 3.24 3.23 3.18 
Customer-supplier relations- Preferred 
Supplier 
2.82 3.03 2.58 2.82 
Supply chain- Integrated 3.14 3.17 2.92 3.08 
Support infrastructure- Networked 3.36 3.55 3.19 3.37 
** The mean scores are between 1 and 4. As the scores get closer to 1, they represent high interaction, 
cooperation, preferred suppliers, integration and networked structures. As they get closer to 4, they indicate 
high individualism; competition; more suppliers from the general market; fragmentation and isolated 
structures. 
 
Even though the majority of the firms noted trust as an important localization economy 
feature, a local culture of trust relationships did not translate into cooperative relations 
between firms in technical matters. From the open ended interview information this 
disjuncture was mostly related to a strong desire to protect intellectual property and 
emerging know-how in innovation projects.  
At the regional level, more than 47 %, 34 % and 50 % of the firms in Istanbul, 
Izmir and Ankara noted they have preferred regional suppliers whose products they 
integrate into their production process.  The majority of the firms in all regions, on the 
                                                 
83 In Istanbul, 21.5 % of the firms noted inter-firm relations as cooperative (3.6 % ―high‖ and 17.9 % as 
―fairly high‖); while the respective percentages are 24.1 % in Izmir (0 % ―high‖ and 24.1 % ―fairly high‖) 
and 19.2 % (7.7 % ―high‖ and 11.5 % ―fairly high‖) in Ankara. 
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other hand, search for new supplies in the market based primarily on cost factors.84 It is 
noteworthy that only 20.5 %, 31 % and 38.5 % of the firms in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara 
respectively identified their regional supply chain as integrated in the way firms consider 
their timing of production in accordance with the needs of the customers, and collaborate 
frequently if any problems arises, etc.  
Firms also identified the support structure as more isolated and less networked at 
the regional level in all regions. Only 23.1 %, 6.9 % and 7.1 % of the firms in Ankara, 
Izmir and Istanbul respectively identified support infrastructure as highly networked.85 
Considering that innovation support infrastructures in the regions are still relatively 
young and developing, the sample firms were not accessing and working with multiple 
service providers at the date of the survey.  Since  new intermediary organizations such as 
technology transfer centers, techno-parks, innovation relay centers, financial institutions 
such as venture capitalists, law firms or offices specialized in innovation and 
entrepreneurship issues are just being formed existing collaborations with these 
institutions were mostly noted as isolated and far from systemically embedded. Majority 
of the firms defined major components of support infrastructure as TEYDEB, TTGV and 
KOSGEB innovation funds, innovation funding consultants that help firms prepare 
applications for TEYDEB, TTGV and KOSGEB funds and patent consultants. But 
sample firms had not developed important relationships with the newer elements of the 
NIS in a systemic way. 
Broadly speaking all three study regions are endowed with most of the specific 
institutions and actors alluded to in the RIS literature. Of course Istanbul as the dominant 
                                                 
84 In Istanbul, 46.4 % of the firms noted they have preferred suppliers (7.1 % ―high‖ and 39.3 % as ―fairly 
high‖); while the respective percentages are 34.4 % in Izmir (3.4 % ―high‖ and 31 ―fairly high‖) and 50 % 
(19.2 % ―high‖ and 30.8 % ―fairly high‖) in Ankara. 
85 None of the firms in all three regions identified the support infrastructure highly networked. The 
percentages reflect ―fairly high‖ responses. 
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primate city has a significantly higher degree of agglomeration advantages and 
institutional thickness than Izmir or Ankara. Specific local linkages and relationships are 
important but extra regional relationships remain crucial to the innovation process. As 
this section demonstrates durable and systemic collaborative practices among regional 
actors remain quite limited at this stage of technological development in Turkey. Firms 
typically do not assess their innovation processes as contingent upon systemic regional 
collaborations and firms‘ innovation practices reflect higher national and international 
influences overriding the advantages rising from proximity to major local actors and 
institutions. The limited scope of collaboration partners (mainly customers, suppliers, 
consultants and universities) also suggest a room for improvement in designing policies 
to increase interactions with institutions that specifically address gaps identified by these 
innovating firms (such as  financial institutions, technical assistance providers etc.) to 
strengthen the firm‘s capacity to implement strategies based on technology upgrading and 
new product development.  
 
7.6  Conclusion 
The economic profiles and trajectories of the regions in the first section of the 
chapter clearly demonstrate that there are significant agglomeration economies of 
manufacturing industry in all three regions. Istanbul produces almost one third of the 
national GDP and hosts more than one third of all the manufacturing firms in the country. 
Economic diversity in the region is huge and Istanbul‘s export base is specialized mostly 
in the manufacturing industries of wearing apparel; pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemicals; other electrical equipment; plastics products; jewelry and related articles; 
cutlery, hand tools and general hardware; footwear; other fabricated metal products; and 
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television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy. 
Ankara and Izmir are the second and third most industrialized cities in the country, but 
they have considerably smaller regional economies in comparison to Istanbul. Ankara 
and Izmir produce about 6-7 % of the national GDP and again host about 7 % of all 
manufacturing firms in the country. Ankara, the capital of the country, specializes mostly 
in the industries of manufacture of structural metal products; weapons and ammunition; 
television and radio transmitters; aircraft and spacecraft; bearings, gears, gearing and 
driving elements; machinery for mining, quarrying and construction; and furniture. And 
Izmir specializes mostly in the manufacture of tobacco products; plastics; plastics 
products; refined petroleum products; wearing apparel; paints; and also parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles and their engines. These three regions, compared to most 
of the other regions in the country, have significant institutional thickness and host 
various organizations that are considered crucial in properly functioning innovation 
systems.  
The case study regions were used as units of analysis to understand the scope of 
interactions among innovation actors within the developing national innovation system in 
Turkey. The regional analysis intended to answer the main research questions of how 
present and deeply embedded are components of innovation systems among innovative 
manufacturing firms in the main Turkish economic regions. In this respect, both the 
commonalities and the differences of the firms in different regions were sought to explain 
existing strengths and capacities at the regional level to the extent they inform the 
developing national innovation system policies.  
Within the context of the innovative practices, the commonalities of the firms in 
all three regions show that firms are highly engaged in product and process innovations 
and the innovation practices of firms in all regions exhibit similar behavior as far as 
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innovation practices and the sources of information. As the systems of innovation 
approach suggest, firms rely on a variety of different information sources to build know-
how, but generally rely upon their internal and codified sources the most to carry out 
innovation and technology adoption projects. The majority of the sample firms continue 
to encounter significant financial, human capital and organizational and networking 
barriers in their innovation process. 
 Firms also collaborate with regional, national and international institutions which 
define their innovation process as multi-scalar. But most sample firms did not perceive 
these interactions as systemic and integrated at the regional level. Innovative firms 
appreciate access to quality collaborators and reliable low cost suppliers regardless of 
regional proximity. Cooperation with customers, suppliers, universities and consultants 
stand out as important associations, while collaborations with industrial associations and 
marketing firms remain rather weak. Specific relationships with a variety of newly 
developing institutions such as technology transfer organizations, venture capital firms, 
and patent consultancy firms, etc. remains underdeveloped. 
The regional patterns of co-operative relations in the innovation process are 
striking in the sense that firms rely on different actors and institutions based upon specific 
needs. If regions do not have sufficient resources or knowledge bases in the innovation 
process, firms, endowed with certain capabilities, often need to co-operate with national 
and international actors. As shown in Ankara and Istanbul, even though these regions 
host the best universities in the country, firms search for their specific needs in other 
regions and consider these external links as critical in their innovation process. Likewise, 
firms in Izmir attach the highest value on the technical expertise they receive from other 
institutions to customers in Europe and Istanbul, highlighting the value of out-of-region 
resources for them. So, regions are characterized by a highly embedded set of institutions 
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and at this stage of technology development they remain dependent on links to the 
outside world. The findings in this chapter strongly suggest a re-evaluation of the 
―spatial‖ dimension of RISs in more recently industrializing countries, especially since 
learning and innovation take place at all levels of production and geography (Malerba 
2002). A better understanding of the role of proximity in the current context of 
technology development and innovation is essential given the recent emphasis on cluster-
based innovation policies in Turkey. The key question is how to better calibrate the 
newly developing support institutions with the specific needs of regional firms. In certain 
instances the further development of local institutions and ties will be crucial to support 
the further evolution of the innovation process, but in other cases extra-regional ties 
should not be duplicated or replaced but instead should be encouraged.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The fundamental objective of NIS policies and programs is to enhance a country‘s 
innovative and technological capacity. The NIS framework is built upon the now 
commonly accepted premise of contemporary growth theory that technological 
improvement and growth in human capital are the key drivers of national growth and 
development.  The focus of the NIS approach is an inquiry into how public and private 
institutions can be built and changed to increase a nation‘s capacities to search, acquire 
and absorb new technologies. In developed countries, these questions are directed at how 
advanced market economies maintain and also improve an established level of economic 
competitiveness and growth. In developing countries the questions are more related to 
how the build-up of national science and technology capacities can change the behaviors 
and performance of firms to affect a ―catching-up‖ process vis-à-vis the leading market 
economies. It is therefore especially important to figure out how learning takes place or 
how well the developing system addresses and manages its primary functions of creating 
new knowledge, human capital, and new technological products and opportunities. 
Why is the NIS framework potentially the most powerful and illuminating 
approach to the study of ―catch-up‖ processes based on improving technology adoption 
and innovation in the context of a developing country? The literature offers many 
different frameworks and models that might be applied to this issue. First, this framework 
is rooted more deeply in evolutionary economics studies how technological change and 
innovation as shaped by a complex ensemble of law, policies and institutions that are 
built up over time and evolve within a nation state. Key system components are diverse 
and include legal standards affecting property rights, technical standards, education and 
training institutions, firm and industrial research and development activities, direct public 
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investments in R&D, institutions supporting technology diffusion, government research 
priorities and institutions and so on. To understand in a sophisticated way the shortfalls 
and gaps which may be impeding technological development in a middle-income 
country, all of these elements must be in play and understood.  The NIS framework 
carefully delineates the complex institutional set up in a particular nation, but is 
especially concerned about how the components interact and evolve over time to foster 
the accumulation of technological and innovative capacities.  
Second, in a country engaged in the construction of a set of institutions and 
relationship that can significantly shift the technological trajectory, how the system is 
implemented and how interactions evolve is central.  The effective running of the system, 
the art of co-existence of many units and agencies working toward similar objectives and 
learning to achieve them, depends in important ways on the ability of governments to 
design policies that nurture the quality of interactions among institutions. Different 
national histories, patterns of intergovernmental relations and institutional set-ups shape 
patterns of interaction and cooperation. These factors were certainly shown to have 
influenced the construction of the Turkish NIS components and they way the components 
are working or not working in the overall project. 
Finally, this dissertation research highlighted how the applicability of the NIS 
framework to lower and middle income countries requires a specific understanding of the 
status of technological change and innovation given the level of industrial, technical and 
educational development in a country. A noted advantage of the NIS approach is that it 
assumes that context matters greatly and national efforts to change technological 
performance cannot be drawn from a recipe list or ―reverse engineered‖ from experiences 
in advanced economies. Mature public and private institutions that make up systems in 
advanced market systems generally do not exist or exist in very weak or fragmented 
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forms that exhibit limited interaction among public and private sector institutions 
(Intrakummerd et.al. 2002, Alcorto and Peres 1998, Radosevic 1998, Viotti 2002, Shulin 
1999). But to date the fifteen year effort to construct NIS elements and foster knowledge 
building interactions between the elements necessitate has been durable and has had some 
meaningful and impressive payoffs.   
This dissertation set out to address one important criticism of NIS studies. As 
noted in the second chapter, some scholars have argued that most studies in the NIS 
tradition focus on historical, national, industrial and institutional development processes 
but do not adequately account for, and empirically measure the extent and scope of 
interactive relationships evolving within unique national institutional and economic 
contexts. The integrated multilevel research approach used in this work enabled the study 
of NIS construction processes through the eyes of policy makers, bureaucrats, analysts, as 
well as the R&D personnel and firm mangers in Turkish companies. In most cases the 
importance of inter-institutional interactions was studied and appraised. In addition, by 
analyzing firm interactions and relationships in their innovation efforts at both the 
national and regional scales, I could provide important insights about the importance of 
regional processes to the direction and performance of the NIS construction process. 
Specifically, the information developed in this research allows some assessment of the 
status of regional processes, specifically the relationship between proximity and learning 
processes by informing the scope and scale of firm level collaborations in a developing 
country context.  In sum, I would argue that this work advances previous NIS studies by 
measuring the existence and strength of collaborations, measured according to  
perceptions of key innovating figures at different geographical scales among firms and 
support institutions.` I will now turn to discuss the key findings of this work as they 
related to my main research questions. 
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8.1 Review of Key Findings  
8.1.1 How Does History Matter in Applying the NIS Framework to the Turkish 
Case? 
At the beginning of this work I posed the question what is the historic role of 
central government in supporting technological development and innovation in Turkey. 
The long-term historic pressures of maintaining the Ottoman Empire and then 
establishment, restructuring and modernization of the new Republic have made the 
Turkish central state a dominant actor in the Turkish case. The central government has 
been, and remains the dominant public sector actor as there has never been a strong or 
meaningful effort to decentralize to sub national jurisdictions.  In the Ottoman Empire the 
indigenous manufacturing industry was developed primarily to meet the demands of the 
military and the ruling elites. The ―ethnic division of labor‖ and the dominance of 
minorities and foreigners in industry and trade in the Ottoman Empire created major 
adjustment costs for the newly established Republic after the demise of the Empire. Many 
minority owners and managers of industrial and trading companies left or fled the 
country between 1910 and 1930. This meant the loss of a valuable accumulated base of 
knowledge and trade relations that severely hobbled the early industrialization drives in 
the Republic. A general lack of experience in modern production methods and modes of 
commerce in a largely agrarian society appeared as a serious challenge for the new state 
that set industrialization and economic modernization as its primary objectives. Turkey as 
a lagging county with major structural and social obstacles, created a backward status for 
Turkey relative to rapidly modernizing European powers that has persisted into the 
current era. 
The industrialization objectives of the Republic revolved around the desire to 
build a modern secular state comparable to what it saw as its European counterparts. The 
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Republican government first adopted liberal and then etatist principles to achieve 
industrialization objectives.  In the etatist era, in order to nurture and protect domestic 
private industry, the state restricted entrance of foreign investors in to the country and 
also encouraged domestic production of inputs that used to be imported by the 
enterprises.  To build up indigenous primary and capital goods sectors it established and 
operated SEEs (State Economic Enterprises) which were equipped with imported modern 
technologies that fueled the economy by generating growth and achieving rapid 
development in targeted industrial sectors. Until the beginning of the World War II, 
etatist policies generated positive outcomes. But, because of the massive disruption of the 
war years and internal political turmoil, Turkey replaced its state directed heavy 
industrialization vision with private sector liberalization and agricultural and 
infrastructural development. The planning ideals and strong central government steering 
of the etatist era were left behind and more liberal, market based development of 
investment projects were adopted which were mostly funded through foreign borrowing. 
In the rebirth of liberal policies the focus of government policies turned to 
upgrade the capabilities of the private sector and encourage the development of new 
markets for Turkish private enterprise. However, post war policies involved major swings 
in industrial and trade policies.  In the immediate post war years, State Economic 
Enterprises continued to play a major role in the production of capital and intermediate 
goods while private sector grew more on the basis of an expanding consumer goods 
sector. After 1960s, with the establishment of the State Planning Organization, the 
government introduced an import-substitution oriented development strategy (1960-70) 
which prioritized mobilizing available industrial capital through restricting international 
purchases and increasing domestic sales within a protected environment. The import 
substitution based development policies had significant success in achieving substantial 
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growth and industrialization over a 20 year period. Industrial growth averaged 6% per 
annum between 1960 and 1980. However, the expected transformation in the economic 
structure to higher levels of international competitiveness was not achieved as the quality 
and pricing of manufacturing goods did not reach the expected standards in international 
markets.  
After the second oil shock in 1979, the military government that took over in 
1980 and emphasized reducing the state role in the economy. The newly elected 
government adopted an export oriented growth strategy in which the government used 
generous subsidies to promote exports. Efforts to increase export markets mostly relied 
on more traditional mechanisms including devaluations and export incentives that did not 
improve the productivity and technological levels of Turkish industries in relation to 
world markets (Rodrik, 1995). In this period no programs or incentives were put in place 
to upgrade technology or upskill the workforce. 
A second question that was asked at the onset was what level of national and 
technical and industrial development was achieved by the end of the 1990s under 
numerous post WWII government technology and innovation planning initiatives? 
During the early 1990s the objective of diversifying the export base through expansion 
into medium and high-tech products did not generate the expected transformation in the 
production structure. However, these years were identified with major macroeconomic 
instabilities and major crises. While GDP per capita grew 33% between 1980 and 1990, it 
only grew 19 % between 1990 and 2000.  By the 1990s it was clear that Turkeys‟ 
backwardness had been ameliorated but not overcome. The remained a relatively poorly 
developed capacity in the private sector for technology adoption and entry into higher 
end markets. Despite numerous plans and policy pronouncements in the 1970s and 1980s, 
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the central government economic agencies were increasingly out of touch with rapidly 
changing technologies and patterns of international production.  
The seriousness of these problems became more intense when Turkey signed 
important international agreements such as GATT (elimination of export subsidies) and 
Customs Union (travel of goods without ant custom restrictions). The signing of the 
Customs Union Agreement with the European Union in 1996 strongly influenced the 
competitive environment that manufacturing industries were faced with. Most enterprises 
in order to compete with the high-tech more efficient European producers in both 
domestic and international markets were forced to find ways to upgrade their production 
capabilities by investing in newer technologies. The fast paced technological 
developments in newly industrializing countries and commitments to new international 
agreements encouraged institutions in the central government to start a serious program 
backed with real resource commitments to support R&D activities of the firms which 
later became the core of the NIS building process in Turkey.  
Setting precise dates for the beginning of the NIS building process is pretty hard 
but the EU integration project in the mid-1990s with planned entry into the Customs 
Union and subsequent initiatives was definitely the key ignition factor in the process. The 
trade openings and other agreements on standards put into sharp relief the need for a 
serious focus on science and technology policy backed with real public sector investment 
to compete against European firms in higher value added and more technologically 
advanced product and service markets.  However, at the dawn of the NIS construction 
process there was a long legacy of public sector ambivalence. Historically, there was 
limited experience and trust in regards to public and private sector collaboration in 
advancing the adoption of new technology or the pace of innovation. The development of 
a systematic science and technology strategy at the dawn of the 21st century did finally 
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involve a focus, and real resource commitments, to a coherent NIS construction process. 
While this process was launched in a very challenging environment shaped by the long 
term history of Turkish development, the long history of assertive and ―uncontested‖ 
central government action also helps explain how the components of the NIS were put 
into place over a relatively short period of time. 
 
8.1.2 What are the Distinct Planning and Policy Initiatives that were Implemented 
to Built the Turkish NIS and What are the Strengths and Weaknesses of the System 
to Date? 
After much discussion and limited action, the first comprehensive science and 
technology plan ―Science and Technology Policy: 1993-2003‖ was adopted and then 
converted into specific action plans unlike before. This was the first time science and 
technology policy was prioritized in national economic policy and received the attention 
and investment commitments to push change. For instance, TUBITAK initiated an 
industrial R&D support program in 1995 which later became one of the core components 
of developing NIS. Following this Plan, next five year development plans introduced new 
strategies, the implementation of which were scrutinized through mid-term and 
implementation plans and other strategic documents such as ―Vision 2023: Science and 
Technology Strategies‖, ―National Science and Research Strategy: 2005-2010‖, 
―National Innovation Strategy: 2008-1010‖ and ―International Science, Technology and 
Innovation Strategy: 2007-2010‖ (See Chapter 4 for details).  To accomplish the 
objectives of the national innovation strategy plan, the government, for the first time, 
made a substantial commitment to build up the national science and technology base with 
$1.5 billion budgeted for the initiatives in the strategy in 2008. The increased R&D 
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funding resources supported a number of policy instruments and programs that 
constituted the foundation of the NIS.    
 In terms of the expected outcome of NIS initiatives, improvements in basic 
outcome measures of science and technology performance was the primary evaluative 
standard. This view of science and technology policy success has some validity  because 
basic capacities have to be built up in  public and private sector institutions and basic 
experience in integrating ongoing research and development into actual technology 
upgrading and innovation activities is a necessary foundation for the further evolution of 
the NIS. However, development of collaboration fostering policies is also necessary to 
animate the newly developing innovation systems. This leads to the more serious and 
coherent series of plans and initiatives to improve the nations technological and 
innovative capacities that have been developed and implemented over the past decade.  
There is a consensus in the literature that the establishment and rapid evolution of 
technology adoption and innovation practices is dependent on how countries can 
successfully design and implement programs that encourage co-evolution and collective 
learning among innovation system actors. The innovation system construction process 
was led in the first phases by a select set of central government institutions including 
TUBITAK and DPT. As the interviews with policy and program leaders showed, the 
specific institutional roles and programmatic responsibilities are evolving and changing 
as different agencies and departments claim turf and resources. But the interviews also 
suggested that public institutions were learning and improving their capacities to 
stimulate technological change and innovation in specific areas and segments.  It is 
possible to say that in general a learning culture is operative on some level and that the 
NIS construction process is changing and evolving as shortfalls and unmet needs are 
identified and addressed.  
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This study focuses on about a 14 year period (1995-2008) beginning when the 
Turkish state first developed a coherent strategic vision to accelerate growth in 
technology development and innovation in response to strong international trade 
pressures.  The density and diversity of programs and institutions, filling virtually every 
area or element in common NIS model diagrams, have developed in a rapid and relatively 
systematic manner. Structures have been developed in the legal area, in numerous areas 
of R&D support and tax subsidy, in an array of technical support and assistance areas, in 
firm-university collaborations and partnerships, and in spatially based technoparks and 
business incubators. Services are directed to numerous industrial sectors, to large and 
small firms, and to entrepreneurs and business startups. Indeed, the rapid and relatively 
coherent development of public institutions and the implementation of specific programs 
in all areas of the NIS system is an important finding. As expected, certain institutions are 
more dominant, holding many responsibilities ranging from technology and innovation 
policy making to program implementation such as allocating R&D grants to firms as in 
the case of TUBITAK.  However over the 2004-2008 years, other agencies identified 
gaps such as seed capital for start-ups and smaller firms, intermediary services to improve 
university-firm collaborations, and technology relay centers at universities. Again the fact 
that most of these institutions, programs and projects were developed and implemented 
over the past decade is surprising. And even with all the problems identified by 
interviewees, there appears to be a degree of coherence in the overall structure and 
business participation has been, in most cases, strong. 
 In addition, the institution building and public investment associated with the 
NIS construction project has clearly been associated with positive movements in key 
national science and technology indicators over the period. Growth in various categories 
of R&D, especially private sector R&D investment was relatively robust. This 
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corresponded to an increase in R&D personnel and the production of scientific articles. 
Most significant was the relatively strong increase in patenting activity that was 
associated with positive movements in other indicators. While there is almost no 
evaluative data tying various policy changes and program interventions to these 
aggregate science, technology and innovation indicators, it can be said that the change in 
government commitment and the change in the environment related to NIS construction 
did contribute to a move toward more technology based growth over the past decade. 
One of the key questions outlined in the first chapter was what are the major 
difficulties and problems confronting policy makers in their efforts to build a more 
effective national innovation system? The analysis and interviews with key NIS actors 
uncovered problems and ongoing challenges. There was evidence that as more 
government agencies carved out a role in the NIS, fragmentation and overlap has become 
a growing problem. For instance, certain programs run by KOSGEB, TTGV and Ministry 
of Industry and Trade, started more to resemble each other. Similar problems started to be 
addressed by multiple agencies, or same firms started to be supported by various 
institutions without any selectivity in terms size, industry or specific R&D needs. In some 
cases, the fragmented structure was even evident within organizations belonging to the 
same agencies as in the case of business incubators of KOSGEB, where firm acceptance 
and program goals were disconnected from each other. A collective systems perspective 
among similar program implementers is very weak and fragmented.  
As several of the respondents phrased it, there were major problem with 
―systemness‖ in the current phase of NIS construction.  Systemic-identity awareness was 
mentioned with respect to how system actors define their role in a functioning NIS and 
how their bureaucratic culture permits collaboration with other organizations especially 
with respect to reorganization of existing programs and needs. The lack of a performance 
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or outcome based culture in the public sector, limited policy making and implementation 
capabilities and the lack of systems perspective on technology related problem 
identification and solutions were seen as ongoing barriers to the evolution of the NIS in 
Turkey.  
A related criticism emerging out of the interviews and analysis were directed to 
both strategic goals and elements and more tactical issues of program design and 
implementation. At the strategic level the most prominent concern was the detachment of 
the NIS construction process from any coherent industrial strategy. Tackling industrial 
objectives such as increasing the competitiveness of current or potential export industries 
through a broader science and technology framework was seen as a major flaw in the 
national strategy by the agency and program leaders. The core assumption is that if the 
state invests in science and technology assets at the national level, the general 
competitiveness of the country will increase. On the other hand, the literature on the 
rapid-innovation based growth strategies (Breznitz 2005) shows that states‘ commitments 
and support in certain sectors differentiate competitive status of countries in global 
production networks. As several commentators noted, a more sophisticated industrial 
targeting and linkage strategy could also limit overlap and redundancy among programs. 
In a related sense, the scope of policies and programs reflect the dominance of supply 
side measures and lack of demand side policy levers such as government procurement, 
regulations and standards policies.  The lack of a sectoral emphasis on demand side 
measures is compensated for in the Turkish NIS through technology platforms to 
coordinate development among actors interested in or working on similar technologies. 
The insight policy document Vision 2023 was prepared in a similar collaborative fashion 
and was praised as it provided a selected set of industries to build on growth and 
development. However, most respondents in agencies and programs noted that the 
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current structure of the decision making was not strong enough to change the existing 
horizontal R&D support scheme to more of a vertical one guided by the principles set by 
Vision 2023.  Lack of restructuring of programs in congruence with various policy 
objectives and targets articulates that the state is still hesitant to adopt vertical support 
schemes based on selected industries.  
The most common and troubling criticism of participants in NIS program 
implementation is the absence of any serious or systematic monitoring and evaluation of 
specific programs and projects. The literature and international agency best practice 
guidance emphasize that evaluation should be built into program design so that program 
goals are clear and match larger strategic goals of the national investment program.  The 
link between the objectives of increasing national innovation and competitiveness and 
how well the NIS is addressing this objective is not evaluated in any systematic manner.  
Most informants emphasized the need for serious assessments and critical reports at the 
policy and plan making level with respect to how the current system is serving the stated 
objectives, how and in what ways the adopted NIS system promotes the development of 
comparative advantages, and what factors place Turkish industry on a competitive 
footing in international markets. However, as was emphasized in Chapter 5, the open and 
critical stance of agency and program leaders and the dearth of hollow promotional 
claims were very surprising and may bode well for the ongoing evolution and 
improvement of the NIS construction process. 
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8.1.3 What are the Unique Characteristics of Turkish Firms Engaged in Innovation 
Projects and How Important are Intra and Inter-Regional Collaborations in their 
Efforts? 
 All of the NIS institutions, policies, programs and support structures are directly 
or indirectly aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of business structure, 
the core of technology adoption and innovation development in the country. The set of 
firms in the interview sample were committed to innovative projects, and surprisingly 
active in patenting. In this sense government subsidy and support for innovation is 
registering some success in this set of firms and in terms of national science and 
technology outcome measures.  
However, on the firm level, this dissertation research shows that innovative 
practices of firms are shaped by the level of industrial development, inexperience in 
developing and exploiting external relationships, and difficulty finding and cultivating 
markets for new more technically advanced products. Expanding existing customer base 
rather than innovating for new and or non-traditional markets was more important for 
most firms in the sample.  This makes most of the firms actively engaged in innovation 
projects (and receiving government support) focus on  technology and innovation 
activities  for minor or major product improvements rather than developing major radical 
technologies. Their innovation strategy, knowledge acquisition and transfer, and 
technology development is very contingent upon endogenous resources. This does not 
mean that firms in the study sample innovate in isolation. The majority of sample firms 
had important external sources of knowledge and information, but they used more 
codified information resources such as the specialized literature, in-house R&D and the 
Internet. Most of the Turkish firms interviewed saw their competitive advantages as 
contingent upon their internal knowledge and skilled labor. Hence, most companies 
wanted to keep other firms and institutions at a distance to prevent knowledge and assets 
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from leaking out. Their knowledge acquisition and R&D projects are highly contingent 
upon the quality of their customers and existing customer demands. Yet there is a 
significant subset of firms engaged in innovation to improve their performance on 
international markets by substantially upgrading their technologies and products or 
attempting to develop substantially new products for new markets. When the sample 
firms were categorized in four groups based on their technology capacity and product 
development strategies, firms that were more engaged in new, more technologically 
sophisticated product development viewed external relationships as more important.  
One of the key research questions raised in the beginning was how present and 
strong are intra and inter-regional (including international) networks and relationships 
among innovative manufacturing firms in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul?  Among a variety 
of potential collaborators on innovation projects, customers together with suppliers, 
universities and consultants appear as important references and sources of information for 
firms in all three regions. External linkages with public institutions are growing and are 
becoming more important, but linkages with other private sector actors or institutions 
such as training centers, marketing companies, knowledge service providers, financial 
institutions etc., on the other hand are weak and not seen as important. Likewise there is 
very little evidence that deep regional associations have any kind of privileged status in 
the firm‘s innovation activities.  
At the firm level, most of the survey/interview findings indicated that linkages 
and collaborations are at an early stage of development and exhibit certain problems and 
frictions. Customer and supplier linkages are more external to the firm‘s home region, 
and in many cases to the nation. Local links are important, especially new external 
relationships with consultants and universities. When we look at the collaboration 
patterns of case study firms, we see that Istanbul firms have more technical collaborations 
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with their international customers and suppliers and they place the highest importance on 
their collaborations with international customers and suppliers. In terms of their 
collaborations with universities and consultants, Istanbul firms have more collaboration 
with regional universities and consultants. Yet they place the place the highest 
importance on their collaborations with national universities and international 
consultants. Izmir firms, similar to Istanbul firms, have more technical collaborations 
with their international customers and suppliers and they place the highest importance on 
these collaborations. Izmir firms have more collaboration with national universities and 
they place the highest importance on national universities. And Ankara firms, have more 
technical collaborations with their national customers and international suppliers and they 
place the highest importance on their collaborations with regional customers and 
international suppliers. Unlike the two other regions, regional customers receive high 
importance among Ankara firms due to the prominence of the defense industry in the 
region. Ankara firms, like Istanbul firms, have more collaboration with regional 
universities and consultants but they place the highest importance on their collaborations 
with national universities and international consultants. Firms‘ geographical distribution 
of technical collaborators shows that firms try to access to knowledge irrespective of their 
collaborators‘ proximity. In other words, innovative firms appreciate access to quality 
innovation collaborators regardless of regional proximity. If regions do not have 
sufficient resources or knowledge bases in the innovation process, firms, endowed with 
certain capabilities, often seek to co-operate with better endowed national and 
international actors.  
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8.1.4 How Important are Interactions and Collaborations at the Regional Level 
from the Perspective of Firms Engaged in Innovation Projects 
 
The case study regions were used as units of analysis to understand the scope of 
interactions among innovation actors within the developing national innovation system in 
Turkey. The regional analysis intended to answer the key research question of how 
present and deeply embedded are components of regional innovation systems among 
innovative manufacturing firms in the main Turkish regions- Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul? 
In this respect, both the commonalities and the differences of the firms in different 
regions were sought to explain existing strengths and capacities at the regional level to 
the extent they inform the developing national innovation system policies.  
All three study regions are large urban regions endowed with most of the specific 
institutions and actors alluded to in the RIS literature. Istanbul as the dominant primate 
city has a significantly higher degree of agglomeration advantages and institutional 
thickness than Izmir or Ankara. Specific local linkages and relationships were found to be 
important to the firms in the sample, but extra-regional relationships remain crucial to the 
innovation process. Durable and systemic collaborative practices among regional actors 
remain quite limited at this stage of technological development in Turkey. Innovative 
firms appreciate access to quality collaborators and reliable low cost suppliers regardless 
of regional proximity. Cooperation with customers, suppliers, universities and consultants 
stand out as important associations, while collaborations with public research institutes, 
industrial associations and marketing firms remain weak. Specific relationships with a 
variety of newly developing local institutions such as technology transfer organizations, 
business incubators, and labor training institutions remain underdeveloped. The firms 
interviewed did not typically assess their innovation processes as contingent upon 
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systemic regional relationships or collaborations. Their innovation practices reflect higher 
national and international influences overriding the advantages rising from proximity to 
major local actors and institutions. The limited scope of collaboration partners (mainly 
customers, suppliers, consultants and universities) also suggest room for improvement in 
designing policies to increase interactions with institutions that specifically address gaps 
identified by these innovating firms (such as  financial institutions, technical assistance 
providers etc.) 
The findings in this dissertation strongly suggest a re-evaluation of the ―spatial‖ 
dimension of RISs in more recently industrializing countries, especially since learning 
and innovation take place at all levels of production and geography (Malerba 2002). The 
regional patterns of co-operative relations found in the firm survey/interviews are 
interesting in their contrast with RIS and related literatures in the sense that firms rely on 
different actors and institutions based upon specific needs. If regions do not have 
sufficient resources or knowledge bases in the innovation process, firms, endowed with 
certain capabilities, often seek to co-operate with national and international actors. As 
shown in Ankara and Istanbul, even though these regions host the best universities in the 
country, firms search for their specific needs in other regions and consider these external 
links as critical in their innovation process. Likewise, firms in Izmir attach the highest 
value on the technical expertise they receive from other institutions to customers in 
Europe and Istanbul, highlighting the value of out-of-region resources for them.  
So, regions are not characterized by a highly embedded set of institutions and at 
this stage of technology development - they remain dependent on strong links to the 
outside world. A better understanding of the role of proximity in the current context of 
technology development and innovation is essential given the recent emphasis on cluster-
based innovation policies in Turkey. The key question is how to better calibrate the 
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newly developing support institutions with the specific needs of regional firms. In certain 
instances the further development of local institutions and ties will be crucial to support 
the further evolution of the innovation process, but in other cases extra-regional ties 
should be encouraged.  
 
8.1.5 Moving Forward: What are the Strengths and Weaknesses of the System and 
How Important are Regional Policies?      
On balance, I would argue that the Turkish NIS construction process is a 
promising story, but a story with many complexities and potential pitfalls. Policies and 
institutions, filling virtually every area or element in common NIS model diagrams, have 
been developed in a relatively systematic manner. The fact that the development and 
implementation of the NIS elements has been associated with positive movements in key 
national science and technology indicators cannot be overlooked as a substantial 
achievement. There has been as significant turn toward technology based development 
over the past decade and Turkey‘s recent economic performance has been impressive, 
especially in the teeth of the current global economic slowdown. 
Emphasizing the catch-up pressure put on the shoulders of the newly developing 
NIS, the central emphases that emerged out of the interviews with respect to the 
applicability of the NIS concept in Turkey are the challenges of fostering a cultural 
awareness of the importance of innovation, of building a systems perspective among 
program implementers and program clients and of meaningful information sharing and 
collaboration across bureaucratic boundaries. This research suggests at least that cultural 
awareness of the importance of technology advance and innovation is growing among 
public sector actors and private firms. The other important features of a successful NIS 
construction process are not clearly in place (for instance market creating regulations, 
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government procurement, monitoring and evaluation etc.). There is a long way to go and 
more careful evaluation of efforts to foster collaboration between firms and external 
institutions is crucial at this stage. The institutions must move beyond just subsidizing 
firms to invest. They must be better engineered to link innovation to efforts to encourage 
external collaboration and to build thicker innovation networks. The NIS construction 
process moving forward must pay attention to how to build on and diversify existing 
linkages supporting technological change and innovation. 
Based on what was found in this investigation, should regions have a more 
prominent place in future policy making related to the NIS? and How can national 
innovation policy take better advantage of existing strengths and capacities at the regional 
level? 
The historical evolution of science, technology and innovation policies indicates 
that the central government agencies leading the NIS construction effort have never had 
an intentional approach the technology development problem at the local scale in Turkey. 
One important reason for that is the lack of autonomous regional governments endowed 
with power to make decisions to influence the productive and innovative structures of 
localities. Very recently, as part of the European Union integration project and also as 
part of the policy discussions around developing the NIS, regions started to emerge as a 
new scale for innovation policies. The common arguments related to benefits from the 
external economies or collective efficiencies associated with proximity and learning is 
being taken more seriously. Unfortunately, as articulated by some interviewees, clusters 
and RISs became buzzwords for many localities and even in some cases proposed to be 
established from scratch according to major typologies that exist in other country 
examples.  
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In respect to this contemporary discussion, this research presents important 
findings by articulating existing collaborative strengths and weaknesses according to 
major innovation partners in different localities. For instance, collaborations of firms in 
Izmir show that innovative firms widely interact with high quality research universities in 
other parts of the country and value their contributions more than local universities for 
the success of their firms. In such a case endorsing an endogenous growth strategy within 
the study regions by improving regional innovation support systems (Hassink 2002) and 
also absorptive capacities (Asheim and Vang 2005) is not enough in itself since  most 
innovative firms have stronger linkages with external  partners, such as universities and 
consultants at different geographies. On the other hand, firms in Izmir also highly value 
their collaborations with customers and suppliers in other countries. The exogenous 
growth model (Asheim and Vang 2005) which highlights the importance of external 
knowledge sources and the necessity to connect with larger more advanced firms in 
global production networks due to limited local capacities and institutions in developing 
countries might be more relevant to actual technology adoption and innovation efforts of 
some firms than trying to force regional linkage. The limited variety of innovation 
collaborators in Izmir as in the other regions would seem to benefit most from Feser‘s 
(2005,2008) synergy leveraging approach.  
This research broadly supports the notion of building upon existing institutions, 
linkages and interactions rather than on establishing abstract models of local or non-local 
clusters. The scope and geographies of collaborations may contribute national policies 
best through appropriate and flexible measures that cultivate collaborative and productive 
structures at the regional scale when an advantage is clearly demonstrated. The central 
state should continue to invest on absorptive capacities of regions but instead of adopting 
abstract models, firms should be given specific consideration within their greater sectoral 
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and industrial context and the means that encourage their participation in national and 
global production networks should be incorporated into the system. In this context, 
leveraging synergies between innovative actors and knowledge providers, irrespective of 
space, might serve better for the fuller development of the firms and also the developing 
national innovation system. It is hoped that this dissertation makes some important strides 
in this direction.  
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Name of Enterprise:    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Location of Enterprise: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Name of Respondent: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Position:                      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Telephone:                  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
E-mail:                         ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Survey #:                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Part 1: Firm Characteristics, Innovation and Competitiveness 
 
1. Please give a brief description of the products designed and manufactured in your 
firm? 
 
 
 
2. In what year was your firm initially set up? ________________ 
 
 
3. How long have you been located in this region? ________________ 
a. Has your firm ever been relocated?   Yes  No 
b. If yes, where:  Another region   Same region another location 
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4. What is the organizational status/ ownership structure of your firm? 
 Independent firm  
 Family firm   
  Branch plant of a Turkish firm  
  Branch plant of a foreign firm  
  Head office of a Turkish firm  
  Turkish head office of a foreign firm  
 Joint venture 
 
5. What was the status of your firm at establishment? 
 New independent start-up 
 Family firm 
 Spin-off from another firm 
 Subsidiary of another firm 
 Branch plant 
 Other ________________ 
 
6. How did your activity evolve since the firm founded? 
 Same basic knowledge, incremental change 
 Radical change compared to past 
 No change, too early in firm history 
 Changed product/market segment 
 Process technology totally different from past 
 
7. Does your establishment produce: 
 A final product 
 An intermediate product 
 A service 
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8. Which of the following types of activities are located at your firm in this location? 
 Manufacturing 
 R&D 
 Management 
 Sales 
 Marketing 
 Other      _________ 
 
9. What is the employment of your firm? 
 1-25  26-50  51-99  100-249    250 + 
 
10. How does this compare with the number of employees three years ago? 
 Increased    Decreased    Stayed same 
 
11. Please indicate the total value of gross revenues generated by your firm at this 
address. 
________________________________ 
 
12. How are your revenues distributed (by percentage) among the following regions? 
 Ankara     ________________ 
 Izmir       ________________ 
 Istanbul    ________________ 
 Elsewhere in Turkey   ________________  
 Europe    ________________ 
 United States   ________________ 
 Elsewhere in the world  ________________  
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11. During the last 3 years, has your firm introduced any technologically new or 
improved product into the market?  
 
 Yes  
 No 
a. If yes, how many? __________________ 
 
13. Was the most important technologically new or improved product: 
 A world first   A first in Turkey   A first for your firm 
 
14. Did your company undertake any of the following activities during the last five 
years? 
 
 Yes No 
Developed or modified an existing process   
Introduced changes in management routines   
Introduced a new marketing technique   
Introduced an internal training program   
Introduced an external training program   
Developed a new market in Turkey   
Developed a new market abroad   
Reverse engineered any product or process   
 
15. Please indicate the importance of following reasons for conducting innovative 
activities? Why does your firm innovate? 
 
Reasons for Innovating 
V
er
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
M
o
d
er
at
el
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
S
li
g
h
tl
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
N
o
t 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
Decrease production costs     
Decrease processes costs      
Extend product range     
Increase product quality     
Comply with the demands of customers     
Deal with new competitors at home     
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Deal with new competitors in export markets     
Achieve market leadership     
Comply with local laws or standards     
Develop more environmental friendly products or 
processes 
    
Availability of government support     
 
 
16. Please indicate the importance of following sources of information for your 
innovation? 
Knowledge Sources 
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Market (new products, etc)       
Within your firm internal R&D department       
Within your firm production line       
Parent firm       
Customers/Client firms       
Competitors       
Partners        
Associated companies within your corporate 
group 
      
Suppliers of equipment or material       
Consultancy firms or consultants in person       
Marketing firms       
Fairs and exhibitions       
Industry associations       
Chamber of Commerce       
Chamber of Industry       
Technical Schools       
Universities       
Public Research Institutes       
Private Research Institutes       
Venture Capital Organizations       
Innovation Relay Centers       
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17. How do you plan to increase access to new sources of information/knowledge? 
 Cultivate linkages with other actors  Train employees externally 
 Train employees internally   Hire new specialists 
 Participate in exhibitions     Have not thought about it 
 Other  ____________ 
 
 
18. Please rate the importance of each of the following competences to your firm during 
the last five years? 
 
a. Organizational Competences 
Organizational Competences 
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Structuring of the company around innovative projects      
Encouraging joint work to innovate      
Incentives to formulate new ideas      
Rewarding the ideas that have been selected      
Pooling of knowledge      
Identification of the knowledge and strategic know-
how 
     
Identification of the people holding strategic know-
how 
     
Making everybody aware of the need for adapted 
training  
     
Evaluation of the impact of training on the innovation 
process 
     
Reward for useful training      
 
 
Government Programs (TUBITAK, TTGV, 
KOSGEB) 
      
Specialized literature       
Internet       
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b. Technical Competences 
Technical Competences 
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Effectiveness and the quality control of the production      
Technological evaluation of the products which the 
company is likely to produce 
     
Technological evaluation of the processes which the 
company is likely to adopt 
     
Carrying out a technological assessment of the 
company 
     
 
c. Competences in Collaborating with Customers 
Competences in collaborating with customers 
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Analyzing the nature and the needs of the customers      
Collecting customers reactions at after-sales services or 
retailers 
     
Using the product as a source of information about the 
customers satisfaction  
     
Special offers for new products      
Determination of the target, the media and the type of 
message for advertising new products 
     
Company‘s innovation image      
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d. Competences in Finance 
Competences in finance 
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Anticipation of the whole set of the costs of 
innovation 
     
Knowing the private and public modes of innovation      
Communication strategy towards potential financial 
partners of innovation 
     
 
e. Competences in Relations with Competitors 
Competences in relations with competitors 
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Analyzing competing products       
Analyzing patents of the competitors      
Knowing competitors technologies      
R&D alliances with other companies      
Using external inventions (patents, licences)      
Joint ventures, various strategic alliances and forms 
of cooperation 
     
 
 
f. Competences in Interacting with Suppliers 
Competences in interacting with suppliers 
N
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Fast adoption of the technologically new equipment       
Fast adoption of the technologically new supplies      
Subcontracting or acquisition of R&D      
Absorption capacities of the knowledge incorporated 
in the innovating equipment and components 
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19. Does your firm conduct on site R&D activities? 
 Yes No  
a. If yes, which of the following R&D activities have been carried out in your firm 
during the last 3 years? 
 
 Basic Research   Applied Research Experimental Development 
         Processes 
         Product Design 
         Prototyping 
         Product Testing 
 
20. What was the annual average expenditure of your firm on R&D activities during the 
last 5 years? ________________ 
 
21. What was the total number of people working in R&D in your firm? 
 Part time _______   Full time ________ 
 
22. Have any patents been applied for in your firm during the last five years? 
 Yes No  
a. If yes, how many?   __________ 
 
23. Have any patents been granted to your firm during the last five years? 
 Yes No  
a. If yes, how many patents have been awarded and where?  
__________ __________ 
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24. Please rate the importance of each of the following obstacles and/or hindrances to 
your firm in innovation activities during the last three years? 
 
 
 
Obstacles/Hindrances 
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High cost of developing new products and processes     
Lack of financing, risk and investment capital      
Lack of qualified or skilled personnel      
Long administrative/approval procedures     
Lack of strong customer demand     
Lack of marketing capability      
Unfavorable domestic macroeconomic conditions 
(recession, inflation, etc) 
    
Ineffectiveness of legal conditions supporting 
innovation (for instance intellectual property rights) 
    
Lack of networking with other firms and institutions     
Lack of information on technology     
Lack of external technical and consultant support 
services 
    
Lack of access to expertise in universities and higher 
education institutes 
    
Lack of access to expertise in research institutions     
Lack of information on research and technical 
programmes 
    
Lack of information on government support 
programmes 
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25. Please indicate the importance of following government support programs for 
innovative activities in your firm. 
 
 
 
Government Support Programs 
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R&D funding     
Training      
Subsidies     
Tax rebates     
Technical Support/Advice      
Infrastructure Support     
Loans and grants     
Other     
 
Part 2: External Knowledge Resources and Regional Embeddedness of 
Firms in Innovation Processes 
 
 
26. The variables presented below are key dimensions regarding the general character of 
innovation by firms, regions and nations.  They assist the placing of regional and 
national firm innovation in relation to lower (left-side: 1-2) or higher (right-side 3-4) 
degrees of systemic regional and national innovation. Please place your firm in one of 
the four categories considering that the first table indicates regional and second table 
indicates national innovation systems. 
Scale:  1: High, 2: Fairly High, 3: Fairly Low, 4: Low 
 
  1 2 3 4  
Source of innovation Globalised     Regionalized 
Implementation of innovation Individualistic     Interactive 
Inter-firm relations Competitive     Co-operative 
Customer-supplier relations Market     Preferred supplier 
Supply-chain Fragmented     Integrated 
Support infrastructure Isolated     Networked 
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  1 2 3 4  
Source of innovation Globalised     Nationalized 
Implementation of innovation Individualistic     Interactive 
Inter-firm relations Competitive     Co-operative 
Customer-supplier relations Market     Preferred supplier 
Supply-chain Fragmented     Integrated 
Support infrastructure Isolated     Networked 
 
27. Please indicate the organizations and their importance in providing technical expertise 
to your firm during the last five years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation Partners 
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Other units within the firm        
Parent firm        
Customers/Client firms        
Competitors        
Partners         
Associated companies within your 
corporate group 
       
Suppliers and sub-contractors        
Consultancy firms or consultants in person        
Marketing firms        
Industry associations        
Chamber of Commerce        
Chamber of Industry        
Technical Schools        
Universities        
Public Research Institutes        
Public Research Institutes        
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1: Very Important, 2: Moderately Important, 3: Slightly Important, 4: Not Important 
 
28. Please indicate the motives for your firm for exercising collaborative activities 
1: Very Important, 2: Moderately Important, 3: Slightly Important, 4: Not Important 
 
 Collaborative Activities With 
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Idea Generation/Improvement      
Risk/Cost Reduction      
New Technological Opportunities      
Know-How Takeover      
Financial Resources      
Funding Requirements      
Marketing Purposes      
Training Purposes      
Testing/Quality Control      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Venture Capital Organizations        
Innovation Relay Centers        
Science and Technology Parks        
Government Programs (TUBITAK, 
TTGV*, KOSGEB) 
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29. Please indicate the types of collaborations with other firms and their importance for 
your firm during the last five years. 
1: Very Important, 2: Moderately Important, 3: Slightly Important, 4: Not Important 
 
30. Please indicate the types of collaborations with the following organizations and their 
importance for your firm during the last five years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Types Of Collaborations 
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Formal Collaborations (strategic alliances, 
joint production, product or process 
development) 
       
Informal Collaborations        
Stable sub-contracting/supplier 
relationship 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Types Of Collaborations 
 
 
Universities 
A
n
k
ar
a 
Iz
m
ir
 
Is
ta
n
b
u
l 
E
ls
ew
h
er
e 
in
 T
u
rk
ey
 
E
u
ro
p
e 
U
S
A
 
E
ls
ew
h
er
e 
in
 W
o
rl
d
 
Informal Contact        
Research Contract        
Joint Research        
Consulting/reports        
Training of personnel        
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1: Very Important, 2: Moderately Important, 3: Slightly Important, 4: Not Important 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests/Control        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Types Of Collaborations 
 
 
Research Institutions 
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Informal Contact        
Research Contract        
Joint Research        
Consulting/reports        
Training of personnel        
Tests/Control        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Types Of Collaborations 
 
Other Institutions 
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Informal Contact        
Research Contract        
Joint Research        
Consulting/reports        
Training of personnel        
Tests/Control        
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31. Please indicate the problems with exercising collaborative activities. 
 
 Collaborative Activities With 
 
 
Problems 
U
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A
ss
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Problems with Project Management      
Budgeted Cost Overrun      
Unintended Knowledge Drain      
Coordination Difficulties      
Different Capabilities      
Confidential Relation/Secrecy      
Loss of Independence      
Lack of Schedule Effectiveness      
 
 
32. Please indicate the importance of proximity to other institutions in YOUR REGION. 
 
 
 
 
V
er
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
M
o
d
er
at
el
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
S
li
g
h
tl
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
N
o
t 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
Suppliers and subcontractors     
Consultants     
Customers     
R&D collaborators (universities, research institutions, 
consultants, etc.) 
    
Competitors     
Institutions providing services      
Banking/venture capital services     
Other     
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33. Please rate the importance of following regional factors for the success of your firm. 
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Local/regional entrepreneurial culture     
Trust between actors     
Scientific and technical culture in the region     
Degree of industrial specialization in the region     
Diversification of economic activities     
Accessibility to markets     
Availability of skill labor     
Availability of local labor     
Quality of labor education     
Proximity to universities     
Quality of physical infrastructure     
Quality of communications networks     
Cultural amenities     
 
 
34. Please indicate the principle obstacles constraining the innovative activities of your 
firm? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and cooperation! 
 
*** In the final survey design, the studies of Cooke 2002, Doloreux 2002, UNU-
INTECH 2004, Ronde and Hussler 2005 were extensively used to extract the knowledge 
required to answer the main research questions.  
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